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A B S T R A C T
The study deals with one of the crucial fundamental rights in the 
Pakistan Constitution, the right to personal liberty, which is comprehensive.
In an era of centralised and totalitarian rule in Pakistan, by the head of the 
Central Executive before 1958, with little of parliamentary Government or by the 
head of the armed forces after 1958, this right has been more under attack from 
bureaucrats, than any other. The constitutional provisions for the protection of 
personal liberty in Pakistan are as comprehensive as in other modern constitutions, 
but they are not so extensive as to cover all kinds of arbitrary deprivation of 
personal liberty. The role of the judiciary in protecting personal liberty has, 
therefore, been more difficult.
It is necessary to maintain a proper balance between the security of 
State, the public safety and the maintenance of law and order, on one hand and 
the right to personal liberty on the other. This problem has inspired me to 
undertake this study.
The work is divided into eleven chapters. It begins with the inter­
pretation of the terms •liberty* and ‘personal liberty*, the scope of personal 
liberty in this present age and its historical development from the time of 
Magna Carta to the French and American Bills of Rights. It is followed, in 
the next chapter, by an account of the development in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
the Dutch and Belgian Constitutions, the American l*fth Amendment, the development 
after the World War I and II. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
European Convention of Human Rights are dealt with.
*1
A comparative study of the provisions regarding personal liberty in the 
various constitutions of the world is attempted in the third chapter. The fourth 
chapter generally deals with development in Pakistan from 19^7 to the Proclamation 
of Martial Law in 1969* A detailed analysis of the constitutional provisions 
relating to personal liberty, including protection against retroactive punishment, 
is made in the fifth chapter. Procedural safeguards, such as protection against 
double jeopardy and self incrimination, are discussed in the sixth chapter.
The crucial problems of preventive detention, the satisfaction of
detaining authority, the detaining authority*s privilege of withholding certain
facts in the general public interest and the right of the alien enemy, find
by
place in the seventh chapter. It is followed in the eighth chapter/the freedom 
of movement and the question of reasonable restrictions on the right in the 
general public interest. The remedies for violation of the right to personal 
liberty, in particular the writ of habeas corpus, is comparatively and analytical^ 
discussed in the nineth chapter.
In the tenth chapter the difficulties of ensuring the protection of 
the rights of the people when martial law is in force are discussed. Various 
kinds of martial law and state of seige, are considered and the role of judiciary 
analysed. Finally, conclusions are drawn and some suggestions as to the 
solution of certain problems in the field of personal liberty, are made in the 
eleventh chapter.
•v/
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CHAPTER 1.
1
CONCEPT OF LIBERTY.
In legal science ’liberty* is a relative term. 1Liberty' in the 
sense of acting without stay or hindrance according to one's free will, is 
unknown to jurists# 'Liberty' in the legal sense means the degree of freedom 
presented by the law to act according to one's free will# A limit is always 
placed, beyond which the enjoyment of 'liberty* is not allowed. In short 
'liberty' is a restricted right to exercise one's freedom of will#
Roscoe Pound seems realistic when he says that "in the nineteenth 
century there was no difficulty in answering the question. Kant's idea of 
liberty of each - limited only by the like liberty of all, , was generally 
accepted# Liberty was a condition in which fl*ee exercise of the will was 
restrained only as far as necessary to secure a harmonious co-existence of 
the will of each and the free will of all others# But I am not speaking of the 
Kantian idea of liberty, in which my generation was brought up. Whatever 
'liberty' may mean today, the liberty granted by our bills of rights is a 
reservation to the individual of certain fundamental reasonable expectations 
involved in life in civilized society and a freedom from arbiiJary and un­
reasonable exercise of power and authority of those who are designated or 
chosen in a politically organised society to adjust relations and order 
conduct, and so are able to apply the force of that society to individuals# 
Liberty under law implies a systematic and orderly application of that force, 
so that it is uniform, equal and predictable, and proceeds from reason and 
upon understood grounds, rather than caprice or impulse; or without full and 
fair hearing of all affected and the understanding of the facts on which
2
official action is taken1' #
It is obvious that, in this sense liberty connot be said to be 
the absolute freedom to act according to one*s free will, because, if 
liberty is enjoyed unrestrictedly and without control, it will culminate 
in anarchy. But again the power which controls the enjoyment of liberty 
by individuals should not be unreasonable or arbitrary; otherwise it would 
itself be an impediment to the enjoyment of liberty, in the legal sense, as 
explained by Roscoe Pound. The degree of liberty one can enjoy and the 
amount one has to surrender for the sake of the liberty of others, as well 
as the power demanding such surrender, is organised and designed in modern 
society by the body of laws.
2
Woodrow Wilson, in his speech in New York , in 1912 defined
1 liberty* in a comphrehensive and precise sense. He said:-
1 The History of * liberty* is the history of limitations 
on Governmental power and not the increase of it.
When we resist... concentration of power, we are 
resisting the powers of death, because concentration 
of power is what always preceeds the destruction of 
human liberties.”
It follows that the concept of liberty comprises both restriction on 
the exercise of free will by an individual for the sake of the liberties of 
others and limitations on the arbitrary exercise of the power of the 
government to establish equilibrium between them,•liberty* in this sense 
is a double edged sword, which defends the individual from the hostility
1. Roscoe Pound, 'The Development of the Constitutional Guarantees of 
Liberty*
2.Woodrow Wilson 'Speech in New York* (1912)
2
of other people and the government.
Lord Acton defines 'liberty* as "the motive of good deeds and 
common pretext of crime." He continues "So gross have been the abuses, 
misinterpretations and disappointments of liberty, that it is pertinent 
to ask whether, in fact, it is universally sought by men and whether it 
is self evident good" •
When we come to the question of what we mean by * Liberty*, we
might indulge in a great deal of metaphysical speculation and discuss such
fascinating questions as whether a person should be forcibly prevented from
crossing a bridge which, it is known, will break under him, and so forth.
But if, like Edmund Burke, we detest the very sound of these metaphysical
things, in order to define 'liberty* we will ask ourselves j What are the
characteristics of a free society? One of the negative characteristics is
that it is not a society based upon uniformity imposed/above. A perennial
positive characteristics of any society is that there are tensions within
it. If we feel that we want to live in the kind of world, where there are
no disputes or none which cannot easily be settled by a straight forward
administrative organ, we shall not want to live in a free society. If we
want to live in a free society, we have to reconcile ourselves to an
apparently never-ending series of perpetual tensions. It will be the business
of government to hold the reins and to see that these tensions are properly
and peacefully managed and that one group or class does not establish its
2
ascendancy over the rest •
1. LordJtcton 'History of Freedom*
2. See T.E. Utley 'Liberty or Equality* in 'Liberty in the Modern State'.
4
The dictionary definitions of •liberty1, though less significant
from the Juristic point of view, require seme attention, while dealing 
with the concept of liberty. The word * liberty* is defined by Webster* s 
Dictionary in the following senses
wThe state of freedom; exemption from subjection to 
the will of another claiming ownership of the person 
Or the services; freedom opposed to slavery, serf­
dom, bondage or subjection;
A privilege conferred by a superior power, permission 
granted, or leave, such as •liberty* given to a child 
to play or to a witness to leave a court and likewise, 
privilege, exemption, franchise, immunity enjoyed by 
prescription or by grant, as the liberties of the 
commercial cities of Europe.
Freedom froir? imprisonment, bonds of other restraints 
upon locomation, a certain amount of freedom, or 
permission to go freely within certain limits, also 
the place or limits within which such freedom is 
exercised, the power of choice, freedom from necessity, 
freedom from compulsion or constraint in willingness.
*The idea of liberty* is the idea of power in every agent
to do or forbear any particular action, according to
determination or thought of mind, whereby either of them 
is preferred to other,1
The liberty of Judgement does not necessarily lead to 
lawlessness” 1 *
The Dictionary of English Law defines * liberty* as an authority to
2
do something which otherwise is wrongful or illegal .
The Judicial Definition of •Liberty1 :
•Liberty1 has received a most comprehensive interpretation at the 
hands of the Judiciary. It has been rightly said to embrace every form and 
every phase of the individual^ rights, that is not necessarily taken away by
some valid law for the common good. The right to liberty includes the right
1. See Webster* s International Dictionary (1903) p. 81.8,
2. See Earl Jowith (edit) * Dictionary of English law* Vol. 2. p. 1088.
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to exist and the right to enjoyment of life; it is invaded, not only 
deprivation of life but also by deprivation of those things, which are 
vital to the enjoyment of life, according to the nature, temperament and 
lawful desires of the individual,
The Common law concept of liberty implies the right to do or say 
everything, which is not prohibited by the law or statute. But, in general,
* liberty1 is a complex of rights. The law of England itself has been said 
to be the law of Liberty •
The word ' liberty*, standing by itself, has been given very wide
meanings by the Supreme Court of the United States of America, It includes,
not only personal freedom from physical restraint but also the right to free
2
use of one's own property and enter into free contractual relations •
Mr, Justice Reynolds defines 'liberty* in wide terms by observing:-
"While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the ' liberty* thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration, and seme of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of Life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God, according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognised at common law as essential to the orderly
3
pursuit of happiness by free men ,
1, E.V. Cobbett (180!,.) 29 St.Sr.l at p.49.
2, See American Jurisprudence, Vol.II at p,329,
3, Meyerv, Nebraska, 262 U,S, 390,
The American concept of liberty may be summarised as follows:
"The term 1liberty1, as used in the Constitution, is not dwarfed into mere 
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen but embraces 
the right of men to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties, with which they 
have been endowed by the Creator, subject only to such restraints as are 
necessary for the common welfare. As the Supreme Court has stated, it 
includes, among others, the right to entertain the belief and to teach the 
doctrine that war, training for war and military training are immoral, 
wrong and contrary to the percepts of Christianity; the right to Worship 
God according to the dictates of one*s own conscience, and the right to 
acquire useful knowledge; to marry; to establish a home and bring $tp children; 
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognised at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit for happiness by free men# It includes 
the right of a man to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to 
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; 
to pursue any livelihood or vocation; and for that purpose to enter into all 
contracts which may be necessary and essential to his carrying out these 
purposes to a successful conclusion. Within the meaning of term 'liberty* 
is also included the right to buy and sell; to select freely such tradesmen 
as the citizen may himself desire to patronise; to manufacture; to acquire 
property; to live in a community; to have a free and open market; the right 
to free speech, of self-defence against unlawful violence; and, in general, 
the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.." .
1. See American Jurisprudence Vol.II, para.329, at p.1133*
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It can be added here that * liberty* is not a right which can be 
either completely restricted or left absolutely uncbntrolled in all the 
circumstances. It has been rightly said that a society, based on the rule 
that each one is a law unto himself, would soon be confronted with disorder 
and anarchy. 'liberty* implies the absence of arbitrary restraint and not 
immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest 
of society.
It is a cardinal principle of the English Constitution that a 
subject may say or do what he pleases or move about anywhere he likes and 
form associations and act in concert with his fellow-men, provided he does 
not trangress the substantive law nor do acts -which invade the legal rights 
of others. Similarly, the authorities charged with the duty of maintaining 
public order or performing any other governmental duties cannot do anything 
to the prejudice of individual rights, unless they can show that they were 
authorised to do that act by some rule of common law or some provision 
by the statute^-.
liberties of the Subject:
The so called liberties of the subject are really implications
drawn from the principle, & subject may do or say what he pleases, provided
that he does not transgress the substantive law or infringe the legal rights
of others. The liberties of the subject are not expressly defined under any 
2
law or statute . Where public authorities are not authorised to interfere
1. See Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 St.Tr. 1030.
2. See Halsbury's laws of England, 3rd ed. Vol. 7, p. 195*
1 .with the subject, he has liberties . It follows frorr. the general provisions
ensuing the peaceful enjoyment of the rights of property and freedom of the
subject from illegal detention, duress, punishment or taxation, contained in
o
the four great Charters4- or Statutes, which regulate the relations between
the Grown and the people, but the liberties of the subjects are not expressly
defined in any law or code.
tin
The liberties of the subject culminate in general welfare and 
happiness of the members of the state. The main purpose of the state being
all round development of its members, it is essential that they must be free
to choose their own way of life and what they should do with it* The develop­
ment of the individual's personality leads to mass development and, as such,it 
is the duty of the state to create an atmosphere in which certain standards and 
rules of conducts for individuals prevail , so as to make 'Liberty1 enjoyable 
by all equally.
The term 'liberty' has not been expressly defined in any of the
constitutions of the world, What the constitutions of the world contain are
guarantees of the liberties of the people. But the British constitution, in­
stead of defining and guaranteeing the liberties of subject, designs procedure 
to protect the fundamental liberties. Liberty is residual and presumed to exist 
in Britain, unless a specific rule of common law or statute encroaches upon it. 
It is, therefore, always incumbent on every one, be he private individual or 
official, who seeks to intrude upon the freedom of another, to justify his
conduct. In pressing a criminal charge, the prosecution must establish the
/precise ingredients of the'Offence
1C See Hatscheck's Englishces Staatrecht, pp.5*+7-5^&•
2. Namely, Magna Carta (1215) 25 Edw.l; The Petition of Right.,,(162?) 5 car.
l.C£L. The Bill of Rights (1688) 1 Will & Mar.Sess.2.C.2. & The Act of 
Settlement (1700) 12 and 13 will. 3*0.2.
9
beyond doubt* Only then can a person be imprisoned, fined or otherwise 
punished .
Dicey, discussing the scope of liberty in England, pointed out,
'Since Parliament is sovereign, the subject cannot possess guaranteed rights,
such as are guaranteed to the citizens in many constitutions. It is well
understood that certain liberties are highly prized by the people (the absence
of the constitutional guarantees makes necessary and perhaps stimulates a
strong public Opinion on this subject) and that in consequence Parliament is
unlikely, except in emergencies, to pass legislation constituting a serious
2
interference with them' .
The scope of these liberties which have been given general recog­
nition, has differed from time to time but there are some today to which almost 
all civilized countries pay at least lip service. Peaslee*s 'Constitutions of 
the World' sets out the constitutions of eighty countries, in all of which 
there is some recognition of some of the fourteen liberties of people. Eighty- 
four countries recognise the right to. i personal liberty, fair legal process and 
freedom of expression. Eighty-three recognise freedom of assembly and associat­
ion and inviolability of correspondence and domicile. Eighty recognize the 
right to property; seventy-nine the right of freedom of education; seventy- 
seven the right to equality before law; seventy-six the right to freedom of
labour; sixty-three the right to petition government authorities; sixty the
1. See R.H.Jones 'Constitutional and Administrative law' p. 112.
2. See Dicey*s 'law of Constitution* 9th ed. p. 197* 'This was done without 
trouble during 1914-1918 War, by the Defence of Realm Acts, but the right 
of the subject to trial by Jury was, after a short period of supression, 
restored. Similarly very wide powers were given by the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act, 1940, to make Defence Regulations, requiring subjects 'to 
place themselves, their services, and their properties* at the disposal of 
the Crown. These Powers expired on 24th February, 1946. Reg.l8B of the Defence 
(General, Regulations, 1939, which empowered the Home Secretary to intern 
suspected persons without-trial, was revoked by Order in Council, dated 9th 
May,1943 (S.R.& 0,1945)as soon as hostilities in Europe ended).
- 1 0
rights relating to health and motherhood, fiftynine the right to social 
security, sixtysix the right to freedom of movement within the nation and 
fortynine the right to protection against retroactive punishment^.
Professor Gledhill further points out that 'There are normative consi tut ions 
of politically mature countries in which the Supreme Court interprets the 
Constitution) and the executive and legislature abide by the interpretation; 
the formal constitutions found for instance in South America only partially 
enforced in practice but which it is hoped will be normative constitutions 
when political maturity is achieved* And there are constitutions devised to 
throw dust in the eyes of the observers, while the ruling clique or party does aj 
it likes; here the fundamental rights like bikinis are important only for what 
they conceal. Again some constitutions provide effective legal process for 
enforcing Fundamental Rights. India for instance makes the right to effective 
Judicial process a Fundamental Right itself; other constitutions are silent 
on this point; but there may nevertheless be a Judicial remedy for infringement, 
and this may be speedy or not. There may be effective protection by convention, 
as in this country (England) where it would be impracticable to initiate 
legislation permitting detention without trial in the interest of public 
safety, except in time of war, legislation expropriating without compensation 
and legislation to suppress an effective political opposition. On the other 
hand there may be no effective protection of Fundamental Rights. The degree 
to which any particular liberty is enjoyed in a particular country depends
2
on a large number of factors of which a constitutional provision is but one •
1. Prof.Alan Gledhill, 'Fundamental Rights' in Changing Law in Developing 
Countries' by Prof.Anderson, p.bl.
2. Prof. Alan Gledhill, op cit. p. 81.
uIt could be added that the important question is not "whether 
Fundamental Rights exist on paper, but to what extent do they in practice 
limit the powers of the ruling class in favour of the individual. According 
to Jennings* *What are regraded as Fundamental Rights by one generation may 
be considered to be inconvenient limitation on legislative powers by another 
generation. For example, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of United States prevented the United States Congress and the 
Legislatures of the States from depriving any person of life, liberty or 
property, * without due process of law*. This has been used by the Supreme 
Court to limit very seriously the entrance of the social legislation dealing 
with matters as, hours of labour, minimum wages and workmens compensation •
American constitutional liberty is juridical in nature; it is
regarded as a legal rather than a political limitation upon governmental power;
and looks to judicial review as the means of effectuating constitutional limit-
2
ations. The concept of liberty is a concept of limitation and affirmation .
It is observed that there are stages in the history of nations, when the 
request for liberty concerns itself predominently with the affirmation of 
power and there are other stages when it is concerned predominently with the 
limitation of power* The high point in the stage of affirmation is in one of 
those revolutionary movements in history, when frustrations and oppressions 
of old society become so intense, that men yearn for some sharp and sovereign 
instrument which will clear it away and liberate them from it* The age of 
Cromwell- in England was such an era. The French Revolution was surely another
1. See W.I* Jennings *The Law and the Constitution* p.257.
2. Arthur E.Sutherland, editvGovernment Under law p. 107* See. The 
distinction made between civil liberty and constitutional liberty and 
between political and judicial guarantees of Constitutional liberty in 
CORWIN /Liberty Against Government* , pp 7-8, (191*8).
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one. After these upheavals, when the worst of the ancien regime is cleared 
away, men begin to tame these giants of power, that they have created for 
their own liberation and the age is predominently one of limitation, the age 
when liberty is defined in terms of control of power begins. The old revolut-
ionary memories are in many ways buried, repudiated and forgotten .
Both America and England have for a long time been living in what
might be described as predominently the age of power limitation, And America
almost from its outset, having fled from those struggles prevalent in Europe,
2
has lived with this perspective on power •
The question is; how are societies, in different phases of this
power-liberty cycle, to judge each other and how are they to communicate with
each other? The irony is in part this: that these stages above mentioned are
never clear cut. Both exist together. In times of revolutionary upheaval,
the men who have fashioned sharp power instruments for their liberation never
completely forget that these instruments also involve a potential threat to
liberty and are dbliged to come to terms with their consciences. In the
affirmative movements, so to speak, they are forever struggling with the
limitational side of their personalitiesj they are trying to suppress it,
to rationalise it, and in some sense, the whole history of revolutionary
. 3thought can be interpreted in terms of this pre-occupation .
1. A.E. Sutherland op.cit. p. 502
2. Ibid.
3. See Arthur E. Sutherland op.cit. p.503.
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Just as the old constitutions had their own political theories, 
new theories have to be evolved to explain and defend the new organisation 
in England as well as in other countries. Whether a society is conservative 
or progressive in its economic aspects, it has to achieve a balance between 
the rights of the community as a whole and the rights of the individual. In 
the welfare state the word * liberty* has changed its meaning* the most 
important kind of liberty is no longer liberty to manage one* s own affairs 
but liberty to combine with others or to join associations.
With this new concept of liberty, it is not surprising that the old
idea of Rule of law, has been neglected, if not deliberately dropped, because
the Rule of law is essentially concerned with individual rights. Blackstone
derived the Constitution itself ftom these rights, and was followed in this
instance by Dicey. As Professor Wade points out, no one would suppose this
to be true of modern constitutions and nearly twenty years ago he referred
to it as, *the difficulty which any literal acceptance of Rule of law causes
today, because of system of law, which like the common law, is based on the
protection of individual* s right is not really compatible with legislation
which has for its object the welfare of the country or a large section of 
1
it as a whole .
It may be that the idea of liberty in the sense of freedom of the 
individual was an illusion or was never a really essential element in any 
form of democracy. It is undeniable that all the conditions of modem life 
work against it and seem jjo make it an anachronism. For many people it is 
sufficient that, if there are strong tendencies in any direction, it should 
be the duty of any government to strengthen it further; anything else is
1. Prof. Wade 1 Introduction to Dicey* s Law of Constitution*
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putting back the clock, trying to sweep away the Atlantic with a broom, or 
some such metaphor. It seems more reasonable to argue that the purpose of 
government, once it extends beyond defence and enforcement of the criminal
•i
law, is to offer some counterweight to the prevailing forces; otherwise results 
would be much the same as if it did not exist •
2
The arguments advanced by Jhon Stuart Mill, in the context of liberty 
of the individual, include an element of well-being. He contends that men 
should be free to act upon their opinions and according to free will, without 
hinderance, either physical or moral, from their fellow men, so long as it is 
at their own risk. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one 
pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even 
opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed 
are such as to constitute a positive instigation to some mischievous act.
.Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, 
may be, and in the more important cases, must be controlled by disapproval, and, 
when necessary, by the active interference of mnpcincL The liberty of the 
individual must be limited, to the extent that he must not make himself a 
nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what 
concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgement 
in things which concern himself, the same reasons for holding that opinion 
should be free, support the view that he should be allowed, without 
molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost. That man­
kind are not infallible, that their truths, for the most part, are only half­
1* See Mrs. Diana Superman*s Article 1Democracy and Liberty* in; Liberty in 
the Modern State, pp.39-^0. ’ •
2. See ’Liberty*.
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truths, that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and free 
comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity is not an 
evil, but a good, until mankind is much more capable than at present of 
recognising all sides of truth, are principles applicable to men’s modes of 
action, no less than to their opinions. As it is necessary that, while man­
kind is imperfect, their should be different opinions, so it is that there 
should be different experiments in living, that free scope should be given to 
varieties of character, short of injuries to others; and that the worth of 
different modes of life should be proved practically. It is desirable, in short 
that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should 
assert itself. Where, not a person’s own character, but the traditions of 
customs of other people are the rule of the conduct, there is wanting one of 
the principle ingredients of human happiness, and the quite chief ingredient 
of individual and social progress.
It is rightly argued that, without the liberty of individual being 
constitutionally guaranteed (in developing countries), it is impossible to 
hope for any progress and it is the individual w^o is given the freedom of 
thought and action, in order that society may be able to adjust itself in the 
changing needs of the time. But the liberty of the individual must not be 
allowed to go so far as to stultify itself. The individual must not be allowed 
to make a nuisance of himself to his fellowmen. In a civilized society a line 
has to be drawn somewhere in order to confine, by means of regulations and 
control, the actions of the individual in such a way that they do not come 
in conflict with the overall interests of the society as a whole. The common 
good can only be realised by imposing certain limits on individual liberty.
How and where this line is to be drawn, so as to confine the conflicting
16
interests and desires to the sphere of their legitimate expression, is the 
matter of practical dealings •
To summarise, there are no absolute rights and no uncontrolled
liberties in the modern state, for the collective interest of the society,
the peace and security of the State and the maintenance of public order are of
vital importance; fundamental rights can have no meaning, if the State is in
danger or disorganised, for not only the state but also the liberties of its
subjects are endangered. There must be equilibrium between the rights of
2
individual citizens and the collective good of the society • 
personal Liberty:
The concept of personal liberty is not specifically defined in 
English Law. The right to personal liberty is assumed in various declarations 
of human rights; charters and statutes. Under the English Constitution there 
are no formal guarantees of the right to personal liberty, apart from the 
declarations of rights contained in the ancient charters and the restrictions 
on the arbitrary use of power by the Crown or servants of the Crown, imposed 
by the Act of Settlement, 1688. The citizen may go where he pleases and do or 
say what he pleases, provided that he does not commit an offence against the 
criminal law or infringe the rights of others.
According to Dicey, the right to personal liberty as understood in 
England, means in substance a person*s right not to be subjected to imprison­
ment, arrest or other physical coercion in any manner that does not admit of
1. See A.K. Brohi, ’Fundamental Law of Pakistan' p.363«
2. See Prof. Alan Gledhill 'Pakistan', p.196. (See also NasuHallah Khan v. 
D.M., P.L.D.1965, Lah.8l3.
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legal justification •
Denning tries to elaborate the concept of personal liberty in a 
very comprehensive way* According to him personal liberty means the freedom 
of every law-abiding citizen to think what he will; to say what he will and 
to go where he will on his occasions without let or hinderance from any 
other person. Despite all the changes that have come about in other free­
doms, this freedom has, in England, remained intact* It must be matched, of 
course with social security, by which is meant the peace and the good order 
of the community in which we live* The freedom of the just man is worth 
little to him, if he can be preyed upon by a thief or murderer* Every 
society must have the means to protect itself from marauders. It must have 
powers to search, to arrest and to imprison those who break the laws. So 
long as those powers are properly exercised, they are themselves the safe­
guards of personal freedom. But powers may be abused, and, if those powers 
are abused, there is no tyranny like them. It leads to a state of affairs 
when the police arrest any person and throw him into prison without cause 
assigned. It leads to search of his home and belongings on the slightest 
pretext or on none. It leads to a hated Gestapo and the police state. It 
leads to extorted confessions and to trials which are a mockery of justice.
The moral of it all is that a true balance must be kept between personal
2
freedom on the one hand and social security on the other •
•Personal liberty is*, as Harry Street advocates, !,Our most 
vaunted freedom against the realities of police and follows the police from
1. See A.V*Dicey, ’Law of the Constitution* 10th ed. by C.E.Wade, Chap.5*
2. See Sir Alfred Denning, ‘Freedom Under the Law* pp. 5-6*
their powers of arrest to the restrictions imposed on the searching and 
entering of premises, to the police questioning^ then to bail and habeas 
corpus, and finally to an extended discussion of controversial power of 
telephone taping and intercepting mailM\
So we come to the vital part played by the police in the preservation 
of freedom. If liberty must be circumscribed in order to preserve it, so must 
the laws which set the limits to freedom be fully and fairly enforced.
Oppressive enforcement can be just as intolerable as harsh laws; w^ile, without 
enforcement, there might as well be no laws at all. The dilemma seen by Dr. 
Johnson - how to find the golden mean between anarchy and totalitarianism - 
requires an effective but properly controlled police force as part of its 
solution. In the conditions of the modern world the existence of such a 
force is a fundamental condition of a free society. Consequently, the study 
of a society*s police can beias revealing as the study of other organs of the 
government - the legislative, the executive and the judiciary - and is just as
essential, if we are to understand the nature and the basis of the freedom,
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which we in this country (England) are fortunate to enjoy .
There can not be a specific definition of personal liberty.
♦Personal Liberty*, in general, means that the citizen may do what he pleases 
or go where he likes, provided he breaks no law and does not infringe the 
rights of others by e.g. committing nuisance or a trespass. It means further 
that, if he is prevented from doing what he likes or from going where he pleases 
those who prevent him must justify their action before the courts and pay
1* See Harry Street, ’Freedom, The Individual and The Law’ p.13*
2. See the Rt. Hon. Gwilym Lloyd-George ’Arm of the Law’ in Liberty in the 
Modern State* p.12.
damages for assault, trespass or other civil wrong, and in the last resort
the citizen may use reasonable force in defence of his personal liberty • And
if he is imprisoned or punished for what he does, it can only be by process of
law, which will normally be executed by ordinary criminal or civil courts;
exceptionally he may be dealt with by some other form of tribunal and in times
of emergency even detained by order of the Home Secretary, - but these cases
are strictly limited and zealously watched. Thus a soldier may be tried by
court-martial but the power to hold a court-martial, like the power to detain
in war-time, is statutory and depends in the last resort upon parliamentary
sanction. Since the abolition of Court of Star-Chamber in l64l, and the
failure of James II*s attempt to revive the Court of High Commission in 1685*
there has been no attempt to imprison or to punish the citizen, outside the
ordinary process of the court. There are, however, occasions when the public
interest demands interference with the individuals freedom; it may be
necessary to arrest him, to search his house, to hold him in custody pending
trial, or require him to desist, by finding sureties for his future behaviour,
on account of a course of conduct on which he has embarked. But all these
interferences with the individuals freedom are, as we shall see, hedged
2
round with safeguards •
Lord Atkin observed, fIt is one of the pillars of liberty that in
English law every imprisonment is prima facie unlawful and that it is for the
3
person directing imprisonment to justify his act •
The justification is generally that the person is arrested and de-
tained without bail - pending trial in court on a charge of crime - or that 
T. R.t/.Hussey (1925) 18 cr.app.Cas.160.
2. G.A, Forest Constitutional Law' 8th ed. pp.371-372.
Liversidge v. Anderson (19^2) A*C.206.
after trial by a court of competent jurisdiction he has been convicted and 
sentenced to imprisonment^or some other kind of detention provided by the 
Statute* Other kinds of lawful detention under Statutory safe-guards are 
those of mentally disordered persons, children in need of care and protection, 
committal for contempt of court or Parliament, imprisonment for failing to 
satisfy a judgement debt in spite of having had the means to do so and custody 
pending extradition or deportation.
Under the English constitution there is no formal expression of the 
guarantees of personal liberty. The citizen may go where he pleases and do 
or say whatever he likes, provided that he does not commit an offence against 
criminal law or infringe the rights of others. If his legal rights are 
infringed by others e.g. by trespass or defamation, he may protect himself by 
invoking the remedies provided by law. It is in the laws of crime and tort» 
part of the ordinary law of the land, and not in fundamental constitutional 
law, that the citizen finds the protection for his personal liberty, whether 
it is infringed by officials or by fellow citizens. In times of emergency the 
Executive is accorded special powers by the Parliament, but there are no formal 
guarantees - such as are to be found in a constitutional code, formally enacted, 
which have to be suspended •
Dicey says that there is an absence of declarations and definitions 
of the personal liberty in the English Constitution, which are generaly found 
under other constitutions of the world. He takes the example of the Belgian 
Constitution and compares it with that of England. He observes that the Belgian 
constitution is the result of legislative action, whereas the English
1. Wade & Phillip's 'Constitutional Law' p.*f88.
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Constitution is mainly based on legal decisions. According to him, in 
Belgium the rights of individuals to personal liberty flow from or are 
secured by the Constitution itself, but in England the right to personal 
liberty is not part of the Constitution; instead it is secured by the 
decisions of the courts through the Habeas Corpus Acts.
Dicey further points out that this difference is merely formal and 
that personal liberty is as well secured in Belgium (or in any other country) 
as in England and as long as this is so, it matters nothing whether we may 
say that individuals are free from all sorts of risk of arbitrary arrest 
because liberty of the person is guaranteed by the constitution, or that 
the right to personal liberty, or in other words the protection from arbitrary 
arrest, forms part of the constitution, because it is secured by the law of 
the land. The question how far the right to personal liberty is likely to be 
secured depends a good deal upon the answer to the question whether the 
Constitution framers consciously or unconsciously begin with definitions or 
declarations of rights or with contrivances or remedies, by which the right 
to personal liberty may be enforced or secured. As more stress has been laid 
on defining or declaring the rights, in most of the foreign constitutions,’ 
insufficient attention has been given to the necessity for the provision of 
adequate remedies for safeguarding these rights. It is, therefore, evident 
that, throughrout the history of individual's rights> no country except 
England could claim that there has been an inseparable connection between the 
means of enforcing a right and the right to be enforced, which indicates the 
strength of judicial legislation. This can well be illustrated by the Habeas 
Corpus Acts, which declare no principles and define no rights but, for the
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practical purposes, they are worth a hundred constitutional articles 
guaranteeing personal liberty* This connection between rights and remedies 
is lacking in many other constitutions of the world; and one cannot find as 
much co-ordination between personal liberty and its enforcement in other 
countries as is found in England .
The fact again that in many foreign countries the rights of the
individual, including the right to personal liberty, depend upon the constitutior
»
whilst in England the law of the constitution is little less than a generalisation 
of the rights which the courts secure to individuals, has an important result.
The general rights guaranteed by the constitution may be, and in foreign 
countries are, constantly suspended. They are something extraneous to and 
independent of the ordinary course of the law. The declarations of the 
Belgian constitution that individual liberty is guaranteed, betrays a way of 
looking at the rights of individuals very different from the way in which such 
rights are regarded by English lawyers. We can hardly say that one right is 
more guaranteed than another. Freedom from arbitrary arrest, for instance, 
seems to Englishmen to rest upon the basis, of the law of the land* In the 
Belgian Constitution the words have a definite meaning. They imply that no 
law invading personal freedom can be passed without a modification of the 
constitution, made in the special way in which alone the constitution can be 
legally amended. This, However,is not the point to which our immediate 
attention should be directed. The important point is that, if the right to 
personal freedom is derived from a constitutional declaration L
1. See A.V.Dicey 'law of Constitution' lOthed. pp. 197-199,
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it suggests that the right is capable of being suspended or taken away. If, 
on the other hand, the right to personal freedom is part of the constitution, 
because it is embodied in the ordinary law of the land, it is a right which can­
not be destroyed without subverting the whole body of legal, institutions of 
the nation. The so called suspension of the Habeas Corpus Acts bears, it is 
true, a certain similarity to what is called in foreign countries, •suspending 
the Constitutional Guarantees'. But, after all, a statute suspending the 
Habeas Corpus Act falls short of what its title seems to imply, for though a 
serious matter indeed, it is, in reality, nothing more than a temporary 
suspension of one particular remedy for the protection of personal liberty.
The Habeas Corpus Act may be suspended and yet Englishmen ehjoy almost all the 
rights of citizens. The constitution, being based on the rule of law, the 
suspension of the onstitution, as far as it can be conceived as possible, 
would mean with us nothing less than a revolution .
According to Justice B.K.Mukhergea, 'personal liberty' in ordinary 
language means liberty relating to or concerning the person or body of the
1. A.V.Dicey, 'The Law of Constitution* 10th ed. pp.200-202.
•The Petition of Right, and The Bill of Rights, and also the American 
Declaration of Rights, contain,it may be said, proclamation of general 
principles which resembles declaration of rights known to foreign 
constitutionalists, and specially the celebrated Declaration of Rights of 
Man of 1739. But English and American Declarations on one hand, and 
foreign declaratioreof rights on the other, though bearing an apparent 
resemblance to each other, are at bottom remarkable rather by way of 
contrast than of similarity. The Petition of Rightr and The Bill of 
Rights are not so much, • declarations of rights* in the foreign sense 
of the term, as judicial condemnation of claims or practices on the part 
of the Crown, which are thereby proclaimed illegal. It will be found that 
every, or nearly every, clause in the celebrated documents negatives some 
distinct claim made and put into force on behalf of the prerogative. No 
doubt the Declaration contained in the American Constitutions have a real 
similarity to the Continental declarations of rights. They are the product 
of Eighteenth Century ideasj they have, however, it is submitted, the 
distinct purpose of legally contradicting the action of the legislature by 
the Articls of the constitution.
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individual and 'personal liberty* in this sense is the antithesis of physical 
restraint or co-ercion. 'Personal liberty' means a personal right not to be 
subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in any manner 
that does not admit of legal justification. This negative right of not 
being subjected to any form of physical restraint or coercion constitutes 
the essence of 'personal liberty* and not mean freedom to move to any part 
of Indian Territory. In the Indian Constitution the expression 'personal 
liberty' has been deliberately used to restrict to freedom from physical
A
restraint of a person by incarceration or otherwise M.
Justice Fazl£ Ali interpreted that the expression * personal liberty'
and 'personal freedom* have a wider meaning and also a narrower meaning. In
the wider sense, they include not only immunity from arrest and detention but
also freedom of speech and ffeedom of association etc. In the narrower sense
they mean immunity from arrest and detention. The juristic conception of
'personal liberty* when these words are used in the sense of immunity from
2
arrest, is that it consists in freedom of movement and locomotion .
pitanjali Sastri J. construed,'personal liberty* in the context of 
Part II of the Indian Constitution is something different from the freedom 
to move freely throughout the territory of India and Article 21 presents an
example of the fusion of the procedural and substantive rights in the same
provision. The right to live, though the most fundamental of all, is also one 
of the most difficult to define and its protection takes the form of
1. Goplan v. State of Madra, AIR 193^ S.C.27, > per Mukherjea J.
2. AIR 1950 Madras S.C.27;: . per Fazle Ali J.
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declaration that no person shall be deprived of it save by 'due process of law1 
or 'by authority of law*. Process of procedure in this context connotes both 
the act and the manner of procedure to take away a man* s life or - ' personal 
liberty*
In the Pakistan constitution, the word ' liberty* is used without 
qualification. The adjective 'personal* is omitted. It is apparent that
* liberty* in Pakistan Constitution has been used in a wider and more 
comprehensive sense and it could be construed in the wider sense of * liberty* 
as in the American Constitution. In fhc^in the original draft of the Indian 
Constitution, the word 'liberty' was used without qualification but the 
Drafting Committee recommended the insertion of the word 'personal' before
* liberty* , so as to limit it and distinguish it from the broader and more
2
sweeping concept of * liberty* • They had already, in Article 19 , dealt
with the several aspects of the liberty of individual and were anxious to
3
avoid giving an impression that the word * liberty* used in Article 21 had 
any reference to the same matters as they had provided for in Article 19.
But it is doubtful whether the word * liberty* will receive the wide meaning 
as it has received in America and this, for the reason that the liberties in 
general have, in the Pakistan Constitution, been separately dealt with in
4much the same manner as in Article 19 of Indian Constitution .
1. Ibid, : - per Pitanjali Sastri J.
2. Indian Constitution.
3. Ibid.
4. See Blackstone* s commentary on laws of England, 4th Ed. Vol. 1. p. 134 - 
See AyK. Brohi, op.cit. p.396.
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It could be argued that the word ’liberty' in Pakistan Constitution
means 'personal liberty* and something more* 'Personal liberty' consists in
the power of locomotion , of changing situation, or moving one's person to
■whatever place as one's own inclination may direct, without fear of restraint
2
or punishment unless 'according to law.1
Personal liberty is guaranteed by Right No.l of the Consititution
of Pakistan, 1962, but instead of 'personal liberty', Pakistan Constitution
uses only • liberty*• The word 'liberty* in Right No.l means 'personal liberty’,
which in its widest sense, includes freedom of movement and residence in any
part of Pakistan. But Right No.l comes under the caption 'security of person*
the word 'security* in the caption is plainly used in the sense of protection,
so as to guarantee freedom from physical restraint* What is sought to be
protected by Right No.l is loss of 'life and liberty’ or loss of personal
liberty, that is to say, freedom from physical restraint of person and from
incarceration^. In other words it guarantees the protection of personal
liberty against its arbitrary deprivation, or provides safeguards against
loss of personal liberty at the instance of Government or any other organ 
4
of the society •
1. On this point there is a difference of opinion between one of the two 
judges of the Division Bench of Lahor High Court; according to Akram J. 
it does include powers of locomotion while in the opinion of Gul J. it
does not; the latter*s view is correct; discussed in Chapter VII, see
Abul Ala Maudoodi v. State Bank, infra.
2* See Blackstone* s,Commentary on laws of England,4th Ed.Vol. 1, p. 134;
See A.K. Brohi, op.cit* p*396.
3. See Gul, J* s observation in Abul Ala Maudoodi v. State Bank of Pakistan, 
P.L.D., 1969, Iah.908.
4. As one above.
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Historical Development of Concept of Personal Liberty - Magna Carta 1215;
The history of the concept of 'personal liberty' may be said to 
begin with the Magna Carta in 1215* Before this first and famous Charter 
of Rights of People, there was no statutory document, which could be said 
to speak about the principles of 'personal liberty*• Magna Carta is, 
therefore, regarded as to be the first 'Great Charter of liberties'. Bracton 
described it as 'Carta Mberatum*. Holdswbrth said -
”It (Magna Carta) stands on the heads of those two or 
three documents which contain, or are supposed to 
contain, some of the fundamental principles of the 
British Constitution. lawyers, historians and 
politicians of every period of our history have 
interpreted it from the standpoints of every period 
of that history* Prom this point of view, we compare 
it to the ’Twelve Tables*. In the same sense as they 
were regarded as the ' fons et origo civilis', Magna 
Carta is the fbunt and source of our Constitutional 
law..1”.
McKechnie contemplating the dignity and Importance of Magna Carta
says:
"The greatness of Magna Carta lies not so much in 
what it was to its framers in 1215, as what it 
afterwards became to the political leaders, to 
the judges and the lawyers, and to the entireg 
mass of the men in England in later ages ”.
The importance of Magna Carta lies, no doubt, in introducing the
principles of ' personal liberty', its safeguards in the form of writs and its
protection against imprisonment without trial. The various interpretations of 
this first charter of personal liberty lead to the same two-fold protection of
1. William Holdsworth, 'History of English Inw' Vol. II. p*207*
2. McKechnie, 'The Magna Carta' p.436.
rights of the people, namely the exposition of the principles of personal 
liberty and its safeguards.
Holdsworth comments on these interpret at icns_in these words:
"There is a sense in which these interpretations are true.
The clauses do embody a protest against arbitrary punishment 
and against arbitrary infringement of personal liberty and 
rights of property; they do assert a right to a free
trial, to a pure and uribought measures of Justice.
....,this is the real sense in which the trial by Jury 
and the writ of Habeas Corpus.may claim descent from 
the clauses of the Charter... .
It is generally understood that Clause 39 of Magna Carta, is the 
foundation Stone upon which the structure of the English Common law, protecting 
personal liberty, rests. This clause provide® that no freeman shall be taken 
or imprisoned or deceased or exiled or in any way destroyed except by the 
lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land 'Nisi legale judicium 
parium vel per legem terrae'. Clause 40 lays down, 'To no one will we sell, 
to no one will we refuse or delay the right or justice*.
The precise meaning of these critical words has been the subject of 
much debate among scholars, but whatever meanings their author attached to 
them, they have been used as a background to develop and support two 
institutions, which, probably more than all else, have been the safeguards 
in England of personal liberty, namely the jury system and the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. In the days of Magna Carta, trial by Jury in the modem sense of the 
term was non-existent, and the phrase probably referred to tribunals of old 
type, where those whose duty it was to Attend the court (commonly called the
1. William Holdsworth, op.cit. p.207.
suitors) were judges both of law and fact, and was intended to secure that 
the freeman should not be judged by a tribunal in which the suitors were his
*
A
inferiors .
The phrase *by the law of the land1 , ‘per legem terrae1 is 
regarded as founding or declaring the right of personal liberty for the 
protection of which the Writ .of Habeas Corpus has become the remedy. Upon the 
meaning of these words the commentators are least of all agreed - one school 
reads them as referring only to the test by which only at that date issues 
were usually determined, that is compurgation, ordeal or trial by battle*
Upon this view of the words, the clause is retrogressive and has no 
constitutional significance* Others interpret, them a3 referring to the 
general law of the land and thus gives to them some constitutional significance. 
The truth is that from the constitutional standpoint it matters not which is 
right, because Parliament from time to time confirmed the Charter and the 
common lawyer, acting in this respect in alliance with Parliament, soon put 
upon the words a meaning which gave them high constitutional importance. The 
words were construed as meaning fby due process of the common law*. In order 
to appreciate what was meant by due process of the common law, it is necessary 
to distinguish between the common law and the law in more general sense. The 
common law practised by the common—law courts only, whereas the law, in the 
general sense was the laws which were enforced by the Council, the local and 
franchise courts and the Chancery. Thus, the phrase ’the law of the land1
1. The Eight Hon.Lord Tomlin of Ash, ‘Liberty under the Common law* pp. 7 and 8
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| might be regarded as a much wider phrase than the phrase 'the common law* ie.
j the Daw as administered by the common law courts .
i
!
; In time the common law courts proceeded to extend and magnify their
own jurisdiction. Their attack on other Tribunals was two-fold. They started 
limiting the jurisdiction of the local and franchise courts and th§r attempted 
to minimise and restrict the activities and jurisdiction of the Chancery and 
the Council# This claim to priority of the common law courts over other 
tribunals, has been well expressed by Holt C.J. in 1691 in these words;
"The common law is the over-ruling jurisdiction in this 
realm and you ought to entitle yourselves2well to draw 
a thing out of jurisdiction of it........1
In the course of the struggle the Common Law Courts discovered 
a powerful instrument in the Writ of Habeas Corpus and established a principle 
■which has given to personal liberty its present security. The common law courts 
never denied outright the jurisdiction of the Chancery or the Council,but 
construeing 1 law of the land' in Magna Carta as referring to the common law, 
they sought to magnify their own jurisdiction and limit the powers of the 
Chancery and the Council in regard to interference with personal liberty.
But the important point is that, whatever the motive which led the common 
law courts to adopt the construction in question, they established a general 
principle ■which influenced both the Parliament and the judges in their dealing 
with the problem of personal liberty. The judges, by the use of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, with assistance of Parliament brought a maturity to what is
1, Ibid, pp. 12-13
2. Shermailin v. Sands, l.ld. Raymond 271, p. 272.
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today the main safeguards of personal liberty .
Sir William Holdsworth describes the situation in these words;
"...Without the inspiration of a general principle with all the 
prestige of Magna Carta behind it this development could never 
have taken place; and equally without the translation of that 
general principle into practice by invention of specific writs 
to deal with cases of its infringement the protection of 2
personal liberty could never have tak-en the practical shape n. .
The Petition of Right 1628 and The Habeas Corpus Acts, 1640 and 1679:
Sir Edward Coke, on 21st March, 1628, introduced in Parliament his
famous 1 Petition of Right1 • In this document he reaffirmed that the principles
in Magna Carta had been grossly violated by the Stuarts and recited that certain
subjects of His Majesty had been cast into prison, without just cause on no
more authority than the King* s command and that such acts could no longer
be tolerated. Among other guarantees he proposed that no person should be
deprived of his personal liberty for more than three months without trial.
3
Coke succeeded in pursuading Parliament to declare that in future no man
1. The Eight Hon.Lord Tomlin of Ash, op.cit. pp. 13-14
2. Sir Wm. Holdsworth * History of English Law*, Vol. IX, p. 104.
3. Sir Edward Coke, after a brilliant start at the bar, entered politics.
In 1606 he was appointed Chief Justice of Common Pleas, and in 1613 
Chief Justice of the King's Bench. In 1616, having displayed too in­
dependent a spirit towards James I, he was replaced. To the King's 
declaration that it was treason to say that King was not above law,
Coke replied by quoting Bracton, the famous thirteenth century lawyer,
MThe King should be subject to no man. He is always subject to God and 
the law, because the law has made him King.1 This answer showed that no 
agreement was possible between the King and Coke, since Coke held that 
the common law was the supreme law of the realm, and that the judges,
independent except in regard to the law itself, were its sole interpreters.
James on the other hand, thought that judges were no more than the Crown's
officials and that he had the power of his violation, to adjudicate when 
he though fit; according to him the final arbiter was the King and not the 
courts. In 1620, Coke re-entered Parliament and became a champion of 
personal liberties. He played an important part in drawing up the 
Petition of Right. It was Coke who once said to James; "Your Majesty may 
be very gifted but you do not know the law of this Kingdom, which is a 
subject a man must study deeply for many years before he can become 
proficient in it".
<4
should he imprisoned without just cause and consequently Darnell and other 
four men were set free.
The preamble to the Petition of Rights lay down that it concerns the
subjects regarding their ’diverse rights and liberties1, namely:
(i) That no man could be compelled to pay any tax 
without common consent by the Act of Parliament,
(ii) That no man should be imprisoned or detained
accept in accordance with the laws and statutes 
of the realm,
( iii) That the billeting of soldiers and sailors should 
be abolished.
(iv) That commission for proceeding by martial law 
shall be revoked and annulled.
The object of these provisions, as the Act itself provides, was to
safeguard the ’rights and liberties according to the laws and the statutes of
the realm*. In the words of Holdsworth, the Petition of Right was a
declaratory Act and the result of the declaration was to vest jurisdiction
over civilians, in times of riots and rebellion, in the hands of the Ordinary
Courts of common law; in the Petition of Right certain fundamental rights of
Englishmen were declared in language which admitted one interpretation; and
the declaration was not weakened by any ambiguous saving of prerogative right
2
of the sovereign power •
Twelve years later by the enactment of Habeas Corpus Act 164-0, 
Parliament abolished the court of Star Chamber and confirmed existing legal 
safeguards of personal liberty. Anyone unlawfully imprisoned could, on pay­
ment of the prescribed fee, avail himself of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
1. See Darnell* s Case, infra
2. Sir Wm.Holdsworth, op.cit. Vol.V, p.453*
The Habeas Corpus Amendment Act of 1679, though it set forth no 
new rights, nevertheless proved to he a landmark in the way of improving the 
means of asserting rights and speeding up a procedure which was still too 
slow. The assertion of right is meaningless, unless it is provided with 
a quick remedy and strong sanctions against all violation.
Henceforward it was no longer possible for a scandalous case, such
as that of the five members to recur. No longer could the highest courts
rule that it was not open to them to inquire into the reasons for an arrest.
A person could no longer be apprehended per speciale mandatum momini regis.
Hence a jury could no longer, as in Throgmorton* s Case . be imprisoned for
having acquitted a person charged with high treason. There is no doubt that
the Act of 1679, taken in conjunction with the existing guarantees, which it
2
confirmed, went a long way towards guaranteeing personal liberty .
The Bill of Rights 1689:
Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act 1640, and 
the Habeas Corpus Amendment Act 1679, were all patiently assembled parts of 
an edifice not yet completed. The famous Bill of Rights 1689 was designed to 
complete it. This (Bill) contained a list of rights, which?as Lord Chatham^ 
once said, formed along with Magna Carta and Petition of Eight, *The Bible 
of the British Constitution*.
1. (1954) State Tr. 869.
2. J.Duhamel, *Some Pillars of English Law* p. 51.
3. William Pitt, First Earl of Chatham (1708-78), father of the famous 
adversary of Napoleon, driving force in England* s effort in seven 
years war, and the firm-imperialist - who opposed the taxation of
American colonies which provoked the War of Independence.
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The revolution that resulted in the execution of Charles I, the 
exile of James II and the troubles that shook England in the seventeenth 
centuiy all sprang from the conflict between the Royal claims of absolutism 
and the will of the people jealous of all its liberties. The principal object 
of the Bill of Rights was to perfect and crystallise safeguards already 
claimed by Parliament at different times, but which were not adequate in 
themselves. The effect of the statute was to put an end to royal inter­
ference with the course of justice. James II had pretensions to the power 
to dispense with the law and, in some cases, to cancel it altogether. The 
Bill of Rights made short work of such pretensions; it declared illegal the 
power of dispensing with or suspending the law, as 1 it hath been assumed of 
late* and affirmed a return to the constitutional guarantees trampled on by 
the Stuarts. Furthermore, the Bill declared to be mischievious and illegal 
any jurisdiction above the law or having an inquisitorial procedure, such as 
the Star Chamber which had been abolished in 1640. Besides other measures 
directed towards the evolution of the right of personal liberty, freedom of 
expression was also assured. Though the Bill of Rights dealt with rights of 
individuals, it did not speak of any natural or imprecriptible rights of 
man; it referred to the positive sights of persons who owed allegiance to 
the Crown1.
The Virginia Declaration 1776:
The Virginia Declaration was made by the Assembly of the Colony 
of Virginia in 1776, for the British settlers in the colonies. Seeing the 
evolution of the rights of individuals in England through Magna Carta and
1. See J. Duhamel, op.cit. p.5°*
the Bill of Rights, the British settlers in the colonies claimed the same 
rights as were enjoyed by their fellow citizens in Great Britain under the 
common law. The Declaration laid down that all persons in colonies, Mshall 
have and enjoy all liberties as if they had been abiding and born within our 
realm of England1. It was provided by the Declaration that whenever the 
liberty of the colonist was threatened by the Act, actions and policy of 
British Government, they could assert their fundamental rights not only as 
British subjects but also as human beings and Christians by virtue of the 
inimitable law of nature and on the basis of their own colonial constitutions".
An analysis of the VirginaaDeclaration clearly shows in the first 
place, that it reiterated two of the provisionsof the British Bill of Rights; 
its Article 7> provided that the power of suspending laws or their execution 
by any authority without the consent of the representatives of the people 
was an infringement of the rights of the people; Article 6 similarly followed 
the British precedent and stipulated that all elections were to be free.
The Declaration also repeated the provisions of Bill of Rights against 
excessive bail as well as against standing army in times of peace.
Secondly, some of the provisions of Bill of Rights regarding the doctrine 
of natural rights we are incorporated in the Declaration; for instance Article 
1 provided that^all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights such as the right to life and liberty and the right 
of property.
French Declaration of Rights 1789:
This famous Declaration was made by the French Constituent Assembly 
on August 27, 1789. It is, as far as .the rights of the individuals are
concerned, a document of great historical importance. It came to be regarded 
as the most important source of charters of liberties, not only for the 
European Continent but also for the other nations of the world.
Professor Colliard while speaking about its importance, remarks,
MThe Declaration passed beyond the Cadre of purely 
Juridicial work of the Assembly. It is an expression 
of a world-wide conception of human rights and 
summarises the philosophy of eighteenth century 
France. The Assembly considered it necessary to 
re-organise and declare fundamental rules ■valid 
for all human societies. The rights simply 
declared and established were natural rights; 
they belonged to man as a human being and par­
taking of his character they were sacred and 
inalienable..
Most European Jurists regard the spirit of the Declaration as 
derived from the Virginia Declaration and ultimately from the British Bill 
of Rights. The provisions of the Declaration, no doubt were a step forward 
towards the evolution and protection of the Liberties of the individual, 
especially personal liberty. Article 9, of the Declaration defines the 
* liberty* in the sense that it is the power to do anything which is not 
pp^judicial to another and that the exercise of the natural rights has no 
other limitations but those which ensure the enjoyment of the same right by 
other members of the society. The Article 1, is Just a parajiirase of Article 
1, of the Virginia Declaration, which declares that all men are born free; 
they should live free and should be equal before law. Article 7, is similar
fr
to the provisions of Article 39 of Magna Carta, which provides that no man 
should be accused, arrested or detained except in cases determined by law 
and according to the procedure established by law*
1. Prof. Colliard, *Libertes Publiques* Chap. II
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Again Article 8 is taken from the Article 9 of the Virginia 
Declaration and reproduces the prohibition of cruel punishments. The adoption 
of principles of common law is found throughout the Declaration, specially in 
Article 9, which lays down that every person is presumed to be innocent, until 
he has been declared culpable according to law.
American Bill of Rights 1791:
The American Bill of Rights are the sum of the first ten amendments
to the 1789 Constitution of the United States of America, which were passed by
Congress and the Legislatures of the Constituent States in 1791* The importance
of these Amendments have been referred to by Frankfurter J. in these words -
HThe first ten Amendments to the Constitution, commonly known 
as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any 
novel principles of government but simply to embody certain 
guarantees and immunities^ which we have inherited from our 
British ancestors  n •
It should, however, be added that the two of the Amendments - Ninth and Tenth -
have nothing to do with the rights and privileges to citizens.
Of all these Amendments, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth, are
important in regard to the evolution of rights and promotion of safeguards
of the right to personal liberty. The Fourth Amendment declares that the
right of people to personal liberty should be secured in their persons, houses,
2
papers, effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Bell y. Hood 
it was held that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
is a common"daw right and that the Amendment IV did not create a new right,
1. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494*
2. (1947V-) 71F. Supp.813
but merely gave constitutional protection to a pre-existing common law 
right#
The Fifth Amendment re-affirms the provisions of Article 39 of 
Magna Carta# It provides that no person shall be subjected for the same 
offence to be twice put in Jeopardy of life or limb. This constitutional 
guarantee against double Jeopardy stems from the ancient please of autrefois 
acquit and autrefois convict# It was held in U#S# v# Sabella that resort 
should be had to the common law to ascertain the meaning of the clause, as
the prohibition of double Jeopardy in the recognition of maxim, * imbedded in
the very elements of the common law.” The Amendment also guarantees the other 
provisions of Magna Carta that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property without the tfdue process of law”. It also provides the famous 
rule of common law that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to 
be a witness against himself#
The Sixth Amendment protects the common law rights of the accused
in criminal trial, namely, the right to speedy trial, and public trial by
an impartial Jury, the right to be informed of the nature and the cause
of accusation, the right to be confronted with the witness against him,
the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favour,
and the right to have the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court in
2
Patton v# United States held that right to trial by Jury under this
Amendment meant, ”a trial by Jury, as understood and applied at common
law, and includes all the essential elements as they were recognised in
1. United States v. Sabella. (1959) 272F. 2nd 206#
2. (1930) 281 U.S. 276
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this country when the Constitution was adopted and also that * the right 
of confrontation did not originate with the provision in the Sixth Amendment 
hut was a common law rigjht, having recognised exceptions, and the purpose of 
that provision was to continue and preserve that right and not to broaden it 
and disturb exceptions#
The Eighth Amendment re-asserts the fundamental right to bail and 
provides that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fine imposed, 
nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted# This clause has been borrowed 
from the Article 9 of the Vir”ginidDeclaration which basically borrowed it 
from the Bill of Eights of 1689.
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CHAPTER 2*
DEVELOHCTT IN THE 19th AND 20th CENTURY,
The Dutch and Belgian Constitutions:
Though in England the right to personal liberty was constituted 
in Magna Carta in the 13th Century, it was then intended to protect the 
nobles against the King^but Magna Carta„ clearly required the nobles to act 
towards their retainers as the King was required to act towards them and 
the Courts interpreted the provisions of Magna Carta as of general 
application* The development of Habeas Corpus in the 17th Century 
provided a means of enforcing the right so that in many ways it was 
better protected in England than elsewhere but, for economic reasons, 
the poor man could not easily find protection for his liberty* The 
French Revolution and the French Declaration of Rights were the work 
of bourgeois or middle classes, who regarded the right to property as 
of equal importance with the right to personal liberty* But the American 
Founding Fathers, though regarding property rights as important, also 
emphasised the right of equality. These two documents of rights have 
influenced all subsequent declarations, though they are both essentially 
bourgeois documents*
In the 19th Century the innovation of nation in Arms m s  introduced by 
Napoleon the subsequent propogation of socialist doctrine called for attent­
i o n  -to the interest of working classes. There were many revolutions in the 19th 
e^rxr\ 20th centuries, and a written constitution with a Bill of Rights became 
a status symbol for state emerging from a revolution. The sufferings endured
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in the two World Wars encouraged claims for protection of working class 
rights* The post First World War Constitutions, like those preceeding them, 
were bourgeois documents and optimistic but the ease with which they were 
repudiatedmade the post World War II documents pessimistic; the old bourgeois 
rights were retained but the Constitution makers seek to make provisions for 
preventing the subversion of the Constitution to the violation of the Rights,
The French Declaration of 1789 was a source of inspiration to the 
people of the European Continent* Most of the European Constitutions 
borrowed the principles of the French Declaration and incorporated them in 
their respective constitutions in the form of the rights of the people or 
fundamental rights. The most noteworthy of them is the Dutch Constitution 
of I8I5, which carried the concept of personal liberty still further. The 
Dutch Constitution is famous for its three-fold characteristics; namely, the 
declaration of rights has been embodied in the constitution itself; the 
basic principles of the French Declaration have been converted into the 
rights of the individuals guaranteed by the Constitution,* and the constitution 
not only gives a clear specification of the fundamental rights, and specially 
personal liberty but also provides for their enforcement and protection.
The Belgian Constitution of 1831, made another step forward in 
the evolution of the concept of personal liberty* Article 7 is an advance 
on the French Declaration of 1789 and provides that no man shall be 
prosecuted, except In cases provided by the law and in accordance with 
the procedure laid down by it. The Belgian constitution provided the 
model of a Bill of Rights for many European countries. In particular, 
the following constitutions adopted the Belgian pattern, namely the Italian
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Constitution of I848, the Greek Constitution of 1864, the Danish Constitution 
of 1886, the Austrian Constitution of 1867, and the Spanish Constitution of 
1876* The declarations embodied in the Belgian Constitution had the same 
principal characteristics and purported to convert ^the concept of personal 
liberty as proclaimed by French Declaration into positive and actionable 
rights.
The South American Constitutions;
The concept of personal liberty laid down by Magna Carta and 
promoted by the French Declaration was adopted in many constitutions. Most 
of the Latin American countries incorporated it in their respective constitutions 
the Argentina Constitution of I853 is the best example. The Argentina 
declarations of rights, although Argentina adopted United States pattern of 
government, differ from the American Bill of Rights. The constitution gives 
the individual the right to petition the state authorities. It also guarantees 
that no personal service can be exacted except by virtue of law or a judgement 
founded upon law. Article 18 of the constitution provides that no person 
shall be punished, except under a judgement in accordance with an interior 
law. It also provides safeguards against self-incrimination and prohibits 
arrest, except by virtue of a written order from a competent authority in 
accordance with law. It abolishes the penalty of death in political cases 
and provides protection against every sort of torture. In furtherance of 
these provisions, section 617 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for 
a writ of Habeas Corpus against an order or process of a public authority, 
which unlawfully restricts the liberty of a person. The Supreme Court of
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Argentina in the famous case of re Isabel v. Elortondo  ^ interpreted the 
concept of personal liberty in the light of principles laid down by the 
United States Supreme Court in its various decisions, as well as by 
eminent European jurists*
The American Forteenth Amendment 1862;
The original American Bill of Rights applied only to laws made 
by Europeans* This had enabled the Southern States to maintain the institution 
of slavery, though the Northern States generally disapproved and the Civil War 
of 1861-1865 was the result of apprehension of the slave owners of the Southern 
States that they would have anti-slavery laws thrust upon them. By 1862 it 
was clear that the Southern cause was doomed* The way was open for emancipation 
of the slave and an amendment of the Bill of Rights so as to restrict State 
powers of legislation was enacted*
The 14th Amendment enshrined higher ideals of personal liberty. It
imposed restrictions on the authority of the State to interfere with the
rights of the individuals. Class 1, of the Amendment lays down -
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of the individuals of the 
United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property without the 1due process of law1 , 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the ' equal 
protection of law1.1
The Supreme Court signified the characteristics of the provisions of this clause 
in express words -
t • .while this provision of this Amendment is new in the 
Constitution as a limitation upon the power of the states, 
it is as old a principle of civilised government* It is 
found in Magna Carta, and, in substance, if not in form, 
in nearly or quite all the constitutions that have been ^
 from time to time adopted by the several states of the Union"._____
1. Fallos 33 y p.l&.
2. Nunn v. Illinois,(1876) 94 U.S. 123.
Development after the First World Wars
The First World War was represented in the countries of the 
victorious allies as a war to stop aggression and defend human liberties 
and after its conclusion, efforts were made in various countries to ensure 
personal liberty by various bills and Charters of human rights, because the 
very existence of some nations, particularly in Europe had been en­
dangered by the Central powers. But the authors of these documents had to 
face the question whether individuals should be allowed,in,accordance with 
the famous principles of the great British, European, American and Latin 
American Bills of Rights, to enjoy the maximum and unrestricted liberty 
in order to seek opportunities for the free development of personalities 
and activities; or whether in the interest of the security of the States, 
some of which had only recently emerged, the liberty of the individual 
must be controlled and restricted. During the war the British Parliament 
and the Legislatures of the European States had been obliged to pass Emergency 
Acts and Regulations, putting restrictions on the personal liberty of citizens, 
to ensure the effective prosecution of the War and to maintain internal and 
external security. These enactments enabled Parliament or the Legislatures to 
give arbitrary and unrestricted powers to the Executive to frame regulations 
for the arrest and detention of persons, to search for and seize their 
property, if their origin or activities raised suspicion that they might act 
to the prejudice of public order or the safety of the State. These delegated 
powers were arbitrary, in as much as they could not be challenged in any 
court of law.
The question before the British judiciary in the case of The King y.
1
Haliday , "was whether the Emergency Acts and Regulations, should be interpreted 
as Implying power to impose arbitrary limitations and restrictions on the 
right to personal liberty in war time, on the assumption that the security of 
the State, being the highest of all purposes, should be maintained even at 
the expense of personal liberty or whether to hold that personal liberty, being 
the essence of life and personality, should not be dispensed with or taken away, 
without juridical justification*
2
Lord Shaw , dissenting from the majority, observed that personal 
liberty should be safeguarded at every cost as, according to him, the Defence 
of Realm Act, 1914> should not be given such a violent and strained construction 
as demanded complete subversion of personal liberty, because the Act itself 
did not explicitly make such drastic provision.
The growing acceptance of the socialist theory of State involved a 
devaluation of the right to unrestricted personal liberty* Restrictions on 
individual liberty were permissible to secure the general interests of the 
community. Since the First World War, the right to personal liberty has been 
subjected to an increasing interference by the State, but the scope of 
1 personal liberty* has been extended to embrace most fields of human activity. 
The modem consitutions were framed at a time when social and economic justice 
were coming to be regarded as more important than personal liberty.
1. (1917) A.o. 260
2. IbioL.
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But in post-war period the protection of personal liberty was 
regarded as an essential feature of the fundamental rights incorporated in 
the post-war constitutions, but limitations on personal liberty were deemed 
to be necessary in the interests of the security of the State, public order 
and peace. The Mexican Constitution of 1917* the Irish Constitution of 19371 
and the constitutions 0f other countries of the world are the best illustrat­
ions of the fact.
Development after the Second World War:
In Second World War, the danger to the existence of the States at 
war with Germany was so great that a large number of emergency enactments and 
regulations were made, which bore heavily on the right to personal liberty, 
and the judiciary was always faced with the difficulty of balancing the 
security of the State against the right to personal liberty.
Ltversidge v. Anderson , the dissenting judgement of Lord Atkin 
laid dov/n principles for the interpretation of preventive detention 
legislation, which the majority, though unwilling to accept as applicable to 
a war-time statute, were prepared to accept it as applicable to preventive 
detention in time of peace.
The West-German Constitution of 19^ +91 the Italian Constitution of 
19^8, the Indian Constitution of 1930, the Pakistani Constitution of 1936 
and post Second World War Constitutions of Commonwealth countries and other 
countries not only include in its classic form, the right to personal liberty, 
but they also have provisions to meet emergency which involve restrictions on 
the right.
1. (19^2) A.C• 206.
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the General 
Assembly of U.N. 0. on 10th December, 1948, is the most remarkable development 
in respect of the Charters of human rigihts and the evolution of the right to 
persona}, liberty. As a matter of fact it was not intended to be a 
constitutional document, but, having received the recognition by most nations, 
its principles have been incorporated in most of the post-1948 constitutions.
It has been rightly described as the international Magna Carta*. Notwith­
standing statements by eminent jurists of the United States and other countries, 
that the declaration is not an authoritative guarantee of legal obligations 
of the member states of U.N.O. and that the document is not a statute, having 
no legally binding force, being merely a statement of principles, devoid of 
any obligatory character, the. fact remains that its importance In safeguarding 
human rights, especially the right to personal liberty is obvious.
i
Iauterpacht has pointed out that, though not a legal instrument, 
the Declaration is of great importance, and the fact that it is not an 
instrument of legal binding force does not deflect from its importance. In 
1 9 5 9 , when considering compacents of constant infringement of the rights of 
the people of Tibet, the General Assembly passed a resolution, affirming its 
belief that respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential for the 
evolution of a peaceful world-order based on the rule of law and called upon 
the Chinese authorities to respect the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people
1. B.Y. B.I.L. (1948) pp. 354-81
and their distinctive culture and religious life •
The Declaration contains important clauses regarding the protection 
of personal liberty* Article 3» lays down that every one has right to life, 
liberty and security of person; Article 4, prohibits slavery or servitude, in 
all its forms; Article 5? provides that no man shall be subjected to torture, 
or to cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment; Article 9i prohibits arbitrary 
arrest and detention, or exile; Article 10, provides for fair and public trial 
by an independent and impartial tribunal; and Article 11, lays down the 
primary principles of criminal justice. The Declaration declares some rights 
which are not found in any national constitutional charter; Article 1^-, 
provides that everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution but the right cannot be invoked in cases of persecution 
for non-political crimes or for acts contrary to the purpose and principles of 
the United Nations. The Declaration also imposes certain limitations on the 
free enjoyment of personal liberty, as do other Bills of Bights. Clause (3) 
of Article 29 lays down that, in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subject to such limitations as are determined by law solely 
for the purpose of securing due respect for the rights and freedom of others 
and meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic state* Article 30, lays down that nothing in the 
Declaration may be interpreted as implying, for any state, group or person, 
any right to engage in an activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration.
1. Tibet and Chinese People*s Republic, International Commission of Jurists
p.^.
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The European Convention of Human Rights;
The Covention -was signed in Rome in 1950 by fifteen members of the
Council of Europe. The Convention was designed, as is apparent from its
preamble, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain
rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Convention is not
merely a declaration of rights, as it provides machinery for the enforcement
of those rights by legal process. Article 19, provides for the establishment
of a European Commission of Human Rights and a European Court of Human Rights,
in order to s ecure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the high
contracting parties. The Commission has competence to receive a petition from
any citizen of the signatory states. The Commission, well as the signatory
states, have the right to bring a case before the European Court of Human Rights.
Under Article 45 the Convention, the Court has jurisdiction in respect of all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention which a
signatory state or commission may refer to it. Under Article 4 6  the signatory
state may declare that it recognises as compulsory the jurisdiction of the
court in all matters referred to it. So far this declaration has been made
axe. ccxttex&e&y
only by states. As far as the municipal laws/ . the states are
not bound to follow the Convention, but in the states, which have agreed, the
-¥Convention has become part of the law of the land. So far in six of the signatory 
states, the Convention has not beem made part of the national law and cannot, 
therefore, be enforced by their respective courts. The Supreme Court of Eire
A
in re lawless held that* so far the Irish Parliament had not accepted the 
Convention, as part of the law of the land; the court could not give effect to 
the Convention, if it contravened the national law or purported to grant rights 
or inrposejf atftjrffional to those of the law of the land.
1. (1958) I.L.R. 420.
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CHAPTER III
PERSONAL LIBERTY IN THE WORLDS CONSTITUTIONS
The Old Commonwealth Countries
The object of the Candian Bill of Rights, I960, was to define
and protect certain human rights or fundamental freedoms. It declares,
among other rights, the existence and continuance of the right of
individuals to life, liberty and security of the person. It lays down
that these rights cannot be taken away except by "due process of law".
It lays down that no law shall be so construed or applied as to authorise
or effect arbitrary detention, imprisonment, or exile; or to impose or
authorise cruel and unusual treatment; or to deprive a person, arrested
or detained, of the right to be informed promptly of the grounds of such
arrest or detention; or to deprive him of the right to retain counsel and
apply for the writ of habeas corpus or of the right not to be compelled
to give evidence or of the right to the presumption of innocence or of the
right to fair trial and hearing, in accordance with fundamental justice or
of the right to have an interpreter, when needed, in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings.
It may, however, be noted that, in the Canadian Bill of Rights,
the rights are not entrenched, in the sense that they can only be repealed 
by a difficult legislative process. It is merely provided that, as a rule
of construction, Canadian statutes shall be interpreted, so as not to
abridge these rights.1
!• See Canadian Bar Review (1959) 1* ct. seq.
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In Australia;there is no formal expression of fundamental 
freedoms in the Australian Constitution, but English law and custom 
generally prevail in practice. Moreover there is no Federal Bill of 
Rights in Australia, as there is in the United States* Though the law 
of each Australian State is based on English law, there are variations 
between the laws of the various States. Only a few States have introduced 
Bills of Rights, designed on the pattern of Canadian or American Bills of 
Rights, in their respective Parliaments. The introduction of Bills of 
Rights into State laws raises problems in Australia. A state Parliament 
could at ary time adopt legislation, purporting to bind future 
Parliaments and the administration to preserve fundamental liberties. But 
in order to tie the hands of future Parliaments, there should be in the 
Constitution, provisions against repeal or amendment of the fundamental 
liberties by ordinary legislative process. Towards the end 1959, a Bill 
was introduced in the Queensland Legislative Assembly - the 
Constitutional (Declaration of Rights ) Bill - which was aimed at 
securing certain fundamental freedoms and included a clause requiring 
every proposed law inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights Act to be 
approved by a majority of electors at a referendum before being submitted 
for the Royal assent. The Bill was withdrawn and consequently never 
passed into law, but it did raise the interesting question, whether the 
entrenching clause would have had the effect its framers claimed for it.
As regarcb personal liberty, though the common law rules generally 
apply in States, in none is the present law defining the powers of the 
police exactly the same as in England, nor is the law uniform throughout 
the different Australian States* Under the constitution, the States alone 
have authority to decide what facilities shall be provided for the 
enforcement of state laws and what powers shall be given to stater 
police as regards arrest of offenders against state law and searches and 
seizures etc. in connection with such offences. The Federal Constitution 
simply provides some safeguards against the arbitrary deprival of personal 
liberty. It lays down that the trial for indictable offences against 
Commonwealth law must be by jury; there must be freedom of movement between 
the States and no State may single out residents of another State for 
discriminatory treatment.
In New Zealand as in Australia there is no formal statement of 
ri^its of the people but English law and customs prevail. In August 1963, 
a Bill of Rights based on the Canadian model was introduced in the 
New Zealand Parliament and was carried.
Asian Countries
The Malaysian Constitution of 1963, gives comprehensive 
recognition and protect ion to the rightto personal liberty. Article 
5, lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty save in accordance with law* that where complaint is made to 
High Court or to any Judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully 
detained, the court shall inquire into the complaint and, unless
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satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to be 
produced before the court and release him; that where a person is 
arrested he should be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds 
of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by 
a legal practitioner of his choice; that a person, arrested and 
detained shall be produced before a magistrate within twenty four 
hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey) and shall not 
be further detained in custody without the magistrate's authority* 
Article 6 states that no person shall be held in slavery; that all 
forms of forced labour are prohibited but Parliament may by law 
provide for compulsory service for national purposes; that no person 
shall suffer greater punishment for an offence than what was 
prescribed by law at the time it was committed* Article 7 provides 
that no person shall be punished for an act or omission, which was 
not punishable by law when it was done or made; that a person who 
has been acquitted or convicted of an offence shall not be tried 
again for the same offence, except where the conviction or the 
acquital has been quashed and a retrial ordered by court superior to 
thatj&rhich he was acquitted or convicted. Article 9 provides that no 
citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Federation, except for 
prescribed ;peaj5Qns*
The constitution of Singapore, 19&3, does not mention the 
rights of people. There are provisions regarding citizenship and a 
Singapore citizen, who becomes a citizen of Malaya by operation of
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law, will enjoy the same rights and liberties as a citizen of Malaya #
2
In the constitution of Union of Burma , the provisions
regarding the protection of personal liberty are found in declaratory
as well as generalised form* It lays down that no citizens shall be
deprived of his personal liberty nor shall his dwelling be entered save
in accordance with law. The exercise of the rights is subjected to law,
public order and morality. The rights to reside and settle in any part
of the union are granted, and traffic in human beings, forced labour
in any form and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party has been duly convicted, are prohibited. But
this does not prevent the union from imposing compulsory service for
public purposes. No person can be convicted of a crime, except under a
law in force at the time of commission of act charged as an offence;
no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that applicable
3
at the time of the commission of the offence . As regards safeguards
of personal liberty it is provided that only the Supreme Court has the
power to issue directions in the nature of habeas corpus to protect
the right of personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution and
that the right to enforce this remedy shall not be suspended unless in
times of war, invasion, rebellion, insurrection or grave emergency, may 
. 4so require .
1. Singapore ceased to be a state of Federation of Malaysia and became 
independent in 1965*
2. Constitution of Union of Burma, 1947, sls amended upto 1961.
3. Ibid. Arts. 16,19,24. 
4# Ibid. Art.25.
The main Constitutional document in Ceylon, hamely, the 
Order in Council,^is silent about the recognition and protection 
of the rights of people, except in respect of religion. But English 
law and customs form the basis for the Judiciary to decide the cases 
regarding the fundamental freedoms.
Other Commonwealth Countries
The Nigerian Constitution of 1960*^  includes a declaration 
of rights largely drafted on the pattern of hhe European Convention 
on Human Rights. Though some differences are found, the similarities 
between the Chapter III of Nigerian Constitution and the European 
Convention are more obvious than the p&ints of difference. Both the 
European Convention and the Chapter III of the Nigerian Constitution 
include the classical liberal freedoms. Provisions corresponding to 
the Nigerian Constitution in respect of fundamental freedoms and 
personal liberty in particular are found in most of the Constitutions 
of the Commonwealth Countries, especially those in Africa. A list of 
justiciable guarantees is preceeded by a general section setting out 
the purport of what is to follow; for instance Article 14 of the 
Constitution of Kenya states;
1. Ceylon (Const.) 0. in C. May 15, 1946.
2. The Constitution of Nigeria as amended October 1, 1963*
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"Whereas every person in Kenya is entitled to fundamental 
Eights and freedoms of the individuals, that is to say, 
has the rights, whatever his tribe, race, place of origin, 
or residence or other local circumstances, political 
opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for 
the public interest, to each and all of the following, 
namely to;
(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection 
of law;
(b) of conscience; of expression; of assembly and association; 
and
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property 
and from deprivation of property without compensation".
( In Nigerian Constitution it is also laid down in the general
section that these rights and protections can be enjoyed equally by
the people, subject to limitations designed to ensure that the
enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual does not
prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interests.
Such a provision serves the useful purpose of setting out the general
purport of the guarantees, lifting them above the austerity of
tabulated legalism, and helping to spread awareness of their
implications - and indeed of their existence - among the community art
large After this provision, the general safeguards regarding personal
liberty are found* It is provided that a person who is arrested on a
criminal charge must be promptly informed in a language that he
understands, of the reasons for his arrest# He must be brought before
a court without undue delay and if not tried within a reasona&le time,
he must be released either unconditionally or subject to reasonable
conditions. One who is illegally detained or arrested is entitled to
li • See Prof# S.A. De Smith "New Commonwealth and Its 
Constitutions" p lS^ f#
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compensation, A person charged with a criminal offence must be given 
a fair hearing within a reasonable time by the court. He is to be
presumed innocent, unless proved guilty, He must be given adequate 
time and facilities to prepare his defence in person or by a legal 
representative of his own choice, to cross examine prosecution 
witnesses, to have the free assistance of an interpreter if need be, 
and to obtain copies of record of the proceedings. Retroactive penal 
legislation and double jeopardy are prohibited. The accused can not be 
compelled to give evidence at his trial. Every person is guaranteed 
the right not to be deprived intentionally of life, not to be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment and not to 
be held in slavery or to be required to perform forced labour.
But these provisions are so qualified as to amount to little 
more than constitutional entrenched treatment of the existing law. It 
is lawful for the state to take life for the execution of a death 
sentence or by the use of reasonably justifiable force for the 
maintenance of public order. No punishment authorised by pre-existing 
laws is deemed to be inhuman or degrading. "Forced labour1 is narrowly 
defined. However the protection of the pre-existing laws by 
constitutional entrenchment is not valueless. It has beeen rightly 
observed by the Supreme Court of Nigeria that a commission of inquiry 
cannot be validly granted power to imprision a person, because 
imprisonment by order of such a body is not one of the enumerated 
grounds on which a person may be deprived of constitutional right
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A
to personal liberty . "■
A somewhat elusive guarantee of respect for private and 
family life, home and correspondence is also assured to all persons.
But the guarantees of freedom of movement and freedom from 
discrimination extend only to citizens of Nigeria. No citizen may he 
expelled from or refused entry into Nigeria; the guarantee however 
does not cover freedom to leave the country.
Preventive detention of political opponents and security
suspects is still unconstitutional in Nigeria, save in a period of
emergency, hut an order restricting movement or residence may lawfully
he made for prescribed purposes even in normal times. A person detained
during an emergency or a Nigerian citizen upon idiom a restriction order
has been served, is entitled to have his case referred within one month
(and thereafter at intervals of not more than six months) to an advisory
tribunal, established by law and so constituted as to secure its
independence and impartiality; the chairman of the tribunal is required
2
to be a lawyer appointed by the chief justice of the Federation .
In practice, these provisions regarding personal liberty in
particular as well as other Fundamental Rights have had little effect and
3
there have been very few cases before the courts to enforce these rights .
1. Doherty v. Baleva, 4 Nig.Bar. JCU48 (June 1962) - affirmed Sub.Nom. 
Baleva v. Doherty (1963) 949.
2. See Constitution of Nigeria 1963, Art.15-18,22,25,26,27.
3. The list of cases and decisions, based on these clauses is given in 
“Digest of Decisions on Nigerian Constitution” by Sir Lionel Brett, in
Journal of African Law,Autumn 1964, Vol.8.No.3*
Out of the cases arising out of the Declaration of a state of 
emergency in Western Nigeria in 1962, Mackintosh1 cites two significant 
cases. He says that the clauses 64 and 63 in the I960 Constitution 
(69 and 70 in the 1963 version) empower the Federal Parliament to 
declare a state of emergency, when there is war or danger to 
domestic institutions. A scuffle in the House of Assembly led the 
Federal Government to declare such an emergency, suspend the Government 
of the Region, install an Administrator and restrict most of the leading 
politicians. In the first case, Chief F. R. A. Williams contended that 
the Emergency Powers Act, 1961, the Emergency Powers (Restriction Orders)
Regulations, 1962, and the restriction .order served upon him, were all
2
ultra Vires • He argued that there was no emergency, that Parliament had 
no right to delegate legislative power to the Governor General, who could 
not therefore delegate them in turn to the Administrator, and that the 
powers were used in a manner contrary to some of the Fundamental Rights. 
The Court refused to consider the question, whether an emergency existed, 
and passed over the difficult question what powers, sections 64 and 65 
(legislation for peace and order and in time of emergency) conferred 
on the Federal Government. They agreed that, under either section, 
a law or regulation to restrict a person was subject to the control 
set out in section 28 on Fundamental Rights, in that it must be 
’reasonably justifiable* for the purpose of dealing with the situation 
that exists. They concluded that, as Chief
1. John P. Mackintosh, ’Nigerian Government and Politics* pp.47-49.
2. Judgement of Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria in F.R.A. Williams v. 
M.A. Majekodunm£ July 7, 1962*
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Williams was chairman of the 'peace committee* set up by the A*G*, 
there was not adequate evidence to warrant his restriction* As soon 
as Chief Williams was released, a new restriction order was issued, 
confining him to his house in Ibadan. He was unable to appeal against 
this order, as he was restricted and could not go to Lagos to plead 
on his own behalf* (in the first case he had been at large long enough 
to obtain a court order allowing him to contest the case in person in 
Lagos)* He considered it too risky to send a Junior member of the 
Bar to plead on his behalf and, in addition, the Supreme court was on 
vacation from July to September*
In the second case, Alhaji Adegbenro appealed against his 
restriction order but not on the grounds that it was unjust to him 
but pn tfce ground that the entire declaration of emergency and the 
emergency regulations were unconstitutional and vaid*
The Court agreed that his case was ' much more fundamentalbut 
refused to consider whether the Emergency powers Act, 1961, was 
unconstitutional, whether Parliament could delegate the power to 
declare an emergency to the Governor General, whether the power to 
remove the Governor, Premier* Minister and Legislature of the Region, 
or whether the emergency regulations were 'reasonably Justifiable' **• 
for dealing with the situation * in the terms of the chapter on
1 . Mackintosh, J.P. op* cit* P.48 gives note saying that he is 
indebted to Chief Williams for a letter of December 31,1963, 
in which he gave his explanation of his failure to take legal 
action against the second restriction order served on him.
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Fundamental Rights. The Justices brushed aside these questions and 
based their decision on one piint: that the only requirement for 
establishing a state of emergency is a resolution of both Houses of 
Parliament.^- Thus the impression was created that the clauses on
Fundamental Rights were no check on Parliament^ use of its emergency
,2powers.
Modified versions of Nigerian model are found in the 
Constitution of Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Noth-Rodhesia (Zambia) 
Nayasalsnd,Malta, British Guiana, M e n  and Jamaica.
The provisions in the latest Commonwealth Countries 
Constitutions make it clear that a person may be deprived of a guaranteed 
freedom in accordance with law, and that derogations from the rights are 
permissible not only by law but also by actions done under the authority 
of law.
Turkey
3
Though the Turkish Constitution is said to have incoi^pOrated 
the Europrean Convention on Human Rights, the provisions regarding 
personal liberty are more akin to those in the Indian Constitution. The 
general clause declares that every individual shall have the right to 
improve himself materially and sjpitually and shall have the benefit of 
personal freedom; and this right can only be restricted by "procedure 
established by law* and through the judgements of the Courts. But it differs
jlL Judgement of the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria in Adegbenro V.
Attorney General and others, June 7# 1962.
2. See also Mackintosh, J.P. op. Cit. p. 48.
.3. Constitution of Turkish Republic, I960
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from the provisions of the Indian Constitution in that the Indian 
Constitution allows complete deprivation of personal liberty by 
the legislature, in accordance with the 1 procedure established by 
law1, whereas the Turkish Constitution only authorises restrictions 
on personal liberty in the interest of the nation .
It prohibits ill-treatment, torture or punishment
incompatible with human dignity; it provides that the privacy of
personal life or the home shall not be violated; search for papers
may not be made except by order of the Court or by an order of an
authority made in accordance with law. It gives to individuals the
rights of communication, of travel and residence, subject to
restrictions by order of the court, duly passed in accordance with
2
law, for maintaining national security •
As regards detention, it lays down that no person can be 
detained except by the Judgement of the Court, for the purpose of 
preventing escape or tampering with evidence, if there exists a strong 
case for indictment, or in similar cases when detention and its 
length is authorised or specified by law. It is provided that no person 
can be detained except in accordance with law. When such detention is 
permitted by law; the detained person must be notified in writing of 
the reason for his detention, disclosing the charges against him; 
he must be brought before the Court nearest to the place of detention^
1. Ibids. Art. 14*
2. Ibid, see Arts.17-19*
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within twenty-four hours excluding the time for * journey*; after 
the lapse of that time, he cannot he deprived of his liberty 
without judgement of Court; and the detainee* s next of kin must be 
immediately informed of the reasons thereof* The detainee has the 
right to be indemnified by the State according to law, if he is 
treated in a manner other than specified by law* He also has the 
right to litigate and present his case to the Judicial authorities, 
availing himself of all legitimate methods and procedure. The 
court cannot abstain from hearing any case within its jurisdiction, 
and no person shall be compelled to appear before any agency other then 
the Court having jurisdiction. No agencies shall be be vested with extra­
ordinary powers to pass Judgement and no person shall be compelled 
to appear before an agency other than a Court normally empowered to 
try him\
Like other constitutions, it gives protection against 
retroactive laws and punishments, and lays down that no person shall 
be punished for an act which was not considered as an offence under 
the law in force at the time the act was committed, that punish­
ments and penal measures must be laid down by law, and no person
shall be punishable with a penalty heavier than that provided by
2
law for that offence at the time the offence was committed .
1. Ibid, see Arts.30-32
2. Art. 33.
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It also protects the individual from self-incrimination and 
states that no person shall be compelled to make a statement or give 
testimony liable to incriminate him or his legally defined next of
i '
kin; criminal responsibility is personal*
But the Constitution is iilent about double jeopardy, 
emergency provisions and preventive detention; it does not give the 
legislature any extra ordinary power to deprive anyone of personal 
liberty* Every kind of arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty 
is illegal* In this sense,it can be said that it differs from 
the constitutions of most Common-wealth Countries7 and many modem 
constitutions, which authorise the arbitrary deprivation of personal 
liberty for the purpose of national security# public order and 
maintenance of peace*
Other Asian Countries*
2
In the Constitution of Indonesia, the right to personal 
liberty is given expression in a very generalized form* Art. 27 
states that all citizens shall have equal Status in law and government, 
and shall be obliged to uphold the law and Government, and that every 
citizen shall have the right to work and live a life befitting human 
beings* The protection against unlawful deprivation of personal liberty 
is expressed in the words that every sort of arbitrary arrest or 
detention is prohibited*
is--* ibid.
2.... Constitution of Indonesia,
The Japanese Bill of Rights drafted by Americans seems to have 
influenced those in the Indian and Turkish Constitutions* The 
Constitution of Japan,like most modern constitutions, gives 
comprehensive expression to the right to personal liberty and its 
protection against arbitrary deprivation. A declaratory clause is 
found in Art. 13 that all of people shall be respected as individuals; 
their right to li£e, liberty and pursuit cf happiness shall, to the 
extent ti^ at it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the 
supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.
Articles 31-^0 provide for the protection of the right to 
personal liberty, laying down the procedural safeguards against the 
arbitrary deprivation of the right. It is laid down that no person 
shall be deprived of life and liberty, nor shall any other criminal 
penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law, which 
resembles the corresponding provision in the Indian and Turkish 
Constitutions. It is further laid down that no person shall be denied 
the right of access to the courts, or be apprehended except upon a 
warrant issued by a competent Judicial officer, which must specify the
5 ■
offence alleged to have been committed; no person shall be arrested 
or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him : 
and allowed the immediate assistance of counsel; nor shall he be 
detained without adequate cause and, upon demand of any person, such
1 * Constitution of Japan 1SM>
2 . ibid. Art. 31
II
i
i
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cause must be immediately stated in open Court in his or his counsel* s
4
presence • It is submitted that these provisions of the Japanese
Constitution go beyond those in most commonwealth Constitution,
including Indiah as well as those of the European countries, in that
the right to be informed of reasons for arrest or detention is given in
2
unqualified terms and unlike the llhdian or Pakistan’s Constitution , no 
reservation is made as regards withholding of the facts by the detaining 
authority in the public interest; the objectivity of satisfaction of 
\ the ground o£ arrest or detention is articulated by the Constitution 
itself; detention is permissible for adequate cause, which must be 
disclosed in open court on any one's demand.
It also gives the rigjht to all persons to be secure in 
their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and seizures, 
and lays down that it shall not be impaired, except upon warrant issued 
for adequate cause, particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the things to be seized^; a separate warrant issued by a competent 
Judicial officer is necessary for each search or seizure. The 
infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are 
absolutely forbidden; in all criminal cases the accused is entitled to 
a speedy and public tidal by an impartial tribunal, full opportunity to 
examine all witness, to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on 
his behalf at public expense and to be represented at all times by
1* Ibid. Art. 54.
2. See Safatullah Khan's case, AIR 1954 Cal. 194.Supra.
3. Constitution of Japan, Art.35*
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competent counsel*
The right against self-incrimination is protected by Art*
38 which lays down that no person shall he compelled to testify
against himself$ a confession made under compulsion, torture or threat
or after prolonged arrest or detention, shall not be admitted in
evidence; this is equivalent to the provisions of Indian and
Pakistani Evidence Acts,* It is also laid down that no person shall be
convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his
own confession*
The protections against retroactive punishment and double
jeopardy are also found in Art. 39 which lays down that no person shall
be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it
was committed or of which has has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed
in double jeopardy* It is also provided by Art.40 that ary person, in
case he is acquitted after he has been arrested or detained, may sue the
State for redress as provided by law.
The Constitution also differs from most of the Commonwealth
and European Countries Constitutions in relation to the preventive
detention - provisions; it does not mention preventive detention at all,
nor does it give power to the legislature to infringe the right to
personal liberty under any condition whatsoever, except that criminal
penalties can be imposed according to procedure '’established by law”.
It is said that Japanese Constitution is designed on the pattern of 
American Constitution but.Lit appears that the provisions regarding
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personal liberty are mid way between those in the American and some 
of the Commonwealth or European Countries Constitutions*
The Provisions as to the right to personal liberty and its 
protection against arbitrary deprivation in the Philipines Constitution'*' 
seem to be a modified version of those in the American Constitution; they 
are laid down in Article 3# Art* 3, Section 1, declares that no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without ”due process of 
law”; nor shall apy person be denied equal protection of law. Sec.l. (3) 
gives the people the right to be secure in their person, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires 
that warrants shall not be issued except upon probable cause to be 
determined by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of 
the complainant and the witnesses; such an order must particularly 
describe the places to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized. Sec. 1. (4) guarantees the liberty of abode and of changiig the 
same within -the limits prescribed by law. Seo. 1 ($) lays down that the 
privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except 
upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order required 
otherwise. Protection against retroactive laws is found in Sec.l(ll) , 
which states that no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be 
enacted. Sec. 1.(13) gives the right to be protected against involuntaiy 
servitude in any form, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted.
1* Constitution of Philipines 1935* as amended 1946.
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Sec. 1 (14) provides safeguards against arbitrary deprivation 
of personal liberty and lays down that the right of an arrested or 
detained person to the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended 
except in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, when the 
public safety required it and during such period when necessity for 
such suspension exists. The Phillipines Constitution, instead of giving 
the legislature extra ordinary and arbitrary powers to enact laws 
regarding preventive detention, like most of the modern Constitutions, 
keeps alive the right to personal liberty and simply suspends the remedy 
for the enforcement of the right against deprivation during the relevant 
period. It is submitted that more effective protection is given to the 
right than is afforded by other Constitutions, in that it does not permit 
the suspension of remedy beyond the period of emergency.
It is further provided by Sec.l 0-5 ) that no person shall be 
held to answer for a criminal offence without * due process of law,1 and 
that all persons shall, before conviction, be released on bail on 
furnishing sufficient securities, except those charged with capital offences, 
when evidence of guilt is strong, that excessive bail shall not be 
required, and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be 
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved; he shall enjoy the 
rights to be heard himself and by his counsel, to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him and to have a speedy and 
public trial, meeting the witness face to face; he is entitled to secure
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the compulsoiy attendance of witnesses in his behalf; excessive fines 
must not be imposed and cfuel and unusual punishment may not be inflicted.
The protection against double jeopardy is found in Sec.l (20) 
which lays down that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of 
punishment for the same offence and that if an act is punishable by a 
law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal under either will 
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same offence.
But the Constitution is silent about the protection against 
self-incrimination. Lastly, it is provided by SecJ*(2l) that free 
access to the court shall not be denied to any person by reason of 
poverty.
In the Constitution of China^the protection of the right 
to personal liberty is in generalised and unqualified terms. Art.89 
declares that the freedom of the person of citizens of People*s 
Republic of China is inviolable and provides for the protection of 
this ri^it by laying down that no citizen may be arrested, except by 
a decision of people’s court or with the sanction of a people’s 
procuratorate. Art.90 states that the homes of the citizens are 
inviolable; privacy of correspondence is protected by law; freedom 
of residence and of changing the same is guaranteed. No provisions 
as to preventive detention and the use of arbitrary power by the 
legislature or Government during an emergency are incorporated in the
1. Constitution of Peoples Republic of China, 195k.
Constitution* It is clear that detention or arrest cannot he made, 
without the order of court, after the decision or without the 
sanction of a people* s procutorate; no executive authority can 
exercise arbitrary powers for the arrest of any person.
Other Countries:
The right to the personal liberty and the protection thereof, 
as in the Chinese Constitution, are found, to a greater extent, and in 
an unqualified manner, in the United Arab Republic* s Constitution *
The declaratory olause - Art*25 - lays down that there is no crime 
or penalty except by virtue of law; a penalty may be inflicted only 
for the acts committed subsequent to the promulgation of a law 
prescribing them, this is equivalent to the right of persons to be 
protected against retroactive punishments or laws in the constitutions 
of other countries.
Protection against arrest and detention is guaranteed in
the same manner as in the Pakistan Constitution, no person may be
arrested or detained * except in conformity with the provisions of 
,2
law* f the Pakistan Constitution says... save in accordance with 
law^. It is further laid down that the right of private defence is 
guaranteed by law, and that every person accused of a crime must be
1. Constitution of United Arab Republic, 1964*
2. Ibid. Art.26.
3* See Constitutions of Pakistan 1956, Art.5(2), 1962 Right No.l.
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provided with the counsel for his defence#'*’
Egyptians may not be deported from the country or prevented
from entering into it; they may not be prohibited from residing in
any place or forced to reside in a particular place except in the
2
circumstances defined by law. It is also provided that homes have 
their sanctity and they may not be entered, except in cases and in 
the manner prescribed by law.^
Provisions regarding preventive detention and arbitrary 
deprivation of personal liberty by legislature are not found in the 
Egyptian Constitution# It is therefore, submitted that the safe­
guards against the deprivation of personal liberty by arrest, 
detention, punishment, search, seizure or restrictions on movement 
and residence are found in a very comprehensive form, in as much as 
the deprivation of the right can only be effected by procedure in 
conformity with the provisions established by law#
The provisions for protection of the right to personal 
liberty in the Constitution of Iraq ^seem to have been borrowed from 
the Egyptian Constitution, though the language has been modified here 
and there. As in the Egyptian Constitutddn, it is declared by Art# 20 
that there will be no offence or penalty, except by ’virtue of law’
1# Constitution of U.A.R. Arts. 27-29.
2# ibid, Arts. 30-31
3. ibids, Art. 33*
if. Interim Constitution of Iraq 1 9 as amended 1965.
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and that no penalty shall be imposed, except on actions following
the issue of the law in which they are prescribed.^
As regards arrest, detention, punishment and search, it is
laid down that no one shall be arrested or detained or imprisoned or
2
searched, except in accordance with the provisions of law. It also
gives the accused the right to be regarded as innocent, unless his
conviction is proved by legal trial, in which he must en^oy the right
of defence in person or through agency. It is also laid down that
the torture of the accused, physically or morally, is forbidden, and
that every person accused for a crime shall have a defender to defend
3
him in accordance with his agreement.
It requires that no Iraqi shall be denied residence
anywhere nor shall he be compelled to reside in specified places,
L
except in circumstances defined by law, and that dwellings shall be
safeguarded and shall never be entered, except in such circumstances
5
and in such manner as is prescribed by law.
The expression of the guarantees of the right to personal 
liberty is comprehensive, but there are no provisions regarding 
preventive detention, retroactive punishment, double jeopardy or 
self-incrimination. No authority is given to the legislature to
1. ibid, Art. 21.
2. ibid, Art* 21.
3. ibid, Arts 23-24*
4. ibid, Art. 25.
5. ibid, Art. 27.
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deprive Iraqis of the right to personal liberty in the national 
or public interest. Unlike the Egyptian Constitution, it is 
silent about the provision of counsel by the State to the 
accused.
Provisions regarding the right to personal liberty and 
its protection from arbitrary deprivation are found in the most 
generalized and briefest form in the Constitution of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republic.^" Only two Articles, deal with the right. 
Art* 127 guarantees the U.S.S.R*s citizens the inviolability of 
person and requires that no person shall be placed under arrest, 
except by a decision of court of law or with the sanction of a 
procurator. Art. 128 assures the in violability of the homes of 
citizens and provides that privacy of correspondence is protected by 
law.
There are no provisions regarding double jeopardy, 
retroactive punishment, self-incrimination or preventive detention. 
Though it is clear that any sort of arrest or detention, if not 
supported by the order of a court of law or the sanction of the 
procurator*is illegal, but it is difficult to say how far this is 
effective.
It is, however, submitted that the U.S.S.R's Constitution, 
in a modified form, has been adopted by the framers of the Chinese 
Constitution. Some minor changes in language or phraseology are
1. Constitution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic,1936 as 
amended 1965*
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found; for instance, instead of the U.S.S.R* Constitution phrase 
!,by the court of law”, the Chinese Constitution says "by the people’s 
Court"•
The Brazilian Constitution ^  recognizes the right to 
personal liberty and provides the safeguards against its 
deprivation. Clauses 20 and 22 of Art. 141 require that no person 
shall be arrested, except in flagrante delicto or by a written order 
of a competent authority in cases prescribed by law, and that 
imprisonment or detention of any person shall be immediately 
communicated to the competent Judge, who shall cancel, If it is 
illegal and consider, if so provided by law, the responsibility of 
the authority ordering the detention*
Protection against retroactive punishment is given by 
clause (27) of Art* 141» which lays down that no one shall be tried 
or sentenced, except by a competent authority under the provision of 
a law, which was in force prior to the commission of the offence. But 
the Constitution is silent about double Jeopardy and self 
incrimination.
The protection against the deprivation of personal liberty,
2
in the Constitution of Argentine, is provided by Art.18, which requires 
that no inhabitant of the Nation may be arrested, except by virtue of a
1. Constitution of Brazil 1946.
2. Constitution of Argentine, 1853*
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•written order of a competent authority. It is further provided that 
no punishment may be imposed except under a Judgement, founded upon 
a law prior to the commissions of the act; no person may be Judged 
by a special commission; and no one may be compelled to testily 
against himself.
Though, in addition to protection against retroactive 
punishment, the safeguards against self incrimination and double 
jeopardy are available, the Constitution does not touch preventive 
detention at all.
In the Mexican Constitution of 1917, the protection of 
the right to personal liberty is afforded by the Art. 14(2)
-which requires that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
possessions or rights without a trial by a duly created court, in 
which the essential elements of procedure are observed, and in 
accordance with laws issued prior to the a ct.
2
Art. 3 of the Cambodian Constitution declares that 
freedom is the right to do whatever does not threaten the rights of 
others, the conditions whereof will be defined by law. The 
protections against deprivation of personal liberty are found in 
Articles 4,5*6*15* Art 4 requires that no one may be forced to do 
anything not required by law, that no one may be prosecuted, arrested 
or detained, except in the cases and manner prescribed by law; no one
1. i bi d
2. Constitution of Cambodia 1947 as amended 1964.
may be kept in detention, unless the Judge has approved the 
legality of his arrest by a decision containing the reasons 
therefor issued within the time limits prescribed by law; illegal 
arrest or unnecessary harassment or coercion or any form of ill- 
treatment during arrest or detention is forbidden by law and the 
doer will be personally responsible for the wrong done. Art# 5 
gives the accused the right to be presumed innocent, until he 
has been declared guilty and requires that every penalty, 
restricting personal liberty must be directed to the re-education 
of the guilty person# It is further provided by Art. 6, that 
Cambodians may not be expelled from Cambodian territory nor 
be forbidden nor obliged to remain in a particular place, except 
in cases stipulated by law.
As regards a state of emergency and subsequent 
suspension of rights, it is laid down that the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be suspended, except 
when the nation has been proclaimed to be in danger, and that such 
a measure may not be taken for a period longer than six months, 
subject to renewal declared with the same formalities, and that 
whosoever abuses such a measure in order arbitrarily to damage the 
material or the moral rights of another, shall be personally 
responsible. Although the Constitution guarantees the right to be 
protected against prosecution, arrest or detention; to be presumed 
innocent pending pr oof of guilt, to freedom of residence and to
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protection against exile, there is no protection against 
retroactive punishment, double jeopardy and self incrimination. 
Notwithstanding that the Constitution provides for the suspension 
not only of the foresaid rights hut also the remedy thereof during 
a state of emergency, the protection against the continuance of 
the emergency for a period longer than six months is however 
qualified in the sense that it is subject to periodical renewal 
for six months at a time. The powers of government to suspend the 
rights are not subject to overriding restrictions in as much as 
Government has complete discretion to decide when the nation is in 
danger,
4
The Iranian Constitution guarantees the individual* s 
rigjit to be protected and safeguarded against deprivation of life 
and liberty. It is further laid down that no one may he molested 
'except in accordance with the law of the landV* Art, 10 provides 
that no ome may be summarily arrested without an order signed by 
the President of a Court of Justice in conformity with laws except 
in cases of crimes, misdemeanors and serious offences, and that even 
in such cases, the accused must immediately or at least within twenty- 
four hours be informed and notified of the charges against him. Art, 11 
lays down that no one may be removed from the Court, which must 
render Judgement on his case, and be forced to appear before another 
tribunal. Art. 12 provides that no penalty may be declared or carried
1, Supplementary Constitutional Law (Iran) 1907, as amended in 1957
out, except in accordance with the law* Art 13 gives protection 
againfct forcible entry into a house or dwelling, except by order 
of a Judge and in conformity with the law* Art. 1A gives protection 
against exile and orders to lixe in a particular place, except 
in cases specified by the law restricting the residence or 
authorising exile* But the Constitution is silent about emergency 
provision, neither does it authorise suspension of the right in 
the interest of the nation.
It is, therefore, clear that the Constitution is drafted 
on the same pattern as that of Cambodia except for the absence of 
emergency provisions*
Art 7 of the Jordanian Constitution ^declares that 
personal freedom shall be safeguarded* Art 8 requires that no one 
shall be detained or imprisoned " except in accordance with the 
provision of law”* The protection against exile and compulsion to 
reside or not to reside in any specified place in circumstances 
prescribed by law, is afforded by Art. S. Art. 10 gives protection 
against unlawful tntiy into an individual’s house or dwelling. 
Compulsory labour is forbidden, except work or service in 
circumstances prescribed by law in the case of an emergency or on 
conviction by a Court, when such work or service is carried out 
under the supervision; and control of an official authority; the 
person convicted must not be hired to or placed at the disposal
1. Constitution of Jordan (Hashemite Kingdon) 1951.
80
1
of any private individual, company or association •
Differing from the Cambodian and Iranian Constitutions,there 
is no provision, for preventive detention or the suspension of the aforesaid 
rights during an emergency. Moreover, the consitutional fetters on the 
discretion of the Government appear to be having binding force.
1. Ibid Art.13*
CHAPTER k 81
THEEVOLUTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN PAKISTAN.
The Dominion Constitution:
The first constitutional document of Pakistan, after the nation 
came into being on l*fth August, 19^7* may be referred to be ’The Pakistan 
Provisional Constitution Order, 19^7* (hereinafter referred to as ’The Order*)’ 
which lays down that, except in so far as other provision is made by or in 
accordance with the law made by the Constituent Assembly, the Dominion and 
provinces and other parts thereof shall be governed, as nearly as may be, in 
accordance with the provisions of Government of India Act, 1935» with such 
omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as may be specified in 
the order of Governor General in accordance with the provisions of the Order,
The Government of India Act, 1935, like the other previous Govera- 
1
ment of India Acts , did not guarantee the fundamental rights except some
2
property rights, concerning land, grants and pensions which were incorporated
3
on the recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee •
Prior to the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935i the
political leaders of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent had become conscious of 
the need of getting fundamental rights incorporated in the proposed
If.
Constitution . In December 1926, at its Eighteenth Annual Session at Delhi, 
the Muslim League adopted a resolution demanding revision of The Government 
of India Act, 1919» so as to incorporate, along with other demands such as
1. Govt, of India Acts; of 1858, 1909 and 1919
2. See SS 297» 298, 299 and 300 of Govt, of India Act, 1935
3* See Report of Joint Parliamentary Committee (1933-193*0
*f. Govt, of India Act, 1935*
82
the establishment of responsible government, the fundamental principles of 
full religious liberty, ie. liberty of belief, worship, observances, 
propaganda and association.
The Nehru Committee Report (1928) stated,
"Our first care should be to have our fundamental rights 
guaranteed in a manner which will not permit their with­
drawal under any circumstances."
The report also reproduced the resolution of the Madrass Congress Session
on Fundamental Rights which demanded that, in view of the unfortunate existence
of ooinmiiaaldifferences in India, certain safeguards as to ensure security in
such an atmosphere were necessary.
The Simon Commission Report, 1930* while rejecting these demands for 
the incorporation of fundamental rights in the Constitution, made the following 
observations which reflect the attitude of English lawyers;
"•♦Many of those who came before us have urged that the 
Indian Constitution should contain definite guarantees 
for the rights of individuals in respect of the exercise 
of their religion and a declaration of the equal rights 
of all citizens. We are aware that such provisions have 
been inserted in many Constitutions, notably in those of 
European States formed after the war of 191*t—18.
} Experience, however, has not shown them to be of any great
practical value. Abstract Declarations are useless, unless 
there exists the will and the means to make them effective..".
The matter was then represented to the Round Table Conference. The
Report of Round Table Conference, Third Session, 1932, seems to have realised
the importance of inclusion of fundamental rights in the Constitution and
recommended that some of the provisions discussed in the Conference should
appropriately and fully find their place in the Constitution, and that His
Majesty’s Government should undertake to examine them most carefully for the
purpose. The Report states;
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"The Government have not in any way failed to realise 
and take account of the great importance which has 
been attached, in so many quarters, to the idea of 
making a Chapter of Fundamental Rights a feature in 
the new Indian Constitution as a solvent of difficulties 
and a source of confidence; nor do they under-value the 
painstaking care which has been devoted to framing the 
text of the large number of propositions which have been 
suggested and discussed. The practical difficulties which 
might result from including many, indeed most of them as 
conditions which must be accomplished as universal rule 
by executive or by legislative authority were fully 
explained in the course of discussion and there was 
substantial support for the view that, as the means of 
securing fair treatment for majority and minorities alike, 
the course of wisdom will be to rely, insofar as reliance 
cannot be placed upon mutual goodwill and mutual trust, 
on the ’special responsibilities’ with which it was agreed* 
the Governor General and the Governors are to be endowed in 
their respective spheres to protect the rights of minorities,11
The representation was also made to the Joint Parliamentary
1
Committee which, in its report , having expressed satisfaction with the 
genuineness of the demand for Fundamental Rights, made the following remarks 
in response to the observations of the Simon Commission Report in respect 
of non-inclusion of fundamental rights and pointed out the practical 
difficulties in the way of implementation of the English concept.
The Report says:
"With these observations we entirely agree: and a cynic 
might indeed find plausible arguments in the history 
during the last ten years of more than one country for 
asserting that the most effective method of ensuring the 
destruction of a fundamental right is to include a declar­
ation of its existence in a constitutional instrument. But 
there are also strong practical arguments against the 
proposal, which may be put in the form of a dilemma: for 
either the declaration of rights is of so abstract a nature 
that it has no legal effect of any kind or its legal effect 
will be to impose an embarrassing restriction on the powers 
of the Legislature and to create a grave risk that a large 
number of laws may be declared invalid by the Courts, because 
they are inconsistent with one or other of the rights so 
declared. An examination of the lists to which we have re­
ferred shows very clearly indeed that this risk would be far 
________ more negligible.," __________
TI See Joint Parliamentary Committee Report (1933-2^ ) Vol.1;para ,3&k*
On the recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, 
some property rights, such as rights to land , grants, titles and pensions, 
were guaranteed under SS.297 to 300 of the Government of India Act, 1935* 
which provided safeguards against discrimination on the basis of race and 
religion, as well as against deprival of property, such as the provision 
that land should only be acquired for a public purpose by authority of law 
on payment of compensation.
Though there was no declaration of the right to personal liberty 
under the Act, habeas corpus under S.^91 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, 1898, would issue, if a person was deprived of his liberty except in 
accordance with law. And though S.*f5 of the Government of India Act, 1935* 
empowered the Governor General and S.93 the Governors of Provinces to 
issue proclamations of emergency, in their discretion, whenever the security 
of the state was threatened, whether by war or internal disturbances, the 
issue of a writ of Habeas corpus would not be affected by it. Section 93 
of the Government of India Act, 1935 was, however, omitted in the schedule to 
Provisional Constitution Ordey, 19^7*
It can be added that in 19^8, the Governor-General of Pakistan 
was empowered by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to proclaim a state 
of emergency, not only on account of internal disturbances or threat of war 
but also on a threat to the security of economic life of any part of the 
country, arising from the possibility of war, internal disturbances or mass 
movements of population. S.92A was inserted in the Government of India Act, 
1935* and empowered the Governor General to direct a Governor of Province to 
assume, on his behalf, the government of the Province, if the security of
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Pakistan was endangered or if the provincial constitution could network.
As regards the judiciary, the High Court at Lahore in Punjab, the
Chief Court at Karachi in Sind, and Judicial Commissioners in North-West
Frontier and Baluchistan, were already existing and exercising the powers
1
of High Courts; a new High Court at Dacca in East Bengal and a new Federal Court 
2
of Pakistan, were, however, created. The Privy Council (Abolition of
Jurisdiction) Act, 1950* brought to an end all the appellate Jurisdiction
3
of Privy Council in Pakistan ,
Though the adapted Government of India Act, 1935* was to be 
promulgated by the Governor-General of India, there was an understanding 
that his approval was purely formal, and that the interim Constitution for 
Pakistan, in the form recommended by Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinah, the first 
Governor General of Pakistan, would be brought into force. Mohammad Sharif,J. 
was entrusted with the task of amending the Government of India Act, 19351 and 
he worked, for the most part, directly under the guidance of Mr. Jinah.
The interim Constitution was federal, being based on the same 
pattern as those of Indian Union, Canada and Australia. The provinces of 
Pakistan were declared to be five: East Bengal, West Punjah, Sind, Nort-
West Frontier Province and Baluchristan. The division of power between the 
central and provincial governments was the same as in the Government of India 
of India Act, 1935* and as in the older Dominions, the Governor General of 
Pakistan was the constitutional head. The Pakistan Cabinet, consisting of the
1. The High Courts (Bengal) Order, 19^7*
2. The Federal Court Order, 19^7*
3. The appellate jurisdiction of Privy Council in civil cases had already 
been abolished by the Federal Court (enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act,
1950.
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Prime Minster and other ministers, was responsible to the Federal Legislature. 
The Pakistan Constituent Assembly was to function in a dual capacity - as the 
Constitution - making body as well as Federal Legislature. The strength of 
the Constituent Assembly was initially 69, but on the accession of the States 
was later raised to 79*
But, the Interim Constitution, like the Pakistan Provisional 
Constitution Order, 19^7» did not touch the question of fundamental rights 
at sill.
Constitutional Objectives:
In March, 19^9* the Objective Resolution was proposed in the 
Constituent Assembly by the Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khgn, The resolution 
provided that the principles of democracy, freedom, equality and social 
justice,as unuciated by Islam, should be fully observed. The rights of 
minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their 
cultures were, however, safeguarded. The Resolution further provided that 
the Fundamental Rights of the people as to equality of status and opportunity, 
equality before law, economic, social and political justice, freedom of 
thought, expression, belief and fath, worship and association, subject to 
law and morality should be guaranteed. But the Resolution was silent about 
the right to personal liberty and protection thereof from arbitrary deprivation.
As early as in 19^7« a Committee on Fundamental Rights and matters 
relating to minority communities was set up, An Interim Report of the 
Committee was presented to the Constituent Assembly on September, 28, 1950, 
and for the first time, the right to personal liberty was given attention.
Among recommendations for other Fundamental Rights of the people, the Report
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provided that all persons should be given equal protection of the law, and 
that no one should be deprived of his life or liberty, save in accordance with 
law, or punished for an act not declared punishable by law when it was 
committed. It was also provided that habeas corpus should not be suspended, 
except in grave emergency. The Interim Report was adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly in October, 1952.
In November 1955, the Report of the Basic Principles Committee was 
considered by the Constituent Assembly and it was resolved that, in order to 
draft a new Constitution for Pakistan for submission to the Assembly, a drafting 
Committee, consisting of eight members, should be appointed.
The drafting Committee, despite the assurances given by Prime Minister, 
Mr. Mohammad Ali, that no impediment to the drafting of the Constitution could 
be allowed, did not make any progress and the evolution of a Constitution seemed 
to be unlikely.
Finaly, the Basic Principle Committee submitted the Report. There were 
no recommendations as to the Fundamental Rights; it was recommended that the 
Federal Court should become the Supreme Court of Pakistan; there should be 
High Courts at Karachi in Sind with jurisdiction in Baluchistan and Karachi, 
at Lahore in Punjab, at Peshaware in North-West-Frontier and at Dacca in East 
Bengal, which should have jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs.
There were many objections to the proposals of the Basic Principles 
Committee from minorities and from East Pakistan, but they were accepted in 
September 1955, with little amendment and sent to the drafting Committee with 
intent they should be finally revised in October,195^•
8 8
Dissolution of the First Constituent Assembly;
Like the Government of India Act, 1935, thb Interim Constitution had 
given vast powers to the Governor General to make ordinances, irrespective of 
the control of the federal legislature. The powers of the Governor General 
were brought under the control of the Federal Legislature through an amendment 
in 1950 . I21 order to enhance the powers of the Constituent Assembly and 
diminish the powers of the Governor General, a succession of Act were passed 
by the Assembly in 1954-. The Indian Independence Act, 1947, was amended retros­
pectively to empower the Assembly to make Constitutional laws for any part of
Pakistan, challenge to the validity whereof was excluded from the jurisdiction
2 .of the courts. Later the Governor General1 s power to create new provinces was
3
transferred to the federal legislature .
On July 6, 1954, the Constitution Assembly passed an important Act
amending the Government of India Act, 1935, by which a new section 223A was
inserted which empowered every High Court in Pakistan to issue the
‘prerogative writs’ of habeas corpus, quo-warranto. mandamus,prohibition and 
4
certiorari , as explained by A„K.Brohi, the Law Minister, to the House. 
Provisions of a similar nature had been recommended in the Report of the Basic 
Principles Committee and were intended to be incorporated in the new Constitution. 
The Law Minister explained that the writs are bulwarks which guarantee and 
maintain the liberties of citizens; some members of the Constituent Assembly 
felt that the provision of these constitutional rights were premature.
1. Government of India (2nd Amendment) Act, 1950.
2. The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1954.
3* Government of India (3rd Amendment) Act, 1954.
4. Government of India (3rd Amendment) Act, 1954.
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On September 20, 1954, the Constituent Assembly repealed The 
Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 194-9, which 
had empowered the Governor General and Governors to examine, punish and, 
if necessary, disqualify public and representative officers found guilty 
of maladministration. On the next day, the 21st September, 1954, the 
Assembly amended the SeclO of the Government of India Act, 1955, under which 
the Governor General had summarily dismissed Khwajaf Nazimuddin's Government • 
The Governor General,Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, was then at Abbotabad on summer- 
vacation. Under the amendment the Governor-General was required to appoint 
as Prime Minister a member of the federal legislature, who enjoyed the 
confidence of the majority and to appoint other ministers on the Prime 
Minister*s advice; he could not dismiss the Prime Minister and Ministers so 
appointed; they could be removed from the office only on a vote of non­
confidence in the federal legislature; and only the Prime Minister could 
dismiss the other Ministers •
This put the Governor General in an intolerable situation, because
there was no provision in the Interim Constitution for the dissolution of the
federal legislature and so no means whereby the Governor-General, when at
issue with the Assembly, could appeal to the electorate. Had he accepted
the position, he might have been indefinitely subservient to the will of a
2
perpetual legislature, which was losing the confidence of the people •
Hence, on October 24, 1954, the Governor General proclaimed an 
emergency throughout Pakistan, declaring that the constitutional machinery
1. Government of India (5th Amendment) Act 1954.
2. Frof. Alan Gledhill, op.cit p.78.
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had broken down, and that the constituent Assembly had lost the confidence 
of the people. It wgs also announced that fresh elections to the Constituent 
Assembly would be held as soon as possible and the Ministry reconstituted; 
the Prime Minister was invited to re-form his Cabinet in order to give the 
country a vigorous and stable administration.
The new Government started its career with intent to be firm and 
stable, and the new Ministry of Interior declared in a press statements that 
for years to come Pakistan would have to be governed as a •controlled democracy*- 
It was also added that the attempts to work democracy on British lines made 
during the preceeding seven years had led to disaster. It was, therefore, 
suggested that the Constitution should take a form other than British. General 
Iskandar Mirza was also reported to have expressed the same view by declaring 
that Pakistan was not then ripe for democracy - as the word is understood in the 
United Kingdom and the Unites Stages. He, however, suggested a flexible 
constitution, maintaining parity between East and West Pakistan.
The expression * controlled democracy* was explained by the Secretary
to Government in the Ministry of Information at a press-conference on
December 5, to mean the system of government then prevailing in the United
Kingdom and the United States. It seems impossible to reconcile the existing
system of government in these two countries with the concept of *controlled
1
democracy*, unless * control* means control by the public or by law • The 
remarks of General Mirza about the nature of Pakistan*s future constitution 
was comparatively clear, when he said that, as Pakistan’s efforts to utilize 
the British political system had proved unsuccessful, the American constitutional
1. See Constituent Assembly Debates 1955, Vol.I. Note 2. p.40.
1system, with some modifications, should be adopted • It could, however, he 
added that, in Pakistan, the Governor General had exercised greater control 
than Prime Minister, so that the idea of a head of the State, who would be
the Chief Executive, might be considered likely to offer prospects of a work­
able solution to some of Pakistan*s difficulties.
The dismissal of the Constituent Assembly by the Governor General
was challenged in cases before the Superior courts, The President of Assembly,
Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, himself filed a petition in the Chief Court of Sind,
2
at Karachi, challenging the action of the Governor General •
The proclamation of emergency and the dismissal of the Constituent 
Assembly was challenged by a petition to the Chief Court of Sind, under the
newly inserted Sec.223A of the Government of India Act, 1935» for the issue of
writs of mandamous and quo-warranto with a view to:
(i) restraining the respondents from giving effect to
the proclamation and from obstructing the petitioner 
in the exercise of his functions and duties as President 
of the Constituent Assembly; and
(ii) determining the validity of the appointment of the 
new Ministers under the recently amended Sec.10 of 
the Government of India Act.
The Central Government raised preliminary objections:
(a) That any constitutional provisions made under Sec.
6(3) of the Indian Independence Act had not only 
to be passed by the Constituent Assembly but had 
also the assent of the Governor-General; the newly 
inserted Sec.223A, which empowered the High Courts 
to issue prerogative writs, was not valid for want 
of the required assent and consequently the Courts 
had no jurisdiction to issue the writs prayed for 
by the petitioner;
1. Pakistan Standard, Karachi 27 January, 1955*
2. PLD, 1935 Sind .96
(b) that some objection was also applied to the recent 
amendments to Sec.10 of the Government of India Act, 
which purported to limit the discretion of the 
Governor General in his choice of Ministers.
The Chief Court of Sind, rejecting all contentions of the respondents, 
held that the Sec.10 of the Government of India Act, substituted by the 
Government of India (5th Amendment) Act, 195^* was a valid enactment, in as 
much as the Constitutional laws enacted by the Constituent Assembly need not 
be validated by the assent of the Governor-General; this also applied to Sec.
223A, inserted by the Government of India (Amendment) Act, 195^5 so the 
petitioned writs should be issued.
On appeal the decision of the High Court was, however, reversed; the 
Supreme Court by a majority held that the assent of the Governor General was 
necessary under Sec.6(3) of Indian Independence Act, 19^7* to all legislation 
of the Constituent Assembly, including provisions for the Constitution of the 
Dominion; Sec.223A and Sec.10 (as amended) of the Government of India Act were 
declared invalid for want of the required assent of the Governor General . 
Cornelius J., in his dissenting judgement, observed that the Constituent 
Assembly being designed to be a sovereign body and intended to exercise sovere­
ign power, including power to alter the Constitution, subject to which the 
Governor General had to act, it would clearly be inconsistent with that design 
and purpose if its constitutional powers were qualified by the necessity of 
assent by the Governor General.
Six days after the judgement given by the Federal Court in Malvi 
Tamizuddin Khan's case, the Governor General promulgated the Emergency Powers 
Ordinance (IX of) 1950 under Sec.^5 of the Government of India Act, 1935*
1. Federation of Pakistani v. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan - PLD.1955 F.C.2^0
whereunder certain Acts which had not been assented to, were validated and 
given retrospective effect.
Section 223A of Government of India Act was also validated with effect 
from the 2nd October, 1955 by the Validation of Laws Act, 1955*
1
In Usif Satel v. Crown , which came on appeal before the Federal 
Court, challenging the validation of aforesaid Acts with retrospective effect, 
it was held that the Governor General could not validate by Ordinance any 
unassented constitutional legislation since such legislation could only be 
effected by the Constituent Assembly, to which the Governor General could 
assent.
2"In a reference by the Governor General as to the Constitutional 
position of his act, the Federal Court, exercising its advisory jurisdiction, 
held that in relation to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly where 
provision was made by the Indian Independence Act, compliance with it was 
compulsory; but to meet a situation for which no provision was made in the 
Act, the Common law would apply.
The question whether the Governor General could set up new Assembly 
was also governed by the same principle that a case not provided for in the 
Statute, was governed by the common law. The Governor General could exercise 
the prerogative of the Crown to summon an assembly and, in doing so, he was 
entitled to take into consideration, the changes which had occured since 19^7*.
th
But in Pakistan v. Ali Ahmad Shah a contentious case, it was held
that a constitutional law not assented to by the Governor General could be given
17 Pjp.1955 F.c. 3«7.
2. Reference by the Governor General, (Special reference No. 1 of 1955)*
3. See Prof. Alan Gledhill, op.cit. p.8l.
V. PLD,. 1955 F.C. 522.
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temporary retrospective validity by proclamation; as to the question of 
validation of the legislation of the old Assembly, the principle of State 
necessity was applied; the Governor General was responsible for preventing the 
breakdown of the Government and the disruption of the Constitution. If there 
was imminent danger of extreme mischief, and it was impossible to wait for a 
legal remedy, he might do what would otherwise be unlawful, provided he went 
on further than the situation demanded. The Governor General would be 
justified in issuing a proclamation giving retrospective validation to 
constitutional laws to which assent had not been accorded until such time 
as the new Constituent Assembly could decide upon their validity •
On April, 1955i the Governor General summoned a Constituent Convention 
for May, 1955» for the purpose of making provision as to the Constitution of 
Pakistan. On the next day the Governor-General issued a further proclamation 
assuming to himself, until such other provision as should be made by the 
Constituent Convention, such powers as were necessary to validate and enforce 
laws needed to avoid a breakdown of the Constitution and the administrative 
machinery of the country. These powers were to be exercised by the Governor
General, subject to the opinion of the Federal Court on certain questions which
2
had, in the meantime, been submitted to it • The Federal Court expressed the 
view that the correct name of the Constitution Convention would be Constituent 
Assembly; the Governor G e n e r a l  would summon a fresh Constituent Assembly; as 
there was no reference to this ±i the Indian Independence Act, the common law 
applied.
There still remained the question of the validation of the enactments
1. See Prof. Alan Gledhill, op.cit, p.8l.
2. Reference made by Governor General under S.213 of Government of India Act.
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of the first Constituent Assembly and, until this problem could be solved, 
which was only possible when a new Constituent Assembly came into being, 
many difficulties would remain and many people would be seriously affected; 
the prisoners under sentence in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case had been 
convicted when a statute/passed specifically to meet the circumstances, but 
the statute, among ethers, still required to be validated. It was a question
A
involving the most precious right to life and liberty .
The second Constituent Assembly was set up and, working deligently
and laboriously, completed the task within one year and a quarter. The draft
Constitution Bill appeared in the newspapers on January 8, 1956. The Bill
was passed by the Constituent Assembly on February 7> 1958 and it came into
2
force on March, 23, 1958 .
The Constitution of 1958:
The Constitution of Pakistan, 1958, except for some significant 
additions and changes, including a Bill of Rights and powers of the higher 
judiciary to enforce thejm, was drafted mainly on the lines of Government of 
India Act, 1935* But the fundamental rights seem to have been designed on 
the pattern of Indian Bill of Rights in the Constitution of 1950, with a few 
variations as regards rights to personal liberty and equality. These rights 
were enumerated in the Ihrt II - Arts. 3 to 21 - of the Constitution of 1958. 
They wrere mostly couched in absolute terms in the sense that in few cases 
meant the powers of the legislatures and executives to restrict the rights 
specifically declared.
1. Dawn, Karachi, 10 August, 1955*
2. See Herbert Feldman ’Pakistan Constitution* pp.69-78.
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In Jibendra Kishore y. Province of East Pakistan , elaborating the
importance of the incorporation of fundamental rights in the 1956 Constitution,
the Supreme Court pointed out that fThe very conception of fundamental right
is that it, being a right guaranteed by the Constitution, cannot be taken amy
by the law, and it is not only technically inartistic but a fraud on the
citizens for the makers of a Constitution to say that a right is fundamental
2
but that it may be taken away by law . In State v. Dosso fundamental rights 
were held to be of a permanent nature. It was observed that the very essence 
of fundamental right is that it is more or less permanent and cannot be changed 
like ah ordinary law.
The Pakistan judiciary seems to have followed the views of American
Supreme Court. According to the American Supreme Court, one of the main
objects of the Government is to protect the life, liberty and property of
the individual citizen. To this end and, in order that the Constitutional
system may be a government of laws and not of men, it is customary to limit
the powers of government and thereby operate as bulwarks of liberty for the
3
protection of private rights • Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of
L
Education v. Barnette observed:
”The very purpose of a Bill of Rights is to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials and to establish them as 
legal principles to be applied by the Courts. One’s 
right to life, liberty and property, to free speech, 
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and 
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote, 
they depend on the outcome of no elections..”
1. %ip 1957 S.c. (.Pak) 9.
2. BBi 1958 S.C. 533
3. (1935) Edward Jones v. Sand C.Commission, 298 U.S.l.
4. (1942 ) 319 U.S. 658."
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The reason for the incorporation of fundamental rights in the 19^6 
Constitution seems to have been twofold, firstly to give protection to the 
rights of the minorities when the Constitution required legislation to be 
bases on the principles of Islam, and secondly to provide safeguards to the 
people at large, against the legislative and executive arbitrariness at a 
time when the people of Pakistan were too immature to comprehend and practice 
the democratic system of government.
Likeoother modem Bills of Rights, the 19^6 Constitution of 
Pakistan guaranteed the rights to equality before law, to life and liberty, 
to property, to freedom of speech, to freedom of assembly, to freedom of 
religion, to freedom of association, to freedom of trade, education, 
profession and to freedom of movement, etc. It also provided protection 
against forced labour, slavery, untouchability, discrimination in the public 
service, discrimination in respect to access to public places, taxation for 
purposes of any particular religion, and against arrest or detention and 
conviction or punishment under retrospective legislation.
The principle of rule of law was maintained, as it was provided in 
respect of most of the rights that they could not be infringed 1 save in 
accordance with law1, as in the case of the right to life and liberty, and 
the right to property or that every citizen would have the right to 
exercise the guaranteed rights •subject to any reasonable restriction imposed 
by law in the interest of public order or public interestas in the case of 
freedom of assembly, or association, or movement, or speech. It was the duty 
of the courts to see whether or not laws enacted by the legislatures or actions 
taken by the executive, infringing, abridging or restricting the latter rights,
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were reasonable, directed to the prescribed object and within the competence of 
the legislature or executive. Rule of law in respect of personal liberty is 
maintained by limitations on the making of laws with retrospective effect or 
penal laws providing a penalty greater than prescribed by law at the time of 
commission of the offence.
The right to personal liberty was guaranteed by Art. 5(2) and the 
protection was given by Art. • 6 and 7. It was laid down that no person should 
he punished under an ex post facto law, nor should he be subjected to punishment 
greater than that prescribed by law at the time of the commission of the offence , 
The detained or arrested person had the right to be informed, as soon as 
possible, of the grounds for his arrest or detention; to be consulted and 
defended by a legal practioner of his choice; to be produced before the 
nearest magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest or detention and not 
to be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a 
magistrate. These protections were, however, not available to an alien enemy 
or a person detained under preventive detention law. But a person under 
reventive detention law could not be detained for a period exceeding three 
months without having his case referred to an Advisory Board before the expiry \ 
of the said period. He could be detained further only if, in the opinion of 
the Board, there was sufficient cause for his detention. The Advisory Board 
in this context consisted, in the case of a person detained under a Central 
Act, of persons appointed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan; or if he was 
detained under a Provincial Act, a Board consisting of persons appointed by the 
the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned. It was furthef provided that
X. Constitution of 19^6 Ait. 6.
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the detaining authority could refuse to disclose the facts regarding detention, 
if he considered it to be against the public policy or interest to disclose 
them.
Differing from the Indian Constitution, protection against double- 
jeopardy and self-incrimination were not provided in the 1956 Constitution, 
but they were available under theCode of Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, *
2
There were limitations on the law-making power of the State . It 
was 2a id down that any existing or pre-constitutional law, if repugnant to the 
Fundamental Rights, and any new law made by the legislatures, contravening 
these rights, should be void to the extent of the repugnancy contravention.
But laws relating to the Defence Service or the Armed forces, charged with the 
maintenance of public order, for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge 
of their duties or maintenance of discipline among them were immune from being 
declared void on account such repugnancy or contravention.
The Supreme Court and High Courts were empowered to prescribe 
appropriate procedure to enforce the Fundamental Rights. Art. 22 conferred 
the right to move the Supreme Court for the irenf or cement. The Supreme Court 
had the right under this Article to issue the order/writs in the nature of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorari for the 
enforcement of any of the rights, which could not be suspended, except by 
the provisions of the Constitution of 1956. This article was, however, not 
applicable in relation to the Special Areas. ' Special Areas' meant the areas 
of West Pakistan, which, immediately before the commencement of the Establishment
1. See Sec. 403 of Cr. P.C. and Sections of Evidence Act, (see chapter on Double 
jeopardy and self incrimination).
2. Const, of 1956, Art.4#
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of West Pakistan Act, 1955, were: (a) the tribal areas of Baluchistan, the 
Punjab, and North-West Frontier; and (b) The States of Amb, Citral, Dir and 
Swat1,
High Courts were also empowered t© issue aforesaid write of habeas
corpus, manadus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorari not only for the
2
enforcement of Fundamental Eights but also for any other purpose • As far as a 
writ of habeas corpus is concerned, a High Court has also the right to issue it 
under S.^91 cf Code of Criminal Procedure*
It was provided that a right to an adequate remedy for the protection
3
of fundament right was itself a right • Except on a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus ©r quo-warranto, a petitioner could only plead his own Fundamental 
Right* Habeas corpus was designed to secure the release of a person illegally 
deprived of his right to personal liberty. It could issue, if any of the 
provisions laid down in Arts* 6 and 7 of the Constitution of 1956 were contrav­
ened, as well as if rules of natural justice were not followed, while detaining 
or arresting a person.
k
As regards the emergency provisions, Professor Gledhill commends 
that these provisions were intended to make specific provision for emergencies, 
not provided for in constitutions of other countries, which had to be met by 
straining the language of their constitutions. The various kinds of emergencies 
and the vast powers given to the head of the Central Executive were, no doubt, 
unique.
1. See Ibid. Art.218.
2. See Ibid. Art.22.
3. - do -
*f. Op.cit. p.82.
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The Constitution of 1956 set out three kinds of emergencies.
Firstly, an emergency arising out of war, or external aggression, or internal 
disturbances beyond the control of the provincial government, or a threat to the 
security or economic life of Pakistan. The President, if satisfied that any of 
the aforesaid circumstances existed, could issue a Proclamation of Emergency.
The Proclamation had to be laid before the National Assembly as soon as possible, 
and; if approved by the Assembly, it would remain in force until the President 
himself revoked it; ifihe Assembly disapproved, it would cease to have effect 
from the date of disapproval . So long as the Proclamation remained in force, 
the National Assembly was empowered to legislate on provincial subjects; that 
did not affecttthe provincial legislature’s power to make any law under the 
Constitution, but provincial laws repugnant to the Federal laws made during the 
emergency, would be deemed void to the extent of repugnancy with the Federal 
laws and the Federal laws would prevail over provincial laws for the period of
j 2six months after the Proclamation ceased to operate , The Federal laws made
during the emergency, which the National Assembly was, otherwise incompetent to
make, would cease to have effect on the expiration of the period of six months
from the date of the withdrawal of the Proclamation, except as respects the
3
things done or emitted to be done . The executive authority of the Federation 
would extend to the giving of directions to the provinces as to the manner of 
exercising the executive authority of the Province. The President by order,
could as suite to himself or direct the Governor of a province to assume on behalf
1. Ibid. Art. 191 (1) and (6) ‘
2. Ibid. Art. 191 (3) and (4-)
3. Ibid. Art. 191 (5).
of the President or on his 07m  hehalf the powers of any organ of the government
A
in the province, except the legislature and High Court .
Secondly, on receiving a report from a Governor that the government of
his province could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution, the President could issue a proclamation, assuming all executive
powers of the provincial government and declaring that the powers of the
Provincial Legislature would vest in Parliament. But the powers vested in
the High Court, were not to be affected at all by this kind of proclamation,
nor was the operation of any constitutional provision relating to the High
Court suspended. The proclamation had to be laid, as soon as possible, before
the National Assembly and, if approved by the resolution of the Assembly, would
fcemain in operation for a total period of six months, except in case of
dissolution of National Assembly when it should cease to operate after the
expiry of thirty days from the date on which the National Assembly first met.
The Assembly could confer on the President the powers of the provincial
legislature to make laws but all such laws made by the President would cease to
have effect after the expiry of six months from the date of the withdrawal of
2
the Proclamation .
Thirdly, arising out of a threat to financial stability or the credit 
of Pakistan or any part thereof, the President could, after consultation with 
the Governor of the province concerned, issue a Proclamation of financial 
emergency, declaring that the executive authority of the Federation would extend 
to the giving of directions to observe such principles of financial propriety as
1. Ibid, V t. 191 (2)(c)
2. Ibid. Art. 193.
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were, specified in the directions, in order to maintain the financial stability 
or credit of Pakistan or any part thereof; the directions could include orders 
to reduce the pay of government servants and federal officials, including the 
judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. But such a Proclamation was to he 
subject to the same parliamentary control and would remain in force for the same 
length of time as that of an emergency of the second type .
It was further provided that, when a Proclamation of emergency was in 
force under Ait. 191, the President could by order, declare that the right to 
move amy court for the enforcement of such of the fundamental rights as were 
specified in the order, and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforce­
ment of the rigjhts so specified, would remain suspended while the Proclamation
remained in force. This order had also, as soon as possible, to be laid before
2
the National Assembly .
The Proclamation of emergency could not be challenged in the Courts.
Moreover, the Proclamation could be varied or revoked by a subsequent Proclamation
3
of the President. The President was the sole judge of the circumstances and the 
necessity to issue proclamation. The National Assembly was empowered to make 
laws indemnifying a 117 person in the service of Federal or Provincial Government 
or any other person, in respect of any act done in connection with the 
maintenance or restoration of order in any area in Pakistan where martial law 
was in force, or validating any sentence passed, punishment inflicted or any 
other act done under the martial law in such area^. The impact of this provision
1. Ibid. Art. 19k.
2. Ibid. Art. 192.
3. Ibid. Art. 195*
k. Ibid. Art. 196.
would fall mainly on the rightato personal liberty. A person illegally deprived 
of his personal liberty or unlawfully punished when martial law was in force 
would not have any remedy to invoke but the wrong done to him would not be 
justifiable after martial law had been withdrawn, unless covered by an Act of 
Indemnity.
It is submitted that, even though the 1956 Constitution gave vast 
powers to the Federal executive during an emergency, the Federal legislature 
could not^like the Indian Constitution, make laws infringing, abridging, or even 
taking away the fundamental rights; only the remedies to enforce the specified 
fundamental rights were suspended. Art.35® the Indian Constitution authorises 
the State to make any law or take any action, regardless of the Constitutional 
limitations on its law making power relating to fundamental rights under Arts. 13 
and 19; Parliament can, during an emergency, by legislation infringe, abridge or
A
abrogate any or all fundamental rights. Basil J. , while commending the vast and
unfettered powers given to Indian Parliament during an emergency quotes Dr.
2
Ambedkar* s speech in the Indian Constituent Assembly in favour of such provision 
as follows:-
,fThere can be noidoubt that, while there are certain 
Fundamental Rights which the State must guarantee to 
the individual in order that the individual may have 
some security and freedom to develop his own person­
ality, it is equally clear that in certain cases, 
where, for instance, the State’s very life is in 
jeopardy, those rights must be subject to a certain 
amount of limitation. In times of emergency, the 
individual himself will be found to have lost his 
very existense. Consequently, the superior right 
of the State to protect itself in times of emergency, 
so that it may survive that emergency and live to 
discharge its functions in order that the individual 
under the aegis of the State may develop, must be 
guaranteed as safely as the right of the individual.”
1. BasS. J. 'Commentary on the Constitution of India', Vol.l p. 282.
2.
105
Abrogation of the Constitution of 1956:
The Constitution of 1956 which was evolved after nine years of hard 
efforts by the Constitutional Assembly, passing through dire political ups and 
downs, did not continue long. After a very short period of two years, the 
Constitution was abrogated by the President Iskander Mirza on October 7, 1958; 
the central and provincial governments along with the legislatures were 
dismissed; and Martial law was declared throughout the Country. Reasons for 
issuing the Proclamation were also pronounced. General Aiyub Khan was appointed
A
as Chief Martial Law Administrator by the President •
On the same day, October 7, 1958, the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
issued a proclamation declaring that martial law orders and regulations for the 
purpose of restoring peace and order would be issued, whereby heavy penalties 
would be imposed; punishments under the existing laws would be enhanced; and 
special courts would be set up to try the offences in contravention of these ord­
ers and regulations, as well as offences under ordinary law. On October, 10, 
1958, the President promulgated the Laws (continuation if Force) Order, 1958, 
whereunder the laws which were in force at the time of the Proclamation were to 
be continued in force during the martial law period; the existing jurisdiction 
of the Courts was maintained, and it was provided - omitting the word * Islamic*- 
that Pakistan would be governed *as nearly as may be in accordance with the late 
Constitution.* It can be said that the Laws (Continuation in Force) Order 
actually constituted a new legal order or an interim constitutional document.
1. See the Chapter on Martial Law.
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But the Order was silentabout the fundamental rights. In State v. Dos so1
the Supreme Court held that the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958,
constituted the 'new Constitution1 and that all things could be determined ■
under this new legal order; even the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The
words 'shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with t he late
Constitution*, were interpreted as referring to the structure and outline
of the government and not to laws and parts of the late Constitution which
had been expressly abrogated by the Art. IV of the Order; these words did not
have the effect of restoring the fundamental rights as the 'so-called fundamental
rights* were no longer a part of the National Legal Order; no writ could be
issued to protect them. It was observed that the Supreme Court, deriving its
jurisdiction under the new national order, could only be moved for a writ when a
right, preserved by the Laws (Continuation in Force) Order, had been infringed ♦
In Province of East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan  ^re-affirming the view in Dosso* s
case, it was held that Fundamental Rights did not exist in the new legal order of
Pakistan. But in a later case the Supreme Court seems to have realized that it
still had a duty to protect the rights of the people and to be willing to
reconsider its earlier decisions. The Supreme Court in Mian Iftekhar-uddin y.
L
Mohammad Sarfrag observed that, if Dosso*s case required reconsideration, the 
question should be reserved for a more appropriate occasion.
During the martial law regime - number of regulations and orders 
were issued, creating new offences, imposing penalties and enhancing punishments
1. PIp. 1958, S.C. 533.
2. Ibid.
3. TJp. 1959, S.C. 387.
4. HD. 1961, S.C. 585.
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for some existing offences. Military Courts, along with the ordinary courts 
were set up, to try ordinary and martial law offences. On November, 16, 1958, 
the armed forces were withdrawn and on February 4, 1959, a reconstituted martial 
law regulation was promulgated, which provided that trials by the military 
courts should not be held, except on the orders of a zonal martial law 
administrator • "When President Mirza told foreign journalists that martial 
law would soon be lifted, General Ayub Khan, on October 1?, 1958, in a press 
statement, flatly contradicted the President. The President had no alternative 
but to resign. On October 27, 1958* General Ayub Khan became President.
On January 13, I960 the Presidential (Election and Constitution) Order 
was issued, under which, after the elections . under Basic Democracies Order, 
1959, the elected members of local government boards were to be called on by 
the Election Commission to declare by vote in secret ballot whether or not they 
had confidence in President Ayub Khan by majority; the result was in his favour.
On February 17, I960, a Constitution Commission with Mr.M.Shahabuddin, 
the former Chief Justice of Pakistan, as its Chairman, -.was set up by the 
President to report on the causes of the failure of the 1956 Constitution and 
also to suggest proposals for thenew Constitution of Pakistan. The Commission, 
on the analysis of the answers to the questionnaire by 6,429 people and interviews 
writh 565, presented its report to the President on April 29, 1961. Among other 
questions, such as whether Fakinstan should become a Federal or Unitary form of 
Government, or, whether it should follow the Presidential or Parliamentary 
pattern, whether legislatures should be unicameral or bicameral, whether election 
should be indirect or direct to the National Assembly t and the provincial
1. See Chapter on Martial Law.
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assemblies, whether there should be separate or joint electorates, the 
commission recommended the first alternatives. The majority of the replies 
to the questionnaire were of the same opinions, except that the opinions were 
equally divided on the question of Presidential or Parliamentary government. 
Having the support of 97*23 per cent of the replies, the Commission recommended 
that, in order to bring the existing law in Conformity with Islamic Principles, 
the relevant provisions of 1956 Constitution, be re-enacted*
As to the question whether the provisions of the late constitution 
enumerating the Fundamental Rights should be re-enacted in the new constitution, 
or whether the maintenance of such rights could safely be left, as in the 
United Kingdom, to the fundamental good sense of the legislature and the oper­
ation of recognised principles through the wisdom and experience of Courts,
98.39 per cent of the answers to the questionnaire favoured the first alternative 
The Commission, therefore, recommended that the Art. k- to 22 of the late 
Constitution, enumerating the Fundamental Rights should be incorporated in the 
new constitution* The Commission, however, suggested that Martial Law 
Regulation No.64, (The West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959) and the 
Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, should be given special protection from 
avoidance for violation of any constitutional limitations^ while the power to 
issue prerogative writs vested in High Courts by the Constitution of 1956,1* 
should be withheld from the Supreme Court, as appeals would lie to Supreme 
Court from the High Courts. 97. Uf per cent of the answers demanded the in­
corporation of directive principles of State policy in the Constitution.
Regarding the method of amendment of the Constitution, the Commission 
recommended that an amendment should (require the approval of two-thirds of the
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total membership of the National Assembly, and that a veto of President could 
be over-ruled by three-fourths; the provisions in the late constitution for
A
ratification by provincial assemblies should be restored ♦
President Ayub Khan considered the recommendations of the Commission 
in his Cabinet and on March 1, 1962, he announced a Constitution -which was to 
come into force on June 8, 1962.
Constitution of 1962;
The Constitution of 1962 was drafted mainly on the lines of the 
recommendations of the Constitution Commission, but the fundamental rights, 
though strongly recommended by the Commission, did not appear in it; instead, 
on the strength of the mandate given to Ayub Khan by the Basic Democrats on 
March 1, 1961, the ‘principles of law making* were incorporated in the 
Constitution. These principles could not be pleaded in a court against any 
law; it was clearly laid down that the validity of a law could not be called 
in question on the ground that the law disregarded, voilated or was otherwise 
not in accordance with the * Principles of law making; they were not enforceable 
in a court of law.
Demands were raised throughout the country for the incorporation of 
the fundamental rights in the Constitution* Consequently a Bill was introduced 
in National Assembly in March, 1963, to insert the provisions of the 195& Const­
itution relating to fundamental, rights, in the 1962 constitution and to restore 
the power of the Courts to declare laws, repugnant to or in contravention of 
the fundamental rights, void* One of the clauses of the Bill demanded that
1. See Prof. Alen Gledhill, op.cit. pp. 84 t© 120.
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any law, passed or made, on or after October 7* 1958?and being in force 
immediately before the coming into force of the proposed Amendments to the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963* would not be subject to judicial 
review. The clause was strongly criticised and the bill was referred to 
the Select Committee to report on it. The Committee submitted its report 
in April,1963, but it was not accepted, and the Bill was referred back to 
the Committee. In the final report, submitted in December,19631 the majority 
of the members of the Committee strongly supported the incorporation of the 
aforesaid clause in the Bill, with the amendments that, instead of nine 
hundred laws which Government wanted to exclude from the scope of the 
examination by the Courts in the light ©f proposed fundamental rights, only 
thirtyone laws, which were a bare minimum, should be protected from judicial 
review; as these were made during the interregnum between the two Constitutions 
and radical reforms were made to remove existing inequalities, and put the 
economic and social structure of the country on a better footing. It was also 
pointed out that, from the draftman's point of view, it would be better to 
limit entrenched legislation to the thirtyone laws specified in the Schedule. 
Finally, on the aforesaid recommendations, the Constitution (First Amendment) 
Act, 1963 was passed by the National Assembly and the Fundamental Rights were 
incorporated in the Constitution of 1962.
The Proclamation of October 7*1958, was revoked, and the martial 
law orders (including orders amending orders) such as the laws (Continuation 
in Force) Order, 1958, the Government (Presidential Cabinet) Order, 1958, the 
Legislative Powers Order, 1959* the State Arrangements Order, 195^ - all martial 
law regulations, except the West-Pakistan Land Reform Regulation 1959*
Rawalpindi (Requisition of Property) Regulation 1959* Pakistan Capital
H i
Regulation, I960, Scrutiny of Claims (Evacuee Property) Regulation, 1961, and 
West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959* were repealed; other existing laws 
(including Ordinances, Orders-in~Council, orders, rules, bye-laws, regulations 
and Letters Patent constituting a High Court, and any notifications and legal 
instruments having the force of law) in force in Pakistan or any part whereof 
or having the extra-territorial validity were continued in force. All other 
martial law enactments were further repealed with effect from the Constitution 
day by the Martial Law Orders (Repeal) Order, 1962, with the saving clause 
providpjgfor the validation of anything done under them, as well as for the 
continuation of investigation and proceedings already started under them. 
Provisions were also made for the purpose of bringing any existing law into 
accord with the 1962 Constitution’s provisions and the President was authorised 
to delegate his powers in this respect to the governors. The President was 
empowered to order such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition 
or omission, as in his view necessary; but it was specified that they would not 
have retrospective effect •
In Mohammad Afzal v. Commissioner, Lahore^Division it was contended 
that the courts had no power to examiner the validity of martial law orders; the 
Supreme Court pointed out that there was nothing in the Laws (Continuance in 
Force) Order which, then or during any time, could prevent a martial law.order 
from being called in question. It was further observed that the Constitution 
of 1962 and the Martial Law Orders (Repeal) Order could protect only things 
duly done or suffered under the martial orders or regulations.
1. Ibid, Art. 225.
2. ELD. 1963, S.C. 401.
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As regards Fundamental Rights, an important provision was added;
Art.2 proclaimed the rule of law. It laid down that, to enjoy the protection 
of the law, and to be treated in accordance with law, and only in accordance 
with law, was the inalienable right of every citizen; no action detrimental 
to life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person could be taken 
except in accordance with law and that no person could be prevented from or be 
hindered in, doing that which was not prohibited by law and that no person 
could be compelled to do that which the law did not require him to do.
'I
Murshed, C.J. in HQp;i Ghulam Xamine v. Khondkar , while evaluating the signifies 
ance of Art.2, remarked it ”is a codification of the ever-growing and elastic 
concept of ’due course of law’ as conceived in the American Constitution and 
is now embedded in our Constitution as a doctrine which cannot be altered by 
the ordinary machineries of legislation.”
As regards the restriction or limitations on the law making power
of the legislatures, Art.4 of the 1956 Constitution was re-enacted and it was
provided that any law, existing or enacted, other than the Constitutional Law,
or any custom having the force of law, so far as it was inconsistent with or
in contravention of Fundamental Rights, should be declared void to the, extent
of inconsistency or contravention; but as under the 1956 Constitution, laws
relating to the armed forces and forces charged with the maintenance of public
order, for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of their duties or the
maintenance of discipline among them, were immune from the aforesaid 
2limitations . One important clause was added to the Constitution, whereunder 
thirtyone laws as specified in the Fourth Schedule, consisting of Presidential 
orders, ordinances and regulations of the martial law period were excluded
1. P.L.D. 1965* Dac. 156.
2. • ' Art. 6(1), (2) and (3). of 1962 Constitution
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from judicial review^, in as much as they could not be called in question for 
contravention of or repugnancy to the Fundamental Rights.
Though these limitations applied to pre-constitution laws or laws 
enacted before the Fundamental Rights came into force, they did not affect 
anything done or suffered under these laws, because of the Constitution (First 
Amendment) Act, 1963* which was not retrospective • Only actions, taken under 
a law before the Fundamental Rights became operative and continued afterwards, 
if in conflict with the Fundamental Rights, would be affected by the aforesaid 
limitations^.
It was further provided that these constitutional limitations on the 
law-making power of the Government, could not prevent the Central Legislature 
from making any law indemnifying a government servant or any other person in 
respect to anything done in connection with the maintenance or restoration of 
order in any part of Pakistan where martial law was in force or validating any 
sentence passed, punishment inflicted or anything done under martial law in 
such areas •
3The provisions regarding the Fundamental Rights were similar to those 
in the 1936 Constitution, except that the order of these rights was changed 
and every right was provided with a separate title. The provisions relating 
to personal liberty were exactly the same as those in the 19^6 Constitution 
except in regard to Advisory Board in the provisions dealing with preventive
1. Ibid Art. 6(zf).
2. Jibendra Kishore v. Province of East Pakistan P.L.D. 1957, Dac 1. See also 
Keshawa Madhava Menon v. State of Bom, AIR, 1951 S.C. 128.
3. Abul Ala MaHdudi v. West Pakistan, PLD., 196k, S.C. 673. See also Prof.
Alan Gledhill, op.cit. at p. 19*+-195.
k. Constitution 1962, Art. 223A.
5* Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963*
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detention. It was now provided that, in the case of a person detained under 
a Central Law, the Board would consist of a Judge of Supreme Court, appointed 
by the Chief Justice of that court and a senior officer in the service of 
Pakistan, nominated by the President; if he were detained under a Provincial 
Law, the Board would consist of a Judge of High Court, nominated by the Chief 
Justice of that Court and a senior officer in the service of Pakistan, 
nominated by the Governor of that province. Protection against double jeopardy 
and self-incrimination was not guaranteed, as had been the case under the 1956 
Constitution •
The emergency provisions differed from those in the 1956 Constitution 
in many respects. Instead of the three kinds of emergency enumerated in the 
1956 Constitution, there was only one kind of emergency, which could be 
declared (a) when Pakistan or any part thereof was threatened by war or 
external aggression, or (b) wheh the security of economic life of Pakistan was 
threatened by internal disturbances beyond control of Provincial Government.
But the scope of the powers given to the President during the period in which 
the proclamation of emergency was in force, was so wide as almost to make the 
President a dictator. The President was empowered, if satisfied that a grave
emergency, of the kind specified above, ocisted to issue a Proclamation of
3
Emergency which, was required to be laid, as soon as possible, before the
4
National Assembly , but the Assembly had no power of control over the
President, as it had under the 1956 Constitution, for its authority to dis-
, 5
approve the Presidents actions or enactments was taken away • A President’s
Tl See S.403 Code of Criminal Procedure & some sections Evidence Act. See 
Chapter on Procedural safeguards.
2. Constitution of 1962 - as amended up to 1966 - Art.50.
3. Ibid. Art.30(1) (2) and (3$.
*f. Ibid. Art. 30(5)
5* Ibid. Art. 30(6) as substituted by the Constitution (7th Amendment) Act,
1966, for the original clause (6)
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Ordinance could not be rendered inoperative by resolution of the Assembly but 
before it ceased to have effect, the Assembly could, with or without amendment, 
by resolution approve it, in which<ase it would become an Act of the Central 
Legislature • The President was empowered, while a Proclamation of Emergency 
was in force, to make ordinances, if satisfied of the need to do so - whether 
the National Assembly was dissolved or in session or not - but such ordinances 
were required to be put before the National Assembly as soon as practicable; 
these ordinances would have the same force of law as an Act of the central 
legislature • The ordinances, thus made, if not approved by the Assembly or 
repealed by the President, would cease to have effect afterv,the Proclamation 
had been revoked^. The President was authorised to revoke the Proclamation,
whenever satisfied that the circumstances creating the emergency had ceased to
kexist . It was, however, provided that the ordinance-making power of the 
President was subject to the same constitutional limitations as that of the
5
Central Legislature .
Though previously the 1962 Constitution, like the 1956 
Constitution, provided only for the suspension of the remedies to enforce 
Fundamental Rights, while the Proclamation of Emergency was in force, and did 
not touch the Fundamental Rights themselves, an important clause was added in 
1965 by the Constitution Fifth Amendment Act, which removed the bar of 
restriction under Art.6 on the law making power of the state, in relation to
some of the Fundamental Rights. The new clause provided that the rights to
TI Ibid. Art. 30 (6a).
2. Ibid. Art. 30 (*f).
3. Ibid. Art. 30 (7)*
*f. Ibid. Art. 30 (3)*
3. Ibid. Art. 30 (8).
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freedom of movement, assembly, speech association, travel, business or 
profession, and the right to hold, acquire and dispose of property, contained 
in paragraphs 6, 7* 8, 9 and 13 ©f Chapter I of Part II of 1962 Constitution 
while the Proclamation of Emergency was in force, did not restrict the legisla­
tive or executive power of the State, but any law so made, should, t© the
extent t© the repugnancy to Art*6, should cease to have effect and should
1
be deemed to have been repealed after the Proclamation was revoked • This 
clause resembled the Art.356 of the Indian Constitution at least in respect of 
the aforesaid rights; it gave unfettered law making power to the State during 
an emergency, inasmuch as the State could infringe ©r abrogate any of the above 
mentioned Fundamental Rights. But it is notable that the clause itself did not 
annul or abrogate these Fundamental Rights, but temporarily removed the constit 
utional limitations ©n the law making power of the State in relation to these 
rights.
The right t© personal liberty, along with other Fundamental Rights 
was not included in the aforesaid list. In other words the State was not 
authorised to make laws infringing or abrogating the right to personal liberty,
and the other rights so saved from the application ef clause (9) of Art.30,even
2
during an emergency. In Gopalan v. State of Madra , it was observed by the 
Supreme Court of India that the Indian Constitution has accepted preventive 
detention as the subject matter of peace time legislation as distinct from 
emergency legislation; there is no such provision in the Constitution ©f any 
other country; the Indian Constitution has deliberately and plainly given
power to Parliament and the State legislatures to enact preventive detention
1 * Ibid. Art,30(9)» as substituted by the Constitution (5th Amendment) Act, 
1963iS.2.,for original clause (9) which was added by the Constitutional 
(1st Amendment), Act,1963, S*5* rp.This original clause (9) is now reprod­
uced in clause (10).
2. A.I.R.,1950, SC.27,
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laws, even In peace time, which is a novel feature of the Indian Constitution,
which it is not for the Court to question. The Pakistan Supreme Court held
1in Ghulam Jilani. and Abdul Bagi cases that the ri^it to personal liberty 
cannot he infringed or taken away, even during an emergency; deprivation of 
personal liberty arbitrarily, without sufficient or reasonable grounds, could 
not he justified in any circumstances; in a case of preventive detention the 
detaining authority * had to prove, beyond any doubt that he was satisfied 
with the grounds on which an authority empowered by law could have issued a 
detention order to deprive a person of personal liberty; and that such1 satis­
faction* by the detaining authority should never be subjective, whether in 
emergency or peace time; it should always be * objective* in the sense that 
the laws or actions depriving a person, of so precious a right as personal 
liberty, could never be immune from scrutiny by the Courts on juridical 
review.
Lastly, like the 1956 Constitution; the President was empowered
to suspend, by order, the remedy or the ri$it to move the Courts for the
enforcement of any or all such Fundamental Rights as specified in the Order;
or the proceedings which * invoke the determination of any question as to the
infringement of any of such rights as specified*, for the period the Proclamation
2
was to be in force • The words in inverted commas were added by the Constitution 
(Fifth Amendment) Act, 1965, and were intended to prevent even -the initiation 
of proceedings to question the violation of any of the Fundamental Bights so 
specified. In other words, they were meant to give arbitrary power to the
1. m>., 1967, s.c. 375; EW, 19&  S.C. 5^.
2* Original Clause (9) of Art* 30 of the Constitution of 1962 as amended by 
the Constitution (vth Amendment) Act, 1965, was reproduced in clause (10) 
of Art. 30.
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executive to infringe the Fundamental Fights, without being called in question* 
Moreover, this clause did not make any distinction between those Fundamental 
Eights saved by clause (9) of Art* 30 and others which were not so protected*
But, as has been already said, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Malik Cfrmiftm 
Jilani' s case^ * held that the right to personal liberty could not be restricted 
arbitrarily, even during an emergency, and any infringement of the right to 
personal liberty would be subject to judicial review.
It is submitted that these clauses in the 1962 Constitution, like the 
corresponding provision in the 1956 Constitution do not authorise the State to 
annul or abrogate the Fundamental Bights, but simply empower the President to 
suspend the remedy to enforce such Fundamental Rights as are specified in the 
Order of the President, while the Proclamation of Emergency is in force. Though 
the State is empowered to make laws affecting some of the Fundamental Rights - 
paragraphs 5>6,7>8,9 and 13 of Chapter 1 of Part II of 1962 Constitution - 
regardless of Constitutional limitations on its law making power, the provision 
is not so absolute as to make the State's authority arbitrary in this respect; 
it simply removed the incompetenoy of the State to make laws affecting some of 
the aforesaid Fundamental Rights, aod, it was expressly laid down that the 
moment the Proclamation of Emergency was revoked, the laws so made should cease to 
have effect to the extent of their repugnancy to the relevant Fundamental Rights 
And should be deemed to be repealed to that extent* Moreover, it was not laid 
down that the laws so made could not be called in question; they were liable to 
be challenged in a Court of law, unless the right to move the Court to enforce
1, Malik Ghulam Jilani v* Govt* of West Pakistan, Supra.
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such Fundamental Rights was suspended ty the Presidential Order under the afore­
said clause. It is also to be noted that the removal of the constitutional 
bar from the law making power of the dtate in respect of these Fundamental 
Rights under clause (9) of Art. 30, applied to all part of Pakistan or 
Pakistan as a whole, whereas the order of the suspension of the right to 
move the Court to enforce such Fundamental Rights as specified in the order, 
by the President under Art.30(l0) would have force either in whole of Pakistan 
or any part thereof only.
As regards the Judiciary, unlike the 1956 Constitution, original
Jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writs no longer vested in the Supreme
Court. Under the 1962 Constitution only the High Courts were empowered to issue
the writs but an appeal lay to the Supreme Court from the High Courts. The
Supreme Court had also appellate Jurisdiction when a person had been sentenced
to death, or transportation for life or punished for contempt of court by a
High Court. But Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution, while conferring original
Jurisdiction on the High Courts to enforce the Fundamental Rights, did not
mention the word 'writ1 but instead used the words ‘make an order*; secondly,
unlike the 1956 Constitution, the names of five prerogative writs were not
mentioned but five categories of conditions for the issue of the orders under
Art.98, were prescribed. These conditions were generally the same as those
applicable to the prerogative writs but it was provided to issue orders
corresponding to certiorari and prohibition to quash non-Judicial order. As
1. Constitution of 19&, Art.9^. ------
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regards the order to enforce personal liberty, it was provided that, on the 
application of any person, a High Court would make an order directing that a 
person in custody in the Province be brought before the High Court so that the 
Court would satisfy itself that the person was not being held in custody without 
lawful authority or in an unlawful manner; this is similar to the conditions app­
licable to the writ of habeas corpus.
Cornelius C. J., in a speech at the Civil Service Academy, explained 
the importance of provisions regarding writs in the 1962 Constitution. He 
said that in Art.98 the ancient names of the writs had been eliminated but the 
categories (of provisions) distinguished themselves easily under those names; 
in Art.98 the true content of each of the major writs had been set out in the 
long form of the words. The object probably was to attain certainty as to the 
limits within which the courts could act. Previously, in each case the Courts 
used to refer to precedents from England, the U.S.A., India and several other 
countries to determine their writ Jurisdiction, which was no longer necessary, 
as the powers were expressed not by l^bel but by full expression. The Superior 
Courts had the power and duty to interpret the words of the Constitution but 
it was not likely that the earlier precedents would lose their value as
guidance. In Art.98 there were verbal changes in respect of the availability
.
of the writ to protect the ri^its of public servants. Except habeas corpus 
the true purpose of the writs was to maintain discipline in the administrative
and Judicial fields and therefore the writs were available to the maximum
1 2 extent . In Mehboob Ali Malik y. Province of West Pakistan it was observed
1. H£>. 2964, ’Journal Section' 73 at pp.78-79.
2. S^D. 1963, Iah, 575
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that, whereas in the 1956 Constitution the scope of the writs was not defined 
but had to be gathered from the text books on the subject, as well as from cases 
decided in England and other countries, Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution attempted 
to reduce into self-contained propositions the substance of the writs, with the 
exclusion of such incidents which, in the course of their evolution, had been 
attached to some of those writs but were not of the essence of the remedy; and 
that in some oases the field covered by the earlier writ had been enlarged and 
in others it had been somewhat curtailed, and the conditions of exercise of 
Jurisdiction in relation to various writs had thus become more uniform; any 
order passed in excess of lawful authority could be declared without legal 
effectfcjfwas enlarged in some cases and curtailed in others in comparison with 
the writ Jurisdiction in the 1956 Constitution. In Shankat Ali y. Commissioner
A
Lahore Division , it m s  observed that Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution afforded 
a new method of an extraordinary character for the enforcement of legal rights.
A very wide and new Jurisdiction had been conferred on the High Court to 
remedy all possible kinds of injustice, where there was no adequate remedy 
under the ordinary law. The Article had created no substantive right but 
only provided a new form of remedy through the High Court.
2
In Muhammad Bachal v. Dy. Rehabilitation Commissioner the High Court, 
comparing Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution with Art.2(4) of the Laws (Contination 
in Force) Order 1958, observed that no one would deny that the Constitution of 
1962 did not confer precisely the same writ powers on High Courts as existed
1. :?¥>., 1963 Lah.127.
2 . H p . , 1962 Kar.889,
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under Art.2(4) of the Laws (Continuation in Force) Order. The powers were not 
the same and $ne noticeable difference was that Art.98 did not mention the i
prerogative writs referred to in Art.2(4) of the aforesaid Order.
An important addition was made in clause (2) of Art.98 - paragraph (c)
to Art.98)2) - by the Constitution (first Amendment) Act, 1963, thereunder
every aggrieved party was entitled to move the High Court to make an order to
any person or authority, including Government, within, the territorial
Jurisdiction of the Court, by giving such directions as would be appropriate
for the enforcement of any Fundamental Right - as conferred by Chapter I of
Part II of the 1962 Constitution. By this amendment the remedy to enforce the
\
Fundamental Right was itself given the Status of a right • The Constitution
(First Amendment) Act, 1963 also added a very valuable clause - clause (3) -
to Art. 1339 thereunder this newly added limb (c) of clause (2) of Art.98, was
given protection from the law making power of the legislatures - which, except
in relation to making of laws as to Fundamental Rights, was unchallengeable in
2a Court of law* the validity of such laws ccxild not be called in question — 
and it was provided that the lav/ making power of the legislatures under Art.
133 should never be construed to have effect in respect of the right afforded 
by paragraph (c) of Art. 98(2) and that the power of a High Court exercisable un­
der Art.98(2)(c) could never be taken away, limited or restricted by the 
legislatures* enactments. It can be added that this clause Art. 133(3) 7  
raised the position of the remedy to enforce Fundamental Right under Art. 98(2) 
(c) to the status of a Fundamental Right in the sense that it could not be
1. Abul Ala Maudoodi v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P1I)#,1964, S.C.673 ( 782)
2. Constitution of 1962, Art. 133*
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abrogated, infringed or restricted by the legislatures* The only limitation 
on the right to an order to enforce a Fundamental Right was the availability 
of an adequate alternative remedy under the ordinary law.
As regards habeas corpus to enforce the right to personal liberty, 
Art.98 (2)(b)(i) laid down that on the application of any person, not necessarily 
the detenu, asserting that a person was held in custody without lawful authority 
or in an unlawful manner, a High Court should make an order directing that the 
person in the custody should be brought before that court, so as to enable it to 
determine whether the assertion was correct; the writ would issue if any of the 
provisions in Right No. l/paragraph 2 of Chapter X of Part II - provisions 
regarding the protection of personal liberty - was violated. The petitioner 
could represent his own case before the High Court, if he was not in a position 
to be defended by the legal practitioner, or to communicate with the court.
The writ was also available to a person who had been in custody but was 
subsequently released on bail.
On September 6,1965, President Ayuh Khan, issued a Proclamation of 
Emergency, on account of the war with India, under Art.30(l)* declaring that 
he was satisfied that a grave emergency existed, in which Pakistan was in 
imminent danger of being threatened by war. On the same day, he issued an 
order tinder clause (10) of Art.30, suspending,while the Proclamation was in 
force, the right to move a High Court for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights 
enumerated in paragraphs 2,3*5*6,7*8,9,13>14 and 17 3n Part II of the 
Constitution of 1962 and all proceedings pending in Court for the enforcement 
of the said rights. Safeguards against arrest and detention were suspended, 
although the right to life and liberty was not touched but, if a man could
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not be protected against detention, his personal liberty would no longer exist.
The emergency w e l s  not revoked, till quite recently when Martial Law/as reimposed
throughout Pakistan, on 25th March, 1969. A number of defence and security
enactments were made during this period, such as the Defence of Pakistan
Ordinance, 1965# under which the Defence of Pakistan Rules,1965, were promul-
gated. But in Ghulam Jilani* s case, though the Emergency Proclamation h«d n@t
been revoked, it was held that a person could not be deprived arbitrarily of hi a
personal liberty ; the detaining authority1 s •satisfaction* in r.32
of the D.P.R. of the sufficiency of the ground for making an order for the
detention of any person could not be subjective, whether in emergency or
peace time; it was always subject to scrutiny by the Courts in Judicial review,
and that the principle of objective satisfaction should always be followed by 
2
the Court . It was a very bold decision, given when there was an emergency, 
declared and continued by a strong Presidential regime. This principle was 
applied in later cases, such as Baqi Baloch and Sorish Kashmiri.
Abrogation of the 1962 Constitution;
President Ayyup Khan, faced with the wave of killing and looting 
which had plunged wide areas of Pakistan into near anarchy, on March 25,1969, 
relinquished -the reins of power to the armed forces. In a brief radio broad­
cast, which he called his *last speech*, he announced that he was standing down 
as President and was handing over the administration to General A.M.Tahya 
Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. President Ayyub Khan said that 
^he country* s condition was * deteriorating day by day* ; iis economy had been
1. Supra.
2. Malik Ghulam Jilani v. _ ‘ W esl Hp.1967 S.C.373
see also Baqi Baloch v. Dy. Commissioner Karbchi, P.L.D.1968 S.C.313 and 
Govt, of West Pakistan v. Begum A.K. Gorish Kashmiri, BED. 1969 S.C. 14*
12 5
shattered; administrative institutions were being paralysed; self-aggrandisement 
was the order of the day; people were circling the places in Gharaos and looting 
or murdering at will; oppression and duress on civil authorities and the public 
at large was prevalent; no one had the courage to speak the truth. Lastly, he 
referred to the letter, which he had written to General Yahya Kan the day 
before, in which he said that, with profound regret, he had come to the 
conclusion that the civil administration and constitutional machinery in the 
country had become ineffective and, if the situation was allowed to continue 
to deteriorate, economic life and civilized existence would become impossible; 
he had been left with no other option but to step aside and leave it to the 
Defence forces, which, according to him represented the 'only effective and 
legal instrument* to take over full control of the affairs of the country; the 
situation had gone out of the control of the Government and there could be no 
recourse except to the Armed Forces.
Immediately after F.M. Ayuta Khan, General Yahya Khan broadcast a 
Proclamation, placing the country under Martial Law, announcing the abrogation 
of the Constitution of 19^2, dissolving the National and Provincial Legislative 
Assemblies, dismissing the President*s Council of Ministers as well as the two 
newly appointed Governors of East and West Pakistan, and declaring himself the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator. He said that a situation had arisen in the 
country, in which the civil administration could not effectively function and 
that, in the interest of National security, it had become necessary to place
1. See 'Dawn* Karachi, March 26 1969
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the country under Martial Law. The Proclamation, on the lines of 1958 
Proclamation, stated that Martial Law Regulations and Orders would be 
promulgated by the C.M.L.A. or by any authority empowered by him, and 
punishment would be inflicted in the manner convenient to the M.L.Administrators, 
contravention of Martial Law Regulations and Orders would be dealt with such 
penalties as would be prescribed by the Regulations; military Courts would be 
set up for the trial and punishment of any offence under Martial law as well 
as under the ordinary law; special and enhanced penalties for offences under 
ordinary law would be prescribed; ordinary courts would be authorised to try 
and punish contraventions of Regulations and Orders; the ordinary courts could, 
however be barred from trying any offence prescribed in such Regulations or 
Orders; and that, notwithstanding the abrogation of the Constitution of 1962 
and subject to Regulations and Orders made by the C.M.L.A., all laws, including 
Ordinances, M.L. Regulations, Orders, Rules, by-Laws, notifications and other 
instruments having the force of law, in force immediately before the abrogation 
of the Constitution would continue to be in force; all the Courts and Tribunals 
in existence immediately before the Proclamation would continue in existence 
and would exercise all the powers and Jurisdiction as previously, except that 
no Court could call in question any M.L. Regulations or Orders or any finding 
or Judgement or order of a military court, and that no writ or other order 
could be issued against the C.M.L.A. or any authority working under him.
Unlike the 19^8 Proclamation, the Proclamation of 1969 placed the 
C.M.L.A. and all persons in authority under him above criticism or challenge; 
the acts of such authorities could not be impugned and no order made by them 
could be called in question. A significant difference from the 19^8 Proclamation
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is that the Jurisdiction of the superior Courts to issue writs against any of 
M.L. Authorities, has been expressly and completely taken away. The laws 
(Continuance in Force) Order, 1958# provided that writs could not issue to M.L. 
Administrator, but would be sent to M.L. authority that had succeeded, but 
would not be binding on them. The restriction on the writ Jurisdiction in the 
Proclamation of 1969 was reinforced by the Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of 
Doubts) Order, No. 3/69, which declared that no writ whatever would issue 
against the Martial Law authorities and all pending proceedings would abate*
The Supreme Court and the High Court Judges would continue in their offices 
and would exercise the same power of Jurisdiction as prior to the Proclamation, 
except as provided in the Proclamation and subject to the further orders of the 
C.M.L.A.1.
On April 1969, the C.M.L.A. issued the Provisional Constitution Order, 
which seems to have been drafted on the lines of L.C.F.O., 1958. It was to 
come into force at once, with retrospective effect from the date of the 
Proclamation, March 25, 1969. It announced, unlike the L.C.F.O., 1958, that 
the C.M.L.A. would be the President of Pakistan, and, like the latter, it 
provided that, notwithstanding the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution, the 
country ’will be governed as nearly as may be* in accordance with the 
Constitution, subject to any Regulation or Order, made, from time to time, by 
the C.M.L.A. The most significant feature of the Provisional Constitution 
Order is that, whereas the L.C.F.O,, 1958, was silent about the Fundamental 
Rights, it specifically abrogated and annulled most of the Fundamental Rights,
1. Martial Law Proclamation Order, see ’Dawn* Karachi, March 26, 1969.
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those enumerated in paragraphs 2,4,5>6,7,8,9,13,14,15 and 17 of Chapter I of 
Part II of the 1962 Constitution, which included the right to protection against 
arrest and detention, freedom from retrospective punishment and freedom of 
movement and residence. It lays down that all proceedings pending in the 
Courts for the enforcement of any of the rights, enumerated above, Rha 11 abate.
No ordinance promulgated by the President or the Governor of a Province, 
and no ordinance in force before the Proclamation could be called in question, 
no writ judgement, decree, order or process could be made or issued against the 
C.M.L.A. or any authority exercising power under him. There were similar 
provisions in L.C.P.O., 1958.
The Courts, subject to the President’s Orders and M.L. Regulations 
and Orders, would have the same jurisdiction and powers as before the 
Proclamation but no appeal would lie to the Supreme Court from a High Court, 
except when the High Court on appeal reversed an acquittal and imposed a 
sentence of death or transport at ion for life, or imposed such sentence in a 
case withdrawn from a subordinate Court for trial or “where the High Court 
certified that a substantial question of constitutional law was involved or the 
High Court committed a person for contempt of itself.
Other provisions of the Provisional Constitution Order are similar
to those of L.C.F.O., 1958. It is, however, provided that any regulation, made
by C.M.L.A* or any authority exercising power under him, which comes into
conflict with any existing law or ordinance, will prevail. For purposes of
of,
this study, the most remarkable effect/the Provisional Constitution Order is 
that it deprives a person, preventively detained, of the right of recourse to 
an advisory board, if it is proposed to detain him for more than three months,
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for it lays down that paragraph 2 of Chapter I of Part II of the 1962
A
Constitution shall he of no effect • There was a similar provision in Art. 7 of 
L.C.F.O., 1958 which laid down that any provision in any law providing for the 
reference of a detention order to an Advisory Board, should he of no effect.
It is submitted that the right to move the Courts to issue writs to 
enforce the specified Fundamental Rights has been suspended and the jurisdiction 
of the Superior Courts to issue writs for this purpose has been taken away.
The Provisional Constitution gives arbitrary powers to the Martial law 
authorities to deprive a person of personal liberty, in as much as the power 
of judicial review of the actions of the Martial law authorities has been 
annulled; no action of the Martial Law authorities can be called in question 
in any Court of law.
Shortly after the Proclamation of Martial Law, 1969, a petition an
2
April 28, 1969 was filed in the Lahore High Court under S.56I-A of the Cr.
P.C. to quash the proceedings, instituted against the petitioners in 1967, 
long before the imposition of Martial law, under SS.420 and 468 of the Penal 
Code read with S.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, on the ground 
inter alia that no criminal offence had been disclosed and that the continuance 
of theproceedings against them amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court. 
The proceedings were transferred to the Special Military Court by the M.L. 
Administrator, Zone A, for trial from the Court of the Special Judge (Central) 
Rawalpini, A single judge of the High Court, on the application of the petition­
er's counsel,referred the matter to the Chief Justice for constituting a larger 
Bench for decision of the questions raised, as they were of general public
interest. .
1. See Provisional Constitution Order, 19^9.
2. Mir Hassan v. State, H D * , 1969, Iah.786.
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The questions before the Hi$i Court were; (a) whether the cases of 
the petitioners, which had not only been pending in the Court of the Central 
Special judge, but had also been instituted before the imposition of Martial 
Law, had been properly transferred to the special Military Court by the Zonal 
M.L. Administrator for trial; (b) whether the Provisional Constitution Order 
preserved all the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court, including their 
inherent powers under S. 5 61-4 of the Cr.P.C. , when there was no other provision 
comparable to it; and (c) what was the effect of Art.2 of the Constitution,
1962, which was preserved by Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution Order vis-a- 
vis Art .6(2) of the said Order. .
As to the question of the Zonal Martial Law Administrator1 s power, 
under Martial Law Regulation 1969, No.42, to transfer pending cases under the 
ordinary law, from criminal courts, the Court held that the power has been 
completely taken away by the later and reconstituted Martial Law Regulation No. 45 
- previously Martial law Regulation No.3 - and therefore, Martial Law 
Regulation No.42 could not be invoked to transfer cases; and secondly that cases 
which were pending before the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No.42 
itself, could not be transferred from the ordinary Courts.
As regards the second question, whether the Provisional Constitution 
Order, 1969 preserved all the powers and jurisdiction of the High Courts, 
including their inherent powers, the Court held that except as provided by the 
Provisional Constitution Order, all the powers of a High Court enjoyed by it 
immediately before the abrogation of the Constitution of 1962, continued to 
vest in it.
As to the question of the effect of Art. 2 of the 1962 Constitution,
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the Court made very comprehensive observations. It pointed out that Provisional 
Constitution Order, by virtue of its Art. 2, is an addition to the Proclamation 
of Martial Law and is neither in derogation of it nor subject to it. In other 
words, it has the same status as the Proclamation of Martial Law; and since the 
Proclamation itself is not subject to Martial Law Orders or Regulations, the 
Provisional Constitution Order cannot be subject to them. As the Provisional 
Constitution; Order, while abrogating most of the Fundamental Rights, ha& 
purposely preserved Art.2 of the 1962 Constitution, and as the Provisional 
Constitution Order is not subject to Martial law Regulations or Orders, its 
provisions and the rights preserved by it cannot be derogated by the Martial 
Law Regulations and Orders; it cannot, therefore, be amended by a Martial Law 
Regulation or Order but only by the amendment of the Provisional Constitution 
Order itself. "Whether the President and the Chief Martial Law Adinistrator, 
who is not himself above the law, can now amend it is a question to be answered 
when the time comes to do so. Art. 2 of the 1962 Constitution, which entitles 
citizens to the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law 
and only in accordance with law, provides -that no person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty, reputation or property without due process of law, It 
further declares that no public functionary can take any action affecting 
life, liberty, reputation or property without lawful justification. It was 
therefore, held that, the action of any authority, including a Martial Law 
Authority, howsoever high he may be,without the backing of a Constitutional 
provision, is not immune from being struck down by the Courts of the country.
It is submitted that the Lahore High Court was wrong in holding that 
the Provisional Constitution Order is not subject to M.L. Regulations or Orders, 
and that, as the Provisional Constitution Order has preserved Art.2 of the
Constitution of 1962, no Martial Authority, even the C.M.L.A., can take an 
action against any person which has no justification under law,as required by 
the aforesaid Art.2. When the C.M.L.A., himself is law-giver, the promulgator 
of the Provisional Constitution Order 1969* itself, and especially when the 
Martial law Proclamation of 1969 has specially laid down that no acts or orders 
made by the C.M.L.A. or any authority exercising power under him, can be 
challenged by any person or called in question by the Courts, it was not 
correct to hold that the C.M.L.A. or any authority exercising power under him 
was subject to the Provisional Constitution Order.
The reaction from the C.M.L.A. to the findings of the High Court 
was very prompt. Being conscious that this decision of the High Court would 
restrict the discretion of the Martial Law Authorities, circumscribe their 
legislative power and render their orders and regulations, their executive acts 
and the decisions of the Military Courts liable to scrutiny by the Superior 
Courts, the C.M.L.A. promulgated the jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts)
"I
Order, 1969 • It states that, as doubts have arisen as to whether the Supreme 
Court or a High Court has power to issue a writ, order, notice or other process 
to or against a Military Court or Summary Military Court, or in relation to 
any proceedings of or any jurisdiction exercised by any such Military Court or 
any Martial Law Authority, the President directed, with retrospective effect 
from the Proclamation Day - March 25, 1969i gnd with paramount effect over 
the Proclamation of Martial Law, any Martial Law Regulation or Order, the 
Provisional Constitution Order or over any law for the time being in force, 
that no court, tribunal, or any other authority, including the Supreme Court
and a High Court, should receive or entertain any complaint, petition,
lT Presidents Order III of 1969, see Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary)
June 50, 1969.
application or any other representation whatsoever against, or in relation to 
the exercise of any power or jurisdiction by any Special Military Courts, 
Summary Military Courts or any Martial Law Authority or any person exercising 
jurisdiction or power derived from Martial Law Authority or call or permit to 
be called in question in any manner^whatsoever , any finding, sentence, order, 
proceeding or any other action of,by or before the aforesaid Courts or 
Authorities; or issue or make any writ, order, notice or other process to or 
against, or in relation to the exercise of any power or jurisdiction by such 
Courts or Authorities; or any judgement given, sentence passed, writ, order, 
notice or process issued or made, or thing done in contravention of the above 
clauses by the ordinary courts - including a High Court and the Supreme Court 
- would be of no effect; and if any question arises as to the correctness, 
legality or propriety of the exercise of any powers or jurisdiction by such 
courts or authorities, it should be referred to the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, whose decision thereon should be final. Any question,which 
arose as to the interpretation of any Martial Law Regulation or Order, should 
be referred to the Martial Law Authority issuing the same for decision, and the 
decision of such Martial Law Authority should be final and not be questioned 
in any Court, tribunal or other authority, including the Supreme Court and a 
High Court.
By the aforesaid Order, the powers and jurisdiction rested in the
Superior Courts to see that Martial Law Authorities do not transgress the
provisions of the Provisional Constitution Order, to interprete the
Regulations and Orders issued by these Authorities, and to scrutinize actions
of Martial Law Authorities and decisions of the Military Courts, have been
1. Mir Hasan v. State,supra.
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completely taken away. The most crucial aspect of the Order is that laws 
made by the Martial Law Authorities cannot be called in question nor cam 
any Regulation or Order be interpreted by the Courts; the Martial Authorities 
have themselves assumed these powers and jurisdiction of the Superior Courts.
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CHAPTER 5.
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY.
Constitutional Guarantees
The right to personal liberty is guaranteed by Right No.l in the
Pakistan Constitution of 1962 and safeguards against its deprivation are
provided by Rights No.2,^ f and in Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution
of Pakistan 1962* Analogous provisions, in the Indian Constitution, are found
in Arts. 20, 21 and 22 in Part III of the Indian Constitution. In Pakistan
Right No.l lays down that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, save
in accordance with law. Most constitutions of the world, while guaranteeing
the right to personal liberty , enunciate that no person can be deprived of the
2
right to personal liberty except in accordance with ’law* ; or *a legal
3 *fjudgement of his peers or the law of the land1 ; or ’due process of law* ; or
5
•procedure established by law* •
The Indian Constitution borrowed from the Japanese Constitution the
phrase *in accordance with procedure established by law1, but, following the
Irish Constitution added the adjective •personal* before the word ’liberty*,
£
so as to restrict its interpretation to a specific and narrower sense . On 
the other hand the Pakistan Constitution adopted the Irish expression *in 
accordance with law*, but did not use the adjective ’personal* before the 
word ’liberty*, which can therefore be interpreted in a more general and wider
7
sense.
1. See Chapter II.
2. Constitution of Pakistan, Right No.l; Irish Constitution Art.^ fO.^ f.l;
Burmese Constitution, S.16;
3* Magna Carta, Clause 29;
4. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments - U.S.A. Constitution
5* Indian Constitution, Art.21, and Japanese Constitution Art.31
6. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR. 1930, S.C. 27 •
7. See Abul Ala Maudoocfiv. State Bank of Pakistan, Supra.
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The expression 'by the law of the land* in the Magna Carta is 
regarded as the foundation stone of the principle of protection of personal 
liberty, on which the writ of habeas corpus is based* It is accepted ■that the 
notion of the writ of habeas corpus developed to enforce the aforesaid phrase. 
Earlier the words of the phrase were construed as meaning 'by due process of 
the Common Law1 # But this construction gave a very narrow meaning to it, 
namely, *by the law as administered by the common law Courts', as opposed to the i 
wider interpretation 'by the general law, as practised by the Council, the local 
and franchise Courts and the Chancery.' Coke C.J., for the first time maintained 
that the expression should be interpreted in the wider sense, so as to include 
the general law as administered by common law and other courts. He dropped the 
words 'common law' and laid down that the expression 'by the law of the land*
4
must be taken to mean 'by due process of law .
The 'institutes' of Coke C.J. are regarded as the foundation of the 
American Constitutional theories. Originally, the framers of the American 
Constitution has adopted Magna Carta's phrase 'by the law of the land*. But 
later on, being influenced by Coke* s idea, the expression, 'by due process 
of law' was introduced in the Fifth Amendment, which was followed in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of America.
In England the liberty of a subject is not protected against the 
2
enactments of Parliament . If Parliament, by express legislation, authorises
the deprivation of the liberties of the subject, then such law is not subject
1. See Coke^C.J., Institutes. Part II 292, (1669)
2. See Chapter IV.
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to judicial review. The expressions 'by the law of the land* and 'by due 
process of law,' in England, provide safeguard for the protection of personal 
liberty against the executive. It connotes that, if an authority, by any 
action, deprives a person of his liberty, that action should be justified 
by law of the land. To put it differently, a subject cannot be deprived of 
his personal liberty, without lawful justification. It was observed in 
Liyersidge y. Anderson that 'all the Courts today and not least this House, 
are jealous as they have ever been upholding the liberty of a subject. But
that liberty is a liberty - confined and controlled by law,' whether common
1 2 law or Statute \ The passage which Lord Atkin quoted from Lord Wright - which
_ 3
was cited by Lord Wright from a dictum of pollock, C.B. - is of great importance 
on this context. It states
”In a case in which the liberty of the subject is 
concerned, we cannot go beyond the natural construction 
of the Statute. In this country, amidst the clash of 
arms, the laws are not silent. They may be changed, 
but they speak the same language in war as in peace.
It has been always one of the pillars of freedom, one 
of the principles of liberty* *. that judges are no 
respectors of persons and stand between the subject 
and any attempted encroachments on his liberty by 
the executive, alert to, see that any coercive action 
is justified in law*...^1.
As regards the construction of the words, 'if there is in fact reasonable
cause for A.B. so to believe*, it was observed that 'after all, words such as
these are commonly found, when a legislature o't law-making authority confers
powers on a minister or an official. However read, they must be intended to
T. C w T X c T 2 o 5  "
2. Barmaid v. Gorman (1941) Ap. 378
3* Bowditch v. Balchin (1850) AC. 5 (1850) Ex.387*
4. Liversidge v. Anderson, Lord Atkin* s dissenting opinion.
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serve, in some sense, as a condition limiting the exercise of an otherwise 
arbitrary power♦ •. *.
In America the expression 1 due process of law1 is interpreted as 
meaning that both the Legislative and Executive acts should conform to the 
Constitutional guarantees of the liberties of the people# The Courts* power 
of judicial review is not confined to executive acts but also extends to 
Statutes. Not only the procedure by idiich a person is deprived of his liberty 
but the substance of the statute authorising such deprivation must be established 
and justified by the law of the land and the Constitution. It was observed in 
the Slaughter House Case that, 'liberty is freedom from all restraints but 
such are imposed by law. Beyond that line lies the domain of usurpation and tyr­
anny... One process of law is the application of law as it exists in the fair
2
and regular course of administrative procedure 1. The aforesaid expression is 
regarded as a restraint, not only against legislative and executive but also 
against the judicial power of the Government. In Murray* s Lessee v. Hoboken lard 
and Improvement Co., it was observed r
"That the warrant now in question is legal process, is 
not denied. It was issued in conformity with an Act 
of Congress. But is it *due process of law*? The 
Constitution contains no description of the process 
which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does 
not even declare what principles are to be applied 
to ascertain whether it be due process. It is 
manifest that it was not left to the legislative 
power to enact any process which might be devised.
The Article is a restraint on the legislative as 
well as on the executive and judicial powers of 
the Government, and cannot be so construed as to 
leave Congress free to make^any process 'due process 
of law* by its mere willl.. "
X! Nakkuda Ali v. M.P. De.S. Jayaraute (19^i) A.C.66. — —
2. 83 U.S. 36, (127) (1872).
3. 59 U.S. (l8 Hew) 272 (276)
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1 1 By law of the Land* is most clearly intended the general law; a law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgement only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen should hold
his life, liberty, property and immunities, under the protection of the general
rules, which govern society. Everything which may pass under the form of an
1
enactment, is not, therefore, to be considered the law of land... ”•
In India the expression, ’procedure established by law* was inter­
preted by Das J. as meaning procedure established by Statutory legislation.
It was pointed out that words * established by law1 mean 1 enacted by law* and 
consequently the word ‘law* must mean State-made law and cannot possibly mean 
the principles of natural justice, for no procedure can be said to have ever 
been enacted on those principles. Mukhergea J., however, interpreted it in a 
comprehensive way and said that, on a plain reading of the Article, the meaning 
seems to be that a person cannot be deprived of his personal liberty, except 
when the action is taken against him in accordance with the law which provides 
for such deprivation, and that the expression ‘procedure1 means the manner 
and form of enforcing the law. He concluded that the group of Articles 20-22 
embodies the entire protection guaranteed by the Indian Constitution, in 
relation to deprivation of life and personal liberty, both with regard to 
substantive as well as to procedural law ”
The phrashe ‘in accordance with law’ in the Irish Constitution was 
construed to mean * in due course of law* and 1 law* to mean * law then in force* • 
An order of detention conforms to the provisions of the Statute authorising
1. Dartmouth College Case (1819) 4 Wheaton (U.S.) 5I8. per argument of David 
Webster.
2. Gopalan v. State of Madras, Supra.
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detention, it cannot be said to be not in accordance with law* It was,
pointed out that the aforesaid expression cannot be interpreted to mean
•in accordance with rules of natural justice* but it means * in accordance
with the law in force* • It is true that a person can: be deprived of his personal
2liberty by an express enactment of the legislature authorising such deprivation 
but this provision - * no citizen shall be deprived of his liberty save in 
accordance with law* - cannot be used to validate an enactment conflicting with 
the constitutional guarantees^.
As to the meaning of *law* in the expression ’save in accordance with 
law* in S. 16 of the Burmese Constitution, it was held that ’law* means an 
enactment by Parliament or other competent legislative body. It was, however, 
pointed out that the word ’law* was, before the framing of the Constitution of 
Burma, construed to mean only the enacted law, and that even after the 
commencement of the Constitution, the customary laws, theCommon Law of England,
the principles of Justice, equity and good conscience, if they are not enacted
in the statute, cannot be contemplated to be included in the term 'law* which 
means * enacted law. *
In Pakistan the expression * save in accordance with law* is inter­
preted to mean * except according to the provisions of a law duly enacted by 
Legislatures*. The provision that *no person shall be deprived of life or 
liberty save in accordance with law* in Art. 5(2) of the 1956 Constitution -
1. R.V. Military Governor of Hare Park Camp. (1924) (2) 1.I&LQ4#
2. Byan’s Case. (1935) 170.
3. State (Burke) v. Lennon andA.G., (1940) 12.136.
4. Tinsa Maw Naing v. Commissioner of Police, Rangoon, 1950 Burma, LR^  ( SC )
17*
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- Right No.l of the 1962 Constitution - was held to afford no protection 
against an express enactment of Legislature authorising the deprivation of 
personal liberty, and the word *law* in the aforesaid expression cannot be 
construed to mean the principles of natural justice outside the realm of 
positive law* it is equivalent to State-made law\
The expression implies that a person cannot be deprived of personal
liberty except by lawful authority. Relying on Ghulan Jilani y. Govt, of 
2
Pakistan it was observed in Abdul Baqi Baluch v. Govt, of Pakistan that 
power is expressly given by Art.9B to Superior Courts to probe into the 
exercise of public power by executive authorities, how high soever, to 
determine whether they have acted with lawful authority. Not only laws 
made by Legislatures but also rules made under the delegated legislative power, 
and the actions taken thereunder, must conform to the provisions of the 
Constitution. It was further observed that the power of judicial review will 
be reduced to a nullity, if laws are so worded or interpreted that the executive 
authorities may make what Statutory rules they please and may use this freedom 
to make themselves the final judges of their own will in imposing restraints 
on the liberties of persons. Art.2 of the Constitution of 1962 would be 
deprived of all its content through this process and the courts would cease to 
be guardians of the nation* s liberties^.
In Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha K.Sorish Kashmiri, it was 
contended on behalf of the Government that Courts should not be unmindful of 
the fact that emergency legislations must be interpreted with due regard to the 
consideration, that being comes before well being; it was observed that the
Courts cannot go behind the emergency, the contention that the laws must be
1. Saihi Daler v. Superintendent, PjCp. 195?> Lah.BlJ
2. PID. 1967 33.373
3. PLD. 1969 Kar.87.
142
interpreted differently during sin emergency cannot be accepted. It was, pointed 
out that Lord Atkin had said in Liversidge v. Anderson that -
,fAdmidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They 
may be changed, but they speak the same language in war 
and peace.
It was, therefore, held that, whilst laws cannot be interpreted differently at 
different times or in different circumstances, the existence of an emergency 
will have a material bearing, if the Courts are to decide upon the reasonableness 
of the action, for what is reasonable in time of an emergency may well not be 
reasonable in ordinary circumstances, when the emergency has ended. But this 
consideration does no exclude the consideration that action, taken by the
authority, which deprives a person of his liberty, must stand the test of
2
judicial review by the Courts .
The expression 'in accordance with law1 should be interpreted as 
meaning According to the manner prescribed by theConstitution or by any valid 
law made under the Constitution by any competent Legislature.' The detaining 
authority should exercise the power of apprehension and detention bona fide and 
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by a valid law authorising detention,
as envisaged by Art.2 of the Constitution of Pakistan,1962 and not arbitrarily
3or perversely •
The words 'in an unlawful manner1 in Art.98(2)(b) of the Constitution 
of Pakistan, have been used, it was observed, deliberately to give meaning and 
content to the solemn declaration under Art.2 of the Constitution itself, in 
the sense that it is the inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in 
accordance with law and only in accordance with law. Therefore, in determining
I~ 3Upra# " “ ' “
2. P.L.D.1969 SC.14; see also Abdul Baqi v. Govt.of Pakistan,P.L.D.1968 SC.313
3# Ghulam Jilani v. Govt.of West Pakistan,P.L.D.1967,SC.373.
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how and in what circumstances a person would be detained in an unlawful manner, 
one would inevitably look first to see whether the action is in accordance with 
law, if not, then it is action in an unlawful manner. The word *law' in the 
expression * in accordance with law* is not confined to Statute law alone but 
is used in its generic sense as connoting all that is treated as law in Pakistan, 
including even the judicial principles laid down, from time to time by the 
Superior Courts. It means •according to the accepted forms of legal process* 
and postulates a strict performance of all the functions and duties laid down 
by law. It may well be said that, in this sense, it is as comprehensive as the 
American * due process cl^be*, as now interpreted in a new garb. It is in this 
sense that an action which is malP ffi.de or colourable is not regarded as an act­
ion in accordance with law. Similarly, action taken upon extraneous or 
irrelevant considerations is also not an action in accordance with law. Action 
taken upon no grounds at all or without proper application of the mind of the 
detaining authority or by exercising power in excess of his jurisdiction, would
not qualify as action in accordance with law and would, therefore, have to be
1
struck down as being action in an unlawful manner •
The term * liberty’ in the expression 1 no person shall be deprived 
of life or liberty save in accordance with law* is comprehensive and, in its 
widest sense, it includes 'freedom of movement and residence in any part of
p
Pakistan . It was observed that Fundamental Ri$it No.l, connotes the ' security 
of person.' The word * security* in this connotation must be understood in the 
sense of protection of an individual from physical restraint by incarceration.
1. Govt, of W.Pakistan v. Begum A.K.S. Kashmiri, ^ID.1969, S.C.14.
2. Ghulam Jilani v. Govt* W.Pakistan, Supra; see also Kent v. Dulles,357 U.S. 
116.
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In other words it guarantees the protection of personal liberty against its 
arbitrary deprivation, or provides safeguards against complete loss of personal 
liberty at the instance of the Government or any other organ of the society.
It was further observed that •liberty* in Fundamental Right No.l must be under­
stood in its generic sense so as to comprehend, within its connotation, freedom
A
to move and reride in any part of Pakistan .
The word ‘deprived* in the operative part of Right No.l qualifies
both *life* and ’liberty.* According to Blacks tone, 'deprivation* means total 
2
loss of freedom • Therefore what is sought to be protected by Right No.l is
3
loss of life or liberty • A.K. Brohi has comprehensively dealt with the subject 
of 'liberty and personal liberty^ ".
The expression 'no person shall be held to answer for... nor be 
deprived of life or liberty or property, without due process of law* in the 
American Constitution, has been interpreted by the American Supreme Court in 
Alleger v. State of Louisiana. The word ' liberty* has been given a very wide 
meaning as including not only the right of a person to be free from the physical 
restraint on his person as by incarceration but also freedom to enjoy all his 
faculties, that is to say, right to live and work where he will, to acquire 
useful knowedge, to marry to establish home, to worship God according to his 
conscience, and generally to enjoy all privileges long recognised at Common Law
5
as essential to orderly pursuit of happiness by freeman .
Brohi comments that it is doubtful whether the term 'liberty* would
receive the wide meaning it has received in America. The reason, according to
1. Abul Ala Maudoodi v. State Bank of Pakistan, PhD. 19£>9 Iah.908.
2. Blackstone Commentaries, Vol.1 p. 134.
3. Abul Ala Maudoodi v. State Bank of Pakistan.
4. * Fundamental Law* op.cit. See also Chapter 1 for detailed analysis.
3. 165 U.S. 576 (1897); See also Mayor v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.390.
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him, is that, the liberties,in general, have, in the Constitution of Pakistan, 
been dealt with separately in Arts. 8 to 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan,
1956 - Right Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 in Part II of the Constitution 
of 1962 - much in the same manner in which they have been dealt with in Art. 19 
of the Indian Constitution. Referring to the provisions of the Indian 
Constitution, corresponding to Right No.l of the Pakistan Constitution, 1962, 
the learned author opined that the framers of the Indian Constitution qualified 
the expression •liberty1 in Art.21 by prefixing the adjective ’personal1 merely 
by way of abundant caution, so as to avoid the impression that the word 1 liberty1, 
used in Art.21, has any reference to the same subject matter as is provided in
A
Art. 19. In reaching the conclusion the learned author based himself on the
judgement of Kama C.J. in Gopalan case wherein he observed that ’personal liber-
2
tyf is the anti-thesis of physical restraint'.
In Abul Ala Maudoodi v. State Bank of Pakistan. Gul J., pointed out 
that Right No.l comes under the caption 1 security of persons’ and Right No.3 
under ’Freedom of movement'. 'Security4 means protection from 'physical 
restraint', ’Deprived' means 'total loss'. Right No.l protects a person fjrom 
physical restraint by incarceration - as distinguished from partial control of 
the right to move freely.
If liberty in Right No.l is understood in its generic sense so as to 
mean 'universal locomotion’, then Right No.3 is redundant. No anomally arises
1. A.K. Brohi, op.cit.
2. Copalan v. State of Madra, AIR. 1950 S.C.27.
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liberty in Right No. 1 is understood, as meaning freedom from incarceration* 
This interpretation is in accord with the principle that a Statute must he read 
as a whole giving some meaning to every part. It was further observed that, if 
the broad and sweeping concept of ’liberty1, as laid down by theAmerican Judges, 
is followed, then Fundamental Rights No.5,6,7,8,9,10 and 12, will become 
unnecessary appendages to the Chapter relating to Fundamental Rights. It is, 
therefore, essential to bear in mind the general arrangement in Part H  - 
Chapter 1 - of the Constitution of Pakistan, which is wholly different from 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of America; there being no 
catalogue, separately listing the various freedoms, as guaranteed by the 
Constitutions of Pakistan, 1956 and 1962, and the Indian Constitution. In 
the absence of such a catalogue, the American Supreme Court has taken advantage 
of the generality of the word 'liberty' in expanding the scope of the 'due 
process clause'. Though,that Court has never defined the word - 'liberty', 
it has been often reiterated that it 'is not confined to mere freedom from 
bodily restraint* and that 'liberty* is interpreted as extending, ■under law,
A
to full range conduct which an individual is free to pursue •
The question how far the decisions of the American Supreme Court, 
based upon the interpretation of the 'due process clause* should be 
persuasive in Pakistan, came up for the consideration of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan in Jibendra Kishore v. Province of East Pakistan. In that case the 
question arose with reference to the provisions of Art. 5 of the Constitution 
of 1956, -which guaranteed equality before law and equal protection of law.
The argument before the Supreme Court was that the impugned Act offended 
against the equality clause of the Constitution. In support of the argument
1. Hp. 1969, Lah. 908; See also Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499.
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certain American decisions, proceeding on the interpretation of the 'due
process clause' -were cited. Agreeing with the contention of the respondent's
counsel, the Chief Justice repelled the aforesaid argument observed:
MThere is considerable force in this contention, 
because our Constitution does not use and could 
not have used the 'due process of law* clause in 
guaranteeing primary rights, in the sense in which 
that clause has been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, That Court has 
scrupulously avoided giving an exact definition 
of ' due process of law* and all that can be 
gathered from the leading decisions on the subject 
is that no law can be said to be * in accordance 
with due process of law*, if it contravenes certain 
basic principles of Justice and liberty, which are 
above the law that may be made by the Congress or 
by the State Legislature, ”,
The same view was expressed in a later case.East and West
Steamship Company v, Pakistan that:-
"...In the United States a grant of power is often 
invalidated on the ground that it offends against 
'due process' provisions of the Constitution, or 
that it delegates excessive legislative powers or 
that it denies equal protection of law to theg 
citizens; as pointed out in Jihendra Kishore*s 
case nowhere in our Constitution is the concept of 
'due process of law' to be found, in the sense in 
which it has been,understood in the American 
jurisprudence,... ",
It will be seen that the decisions, proceeding on the interpretation
of the 'due process clause* by the American Supreme Court, would not offer any
guidance for the interpretation of the Constitution of Pakistan. As has been
L
rightly pointed out in Abul Ala Maadoodi v. State Bank of Pakistan the
1. HD. 1957, S.C. (Bak) 9.
2. Jibendra Kishore v. Province of East Pakistan, Supra.
3. 9?D. 1958, S.c. (Pak) 41.
4. Supra.
judgement in Kent v* Dulles was generally influenced by an article entitled 
1 Passport Refusal, for Political Reasons*1 The article proceeded mainly on 
the basis of Art* 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by 
the United Rations in 1948, which guaranteed freedom of movement within one* s 
country and the right of exit therefrom and return thereto, and secondly on 
the interpretation of the *due process clause* in the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of America by the Supreme Court of America, but the right to 
freedom of movement in Pakistan, is regarded as a necessary corallary of the 
provision of Right No,l of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, in the sense
that it cannot be restricted 1 save in accordance with law* authorising such
. . 3restriction .
Though the words used by Pakistan Constitution are not * personal
liberty* but only ’liberty? and instead of the expression in the Indian
Constitution 'according to the procedure established by law,* the Pakistan
Constitution uses the expression * in accordance with law* , these expressions
are not to be construed as significant textual changes that will radically
alter the interpretation of these Articles when read in conjunction with other 
4
articles *
Personal liberty is a basic human right of every individual* An 
invasion of that right is a matter of most earnest and anxious concern* To 
repel such invasion and set a person at liberty is the duty cast on the High
1. Supra.
2. See 'Yale law Journal* Vol.£L (1952) pp. 171-203.
3. Abul Ala Mattdooiti v* State Bank of Pakistan, Supra.
4* A.K. Brchi, op.cit. p.396.
Courts under Art.98 of the Constitution of 1962 . The power of a High 
Court extends to every case where a person has been unjustifiably or 
wrongly detained, that is to say, to every case where a person has not been det­
ained bona fide^in accordance with a provision of a statute authorising detention 
where he has been detained under an invalid law; or where the safeguards 
afforded by the Constitution against the arbitrary deprivation of personal 
liberty have been violated.
Safeguards against Arrest and Detention:
Safeguards against the arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty 
are provided by Rights No,2,4, and in Chapter I of Part II of the 
Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, which correspond to Arts.22,20 and 19(1)(d) and 
(e), in Part III of the Indian Constitution, respectively. If the liberty of 
a person is restricted in contravention of the provisions laid down by Rights 
No.2, k or 5, the aggrieved person will be given relief under Art. 9 8  of the 
Constitution of Pakistan, 1962.
1
Right No.2 of the 1962 Constitution lays down safeguards as to 
'arrest1 and 'detention'; it provides protection against wrongful deprivation 
of personal liberty. The words 'arrested' and 'detained' in the expression 
'no person who is arrested shall be detained...' in Right No.2(1) have not 
been defined. The question, therefore, arises as to what is the exact meaning 
of these words. The Constitutions of Pakistan and India do not prescribe 
conditions justifying arrest or detention; it is left to the discretion of the 
legislature.
In India, it was held that arrest or detention under the order of a
court of competent jurisdiction does not come within the purview of Art.22(1)
T~. Mohd. Anwar' v. Govt, of West Pakistan, Pl£>«* 19t>^  Lah, 1 0 9 .
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nor does arrest on a warrant. Art,22 was designed to give protection against 
arrest by any non-judicial authority. It was, however, observed that the arrest 
and detention referred to in Art.22 can only mean taking a person into custody 
on the ground of suspected or apprehended commission of a criminal offence or 
of any act prejudicial to the State or public interest •
2
In Pakistan, relying on Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram Charan Gopal , it
was held that word Arrest1 in the Code of Civil Procedure does not fall within
the purview of Art.7 of the Constitution of 1936-~Right Nc;2 of the Constitution 
of 1962 But in Bazal Ahmad Ayyubi v. Province of West Pakistan, Rahman J.,
observed that whatever may be the position with regard to arrest under orders
of civil Courts, he was disposed to hold that Art.7 of the Constitution is con­
cerned with all arrest affected in criminal or quasi - criminal proceedings,
ifincluding those made under the orders of the criminal courts . The expression 
1arrest* is not confined to arrests, other than those affected on a warrant 
issued by a Court of Judicial Tribunal. The argument that a particular arrest,
in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, does not fall within the purview of
5
clauses (1) and (2), or (3) to (3) of Art.7? cannot be sustained . However, 
steps taken or physical force applied for securing compliance only with a 
legitimate order of a Court, to deport the accused persons from the country, is 
neither such arrest nor detention as is contemplated by Art.7 of the Constitut­
ion of 1956. As to the contention that removing persons from a particular 
area and prohibiting them from entering a particular area is not detention
1. Jit Bahadur Singh v. That State, AIR* 1952 ALL.753; and State of Punjab v. 
Ajaib Singh, AIR. 1953» SC.10.
2. AIR, 1952, S.C.9.
3. Jtimma Khan v. Pakistan, 1^1)., 19571 Kar.339*
Supra*
3* Ibid.
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within the purview of Art.7* it was observed that it is more than ’akin
to detention1 and would amount to internment and would attract Art.7 and 11 of
2
the Constitution • Similarly, the custody of an adbucted woman for restoration 
to-her kins-folk or the physical restraint placed before judgement on a 
defendant in a civil suit or after judgement on judgement - debtor by a civil 
court in execution of a decree, is neither an arrest nor detention for 
purposes of Art.7 of the Constitution. Such physical restraint as might 
result; merely from action taken for the aforesaid purposes, would neither
punitive nor preventive detention nor malicious nor otherwise illegal
3
detention •
Whatdsould be deemed to be detention for the purposes of S.491 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure and Art.98 of the Constitution of 1962 has not been 
defined either in S.5 (l)(b) of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order 
Ordinance, I960 , or in the aforesaid Code and it would be for the Court to 
determine what restraint on the liberty of a person would amount to detention 
for ending which the powers of the Court could be exercised under S. 491 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure. Where an order was passed by the Government of 
West Pakistan directing the petitioner to reside*and remain within the 
revenue limits of a particular village, it was contended on behalf of the 
Government that this did not amount to detention, within the purview of Art.7» 
so as to entitle him to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.491
of the Code of Criminal Procedure Art.98 of the Constitution. It was held that,
1. Inderjit Singh v. State AIR, 1953* Pnng. 52.
2. Liaq Ahmad v. D.M.Karachi, PLD*, 1938, Kar. infra; see also Rao Nahrez 
Akhtar V.D.M. Dera G. Khan, infra.
3. Jumma Khan v. Govt.of Pakistan, Supra; see also State of Punjab v. Ajaib 
Singh, AIR., 1953, S.C.10.
152
on principle, there is very little difference between a place which is walled 
on all sides and one within which, though it has no walls around it, a person^is 
directed /to remain, not to go away from it without permission of someone or 
without the risk of some inquiry to himself and it amounts to detention. The 
reasoning of the Court was that, if a person were detained in a room, the 
position would not alter materially, if the walls of that room were moved from 
their original place and constructed at a very great distance from the place 
where they originally stood. To put it differently, it should be considered 
whether the position would have been different, if the village in which the 
detenus were to remain and which they could not leave without the permission 
in writing of the Superintendent of Police in whose jurisdiction, it was situate, 
if the village were a jail, because, when a person is in jail, he cannot come 
out of it without the permission of a person who is in charge of the jail, in 
which he is confined.^ Where the petitionerwas confined in the C.I.D. office 
for three days, after he was arrested, for the purpose of interrogation, it 
was held to be an unlawful detention. It was, however, observed that detention 
in a C.I.D. office, as distinct from a police station or jail, cannot be constru- 
ed to be ’detention5 in legal custody* or *detention in a lawful manner* •
Where a father did not allow his children, who were minors, to go
to their mother, who had been divorced, it was held to be an unlawful detention
of the Children by the father. It was observed that, as the children were
minors,the question of their consent did not arise and that the detention of
the minor, children by the father, against the wishes of the lawful guardian,
3
the mother ^ids illegal and improper .________________________________ _ _
T~* Mohammad Anwar.' v. Govt, of West Pakistan, I^ LD.,1963i Lah.lo9
2. Aishya Begum v. Crown, PLD., 1955 Sind 375«
3. Magsood Begum v. Mohd. Asldm Khan, PID., 1970, A. J&K.13.
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But the Supreme Court of America in Philip v.William held that a 
high-ranking officer of one of the armed forces, who had been informed that he 
was under arrest and was not to leave a certain place, could not be regarded as 
under detention • It is submitted that this decision appears to have been 
influenced by the fact that he was a member of one of the armed forces and 
could be directed to remain at a particular place, so that he would be available 
for trial as soon as preparations had been made. Whatever might have been 
the consideration before the learned Judges of the Supreme Court of America, 
it makes no difference, as far as the interpretation of the words Arrest* and 
detention* goes, whether a man has been actually arrested and kept in custody, 
or is simply said that he is under arrest; or whether, after arrest, he has been 
taken to the place, which he is directed not leave, or merely he has been 
asked not to leave the place where he is at the moment.
The principle laid down by the aforesaid judgement of the Supreme
Court of America, seems to have been followed by the Single Bench of Lahore
3
High Court in a number of decisions. In Muhamd Aslam v. Crown and
Muhamoma dUmar. v. Crown it was held that confinement of a person to a
particular place or particular village did not amount to detention. A similar
view was taken in Ghalam Haider Shah v. Govt, of Azad J and K, in which it was
pointed out that the definition of the word ‘detention1 has neither been given
in the Code of Criminal Procedure nor in the Public Safety Act, 19^8, under which
the action was taken. The Court relied on the dictionary meaning afforded to
the word ‘detention1, by the’Concise Oxford Dictionary1, according to which
‘detention1 mec-ns;- 
~  n't U.S.?,. (L.ED.) 277.
2. Muhammad Anwar v. Gov$. of West Pakistan, Supra.
3. ELD.> 195^, Lah.720.
154
"Arrest, confinement - House of Detention, lock up - 
compulsory delay; (at Schools - keeping in a punishment, 
barracks, military prison"
and 'Custody* means imprisonment#
It was, therefore, observed that words 'detention* and ^custody' imply some 
sort of confinement or physical restraint on theliberty of movement of a 
person# It was however, ppinted out that the expression 'be set at a liberty* 
in cl.(b) of subsection (l) of '2.491 of Code of Criminal Procedure also leads 
to the inference that the above interpretation of the words 'detained* and 'cust­
ody' is correct; as there could be no question of 'setting a person at liberty*, 
unless the person concerned was in confinement or under arrest# It was, 
therefore, held that restriction of movement beyond certain areas does not 
constitute detention in custody and as such it is not sufficient to attract
A
the provision of S. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure •
But these judgements of a Singl Bench of the Iahore High Court have
been overruled by the Bivision Bench decisions in Rao Mehroz Akhatar v#
2 3
D#M» Dera G# Khan , and Muhammad Anwar v# Government of West Pakistan ,
wherein it was held that confinement of a person whether it is in a walled room
or in an open place, which he is directed not to leave, amounts to 'detention*.
To arrest a person, it is sufficient if the arresting officer confines 
the body of the accused person or the accused himself submits to the custody 
of the arresting officer# It is not necessary that he should be handcuffed#
It is by no means necessary that the arresting officer should# in effecting
1. EEp., 1959 Azad, J.and K.15#
2. 3U). , 1957 Lah# 676.
3. Supra#
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arrest, immediately proceed to handcuff* the accused person* Handcuffs are
used as a restraint and their use can only he justified on the grond that
they were indispensable for effecting the arrest* Where the facts were that
*Af had been sent for by the investigating officer on the 19th October, that
he Joined the investigation, that the same day he made a detailed confessional
statement m  the Criminal Branch Office at Peshawar, that the same evening he
was removed by the Police to Cambellpur, where he was lodged and detained in
the Police Post (Central Investigation Agency), that he remained there in
police custody until 21st October, and that for the first time he was
produced before the Magistrate on the 21st October, it was held that, even
if he had submitted himself to the custody of the police by his action and
words, when he made a detailed confessional statement in the Criminal Branch
Office, it did not change the position, that he had been under detention
3
since 19th October, •
2
Under the Punjab Public Safety Ordinance , the arrest and detention
of a person is to be preceeded by a reference to the Goverhment* Where no
such reference to the Provincial Government was made and permission obtained as
3
to the arrest of the detenu,his arrest and detention was held to be illegal .
In a case where a person was placed in Jail under a warrant of commitment, which
was not within the purview of the impugned Act, the detention was held to be
• • 4void ab initio *
1. Qadir v. State, P.L*D*1958,Lah*38*
2. Infra*
3* Sharifuddin v. Government of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1955>ijak*
4. Muhammad Anwar Be|)dri v* Crown, P.L.D* 1955 *kah. 583,
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The first-limb of Eight No. 2 (l) lays down that no person who is 
arrested shall be detained in custody "without being informed, as soon as may 
be, of the grounds for such arrest* Hence a person, who is arrested and 
detained in the custody without being informed of the grounds for such arrest 
within a period which cannot, under the circumstances of the case, justify the 
requirement laid down by the expression 'as soon as may be1 , will be set at 
liberty or released on bail by a High Court, in exercise of power conferred 
on it by Art*98(2)(l)(b) of the Constitution of 1962.
A detenu, was first arrested under SS.55 a-nd 110 of the Criminal 
1
Procedure Code but was, by a subsequent order, detained under SS. 13 and 14 
of the W*P.Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959, without being informed of the 
latter order; the detenu was released on bail; the order of subsequent detention 
was made by the P.M., after the City Magistrate, before whom the accused was bro­
ught for the verification of the sureties to be furnished for his release, 
had adjourned the case to the next day, demanding sureties for an enhanced 
amount which were unreasonable in the High Courts opinion^.
Where theD.M. passed an order detaining the accused in the custody, 
under S. 40 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation without communicating the grounds 
for such detention, it was held that the order was illegal, being in violation 
of S.42 of the P.C.R*^* Where the petitioner was arrested by the police and 
detained in C. I.D. office for three days and neither the reasons for the arrest
4nor the place of the detention were disclosed to the relations of the petitioner,
1* S.55 Cr*P*C. provides for arrest of vagabonds, habitual robbers etc*; and
S. 110 Cr*P*C. lays down provisions for security from habitual offenders for 
keeping good behaviour*
2. Abdcs Sabur v* D.M*, IJEjp., 1969, Pesh.167*
3. Ali Mohd. v* Commr., H p * , 1964, Quetta. 1.
4. State v* Mohd. Yusuf., Hp., 1965, Lah.324*.
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and where there was nothing with the police to indicate what crime had been 
committed by the accused, the detention of the accused was held to be illegal; 
they were set at liberty •
Delay in the communication of the grounds for arrest or detention is
a violation of the Constitutional requirement; unreasonable delay in informing
the detenu of the grounds of detention will invalidate any arrest or detention
2
and the detenu will be set at liberty • The circumstances under which the 
delay in communication of the grounds for arrest or detention becomes unreason­
able, will be discussed in the following chapter*
Right to Counsel and Production in Court:
The second limb of Right No.2(l) of the Constitution of 1962 affords
to an arrested person a right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner
of his choice; Art.22(l) of the Indian Constitution corresponds to it. The
right to be defended by a pleader is also given by S. 340 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Prom the moment of his arrest, an arrested person has the right to
consult and be defended by counsel of his own choice and also at such times, at
such stages and in such circumstances as are necessary and are convenient to the
authorities and other persons involved • If a trial is fixed for a date, which
is not communicated to the accused, so that he is denied the opportunity to
communicate with his counsel, the right is infringed and the conviction is
4
liable to be set aside.
1. Aishya Begum v. Crown, FID., 1955 , Sind. 375*
2. pazal Ahmad Gfcazi v. State, HD. ,1957, Ear. 190; see also - Tarapada Dev v. 
State of W.Bengal., A.I.R. 195*1,5. C. 174*
3. Moti Bai. AIR. , 1954, Eft j. 241.
4. Hans Rsg* AIR., 1956, All. 641.
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In a case where the detenus were tried by a Jirga, without having 
been provided with the opportunity for defence, it was observed that the very 
essence of the Jirga trial is that it is unencumbered by the law of Evidence, 
the rules of procedure and cross examination by a legal practitioner, which 
amounts to denial of the right of the accused to be defended by the counsel.
It was, therefore, held that such a trial, so far as it is conducted without 
the presence of the detehu1 s. counsel, is violative of Art. 7(l) of the 
Constitution of 195&\
Where the detenu was arrested under S. 6 of the East Pakistan Pood 
(Control and Distribution) Ordinance, 1956, and was produced before a Special 
Magistrate, the contention was that the petitioner made a prayer for defence by 
counsel, which was refused but the contention on behalf of the Government was 
that no such prayer was made. It was held that, as the trial was conducted 
in a manner and under circumstances which amounted to a denial of a fundamental 
right of the detenu to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice, 
guaranteed by the Constitution, the trial must be rendered void and, as such, 
the conviction and sentences were declared illegal. It was, however, observed 
that, even though the petitioner had not, in terms, asked for defence by a 
counsel, it was the duty of the Special Magistrate to provide for the same2.
If a statute, expressly or by necessary implication, authorises a 
trial without representation by counsel for the accused, such statute is
deemed to be void, and trials conducted under it and sentences inflicted will
1. Khair Mohd. v. Govt* of West Pakistan, Pip. ,195^, Iah.&>8.
2. Muslemuddin v. Chief Secretary, HD., 1957, Dac.101.
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be illegal. The procedure to be followed by the tribunal, under Ss.6,7 and 
29 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, enables the Tribunal to keep certain 
portions of the information against the person proceeded against secret and to 
exclude the person concerned and his counsel, at the instance of the officer 
laying information, and also to record evidence of some of the witnesses in 
their absence; they were declared void, as being inconsistent with Art*7 of 
the Constitution of 1956» and the; convictions and sentences, in as much as 
the proceedings resulted in the denial of the constitutional right of the accused 
to consult and to be defended by the counsel of their choice, were held illegal,
"Where witnesses were examined in camera, behind the back of the persons
complained against and their counsel, and the record of their statements was
kept secret from them, it was held that the procedure was wholly illegal and,
2
as such, the orders passed under the illegal procedure were void abinitio. 
Provision by which proceedings can be conducted in the absence of councel for 
the person complained against, on the ground only that such person is 
deliberately evading appearance, is in violation of clause (l) of Art,7 of the 
Constitution of 1956 and, as such, void^.
Recording a statement in camera does not mean exclusion of the 
parties and their counsel. It only means the exclusion of the public or 
unconcerned persons. Thus where it amounted to the exclusion of a party and
his counsel, it was held to be void^* but where it amounted to the exclusion
1. Waryam v. State, H p . , 195^, Lah, 151
2. Liaq Ahmad v. D.M.~Karachi, HO., 1958, Kar.92, Bazal Ahmad Ayyuti's case 
infra.
3. Ibid.
4. A. Baqi Baluch*s case lip. ,1969, Kar.87; also Begum Agha S, Kashimiri v. 
Govt, of West Pakistan, HD. ,1969, Lah, ,438.
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of the public and unconcerned persons, in the public interest, and not the 
accused and his counsel, the proceedings were held valid.
Bight No, 2 of the Constitution 1962 - Art, 7 of the Constitution of 
1956 - guarantees every arrested or detained person the right to be produced 
before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours of such arrest or detention, 
excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the 
Court of Magistrate which corresponds to Art*22(2) of Indian Constitution,
A similar provision is found in the Code of Criminal Procedures under S, 61* a 
person arrested without a warrant can not be kept in police custody for a 
period exceeding twenty four hours, in the absence of a special order of a 
Magistrate under S. 167 of the Code. The object of requiring an accused person 
to be produced before a Magistrate for the purposes of remand under S. 167 of 
the Code, obviously is to enable the Magistrate to see that the remand is 
necessary and also to enable the accused to make any representation he may 
wish to make in the matter. Legal assistance may, therefore, frequently be 
useful on each occasion.
In order to ascertain whether a remand to police custody or judicial
‘X is
custody, under S. 167 of the Codeia duty is cast on the Magistrate himself,
irrespective of whether or not any objection is raised by the accused, to
decide whether there exists any reasonable grounds to order a remand. A
Magistrate performs judicial functions and the preliminary requirement of the
performance of judicial functions is to look into the evidence and to
2
determine as to the sufficiency of the grounds of passing an order ♦ In all 
T  Farooq " SacLajr v, I. G. Police. ,PID. ,1969, Lah. 1020; Bal Krishna v. Emperor
AIR. 1931, Lah. 99.
2. Ibid.
161
cases "where remands are granted, it is the duty of the Magistrate to inform 
the accused that he is a Magistrate, that a remand is applied for, and to ask 
the accused how long has he been in the police custody and whether he has any
A
objection to the grant of a remand * It is well settled that the law views 
with disfavour detention in the police custody, and that such detention can be 
allowed only in special cases and for reasons to be stated in writing and not 
as a matter of course^.
It is not enough to walk past the cell where the accused is confined
and to announce the order of remand, which is subsequently written at home.
If the accused wishes to have counsel to represent him, it is the duty of a
Magistrate to allow him time for counsel to appear and argue the matter before 
3
him . Where the prisoner was not produced before the Magistrate, and the 
remand order was passed behind his back, it was held that the remand was clearly 
illegal^. “Where the detenus were in the lock-up and they were not produced 
before the Magistrate, when the remand orderms passed in a room in the police 
station, it was held that the orders of their remand were clearly in violation 
of the law^. In another case the act of the Additional District Magistrate in 
remanding the accused to custody in the Central Intelligence Agency Office 
was held illegal, and against the spirit of S. 61 of the ^ode of Criminal 
Procedure^. In Nazir Ahmad v. State it was held that a thing must be done
1. Jahingiri Lai v. Emperor, AIR. , 1935, Lay,230
2. Khairati Rain's case AIR. ,1931, Lah.476.
3. Parotjq Badar v. I. Gr. Police, Supra. Jahangiri Lai v. Emperor Supra.
4. Crown v. Shera (1867) 3P.R.39; and in re Venkata SSaman IIR.1948, Mad.297*
5. Farooq Badar v. I.G.Police, supra. See also in re Llewelyn Evans AIR.
1926,Bom. 55I. Sundar Singh v. Emperor, AIR. ,1930, lah. 945; Balkrishna v.
Emperor^^931, Lah.99; In re Khairati Rain, AIR. ,1931, Lah. 476, and Amolok 
Ram v. Emperor, AIR. ,1932, lah. 13.
6. State v. Mohd.Yasuf, PID., 19 63, Lah. 324*
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according to law or not at all. In this case a Magistrate had taken certain 
notes of the confession, which had been made by the accused in the police 
station. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that a confession 
had to be recorded in the Court under S.I64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
and that a confession recorded by the Magistrate in the aforesaid manner was
A
vitiated by an illegality • Where two constables were taking an arrested 
person to a Magistrate and the Magistrate met them in the street and sent the 
prisoner back to the lock up and asked the constables to bring him up for 
examination next day, it was held that the Magistrate was liable to an action
for trespass for sending the accued back to the lock up and hence infringing
2
his right to personal liberty •
But where, shortly after a person was arrested by a Police Officer, a
Magistrate arrived at the spot and the accused was produced before him, it was
held that there was sufficient compliance with the rule laid down by Art. 22(2)
of the Indian Constitution^. But Basil J., did not agree with the decision and
expressed doubt about its correctness, on the grounds that the aforesaid clause
specifically says 'the Court of a Magistrate* and as the arrested person was
4
not taken to the Court, he did not get the opportunity to consult a lawyer • 
Professor Alan Gledhill, with due respect to the aforesaid authority, did not 
sustain the criticism and contended that reference to the Magistrate's Court is 
only relevant to the estimate of the period in excess of the twenty four hours,
/■which may lapse before the arrested person is brought
1. A.I.R.1937,P.C.253.
2. Edwards v. Perris (1836) 7 0*& P.542.
3. Ram Mano h&r's case, A.I.R. 1955? All. 193•
4. D.D. Basu, J. 'Shorter Constitution of India,' 2nd Ed.p. 100.
3. Op.cit.p.143*
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before the Magistrate . He, however, seems to have agreed with the later
decision of the Supreme Court of India in Punjab y. Ajaib Singh, in which
it was held that the object of the Cl,(2) of Art*22 of the Indian Constitution
is to ensure that a judicial mind is applied to the authority of person makj ng
the arrest and the regularity of the procedure; there seems no obvious reason
why this should not be secured by the fortuitous appearance of a Magistrate on
the scene of the arrest. As for the opportunity to consult a legal advisor,
2
there seems no reason why that should not be given at the lock up .
S. 11 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which excludes the provisions 
in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of trying * the guilt or 
innocence of any person* by Jirga - the Council of Elders - lays down that, 
fo?* this purpose, the Council of Elders may make any Inquiry. HThere cases 
of detenus were referred to the Jirga by the Deputy Commissioner and the 
objection was that the Deputy Commissioner was not a Magistrate, in the sense 
contemplated by S.61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, empowered to remand 
the accused to custody pending the trial by the Jirga, it was held that, under 
the scheme of the Regulation, the Deputy Commissioner* s function is envisaged 
to be that of a Magistrate and, as such, the remand of the persons proceeded 
against, while the trial was being conducted by the Jirga, was under the orders 
of a Magistrate. As to the question whether, after the reference of the case 
to the Jirga, any lawful authority still existed with the Deputy Commissioner 
for their detention, it was held that such authority was inherent in the Deputy
1. Op,cit. p. 143.
2. AIR., 1957, SC. 10.
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Commissioner under the Regulation. It -was, however, observed that accused 
persons will be under detention, while a special trial goes on under the 
Regulation, unless the Deputy Commissioner, as a District Magistrate, releases 
them on bail. So fax as the Regulation is not an unlawful measure, detention
<1
for its purposes will not be unlawful, provided it has a lawful origin .
This view of the Lahore High Court finds support in the judgement
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in State v. Dosso in which the contention
was that after a case is referred to the Council of Elders under S. 11 of the
F.C.R., theDeputy Commissioner ceases to have jurisdiction to remand or detain
any person in the custody. The contention was rejected. It was further
observed that every Deputy Commissioner, acting in criminal proceedings under
the Regulation, is necessarily a Magistrate and, as such, is competent to issue
directions as to the custody of the accused persons. As to the contention
that the reference to the Council of Elders was bad, in as much as the Deputy
Commissioner did not state in his order that 'it was expedient that the
question of guilt or innocence of the accused person should not be determined
by the Ordinary Courts, as contemplated by S. 6 of the Code of the Criminal
Procedure,' it was held that what is required by S. 6 of the Code is not that
the aforesaid words should be reproduced in the reference order but that the
Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner should be satisfied and form an opinion
that, 'it was expedient that the question of guilt or innocence of the accused
2
person should not be determined by the Ordinary Courts' • Where neither the
Commissioner nor the Deputy Commissioner was satisfied in the aforesaid manner
and the case was referred to the Council of Elders, the detention of the
3
accused in the remand custody was held to be illegal . As to the contention
1. Khair Mohd. v. Govt, of West Pakistan**^ Lah. 6>68.
2. Hp. 1958, SiC.583.
3. Hamesh Gul v. Crown. ELJ>.19$2T Pesh l
165
that the remand to a second Council of Elders -was illegal, after the original
order had become infruxrtuous, it was held that the Deputy Commissioner was
1
entitled to make the second reference and extend the remand •
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person who is arrested should ; -
2
not be kept in police custody for more than twenty-four hours . During the
investigation a Magistrate may, from time to time, remand him to custody for-a
3
period not longer than fifteen days , and during the trial similar remands may
be made for similar periods, if the proceedings cannot be completed before that
L
period for any reason • In a trial under theCode, therefore, the. petitioner 
must have an opportunity of seeing a Magistrate at least once a fortnight, and 
since this may net happen in Jirgah trial, it may be inferred that custody of 
the accused becomes illegal on the sixteenth day following the reference to the 
jirgah. So far as Art* 7 of the Constitution of 1956 ~ Bight No*2 of the Constit­
ution of 1962 - goes, all that is required is that detention beyond twenty-four 
hours shall not be without the authority of a Magistrate. It does not say at 
what intervals, if any,the accused should be remanded. It was, therefore held 
that, since a trial by jirgah is not a trial under the Code of Criminal
5
Procedure, the fortnightly remand custody is not a compelling provision .
■Where the Deputy Commissioners or Nazim-e-Zilas were appointed as 
Additional District Magistrates by the Governor of West Pakistan for the 
purposes of Bara.2(b) of theRoreisner* Act, 1951, a^ d. the detaining authority
1. State v. Dosso, Supra.
2. S. 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. Ibid S. 3-6?-* 
if* Ibid«S. 344**
5. Khair Mohaminad v. Govt. West Pakistan, Supra.
166
was one of the Nazim-e-Zilas of Kalat Division, it was contended that he was 
not the District Magistrate in terms of S. 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
The contention was rejected and it was held that the Nazim-e-Zila is a District 
Magistrate for the purposes of the aforesaid Act, It was, however, observed 
that the Code of Criminal Procedure of Kalat recognises as one of the Courts 
acting under it, the ’Nazim-e-Zila1, which literally means the administrator 
of a district and, as such, the Nazim-e-Zila, according to that Code, is an 
Officer-in-Charge of a district, which means that the Nazim-e-Zila is a 
Magistrate-in-Charge of a district. It was, therefore, held that, in this 
sense, he is.a District Magistrate for the purposes of the Foreigners Act ,
In a case where the petitioner, who had been previously arrested, and
released on bail by the District Magistrate, Manipur, but later was ordered to
appear in the Court of the Assistant Commissioner - Magistrate First Class -
with intent that he should be handed over to the Karachi Police for extradition
proceedings, on a simple message from the Karachi Police, it was held that the
handing over of the petitioner to the Karachi Police, on a mere message and
without any proceedings, was preposterous and, as such, the District Magistrate
2
of Manipur was directed not to hand over the petitioner to the Karachi Police •
It is not necessary that a remand should be granted or extended by a 
Magistrate, who has territorial jurisdiction to try that case.:', In one case the 
accused was remanded to police custody for a number of days by the Ilaqa 
Magistrate but, due to exigencies of investigation, he was removed to another 
place, sixty two miles distant. On the expiry of the earlier remand, he was
1. Jumma Khan v. Govt, of Pakistan, PJI).,1957i Kar.939*
2. Mohammad Bota v. SarkaST, EJip.'i 19591 Azad J & K.72.
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produced before a Magistrate, who had no jurisdiction to try the case but who 
remanded the accused to police custody for a further period. It was held that 
the second order of remand was not illegal • Relying on the judgement of the 
Federal Court, ill Basanta Chandra v. Emperor, it was observed that, if at the 
time, before the Court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order direct­
ing his detention is produced, the court cannot direct his release, on the
p
ground that, at some prior stage, there was no valid cause for detention •
The person proceeded against should not be detained in custody, without any
reasonable cause, for more than twenty-four hours, without being produced
before a Magistrate. Where petitioner’s husband was placed in custody in
the C.I.D. office for three days for purposes of interrogation, without being
produced before a Magistrate, it was held that it was a violation of the
Constitutional requirement; it was an illegal action on the part of the
3
police authorities.
While clauses (3) to (3) of Right No.2 of the Constitution of 1962 - 
Art*7 of the Constitution of 1956“deal , with preventive detention, clauses
(1) and (2) apply to most other cases of arrest and detention; they confer the 
right to adequate hearing in a specified manner. They embody the principle of 
natural justice that no body will be condemned without being heard, audi altrem 
partem, It is in this sense that a proper hearing, before depriving a person 
of his Constitutional right of personal liberty, should be afforded. This 
principle of natural justice may silently be read into every statute, in the 
absence of any provision to the contrary •
1. Ali Akbar Khan v. Azad J. & K., PLD., 1939, Azad J.&.K.12.
2. AIR., 19^ +5, F.C.18.
3* Aishya Begum v. Crown, P,Lp., 1933* Sind.373*
*f. Abul Ala Maudoodi v. State Bank, PLD.,1969* Lah,910
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The rules of natural justice apply to all tribunals, whether 
judicial, quasi-judicial of administrative, who are called upon to pass 
orders depriving a citizen of his personal liberty; they must be persons 
with a mind which is not biased, in the sense that they are prompted by
personal motives to pass the order, but should act on the maximcthat not
only should justice be done but it should be manifestly seen to be done •
The common law maxim that no one should be the judge in his own
cause, which was boldly declared by Coke, C.J., is designed to eliminate bias
or mala fides on the part of administrators of justice.
In the opinion of Robson:-
n..But it is not only the holders of justicial offices, 
who are required to be free from the sort of bias, which 
is presumed to arise when a man has a personal interest
in the subject matter of a case that he is called upon to
decide or otherwise dealt with, *Even administrators* 
the late Lord Atkin remarked in a modern sense *have to 
comport themselves within the bounds of decency,11
He further sayss-
H.,The courts have, in the recent decale, shown a tendency 
to apply to administrative authorities the principles designed 
to eliminate the possibility^of bias, which are applicable 
to judicial tribunals. V •
Hence,in a case where the District Magistrate was proved to have 
shown bias in passing the detention order against a detenu, it was held that
3
the impugned order was vitiated for violation of the rule of natural justice .
In another case where the Police. Superintendent had investigated the charges
against the petitioner and also tried the case himself, it was held that order
passed by the Superintendent of Police was violative of the principles of 
4
natural justice » In Muhammad MohshlhSiddiqui v. Govt.of V/est Pakistan the
1. Sher Mohd Khan v. Sibghatullah Khan, Pip.j 1967, Pesh.196.
2. Justice and Administrative Law, p,62.
3. Sher Mohd Khan v. Sibghalullah Khan, t?LD,, 1967, Pesh.l67*
4. Mohd.Mohsin Siddiqui v. Govt,of V/est Pakistan, PLD.,1964, S.C.64,
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Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that, to require same man to serve both 
as prosecutor and as judge not only undermines the judicial fairness, but 
it also weakens public confidence in that fairness. In the instant case, 
an administrative authority, composed of a single person, within the frame - 
work of the judiciary had been consciously allowed to operate as prosecutor 
as well as judge and finally punishing authority in the same cause. No 
ground-in justice could be advanced in support of the proceedings before the 
Court, and every principle of jurisprudence required the proceedings to be 
set aside • In Abul Ala Mandoodi v. Government of West Pakistan it was held
that the rule-of natural justice, of affording an opportunity of hearing, is
2
also applicable to administrative acts •
Retroactive Legislation:
The fourth Fundamental Right of the Pakistan Constitution, 19&2, like
3
the corresponding Article in the Indian Constitution , provided that no law
shall authorise the punishment of a person for an act or omission that was not
punishable at the time of act or omission, or the imposition of a penalty
greater than, or of a kind different from, the penalty prescribed by law for
that offence at the time the offence was committed. The expression 'ex post
facto1 legislation is not used in the Indian Constitution, or in the
Pakistan Constitution, the provisions of which are narrower in scope than the
American Constitution* Art.1.S.9(3) of the U.S.A. Constitution provides that
'no bill of attainder or ex post facto laws shall be passed'; it does not
k
prohibit legislatures from making retrospective laws generally • In Pakistan
1. IJLD. ,196^, sp.Bb.
2 . 2^ . 1 9 6 ,^ S,C. 6 7 3
3. Art.20(10 /si' pv<a
4. See Caller v. Bullj /per Chase J. infra.
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or India, if legislatures make any law which retrospectively takes away 
or abridges any fundamental right, it will be void to the extent of such 
inconsistency^.
The struggle for protection against ex post facto laws is an
ancient one; it was recognised in ancient Greece. The objection to ex post
facto legislation in ancient Greece is illustrated by the case of Timokrates
and the Athenian Ambassador, where the Ambassadors had withheld money owed to
the city-state and were condemned to repay twice the amount. Timokrates
succeeded in securing the enactment- of a law to relieve the Ambassadors of
the penalty, but, as a consequence of the efforts of the Demontheses, the
2
law was held to be invalid because it was retrospective .
The Roman law also included the principle against ex post facto
legislation. The Digest, Corpus Juris Civilis, includes a rule that the law 
giver should not change his course of action to the injury of another person, 
'Nemo poftest mutare consolium suum in alterius injurium'^ . The principle of the 
Roman law found its way into the English common law through Bracton „ „ Lord
Coke took it from Bracton, developed it and gave it authencity by creating for
iu t ne 5
it a legal maxim, 'Nova const^tio fiyuris impcye debet non pragfceriatis' a new
law ought to deal with the future and not with the past; in other words, no 
Act of Parliament should have retrospective operation. The principle thus laid
down by Lord Coke was later developed into the maxim of common law and subsequ-
Tl See Pakistan Constitution, Art. 6 and the Indian Constitution, Art7l3. ~
2. Cited by Elmer & Smead in his article 'The Rule Against Retrospective 
Legislation'. 'A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence', 20 Minn. L.Rev. p.775»
See also Sir Paul Vinegradoff, 'Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence', pp. 
139-1*10.
3. See Corpus Juris t'ivilis, Digest, 30,17»73; see also Smead Op.cit.773*
*f. See Bracton, De Legibus et Consetundinibus Angliae, b.*f,c.38, f.228,
edition by Sir Travers Twiss,III, p.330; The Translation by Twiss, p.531*
3. 2 Inst. p.292.
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ently carried to America. It was read into the Constitution by way of
interpretation; the Courts have read ‘higher-law* principles into the
provisions of the United States Constitution . The principle was, for the
2
first time, recognised as a rule of construction in Dash v. Van Kleeck . It 
was Justice Chase who afforded the definition of ex post facto legislation in
3
Cadler v. Bull , and pointed out that the American Constitution does not prohi­
bit legislatures from passing retrospective laws generally but only ex post 
facto laws.
Ex post facto laws have been described by Blackstone as ‘those by 
which, after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the Legislature 
then, for the first-time, declares it to have been a crime and inflicts a punish 
hment upon the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible that the 
party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be after­
wards converted to guilt by subsequent law; he had therefore, to abstain from
it, and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and
k
unjust1 • The definition of ex post facto legislation has been afforded by 
Justice Chase in CseL jer v. Bull as meaning; (1) every law that makes an action, 
done before the passing of law and which was innocent when done, criminal, and 
punishes such action; (2) every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it 
greater than it was when committed; (3) every law that changes the punishment, 
and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime when 
committed; and (*0 every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
1. See Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the Civil War,(1911)
2*f Hari' »L.Rev.pp.366,460, and the Basic Doctrine of the American Constit­
utional Law (191*0,12 Mich.L.Rev.p.2*f7; also The Higher Law: Background 
of the American Constitutional Law (1928-29) ,*1-2 Harvard.L.Rev.pp. 1**9,363»
See also Haines, The Law of the Nature in the State and Federal Judicial 
Decisions (1916) (23 Yale,L.Rev.p.6l7)•
2. (1811) T.Johns,(N.Y.) k77, 3 Am.Sec.291.
3. (1798) 3 Dali.(U.S.) 386, 1 Law ed.6*f8.
*f. Blackstone J. 1 Commentary p.*f6.
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receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of 
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. He further 
elaborated the definition by saying:
"..I do not consider any law ex post facto within the prohibition, that 
fflolifies the rigour of the criminal law, but only those that create, 
or aggravate the crime, or increase the punishment, or change the 
rule of evidence.... Every law that is to have an operation before 
the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time, or to 
same time from the statutes of limitations, or to excuse actswhich 
were unlawful when committed, and the like, is retrospective. But 
such lav/s may be proper or necessary as the case may be."
He further pointed out that -
"..Every ex post facto lav; must necessarily be retrospective, but 
every retrospective^law is not ex post facto; the former only is 
prohibited .
Corpus Juris Secundum puts forth that:-
"V/hile an ex post facto lav; has been broadly said to be one that
has a retrospective effect, under the authority there is difference 
between an ex post facto law and a mere retrospective^law, and not 
all retrospective laws are ex post facto laws...... " .
The nature of ex post facto laws was explained to be:
"An ex post facto law is one which makes criminals and punishes an 
act which was done before the passage of the law and which was 
innocent when done; aggravates a crime or makes it greater than 
what it was when committed,’ changes a punishment and inflicts 
a greater punishment than what was prescribed when the crime 
was committed; or alter the legal rules of evidence and receives 
a lesser or different testimony than was required to convict at 
the time the offence was committed. Further an ex post facto law 
may be one which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies 
only, in effect imposes a penalty or causes deprivation of a right 
for something which, when done, was lawful; deprives* persons 
accused, of some lawful protection or defence previously available 
to them, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, 
or of a proclamation of amnesty in relation to the offence or its 
consequences,,alters the situation, of an accused to his material 
disadvantage" •
TT See Cadler v. Bull, (1798)* 2 Dali.3^6, per Justice Chase.
2. Corpus Juris Sacundum, See under Constitutional Law, Vol.l6-A,Art.**35*
3* Ibid
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Statutes, which do not alter the character of a earlier offence, 
do not create new punishment for that offence, do not take away defence 
which was formerly available to the accused, but simply bring change or 
amendment in the procedure, formerly provided for the trial of that offence, 
are not hit by the doctrine against ex post facto laws ,
It has been pointed out by Professor Gledhill that the protection
2
against ex post facto legislation applies to substantive penal laws ; it 
does not operate against procedural law^. A person is liable by the procedure,
existing at the time of the trial, not that in force when he committed the
k
offence . People do not mind changes in law, if only procedure is altered 
without changing the substance of law . There is basic difference between 
restrospective and ex post facto laws; the former expression is used in respect 
of civil matters, while the latter applies to penal laws* The protection 
against ex post facto legislation is invoked if an erstwhile innocent act is 
converted into an offence, or a lesser crime is converted into a more serious 
one, or the rules of evidence made unfavourable to the offender or an un- 
objectionale monetary device is converted by the legislature into tax-evasion^. 
Such retrospective penallegislation is also forbidden by the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which was signed by
7
members of the Council of Europe and later ratified by the United Kingdom •
1* Nabi Ahmad v. Home Secretary, P.IJ).,1969, SC.599*
2. Op.cit., India, p.198*
3. Nabi Ahmad v* Home Secretary, Supra.
Prof.Alan Gledhill, Op.cit. ,p*198, see also Shive Baharjur v* State of U.B^A.
I.R., 1953, SC.39^.
5* Nabi Ahmad v. Home Secretary, Supra.
6. Ibid.
7. See Chapter on historical Development of Personal Liberty*.
174
It is not easy to draw a line between substantive and procedural 
laws, but the task is not impossible, if the essential difference of these 
two categories of law is kept in mind* According to Salmond*s jurisprudence
MThe law of procedure may be defined as that branch of the 
law which governsthe process of litigation..•. All the 
residue is substantive law, and relates, not to the process 
of the litigation, but to its purposes and subject matter.
fThus* a right of appeal, a right to give evidence on one*s
own behalf, a right to interrogate the other party, rules 
defining the remedy.... as those which deal, not with crimes 
alone but with punishment also, as the measure of liability, 
and many rules of procedure which, in their practical operation, ^
are wholly or substantially equivalent to rules of substantive law" •
and as such must be treated as falling within the classification of substantive
law. If in the process, any existing rights are affected by the change or
. 2giving of the retrospective operation causes inconvenience or injustice , 
it would atwount to an infringement of the existing substantive right and would
be guarded against by the Courts on the basis of objection to ex post facto
legislation. It is, therefore, submitted that the full significance of the 
objection to ex post facto laws is easily grasped; if the above basic difference 
between procedural and substantive lav; is followed.
In one case the Governor of the East Pakistan, by an order under 
r.^2(2) of the Defence of Pakistan, Rules,1965* declared a printing press, 
belonging to the petitioner, to be forfeited to the Government, alleging it 
to have been used in the publishing of offensive materials, in violation of 
earlier orders made under r.32(l)(b) of the D.P.R.,prohibiting the petitioner 
from publishing materials contained in the schedule attached to each of the 
prohibiting orders. The petitioner approached the High Court with a writ
1. See 12th Ed.1966 p.128,
2. See Colonial Sugar Refining Co.Ltd. v. Irving (1903) A.C.369* and in 
re Joseph Sache & Co.Ltd., (1873) l,Ch.D.48.
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petition and a Special Bench of five Judges decided that as the Order of the 
Governor was without lawful authority, the printing press should be restored 
to the petitioner and the forfeiture order made by the Governor should be 
withdrawn* Meanwhile, r.^2 was amended by the Amendment Ordinance of 1$S6 
and C1.(*0, providing for the constitution of a Tribunal for adjudication of 
the forfeiture, along with other new clauses, was added to r.^2 of the D.R.R. • 
The next day, a fresh order r.52,D.P.R. was passed, forfeiting once again the 
printing press, and the following day, the Governor, under the newly added 
Cl.(^) of r-52, issued a notification constituting a Tribunal for the 
adjudication of forfeitures* It was, contended that the Order under the 
newly added Cl.C^ f) of r.^2 contravened Right No.^ f, in as much as it imposed 
a liability on the petitioner, which did not exist when the impugned action 
was taken. It was held that the provision of Cl.(^) of r*52 was procedural 
and did not affect any existing substantive right; it did not create an offence; 
it did not provide a new punishment for the commission of an act whichwas 
innocent at the time of its commission. The subsequent amendment of r*52,D.P.R. 
with retrospective effect, not being a substantive penal provision, did not 
come within the constitutional inhibition regarding £X post facto legislation 
embodied in Right No.^ f. The essence of the protection against ex post facto 
legislation is that the particular act must be innocent at the time of its
1. Previously there were only three clauses in r*52 of the D.P.R*; Cl.(l)
requires the material to be submitted to the Government before publication 
and provides for prohibiting and regulating publication; Cl*(2) provides 
for forfeiture on contravention of an order under Cl.(l); and Cl.(3) lays 
down punishment for contravention of r.^2 which amounts to imprisonment, or 
fine, or both, r.52,as amended by the Ordinance of 1966; clauses (1) and
(2) are retained in the same manner, Cl.(3) is reproduced in Cl.(7)> now 
Clause (3) authorised police officers to seize any copy of the objectionable 
document after forfeiture, Cl-(4) provides for the Constitution of a 
Tribunal for the adjudication of the forfeiture and Clauses (5) and (6) 
deal with the procedure before and the powers of such Tribunal-
176
commission • It is submitted that r.52(^ +) did not attach any criminality to 
an act which was innocent when it was committed; it does not come within the 
scope of Right No.^ f.
By the Code of Criminal Procedure (Uest Pakistan Amendment) Act, 196**, 
S.268 of the Cr.P.C. was amended so as to abolish the provisions in the Code 
relating to trial by a Court of Sessions ’with the aid of assessors.1 It was 
contended, in the instant case, that the abolition of the provision ’with the 
aid of assessors* vitiated the trial in the Court of Sessions. The real 
question which fell for determination before the Supreme Court was whether 
the new lav/ manifests an intention to affect pending cases, and if so, to 
v/hat extent. It was pointed out that the intent of the*new l^w was to provide 
for more expeditious trials, and with that object in view, the new law ought 
to do away with certain procedural provisions. It was in the light of this 
dcminat intention that the point raised in the case was to be resolved. The 
question of failure of justice, in the circumstances of the case, did not, 
therefore, call for consideration, as the only right that accrued to the 
accused by the committment order of the Trial Court, was to be tried by a 
Court of Sessions and that right had not been interfered with, though the 
mode of the trial of the Court had been changed, due to abolition of the 
provision for trial with ’assessors’. It v/as, therefore, held that the amended 
law did not violate the rule against ex^  post facto legislation; it was even
1. Tofazzal Hussain v. Province of East Pakistan, PH)., 1969i Dac.589» see 
also (1925) 2 6 9  U.S.,S.C.R., (2* law Ed.), 170; Craise on Statute Law,
6th Ed. p.3 8 8  and Calder v. Bull, supra.
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1applicable to pending cases • Right No.^ f cannot be attracted to the circumst­
ances of the case, as no change in the penal structure of the matter was 
brought about, in substance, by the amendment.
Ss.256 and 2^7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were amended by 
the Criminal Procedure Code (West Pakistan Amendment) Act,1 9 6 .^ Under the 
amended S.257, an accused person is debarred from recalling a prosecution 
witness who has already been cross-examined by him. The result is that, now, 
under the amended S.2 5 6 , no witness, who has already been cross-examined 
before the charge, can be called for further cross-examination; and S.257 no 
longer entitled the accused to recall such a witness, whether the first cross- 
examination was made before or after the charge. If the witness had not been 
cross-examined at all, though he had been examined before the charge was framed 
he could be called for cross-examination under S.257* The effect of the 
amendment was that a witness for the prosecution, could be subjected to cross- 
examination only at one stage of the case, either before or after the charge 
was framed. It was contended, in the instant case, that the right of the 
accused person to defend himself includes the substantive right of cross- 
examination, and the right to call witnesses, already cross-examined before
the charge, really matures into a vested right only when a charge is framed.
T". Mohd j^ Lam v. State,Pjp. ,19^7,SC.259; see also Khursheed Ahmad v. State, 
£LD., 1957, Kar. 359; see for the change in the Procedural Law. Mohd.
Sajjad v. State, Pip., 1961, $£.13; Raj Bahadur v. Empeior, AIR.,193^, 
Oudh.^09; Colonial Sugar Refining Co.Ltd., Case supra.,; Akhtar v. State, 
Pip.,1961, Lah* 10^9; S;:rinivasa Chari v. Queen, 6 ILR., MadraS,336; 
Sreekatft v. Emperor, AIR.,19^3, Bom. 169; State v. Ex.Mayor, AIR., 53 
Mad.^515 Sungi Chand v. Pakistan, PJLD. ,1961,S.C.523; Venugopala v. Rhish- 
naswahfii, AIR.,19^3, F,C.2if; Ramsingh V. Crown, AIR.,1950, E.Punj.25; and 
fcalipadashaha-v. State, Pip. 1959 S.C.322. But Banwari v. Emperor, AIR., 
19^3, Pat.18 and A.M.Bepgri v. State, 12.D.L.R. (Pak.) 100, are however, 
distinguishable from the above cases.
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In the instant case, the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined before the 
charge and the question was whether the accused, in view of the aforesaid 
amendments, which were enacted during the pendency of trial, would be debarred 
from recalling such witnesses for cross-examination. It was held that the 
amended law does not violate the provisions of Right No.4, as it does not 
interfere with the right of cross-examination in substance; it is even 
enforceable in pending cases, and the accused would not be allowed to recall 
the witnesses, who had already been cross-examined before the charge. As to 
the contention that the right of the accused to reserve certain questions, 
while cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, to be put after the charge, 
would be jeopardised, and that the accused was likely to suffer prejudice, if, 
according to the amended law, he was not given an opportunity to cross-examiner 
such witnesses after the charge, it was pointed out that, though such a
"I
possibility could not be ruled out, in a proper case, the provisions of S. 5^0
2
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, could properly be invoked . It is, there­
fore, submitted that, on the facts of the case, the amended law cannot be said 
to have jeopardised the right of the accused to cross-examine the prosecution 
witnesses in substance,.
In another case where the petitioners were tried before a General 
Court Martial, for offences committed under S.71 of the Air Force Act, 1963, 
read with S.^ f of the Pakistan Official Secrets Act, 1923, the main contention 
was that the Defence Services Laws (First Amendment) and (Second Amendment) 
Ordinances,1967, in accordance with which the petitioners were produced before
1. S.5^0 of the Cr.P.Code empowers the Court to summon, examine and re-examine
any material witnesses at any stage of enquiry, trial or proceeding under
the Code, if essential for a just decision of the case. See also Waheed
Hussain v. State., AIR., 195^, Hyd.20*f.
2. State v. Mohd. Jamil, PLD.,1 9 6 5 , Sp.68l.
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the Court Martial, were ex oos-i" facto enactments. By S.3 of the First- 
Amendment Ordinance, Ss.2 and 3“A of the Air Force Act were amended; in S.2. 
sub-clause (dd) was added, whereby persons, who were previously not subject to 
the Air Force Act, if now accused of committing an offence in relation to a 
fwork of defence.... or in relation to the naval, military or air force 
affairs of Pakistan- an offence previously to be dealt with under the Official 
Secrets Act,1923 - were rendered subject to the Air Force Act, as amended. By
S.3 of the Second Amendment Ordinance, subsection (2) was inserted in S.71 of 
the Air Force Act with,the result that persons who had been made subject to
the Air Force Act by the First Amendment Ordinance, under the aforesaid clause
(dd) of Sec.2 - became liable to be tried or otherwise dealt with under the Air 
Force Act, 19&3, f°r such offences, as if they were the offences under the 
Air Force Act and were committed at a time when such persons were subject to
the Air Force Act* It was, argued that in 1964, when the offences were
committed, the petitioners were not subject to the Air Force Act and, if, by the 
First and Second Amendment Ordinances, they were made amenable to trial by 
Court Martial, it would be a violation of Right No.4. It was held that the 
amendments did not contravene Right No.4, in so far as the punishment under the 
Air Force Act to which the petitioners were made subject, is neither greater 
than, nor of a kind different from the penalty prescribed by the Official 
Secrets Act; the amendments have the cumulative effect of providing a new 
forum; a court martial for the trial of offences which is a procedur&l matter .
S.5 of the Anti-corruption Act, 1957, Tor the first time, laid down 
that fa person, who has in possession any property which, there is reason to
1. Gul Akbar v. Dy.Secretary, PLD., 1968, Pesh.ll4.
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believe to have been acquired by improper means and which is proved to be 
disproportrynate to his knowjisources of income, shall, if he fails to account 
for such possession to the satisfaction of the Court, be punished with imprison­
ment. The expression 'if fails to account' clearly indicates that the 
legislature has required that the accused should in certain circumstances give 
an account of how he obtained possession of property. It is no doubt the duty 
of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
but, though Section 5, required the accused to prove how he acquired the property 
doe.s wcff-
this /mean, that the accused has to prove his innocence. If the explanation 
given by the accused appears to be true and creates no suspicion of the commiss­
ion of an offence, the accused has discharged his burden and it is for the 
prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The provision was, 
therefore, held not to be violative of Right No.4 in the sense that it creates
*
retroactively an offence, or prescribes a new punishment or greater punishment, 
or even alters the legal rules of evidence or allows a lesser or different 
testimony that was required to convict the accused at the time when the act 
was committed^.
S.10 of the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative 
Bank (Repayments of Loans) Ordinance, I960, which inter alia punishes failure 
to pay the instalments due on loans, was enacted after the petitioner had 
received two loans from the respondent Bank. It was therefore, contended that 
it created an ex post facto penalty, which Right No.4 of the Constitution proh­
ibits. It was pointed out that what S.10 of the impugned Ordinance provides, is 
the penalty for default, if any, committed, by the petitioners in respect of any 
provisions of the Ordinance after it came into force and not in respect of any
1. Badsha Mian v. State, P.L.D., 1966, Dac.l.
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act or omission committed prior to the coming into force of the Ordinance. On 
this view of the matter, it was held that S.10 of the aforesaid Ordinance is 
not violative of Right No.^ f •
Subsection (3) of S.12 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, as amended 
by F.C .R.(West Pakistan Amendment') 'Ordinance, 1962, lays down that, in cases 
of conviction for murder or dacoity under SS.302 or 396 of the Penal Code, in 
addition to the sentence under the aforesaid sections, the immovable property 
of the accused shall be liable to forfeiture. The amendment came into force 
after the commencement of the Constitution. It was contended that as the 
amendment imposed a retroactive penalty for an act done before the Constitution's 
commencement, also that, as it prescribed a greater penalty than was prescribed 
by the law at the time of the commission of the offence, it violated the 
protection guaranteed by Right No.^ f. It was pointed out that the amendment of 
the aforesaid section 12 had already been made by S.9 of the Criminal Law and 
Procedure (N.W.F.P. Amendment) Act, 1930, long before the commencement of the 
Constitution. It was, therefore, held that, under the aforesaid S.12(3) of the 
F.C.R., there was no question of retroactive punishment or imposition of a greater 
penalty than prescribed by law at the time of the commission of the offence, in 
as much as the added penalty of the forfeiture of the accused's property could 
be legally ordered under aforesaid S.9 of the Act of 1950, even if subsection
(3) had not been added to S.12 of the F.C.R. by the Amendment of 1962 •
S.3(2) of the V/.P.Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,1963, which was enacted 
during the pendency of the instant case, provided for the reference of certain
1. Ghulam Mohd. v. Dy. Registrar, P.L.D. 1968, Lah.758.
2. Alam Sher v. State, P.L.D.,1966, Pesh.19.
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offences set out in a schedule, whether along with an offence specified in 
the Schedule or otherwise, to a Tribunal at any time before the charge is 
made and for the purpose of such reference, authorises the Commissioner to 
requisition the record of the case from the Court concerned, provided that a 
reference in respect of an offence specified in Cl.(a) of Part B of the First 
Schedule could be made at any time before the judgement was pronounced. The 
petitioners’ case did not come within the proviso. They were charged under 
subsection 1^8 and 1^9 read with S.109 of the Penal Code with rioting, armed 
with deadly weapons and abetment of rioting. S.109 was included in the 
Schedule to the aforesaid Amendement Act,1963» but SS.1^8 and 1^9 were added 
to the Schedule by an amending Ordinance in 1966. It was, therefore, contended 
that the provisions of the 1966 Ordinance could not be applied retrospectively 
to the instant case, as the offences had been committed in 1 9 6 ;^ they should 
be tried according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
was applicable to the offences when they were committed. It was pointed out 
that Right No.k only prohibits ex post facto substantive penal laws; the right 
to be tried by the ordinary courts and the right of appeal cannot be regarded
as substantive rights so as to attract the provisions of Right No.^ f. Further­
more the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, itself provides for the reference 
of the schedule offences, which are tried along with non-scheduled offences,
to the Tribunal at any time before the charge is framed. In the instant case,
where the charge was not made before the reference, the plea of retrospective 
application of the provisions of the 1966 Ordinance, could not be invoked. 
Finally the Ordinance of 1966 made it expressly clear that its provisions
were applicable to pending cases .__________________________
1. Nabi Ahmad v. Home Secretary, (Supra, see also same case PLD.,1969,Lah.9 6 6 ; 
see also Mohd.Ishaque v. State, PIJ3,v,1956 S4C. (Pak)236; State v. Mohd. Jamil 
Supra. Mohd.Ibraheem v. Province of V/.Pakistan,PLD.,1968,Sp.l; Mst.Shorat 
Bano v. Ismail,1968,(Pak),SC.MR.57^*
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In one case where the Central Government had referred a dispute 
between the parties to a Tribunal before the definition of ’appropriate 
Government* in S.2(a) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 19471 was amended in 
September 1938 by SS.1(2) and (3) of the Industrial Dispute (Amendment)Act, 
so as to declare the Central Government as the ’appropriate Government1 for
the purpose of a reference ’in relation to any industrial dispute within the
Federal Capital* and gave retrospective effect to the ammended definition from 
l4th October, 1933» it was contended that the reference of the dispute before 
amendment to the Tribunal contravened the prohibition of ex post facto laws.
It was held that the reference did not violate the constitutional guarantee,
it was held that the amending Act could not be held void because of a mere
possibility, after the amendment, of a prosecution being launched against a
"I
person, who had disregarded a direction given in the earlier award .
In another case, the petitioner had been sentenced to trarportation 
for life on a charge of murder which would amount to 20 years rigorous imprison 
ment in effect, subject to remissions. In 1961, the V/est Pakistan Government 
passed an order th^t all persons, sentenced to transportation for life, would 
be imprisoned for 14 years and remission Would not exceed 4 years. It was 
contended that a person sentenced before the order to transportation for life 
could not, in fact, serve less than the new minimum of 10 years, so that he 
would be liable to undergo a longer period of imprisonment thjtn at the time 
of committing the crime. It was held that there was no violation of Right No.4 
The sentence imposed by the law remained the same - transporation for life.
The exercise by the excutive of the prerogatives of mercy was not subject to
1. Sai Gas Transmission Co.Ltd., v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, PLD.,1939 
sc.66.
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control by law or the constitution^
In State v. A,Ghaffar, the accused was charged with sedition and 
promoting enmity between classes. The accused promoted a protest against the 
establishment of V/est Pakistan and founded the Anti-One-Unit-Party, He made 
speeches about the creation of an independent territory for the Pathans, known 
as fPakhtoonistant, to be carved out of the territories of Pakistan, The 
charge against the accused was that he had not only made attacks against the 
Government established by law but had also attempted to create enmity and 
hatred between Pathans and Pungabis, The prosecution wanted to lead the 
evidence of his speeches made before &th August,19^7? when he opposed the 
creation of Pakistan and the partition of India. When the creation of Pakistan 
became inevitable, he advocated the creation of 'Pakhtoonistan1. ftie prosecution 
also wanted to give evidence of the speeches made by him between 1 9 ^ 8  and 1956» 
to show what he meant by the wore!, Pakhtoonistan' which he used in the writing 
and speeches made by him subsequently which were the subject matter of the 
instant trial. It was contended that such evidence was relevant under SS.14 and 
13 of the Evidence Act, The provisions of Art.6 of the Constitution of 1956, 
corresponding to Right No.*f of the 1962 Constitution, were invoked on behalf 
of the petitioner; it was contended that an act which was not an offence when 
it was committed should not be made subject matter of the trial subsequently.
It was pointed out that what Art.6 of the 1956 Constitution prohibits, is, 
inter alia the punishment of a person for an act, which was not an offence 
at the time it was done, and that it could hardly be doubted that, if some 
speeches or writings of the accused were brought on the record as pieces of
1. Earid Khan v. State, PLD.,1 9 6 5 , Pesh.31*
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f
evidence for the purposes mentioned in SS. 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act', it
would not amount to punishing him for making those speeches, in the sense
contemplated by Art.6, because such speeches, if allowed to be brought on the
record, would be used only as evidence with regard to the matters in question
and no offence would be attached by reason of taking those speeches into
evidence. It was, therefore, held that bringing of such speeches on the record
of evidence under SS.14 and 15 of the Evidence Act is not hit by Art.6 of the
2
Constitution of 1956 .
Under Cl.(e) of subsection (1) of S.4 of the West Pakistan General
Clauses Act, 195&, which is analogous to Cl.(e) of S.6 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, the repeal of an Act or statute ’shall not affect any investigation, 
legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, 
liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment* which 'may be imposed as if the
Repealing Act had not been passed*. In one case the accused was convicted of
murder under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, but, before the sentence could be 
confirmed by the Commissioner, the V/est Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 
1 9 6 5 , repealed the Frontier Crimes Regulation. The sentence was confirmed
subsequently, after the Fundamental Rights had been incorporated in the
1. See for explanation of purposes of S#l4 and 15 of the Evidence Act,. Mumir
J.S. Law of Evidence, pp.154-1351 under the heading 'Treason and Sedition
and defamation etc. S.14- of Evidence Act lays down that facts showing 
existence of State of mind or of body or bodily feeling are relevant when 
the existence of any such state of mind or body-feeling is in issue or 
relevant and S.15 of Evidence Act states that facts bearing on question 
whether the Act was accidental or incidental are relevant; the facts that 
such act formed part of. a series of similaroccurances in each of which the
person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.
2. 5ip.,1957i Lah. 1,42.
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Constitution of 1962* It was contended that, as the Frontier Crimes Regulation 
was repealed before the confirmation of the sentence, and as, due to 
incorporation of the Fundamental Rights, SS.ll and 12 of the Regulation, under 
which the sentence was passed and confirmed, were rendered void, on account 
of their inconsistency with Right No.15 - Equality of Citizens - the retrosp­
ective confirmation of the sentence under the repealed and invalid law was 
violative of Right No.4. It was pointed out that subsection (2) of S.34 of 
the aforesaid Amendment Act, 1963, expressly provided that the provisions of 
3.4(1)(e) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, shall apply on the 
repeal of the F.C.R.* The aforesaid S,4(l)(e) applies to all laws of the 
West Pakistan; it is also provided in the Act that it applies to all laws 
*unless a different intention appears*. Hence the Legislature has, to obviate 
any doubt as to the applicability of S.4(l)(e), made its intention indubitably 
manifest by this express provision. It was, therefore, held that legal 
proceedings, which were institutied under the repealed Regulation, were not 
to be affected by the repeal and had, therefore, to be completed in accordance
with the provisions of the repealed Regulation; and that it did not violate
Right No.4. The punishment to be inflicted under the repealed law would not
•*]
be affected by the repealing Act of 1963 •
As to the second contention, that the petitioner should not be
convicted under the invalid law, it was pointed out that by the abrogation
of the Constitution of 1962, the Fundamental Rights set out in paras. 2, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15 and 17 of Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution have
1. Wali Mohd. v. Govt, of West Pakistan, PU).,1970, Pesh.119, see also Sayeed 
Almad v. State, P,II).,1964, Sp.266, Mohd.Bashir v. Prov.of West Pakistan, 
PJI)., 1958, Lah.853, and Akhtar v. State, PJJ)., 1961, Lah.1049, distingu­
ishable.
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also been abrogated and the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969i has come 
into force, with the result that the High Courts have, under the new legal 
order, no authority to issue writs on the ground of violation of any of these 
Fundamental Rights* It is provided by Art*3(3) of the Provisional Constitution 
Order itself that all proceedings pending in any court, for the enforcement 
of these Rights, shall abate. A contention, therefore, that a law can still 
be declared void, if it is violative of basic human rights, and that the 
writs can still issue, is without any substance. It v/as, therefore, held that, 
on the plain reading of the aforesaid Art.3(3)» the relief claimed on the 
ground that the petitioner’s conviction and confirmation under the invalid 
law was violative of Right No. 4 could not be granted now, when the petition 
had been abated by the aforesaid provisions •
In a case where the petitioner was convicted for not submitting the
return of his election expenses and was sentenced to pay a fine of fifty
rupees, under the President’s Order No.IV of 1962, he was not disqualified,
on account of this conviction, for contesting an election. Later on the
Electoral. College Act,1964, was enacted, S . w h e r e  of disqualified the
persons, convicted under the President’s Order, for contesting an election
to National or Provincial Assemblies. It was contended that the retrospective
disqualification of the kind involved in the case was violative of Right No.4.
2
The High Court, relying on its Division Bench decision , held that the 
disqualification of the aforesaid description amounted to ’punishment’ within
the meaning of Right No.4, in as much as, in relation to a pure election offence
1. V/ali Mohd. V. Govt.of West Pakistan, supra; for abrogation of F.Rs. and 
abatement of proceedings for their enforcement, see Chapter on’Martial Law*.
2. Jamalus Sattar v. Ch.Election Commr. PLD.,1964, Dac.788.
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a greater penalty m s  inflicted retroactively than was prescribed at the time
of the commission of the offence?"
There are cases from viiich it appears that the Pakistan bar has
persistently tried to induce the Courts to read into Right Wo.4 a scope which
is blatantly outside it. Hence in a case where certain ex-detenus, who were
detained under the East Bengal Safety Act, 1951* were elected as member of
the East Pakistan Bar Council, it was contended that their election was illegal,
as they were disqualified for election to any elective body under S. 5 of the
Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959, which came into force after the
detenus were released. The Order was to remain in force for a short period and
was to expire long before the election date. It was contended on behalf of the
petitioner that the Disqualification Order was violative of Right No. A. It was
pointed out that the disqualification Order did not attract the provisions of
Ri^ tit No*4, as it was to expire before the election; after that period the
petitioners were no longer disqualified for contesting the election. Their
2
election was however, held valid .
In one case where the Retired Judges (Legal Practice) Order, 1962,
was repealed by S.4 of the Legal Practice (Disqualification) Ordinance, 1964,
by which the retired judges of the Supreme Court were disqualified to practice
before the Supreme Court and the retired judges of the High Court to practice
before the High Court. The Retired Judges (Legal Practice) Order enabled these
judges to practice before the respective Courts. Hence the Disqualifying
Ordinance was challenged on the grounds that it operates against Right No. 4.
It was pointed out that it would be straining the language of Right No. 4,beyond
what is permissible to say that the Disqualifying Ordinance imposes retrospect!^ 
_______________________________    /ye
1. Saheb Mia v. S. M. Mia ,P. L.D. 1966 ,Dac. 439; see also John A. Cunning v. State, 18th 
Law Ed.356,and BenCJamie Hawker v.People,42 Law Ed. 100 2 and Hobbs v.Morey, 
(1904) K.B.74 and Pritchard v.Mayor,(1808) 13 AC.241
2. Kamal Hussain v. Sirajul Islam, P.L.D. ,1964 Sp.42.
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punishment on the retired judges . It is submitted that the relevant Right 
is Right No.8, which guarantees freedom of trade, business or profession,
In another case, after the issue of a notification on the.26th
February,195$, the provisions of the Essential Commodities Distribution Order,
1 9 5 3 * so far as the fixation of a maximum selling price of cigarettes was
concerned, came to an end. The petitioner was ;convicted under the Order of
1953 after the Notification was issued. It was pointed out that the conviction
was illegal and , that Right No.*f had nothing to do with the circumstances of
the case. The conviction was bad on the general principle that he could not
2
be convicted for an act which was no longer an offence punishable by law .
In case of continuing or recurring wrongs, the acts of a person, 
accused of such wrongs, prior to the enactment of the statute which makes 
them a continued offence, form the part of the same transaction. Thus a 
law which penalized the continued possession of the liquor, even though it was
acquired prior to the coming into force of the law was held valid^.
Penalties imposed on the continued performance of contract, which had 
initially been entered into prior to the enactment of the law prohibiting 
such contracts was held not to be violative of protection against ex post 
■facto laws\
Alien Enemies:
Clause (3)(a) of Right No.2 lays down that protections afforded 
to the arrested person under clauses (1) and (2) of Right No.2, are not
available to a person who, for the time being is an !enemy alien*. This _
1. Akhlaque Hussain, in the matter of PH). ,1965,Lah. 1^7* "" I
2. Shafique Ahmad v. State, IUI).,1959i Lah.^20.
3* Samuels v. McCurdy, (1923)*267,U.S*l88. i
*f. Ghulam Mohd. v. Dy.Registrar, supra; see V/ater Peirce Oil Co. v. Texas,
(1909), 212 U.S.86. i
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clause does not define ‘enemy alien1. However, a definition of enemy is 
given in r.l6l of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1 9 6 3 * Clause (b) of r.l6l 
says that ‘enemy* means *anyiindividual resident in the enemy territory/ But 
this definition of ‘enemy’ does mean that an ‘alien enemy* has to be a national 
of a country at war with or engaged in military operations against Pakistan; 
it only saj® ‘any individual resident in enemy territory.*
Whether Pakistan even today is actively at war with India, or 
whether India is engaged in military operations against Pakistan, does not 
seem sufficiently criterian to enable Courts to decide whether an individual, 
living in India, is an ‘alien enemy*. So long as the emergency continues 
and the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance remains in force, an individual who is 
living in India, even a Pakistani National living in India, is likely to be 
defined as an ‘alien enemy*. In a recent case, where a Pakistani, who had 
been staying in India on the authority of the passport granted to him by the 
Government of Pakistan, but had not renewed his passport since 19&3* It was 
held that he was an ‘alien enemy’, in as much as he had been living in India 
without permission from the Government of Pakistan since 1963 and that an 
{alien enemy* cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 9 8  
of the constitution of 1 9 6 2  • An ‘alien enemy*,according to the Indian 
Supreme Court, means a foreigner whose country is at war with India. Where 
the detenus, alleged to be Pakistani agents, were arrested and detained in 
custody, without following the procedure laid down by clauses (1) and (2) of 
Art.22, it was held that it was a case of detention of alien enemies and did 
not call for compliance with clauses (1) and (2) of Art.22. This was a case of
1. Guru Das Shah v. Dy. Custodian, PLD.,1969, S.C.841.
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deportation and Suba Rao J., dissenting from the majority observed:
"Under this provision there is a constitutional injunction 
that a person arrested and detained in custody shall be 
produced before a magistrate within the prescribed time.
It cannot be again said that arrest and detention in 
custody in contravention of this provision is illegal.
Clause (3) of Article 22 specifies two exceptions to 
the said injunction. Admittedly the respondents 
did not fall under one or other of the two exceptions.
The constitutional provision is couched in clear and 
unambiguous phraseology and it is not permissible to 
read into that provision exceptions other than those 
specially provided fo5  l/hen a provision issues an 
injunction in clear words and provides for two specific 
exceptions it must be held that it prohibits any other 
exceptions... as the respondents were not produced 
before the nearest magistrate within twenty-four hours 
of their arrest, the arrest and detention was in 
contravention of Art.22(2) and was illegal." 1.
The Supreme Court of United States has always held that the
procedure adopted for the deportation should be handled with due care and
caution and must be Established by due process of law1 otherwise the
deportation may result in loss of both life and liberty. In Bridges v. Nixon,
it was observed that ’deportation is a penalty - at times a most serious one -
cannot be.doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised, lefct the procedure
by which he is deprived of the liberty should not meet the essential standards
2
of fairness... Deportability must be established by due process of law* •
The aforesaid clause (3)(a) applies only to an enemy alien and only 
during the existence of a state of war between Pakistan and the foreign 
power; it cannot be applied to any foreigner whose country has ceased to be 
at war with Pakistan. Friendly aliens are immune from the application of this 
clause; they are entitled to the same protections against deprivation of
1. State of U.P. v. Abdul Samad, AIR., 1962, SC.1306.
2. (19^) 326 U.S. 133.
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of personal liberty as a citizen of Pakistan.
The common law rule regarding enemy alien is the same. An
enemy alien can be detained in custody without trial and has no right to 
the writ of habeas corpus. In R. v. Bottril, it was held that an enemy 
alien could lawfully be detained without trial by the Crown and, as such, 
the detenu was not entitled to habeas corpus •
But there is no such provision regarding enemy alien in the
Constitution of the United States and the Legislatures can make laws in this
respect. This question was considered at length in re Yamashito in which it
was held that ’Congress, by sanctioning trials of enemy aliens by military
commission for offences against the laws of war, has recognised the right of
the accused to make a defence. It has not foreclosed their right to contend
that the Constitution or laws of the United States withold authority to proceed
with the trial. It has not withdrawn and the Executive branch of the
Government could not, unless there was suspension of the writ, withdraw from
the Courts the duty and power to make such enquiry into the authority of the
Commission as may be made by the habeas corpus *• It was further pointed out
that ’the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law applies to
’any p rson’ who is accused of a crime by the Federal Government or any of
its agencies. No exception is made as to those who are accused of war crimes
2
or as to those who possess the status of an enemy.”
1. (19^ +6) 2 All.E.R. 43^.
2. (19^5) 315 U.S.205.
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CHAPTER 6 
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS.
Double Jeopardy
1 2 The Pakistan Constitution, unlike the Indian and the
American Constitution, ^does not provide protection against double
jeopardy# However S.403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
the principle of autre fois Convict - formerly convicted - , and
autre fois acquit - formerly acquitted; in effect the doctrine of
double jeopardy# The principle of double jeopardy emerges from the
ancient maxim "nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa”; that is, no
person should be twice harassed for the same offence, It is laid down
by the aforesaid S.403 (l) that a person, once convicted or acquitted
by a Court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be tried again for the same
offence on the same set of facts.
It is clear from the above provision that, in order to claim 
protection against double jeopardy, there must hafre been a conviction 
or acquittal, that it must be in relation to the same offence, being the 
subject matter of the first trial and based on the same set of facts; and 
finally that it must be by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In order
to invoke the plea of double jeopardy, it was observed, that there must
1# "See 1956 as well as 19^2 Constitution of Pakistan.
2* See Art* 20 (3); but the Indian Constitution, however, uses the
expression Hconvicted” and it is silent about previous acquittal.
3* See Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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have been •prosecution* and 'punishment', in respect of the same offence, 
before a Court of law or tribunal, competent to decide the matter in 
controversy Judicially on evidence, given on oath, which it was authorised 
by law to administer; this does not constitute a tribunal which conducts a 
departmental or administrative enquiry . Tribunals which are neither required 
to record the evidence of witnesses on oath nor bound by the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be regarded as a 'Judicial tribunals' in the
2
context of double Jeopardy • Both previous and subsequent proceedings should be
•judicial proceedings', defined by S*4(l)(m), Criminal Procedure Code, as meaning,
'Judicial proceedings in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken
3
on oath;* both the proceedings should be before a criminal court •
The question whether 'domestic tribunals* exercising • quasi-Judicial 
functions* are ' Judicial tribunals' was comprehensively answered in Maclean y. 
Workers Union, It was observed that:
"Speaking generally it is useful to bear in mind the very 
difference between the principles applicable to the Court 
of Justice and those applicable to domestic tribunals* In 
the former the accused is entitled to be tried by a Judge 
according to the evidence legally adduced and has the right 
to be represented by a skilled le gal advocate* All the 
procedure of a modern trial, including the examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses and summing up,it may be based 
on these two circumstances* A domestic tribunal is, in general, 
a tribunal composed of a layman. It has no power to admirteter 
on oath and a circumstance which is of great importance, no 
party has the power to compel ’. the attendance of witnesses*
It is not bound by the rules of evidence. It is indeed 
probably ignorant of them* It may act and some times act 
on mere hearsay and in many cases the members
1. Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 SC*325*
2. Msoom Khan v* State,P.L.D.1969 S.C.M.R.208.
3* Ibid.
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present jr some of them are themselves both witnesses and 
Judges".
The same principle has been applied to tribunals like the Sea
Customs Authority and the tribunals holding departmental or
administrative enquiries; The question whether, by reason of further
proceedings taken by the Sea Customs Authority, the accused could be said
to have been tried once again for the same offence, for which he has been
prosecuted and convicted or acquitted by the criminal Court, has been
2
answered in the negative. It has been observed that the Sea Customs 
Authorities are not "judicial tribunals” and proceedings taken under the 
Sea Customs Act do not constitute a judgement or an order of a Court or 
judicial tribunal necessary to support a plea of double jeopardy^
"Prosecution” was said in Thomas Das V. State of Punjab to mean
a proceeding either by way of indictment or information in the Criminal
Court in order to put an offender on trial. Proceedings under the Sea 
4
Customs Act, for the confiscation of goods or infliction of penalty by 
the Sea Customs Authorities, do not amount to "judicial proceedings” nor 
can such an Authority be regarded as a "judicial tribunal" or "a Court of
1. {1923) 1 Ch. 602; see also Guy Wavering V.Charles,303 U.S. 391, and 
Compare Murply V. United States, 272 U.S. 630
2. Maqbool Hussain V. State of Bom. Supra; Thomas Das V. St. of Punj. in 
fra; Masoom Khan V. State^Supra; State V. Grhulam Iafar PLD# 1970 Pesh. 
66; Leo Roy Prey V.Cupdt.Dist. Jail, India (1958) S.C.R. 822 and Adam 
V. Collector of Karachi, P.L.D. 1969# S.C. 446.
3* ibid.
4* Sees. ^7, item (8l) to its schedule, Sea Customs Act, 1878 as 
amended in Pakistan in 1957»
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competent jurisdiction*', so there arises no question of double punishment 
for the same offence, as envisaged by S. 403, Criminal Procedure Code, 
to bar the proceedings before the Sea Customs Authorities^
It was also ruled that, since the proceedings of the Sea Customs
Authorities and the Criminal prosecution of the same accused under the
penal sections of the Act in a Court of Magistrate are not interdependent,
2
both proceedings can proceed simultaneously* The offences defined in
S. 167 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and the offences of conspiracy to commit 
such an offence under S.120-B of the Penal Code, are separate and distinct 
offences and do not constitute "the same offence" to support the plea of 
"double jeopardy"^
A tribunal which conducts a departmental or administrative enquiry 
is not a "judicial tribunal" and an enquiry conducted by such a tribunal will 
not bar the subsequent trial of an accused government servant for a Criminal 
offence; the principle of double jeopardy does not apply* The dismissal of 
a government servant by the Government oil the ground of corruption will not 
protect him under S.403, Criminal Procedure Code, from subsequent trial and 
punishment under S*l6l of the Penal Code^ Conversely on conviction of a 
government servant by a Criminal Court, the question of double jeopardy 
does not arise, if subsequently disciplinary proceedings against him are 
initiated for an object altogether different from dispensing criminal
1* Adam V. Collector, Supra; Masoom IChan V* State, Supra, State V. Ghulam
Jafar, Supra; Ma^bool Hussaim V. State of Bom. Supra; Thomas Das V. State
of Punjab. Supra.
2. Adam V. Collector, Supra; Masoom Khan V. State. Supra; State V. Ghulam 
Jafar, Supra*
3. Leo Roy Prey V. Supdt. Distt. Jail,(1958) India, S.C.R. 822.
4-. Venkata Raman V. Union of India, A.I.R. 195k S .C-375.
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justice^; disciplinary proceedings are taken on the principle of the larger 
public interest, which has nothing to do with criminal prosecution • The 
principle of autre fois acquit or autre fois convict does not apply to 
successive disciplinaiy proceedings;reversal of the report of the Enquiry 
Officer by the Appointing Authority and the holding of subsequent enquiry 
by the Appointing Authority after an accused government servant has been 
acquitted by an Enquiry Officer, is not prohibited by the principle of 
double jeopardy^.
It is also well established that criminal investigations are not
proceedings in the sense contemplated by the expression ”criminal
proceedings”, so there is no legal limit to the number of investigations
which can be held into a crime; when one investigation has been completed
by the submission of a report under S. 173, Criminal Procedure Code, another
may begin on further information received. The provisions of S. AO3 (l) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be invoked in respect of the number of
h
such investigations.
The expression ”by a Court of competent jurisdiction” also
involved in the case of a government servant who, on the sole gound of want
of necessaiy sanction for his criminal prosecution from the appointing
1. Shafgat Mahmood Lodhi V.' Acctt. Gen* P.L.D. 1968 Lah.786; but a contrai'y-view
was* taken in Dwarka Chattd V. State of Raj; A*I.R* 1938 |&4*38, that the 
principle against double jeopardy is attracted to the number of 
departmental enquiries*
2* Province of E* Pak. V. Hohd. A* Miah. P.L.D* 1939 S.C. 276.
3« Shafqat Mahmood Lodhi V. Acctt£en. Supra; Aznd J.&K.Govt.V* Mohd. Salim
P.L.D*1937 Azad J.&K.33; cases of Rangachari A.I.R. 1937 P*C. 27 and Mohd.
Hayat V. Province of W.Bak. P.L.D. 196A Lah. 26A, are, however, 
distinguishable; the principle of double jeoparcty was not discussed by 
decisions in these cases.
,4. See Dwakar V. Rama Murthi, 85 M.L.J. 127, and Maliinder V.Crown 33 P.L.R.
891, referred in Shafgat Mahmood Lodhia case,Supra.
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authority, as required by the Prevention of Corruption Act,1947, and other
relevant statutes, was discharged or acquitted by a Criminal Court and the
question arose whether his subsequent trial on the same charge, after the
requisite sanction had been obtained, barred on the principle of double
jeopardy. In Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhy V, King it was printed out that the
whole basis of S.403 (l)* Criminal Procedure Code, is that the first trial
should have been before a Court, competent to hear and determine the case
and to record a verdict of conviction or acquittal . It was, therefore, laid
down that a Court cannot be said to be competent to hear and determine a
case, the institution of which is prohibited in the absence of a proper
sanction. It has been further held that where an accused, a government
servant, has been acquitted in the former trial on the sole ground of an 
2
invalid sanction or want of sanction, the subsequent trial is not barred 
under S.403 (l), Criminal Procedure Code, as the previous trial has not been 
before a Court competent to proceed with the case? It was clearly 
established by their Lordships of Privy Council that, if an order of 
acquittal were passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction, though wrongly, 
it would be binding and tantamount to a bar toi.a second trial on the same 
charge; but if the first trial were a nullity, having been held by a 
court not competent to hear and determine the case, it would not be binding; 
the State need not appeal against it; no question of a bar to the second 
lT P.L.D. 1949 P.C. 108,
2. State V, Mohd*Ziya Nayyar P.L.D. 1957 hah, 477.
3, Ihsan Elahi V* Crown. P.L.D. 1931 Lah. 430 and Salahuddin V.
Crown P.L.D. 1956. Lah. 87.
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trial arose at all^ If a previous acquittal was not passed on the merits 
but on the sole ground of want of sanction, it did not fall within the 
purview of S. 403 (l) Criminal Procedure Code • It was laid down by 
the Supreme Court in another case that a bar to the subsequent trial on 
the same charge, under S.403 (l) » Criminal Procedure Code, applies only 
if the Court which held the first trial was a Court, not only qualified to
try offences generally, but also competent to tiy the accused for the
offence in the particular case*
But the aforesaid rule will not apply in a case where the
prosecution of the accused, a government servant, was kept pending for
a long time, on account of want of the requisite sanction and, on the
application of the accused under S. 561 - A, Criminal Procedure Code, the
High Court discharged the accused; subsequently, when the necessary
sanction had been obtained, a fresh complaint on the same charge was made
against the accused. It was held that, though it was true that, when the
accused was discharged, he was not acquitted of the charge, the
circumstances of the case showed that it was certaiMy not the intention
of the High Court that fresh proceedings for the same offence should be
instituted against the accused* To allow a fresh trial on the same charge
would not only nullify the High Court’s order quashing the proceedings, but 
1* Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy V. King, Supra*
2. Abdul Jabbar Khan V. State, P.L.D. 1961 Dac.449; see also Hata V.Emper
30.C.L*J. 233; Hukum Singh V. Emperor, 30.C.L.J, 114-9 and Ramanandarilftl..
V* Ali Hussain 260.L.J; cited in Aboul Jabbar Khan's case, supra*
3. Mohd Afzal Khan V. State, P.L.D* 1962 S.C.397 at p. 4-07; see also Abdul
Rashid V. Harish Chandra A.I.R. 1929 All.940; In re Muthu, A.I.R* 1937
Pesh.52; Emperor V* Ram Rakha, A.I.R* 1938 Lah.625; Emperor V. Ambaj A.I.R. 
1928 Bom. 14-3; Mahendra N. Shah. V. Emperor A.I.R. 193k Pat. 4-11* Farid 
Mohd. V. Emperor A.I.R. 1927 Sind 10; and Hari Jivan Shah V. Emperor,
A.I.R. 194-6 Bom. 492.
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<i
would constitute a glaring abuse of process of law . Also where the
Government had refused, in clear words, to sanction an appeal against the
discharge of the accused, it was oh served that the Government could not later
be permitted to turn round and urge that their previous position was ill-advised.
It was, therefore, held that fresh proceedings on the same charge, though, armed
with necessary sanction, was illegal as being barred under S.403(l) of the 
. . 2
Code of Criminal Procedure • An appeal against the order of the High Court 
was dismissed by the Federal Court^. But where the Government withheld the 
requisite sanction, requiring the matter to be further investigated by the 
Special Police, and the trial Court, implying wrongly that the Government 
did not want to accord the sanction, had acquitted the accused, it was held 
that the subsequent trial on the same charge, when the proper sanction was 
accorded, was not barred by S.403(l)* It was, however, pointed out that this 
was not a case where the Government, having first decided not to accord the 
sanction, later changed its mind\
A different point was involved in Emperor v. Menrag Devidas
5
where the police challenged the accused persons under S.291 of the Penal
g
Code, when an order from the District Magistrate under S. 144 > Criminal
Procedure Code, was in force. The dase was withdrawn under the instructions
1. State v. Qamar-uz-Zaman, P.L.D.1960,Lah.H99
2. Crown v. Sultan Mahmood, P.L.D.1953»L&h*271
5. Crown v. Sultan Mahmood, P.L.D. 1 9 5 5 2 0 .
4. State v. Mohd. Shafi,P. L.D. 1964,Pesh. 1
5. S. 291 deals with continuance of nuisance by the accused after an injunction 
from a public servant having lawful authority to issue it, is in force.
6. S. 144, Cr.P.C.gives power to the District Magistrate to issue order 
absolute at once in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.
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of the D.M. after a number of adjournments. Then, armed with a fresh sanction
1
from the D.M., a fresh complaint on the same set of facts, under ss.188 and
p
290 of the Penal Code was filed before another Magistrate. It was held that, 
as the previous withdrawl of case under S.494 (6)^* Criminal Procedure Code, 
amounted to an acquittal of the charge by a “Court of competent jurisdiction", 
the acquittal operated as a bar to the subsequent trial on the same charge*1"•
5
Where the evidence was not recorded as required by S.244f Criminal
Procedure Code, before the acquittal of the accused under S.245 (l)f Criminal
Procedure Code and later on a fresh challan was made on the* same charge, it was
held that the formal acquittal of the accused of the charge, without
recording the evidence, did not amount to an acquittal by a "Court of
competent jurisdiction, as envisaged by S.403 (l) of the Code of Criminal
7
Procedure, to bar a subsequent trial on the same charge.
8The acquittal of the accused under S. 247, Criminal Procedure Code,
due to default of appearance of the complainant where the accused had appeared
Tl S.188. P.P.C punishes disobedience to an order promulgated by a public
servant, lawfully authorised to make that order.
2. S.290 P.P.C. lays down punishment for public nuisance not otherwise 
provided for in the Code.
3. S.494 deals with effect of withdrawl from prosecution by public prosecutor,
of any person,of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried and 
states that upon such withdrawl, if it is made after a charge has been made, 
the accused shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences.
4. 23* C.L.J._, cited in Abdul Jabbar Khan's case Supra.
3. S.244, Cr. P.C. requires that a Magistrate, in proceedings on non-admission 
of the accusation hy the accused, should record the evidence ajauced both in 
support of prosecution and accused's defence.
6. S.245 (l), Cr. P.C.empowers the Magistrate, after recording the aforesaid
evidence, finds the accused not guilty, to record the order of acquittal.
7. Sardar V.Mohd Nqfwaz, P.L.D. 1949 Lah. 537.
8. S.247 deals with non-appearance of complainant on the appointed day for the 
appearance of the accused on having been informed, and empowers him to 
acquit the accused if complainant does not appear.
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and answered to the charge, would operate as a bar aga±nst the subsequent trial
1on the fresh complaint on the same charge • But, in a summons case the trial 
cannot be said to have begun until the particulars of the charge are stated to 
the accused and are answered by him* In the instant case where there was 
nothing on the record to show that the accused was discharged after the trial 
was commenced on the first complaint, it was held that as there was no trial 
on merits in the previous proceedings, the subsequent trial on a fresh complaint,
though on the same set of facts, was not barred under S.*K>3(1) of the Code of
2
Criminal Procedure •
But the cases of discharge are not covered by the principle of 
autre fois acquit laid down by S.*K)3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The 
section itself excludes the cases of dismissal of a complaint, the stopping of 
proceedings under S.2*f9 , Criminal Procedure Code, the discharge of the accused 
or any entry made upon a charge under S.275 9 Criminal Procedure Code, by 
declaring that these are not cases of an acquittal to support the plea of 
double jeopardy^• But the Supreme Court of Pakistan pointed out that an order 
of discharge, which is passed on the merits, though it does not, in law, 
constitute a legal bar to a subsequent trial on the same charge, will usually
1. Mohd Lalif v. Shah Nawaz,P.L.D.196l Azad J. & K.2 5^ and Raban Shah v. Mir 
Ramzan,P.L.D.I960 Azad J & K.29*
2. Abdullah v. Fazal Din,P.L.D.1960 Azad J. & K.2^.
3# S.2^9 Cr.P.C.deals with the power of the Court to stop the proceedings in 
the case instituted otherwise then upon complaint, after having recorded the 
reasons, at any stage without pronouncing any judgement either of acquittal 
or conviction, and to thereupon release the accused.
*f. S.275 Cr.P.C. lays down that, in trials before the High Court, when it
appears to the High Court, at any time before the commencement of the trial 
of the person charged, that any charge or any portion thereof is clearly 
unsustainable, the judge may make on the charge an entry to the effect.
5* See ’Explanation* to S.403, Cr.P.C.
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have the same effect as an order of acquittal for the purpose of the 
application of S.403, Criminal Procedure Code. This was the case where the 
proceedings instituted on a complaint, had been revived, even though an 
order of discharge on the merits was in force and had not been set asici^ ; j 
it was, therefore, held that the order of discharge would operate as an order 
of acquittal to bar the subsequent proceedings on the same charged It seems 
hard to reconcile the principle laid down in this case with the provision 
of S. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which in express terms states 
that the discharge of an accused cannot be regarded as an acquittal to bar a
2
subsequent trial on the same charge or to support a plea of autre fois acquit. 
It cannot be a rule of law, as the Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that an 
order of discharge, if made on the merits, will operate as an acquittal to bar 
the subsequent trial; it may be under the circumstances of a particular case, 
that an order of discharge on the merits should be regarded as a bar to a 
subsequent trial on the same fact.
The principle of double jeopardy will certainly come into operation
if the accused, on retrial, is tried once again for the offence for which he
has previously been tried and acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction
and that order is still in force. Some persons were tried for an offence
3 4punishable under S.302*^  read with S. 34 of the Penal Code and were acquitted 
of the said offence, except the petisioners, who were convicted of the offence.
1. Abul Husain Sana V. Suwala Agrawala, per Kaikaus J.P.L.D. 1962 S.C. 242
2. See RgjoNarayan V. Ajmaram Govinda^Al.R. 1954 A H  319 ; In re: Wasndeo
Narayan, A.I.R. 1950 Bom.10; and Inre: Dist. Magistrate, A.I.R. 1949 Mad.
76, see also MadadAli V. State, infra and SambQsiMariscase (1950) A.C.450
3« S.302, P.P.C. lays down punishment for Murder.
4» S.34 makes - when a criminal act is done by several persons,
in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons
liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him, alone.
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In appeal against their conviction under the aforesaid section, the convictions 
and sentences were, however, set aside and a retrial of the case was ordered*
They were again convicted under S. 302 of the Penal Code* It was held, 
wrongly it is submitted, that the accused could not, on retrial, be convicted 
of an offence for which he had been iformerly acquitted by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction and the order of acquittal was still in force as the state had 
not appealed against it^ In another case where, after the acquittal of the
o
petitioner of a charge of misappropriation or abetment thereof under S.409A09 
of the Penal Code, the petitioner again charged the accused with falsification 
of the accounts and putting his signature thereon under S.477-A of the Penal 
Code, and the accused was acquitted of the charge on the ground that he had 
signed the document, on which the prosecution relied, in good faitk * Later 
on the accused was once again charged with the same offence and it was contented 
that the signatures were made with criminal intent, It was held that, as the 
facts alleged to have constituted the offence in the instant trial were the 
same as those which had formed the subject metter of the previous trial in 
which the accused was qcquitted, it would put the petitioner under double 
jeopardy, if the subsequent trial were allowed, so the proceedings were 
quashed"?
1* Bahadur V. State P*L.D. 1961. Lah*923; See also Kisan Singh V. Emperor A.I.R*
1928 P.C. 254. Lala V. Emperor A.I.R. 1923 All. 941; Azam Ali V. Emperor A.I.R.
1929 All. 710; Indar Kumar HattoMT. State, A.I.R. 1954 Cal.375;Nazimuddin v. 
Emperor A.I.R. 1940 Cal.l63; and Mangi Jairam Bhate V. Emperor, A.I.R. 1929 
Nag. 161.
2. S.409, P.P.C. deals with criminal breach of trust by public servant or banker 
or merchant or agent. S. 109 lays down punishment of abetment if the act abetted 
is committed in consequence of the abetment and where no express provision is 
made by the code for the punishment of such abetment.
3. Abdul Majeect. V. State P.L.D. 1963 Dac.66l;see also Emperor V. 3habar Mull 
E.L.R.49 Cal. Emperor V. Nand Kishore A.I.R. 1919 Pat,3841& Mahadeo Prasad 
V. Emperor A.I.R. 1937 All. 117.
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When a person has been acquitted and a different charge is made
in a subsequent trial, based on the same set of facts and supported by the
same evidence as in the first trial, it will be clearly unjust and highly
oppressive and amount tS an abuse of the process of the Court, to permit
his repeated trials on identical evidence in respect of the identical charges
even though relating to different items?’ Thus in case where the accused were
acquitted on a charge under S. 3 of the West Pakistan Suppression of
Prostitution Ordinance, 1961, after the evidence of the prosecution and
defence had been recorded but the accused, on a fresh complaint, was charged
2.
for the sams offence under ss. 3,4 and 6 of the aforesaid Ordinance. It was 
held that the subsequent proceedings against the accused on the same set of 
facts for the same offence of which they had been acquitted, even under 
different sections of the aforesaid Ordinance, was against the principle of 
autre fois acquit^
S.I. of the frontier Crimes Regulation requires that offences under
S. 11 of the Regulation should be referred to a Jirga during the pendency of the 
proceedings; the question arose whether the aforesaid reference under S.I. of 
the Regulation, after the accused had been discharged under S. 209^ * of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, by a Court of Competent Jurisdiction, would amount to
double jeopardy. The Peshawar Division Bench of the Lahore High Court,
1. Mohd Ikram V. State, P.L.D. 1965 Lah.4^1; and Chaman Lai V. Emperor A.I.R. 
1943 Lah. 304.
2# S.3 of the Ordinance of 1961 deals with punishing the offence of committing 
illegal sexual intercourses; S.4 makes illegal the living on the earning 
of the prostitution and punishes it; and S.6 lays down punishment for 
running a brothel house.
3. Ramzan Bibi V.Muzaffar Hussain, P.L.D. 1967 Lan. 186.
4. S.209, Cr. P.C. lays down conditionin vdiihai accused person can be 
discharged.
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relying on the decision in Khanimullah V. Emperor^ expressed the view
2
that, as the discharged persons continued to be in jeopardy for two years
for the purposes of the fresh proceedings against him, even though the
order of discharge had not been set aside, a fresh trial by a Jirja could
validy be ordered within two years of the order of discharge* On appeal a
Full Bench differed from the aforesaid view and held that the case should have
been referred to the Jirga during the pendency of the case, as required by S.I
of the Regulation; after discharge the case could not be said to be pending.
It was concluded that as a fresh police report or complaint is required to
stafct fresh proceedings against the discharged accused, the reference of the
instant case to the Jirga could be made only when the proceedings had been
recommenced on a fresh report or complaint. Then only could the reference be
said to have been made during the pendency of the case; otherwise the reference
to the Jirga by the commissioner on his own motion and without the initiation
of fresh proceedings on such complaint or report* after the discharge of the
pj
accused^ would amount to double Jeopardy.r
If a person is accused of more than one offences,one or more of
which are mentioned in the First Schedule to the West Pakistan Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1963, aru* others are not so included, and the evidence is
relevant partly or wholly to both categories, the question arises whether it
is against the principle of double Jeopardy to allow the Commissioner to refer
1. A.I.R. 194? Pesh. 19, See also Qasam V. Crown P.L.D. 1953 Pesh. 54.
See S. 4-37* Cr. P.C.
3* See Emperor V. Kiru, 11 I.C. 132; See also Abdul Ghani V. Rokhan Shah,A.I.R.
1942 Pesh. 24 and Allah Ditta V. Karim Bakhsh, A.I.R. 1937 Lah.879.
4* Kasam Khan V. State, P.L.D. 1938 Pesh. 138.
5* Sher Wali V. S.ate, P.L.D. 1961. Pesh 117, see also,Mohd. Afzal Khan V. State,
P.L.D. 1939 Pesh. 133.
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thos£ offences which are included in the Schedule, to a Tribunal, leaving the 
otheres to be tried by a Criminal Court. Two of three Judges of the High 
Court were of the view that the Commissioner has no power to sub-divide the 
offences in the manner postulated and even if he were deemed to have such a 
power, it would be contrary to all known principles of justice to do so. The 
miniority view, however, was that there is no impediment imposed by law 
preventing the Commissioner from referring the question of guilt or innocence of 
the accused person to the Tribunal in relation to the some of the offences, as 
specified, in the Schedule, while leaving the others to be dealt with by 
ordinary Courts, even if the evidence in proof of the offences is relevant 
to both classes of offences. The Supreme Court observed that the proper reply 
which the Pull Bench should have returned,should have been confined to 
answer the question referred; the writ petition did not raise the question of 
the power of the Commissioner to refer a Scheduled offence, while leaving 
the other allied offences to be dealt with by ordinal * Courts/ it sought to 
quash the whole order of reference, which mentioned a number of unscheduled 
offences. The proper course and that which as dictated by law was to find 
that the reference under S.3&3 of the Penal Code was in excess of the powers 
of the Commissioner and to that extent his order should be quashed. It was 
further pointed out that, both by reason of the exclusive nature of the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction qnd the facts,on which the Tribunal would be called 
upon to adjudicate were the basis of a charge of Kidnapping simpliciter. the 
requirement of the law should be that ary further proceedings before the 
ordinary Court, which might be contemplated, whould wait upon the final
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decision by the Tribunal under the aforesaid Act# In other words, after the 
withdrawl of charge under S#363 of the Penal Code from the jurisdiction of 
the Magistrate, further proceedings in respect of other offences, arising out 
of the same set of facts, should be stayed, until the decision in the case 
withdrawn and referred to the Tribunal was reported to the Magistrate, and 
the prosecuting agency had made kfcown its intention with regard to the trial 
of such other offences. It would be at this stage that the plea of autro. fois 
acquit or convict, as the case might be , would appropriately be raised for 
adjudication#^
The expression "offence" has been defined by the General Clauses 
Act as an ”act or omission made punishable by law for the time being in force11 
For invoking the plea of double jeopardy, the cardinal principle is that, in 
the subsequent trial, not only the facts or evidence should be the same but 
also the judicial inferences from the facts# Cases may occur in which the 
same act may render the actor guilty of two or more distinct offences, for
O “2 I r
instance, theft and robbery*^  or dacoity , or dacoity and riot , or kidnapping 
and abductionj Therefore, the essential requirement for attracting S.403* 
Criminal Procedure Code, is that the offences, in the previous and subsequent
Q
trials, should be indentical « The protection against double jeopardy cannot 
be available where, there is difference in the basic elements which constitute
1. Commr# V# Khizar Ha&t, P.L.D# 1966 S£. 793.
2. See for ”theft” S.378(2)
3. For ”robbery” S.390 (3)
4« For "dacoity” S. 39l{4;
3* For ”riot” S#147 and 148
6# For "kidnapping” S. 360; and
7* For”abduction” S. 362 of the penal Code of Pakistan.
8. State of Bom. V. Apte, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 378.
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the different offences arising out of the same set of fact si Where the
offences forming the basis for previous and subsequent trials or simulteneous
two trials are distinct and different, the principle of double jeopardy cannot 
2
be invoked.
In one case the petitioners had previously been acquitted on a 
charge of criminal breach of trust under S.40^ of the Penal Code; later they 
were prosecuted under Martial Law Regulation (C.M.L.A.) No.l6 read with 
Martial Law Order (M.L.A.S.) No.104, for the recovery of the Government dues 
outstanding,it was held that the subsequent trial was not for the same offence 
as the accused persons could be tried for any other offence for which a 
different charge from the one for vdiich they might have been convicted, was 
made under S. 237 Criminal Procedure Code; the offence under the Martial Law 
Regulation was altogether different and hence the principle of autre fois 
acquit could not be invoked*^ .
If subsections (l) and (2) of S.403, Criminal Procedure Code are 
read together, it seems that, if in the first trial an alternative charge 
under S.236, Criminal Procedure Code, is framed, or the accused is convicted 
of a different offence without such an alternative charge, under S.237 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, then the second trial for another offence on the 
same set of facts and identical evidence would be barred. It was pointed out 
in ^ re: Tangvelu that an acquittal in respect of offences under S.477 -A^
lT Om Prakash V. St. of U.P. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 458.
2. Mohd. Ikram V. State, P.L.D. 19&5 Lan. 461; Motiur Rahman V. State,
P.L.D. 1963 Dac. 595; Madad Ali V. State, P.L.D. I865 Kar. 541; See also
Sumbasiwan V. Pub.Prosecutor (1950) A.C. 450 and Pritam Shigh V. St., P.L.D.
1957-S.C. (Ind) 1.
3. Ghulam Nabi V. State, P.L.D. 1966 Lah. 131.
4. S.477 - A of the Penal Code deals with falsification of accounts by a clerk,
officer or servant with intent to defraud his employer or abets such falsifi­
cation.
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of the Penal Code, does not bar the prosecution of the accused under S.409 
of the Penal Code. The fact that the evidence in the second trial was bound
to be substantially the same as in the first trial was held to be not the
material test. The material test is that laid down by S. 236 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, namely, whether the facts are of such a nature that it
is doubtful which of the several offences, the facts, which are to be proved,
would constitute. It is only in such circumstances that S.236 of the Criminal
Procedure Code is attracted. And it goes without saying that S.237 cannot be
2
attracted unless S.236 applies to the case.
^he Code of Criminal Procedure authorises prosecution for more 
than one offence at one trial* S.234 of the Code enables a Court to try a 
person for three offences of the same kind committed by him within a year.
Two or more persons .mpy be tried for three offences of the same kind committed 
by them jointly within a year under 239 (c). S^233 provides that, if one
series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction , more 
offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with 
and tried at on trial for every such offence. S.222(2) enables person, charged 
with criminal misappropriation of criminal breach of trust, to be charged in 
respect of a total sum involved between specific dates, which shall be deemed 
to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of S. 234» Nowhere is it 
prescribed that separate charges, in respect of separate amounts misappropriated, 
shall not be made or that if the accused has misappropriated several sums
1. S.409 of the Penal Code, provides punishment for criminal breach of trust
by public servant, banker, merchant or agent.
2. A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 130.
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within a year, they all must be added together and made into one gross sum 
and tried as one charge* Hence, where the accused in the former trial was 
not tried for a gross sum misappropriated within two dates but for misappro­
priation of specific sums of money recieved on one specific date, it was 
held that the subsequent trial for misappropriation of sums on other dates 
was not barred and that S.222(2) did not come into operation.
Where the accused were formerly tried under S.189 of the Penal
Code, for obstructing a public servant conducting a local auction and
acquitted, but subsequently they were challaned for offences falling under
SS.353/109/34 of the Penal Code, for a^ulting a public servant in the
execution of his duty, it was held that the second trial was barred under
S . C r i m i n a l  Procedure,/ as S.235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
applied. It was, however, pointed out that, in the first instance, when the
knowledge of the alleged offences came to the notice of police authorities,
they were at liberty to challan the accused at the first trial by the
joinder of the offences, and that it is certainly not the intention of the
Legislature to alloy* the prosecution of accused persons under one section of
the Penal Code and, if the prosecution fails, to allow trial for another
2
alleged offence on the same set of facts.
Tl Kankayya Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 MadT978
2. Mohd. Jan V. Crown, P.L.D. 1933 Bal. 14; Masir Ali V. Abdul Mami 
(1956) 81 D.L. R. 634; see also Malak Khan V. Emperor A.I.R. 1946.
P.C. 16.
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The petitioner was ^charged of an offence under S.19-^ of the Arms
act, 1878, but was convicted of murder under S. 302 of the Penal Code* Later,
after the discovery of a pistol in the accused's possession, .he was again
tried on the charge under the Arms Act* It was held that the subsequent trial
was not barred under S*403 (l) Criminal Procedure Code* It was, however,
pointed out that it is well established that a person discharged at previous
trial cannot be said to be in double jeopardy of being convicted of the same
offence for which he has been subsequently tried on the same evidence or on the
2
discovery of new evidence* Had the accused been acquitted of the charge 
under the Arms Act, his subsequent trial, even though on the discovery of
the relevant evidence, would have been against the principle of double
jeopardy^
The appellants were placed on trial on a charge under S.302/10$ of 
the Penal Code, for murder or ebetment of murder and acquitted* They, along
k
with others^ were thereafter tried on a charge under S* 148 of the Penal Code,
for rioting; they were again acquitted but the other accused were convicted 
5
under S*147 of the Penal Code* The instant trial was the third, on a charge
of being in possession of unlic.*h&ed fire arms under S*19-A of the Arms Act*
To rebut the plea of double jeopardy, it was pointed out that subsection (2)
of S.403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a person acquitted
1* S-19-E punishes for carrying the fire arms with Criminal intentent 
2*Mada‘d ‘Ali v. State, P*L*D* 1965 Kar* 541
3* Sambasivan V* Pub* Prosecutor, Supra; Pritam Singh V. State, P*L.D* 1957 S-C.
India 1* See also Ataullah V* State, Supra*
4* S* 148 provides punishment for the accused persons guilty of rioting, being 
armed with a deadly weapon which is likely to cause death.
5» S* 147 l^ys down punishment for rioting; use of force or violence by un­
lawful assembly.
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or convicted of an offence mgy be later on tried for any distinct offence 
for which a separate charge might have been made against them in the fdfmer 
trial under S. 235* It was further pointed out that, if the instant trial 
under the Arms Act were the subject matter of the charge under the provisions 
of S*236, Criminal Procedure Code, cumulatively or alternatively made in 
the first two trials, the instant trial of the appellant would be barred*
If, however, the instant offence was a distinct one, which could have been
K
joined under S*235 (l) along with the oi£er charges in the previous two trials, 
in view of the fact that these offences were committed in the occurrence of 
the same transaction, the instant trial was not barred; in view of the 
circumstances the instant trial was held not to be bax*red under
In one case the petitioners were charged with 24 distinct offences,
arising out of the same act of misappropriation of money; the petitioners
were convicted on only one charge but the other accused were acquitted*
Later, proceedings were commenced against the petitioners on the remaining
23 charges* It was contended that the allegations in those twenty-three cases
dL
and the evidence to be acjjiced in their support were identical with those which 
formed the basis of the previous trial, offending against the principle of 
double jeopardy* It was ruled that the subsequent trial in respect of 
identical charges and on identical evidence was certainly barred against those 
who had been acquitted by the Court of competent jurisdiction in the previous
trial* It was, however, pointed out that the same principle could not be 
applied to the accused, who had been convicted at the previous trial, for 
the reason that the punishment awarded at the previous trial had no relation
1* Motiur Rahuran V. State , P.L.D* 1963 Datf,595
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to the offences which formed the basis of the subsequent trial* In the 
latter case$ it was observed, the ends of justice requires that they should 
fact the subsequent trials for the remaining offences. These were the cases 
in which distinct offences of misappropriation were committed on different
X
dates of separate ascertained money*
Continuing offences do not fall within the purview of S.403(l) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure; the plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against a trial for a continuing offence. But it has been established that
only those continuing offences can be excluded from the application of the
aforesaid S.40<3(l) when their continuance is made punishable by the Statute.
&■
By 1 continuation of an offence** is m^nt that there should be repetition of 
the same offence by the commission of the same act. The Municipal 
Adminstration Ordinance, I960 expressly provides that, if an offence under the 
Ordianance is continuing, the offender is liable to pay a fine of £1 for every 
day. The petitioner was convicted under cl.3 of the Second Schedule read with 
S.116 of the aforesaid Ordinance, for running a saw-mill without a licence and 
was ordered to dismantle the mill . After the conviction, the petitioner 
continued running the mill and consequently, he was again convicted and 
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 for every day on which he continued running 
the saw mill. It was held that, in the light of the provision for the 
punishment of the **continuing offence**’ under the aforesaid Ordinace, the 
petitioner's second conviction for the continuing offence, being the 
continuation of the same act, amounted to a fresh offence eveiy day of its 
commission and was not barred by the provisions of S.403 (l) of the Code of
1. Mohd. Ikram V, State, P.L.D. 1963 Lah. Supra; see also Inre: Osman Ali 
A.I.R. 1939, And. Pfa. 520; Kankayya V. Emperor A.I.R.1930 Mad. 978.
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Criminal Procedurei
But where the petitioner was convicted under S. 14- of the Foreigners 
Act 194-6, for staying in Pakistan without having obtained the due permit under 
cl7 of the Foreigners’ Order, 1951# and subsequently he sras again convicted 
for non-compliance of the aforesaid requirement of law on the ground that it 
amounted to a continuing offence • It was observed that, in order to consider 
the question of "continuing offence" in respect of the plea of double jeoparcty, 
two questions are involved; (i) whether the person is being tried for the same 
offence for which he has been tried and convicted or acquitted before; and (&£) 
or alternatively, whether he is guilty of having committed a fresh offence 
daily. In the instant case, in order to answer these questions, the gist of 
the offence complained of has to be looked into. On the analysis of the said 
clause 7, it becomes patently clear that the clause does not require that the 
persons accused of non-compliance with the provisions of the said clause should 
be tried and convicted each day for & fresh offence so long as non-compliance 
continues. The failure to comply with the requirements of the said clause 7 
is one act and it does not constitute a fresh breach of law eveiy day; it is 
the same contravention of the ia w, which is being continued, not that a fresh 
contravention occurs daily. It was, therefore, the continuance of the "Same 
offence” and not ’♦repetition” of the offence every day to constitute the 
1 continuing offence" • Hence, within the meaning of S.403(l), Criminal 
Procedure Code, nobody can be tried and convicted more than once in respect 
of the "same offence", unless the statute or the particular provision of the
1. Amanullah Molla V. Dacca Mplty., P.L.D. 1967 Dac.58l see also State V#
Kunga Bihari, A.I.R. 195^ Pat# 371 F.B$ and Emperor V.K.G.Ved, A.I.R. 1942 
Bom*326.
2. For the explanation of the expression” continuing of fence", see Emperor V. 
Chhota Lai Amarchand, A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 1.
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relevant law clearly provides that if an act, so continued, would amount
to a Mfresh offence” committed daily, if continued from day to day# In
the absence of ahy such provision in the aforesaid Act and Order, it was 
held that the second conviction of the petitioner was illegal, being in
oontra vent ion of the provisions of the aforesaid S#403 (l)*
Retaining articles of stolen property is a continuing offence
2
and if an accused is previously acquitted of an offence under S.411 of the
Penal Code, for retaining stolen property, a subsequent prosecution under
3
S.412 of the Penal Code in respect of the greater number of articles, 
discovered in accused's possession, is not barred under S.403(l) , Criminal 
Procedure Code, though such articles might have been received at the same 
time*^
There is no conflict of authority on the point that an alternative
punishment, provided by any valid statute, for an offence cannot be construed
as creating double jeopardy^ nor can S.403 (l) Criminal Procedure Code be
invoked in a case where the law provides two punishments for the same offence,
such as a sentence of rigorous punishment and fine provided for any single 
$offence • The plea of double jeopardy cannot be raised in cases of preventive
ll Amir Khan V. State, P#L.D. 1963 Dac.92; See also Griffiths V. Tezia Dosadh,
I.L.R. 21 Cal* 262; Unwin V. Clarke,L.R; l.Q.B.4-17 Cutler V.Turner,L.R.9.Q*B. 
302 Ex Parte Baker, 26 L.J.M.C.135; and In re; S.V#Kishta Pillai, $P.C#4l6;
2* S.411, provides punishment for dishonestly receiving stolen property# knowing 
or having reason to believe that same to be stolen property.
3# 412 lays down punishment for dishonetly receiving property stolen in the
commission of dacoity, the possession wher^p^* ^ke accused knows or has 
reason to believe the same to be so, or dishonestly received it from a person 
whom he knows or has reason to believe to be belonging to a gang of dacoits 
4* Ashutosh Todar V# State ,P.L.D*1963 Dac# 719; see also Yomappa Joteppa V.
Emperor, 48 Cr. L.J#873, cited in the aforesaid case; However the cases of 
Hayat V. Emperor A.I.R# 1928 Lah#637; and Jalal V. Emperor A#I,R#1932 Lah.6l5 
are distinguishable.
3. Loom Chand V.dfficial Liquidators 1*, M.L.J#514;see also Seervai op.cit.p.425
6. Ebraheem V. State of Bom. (1934) S#C#R#933
detention, because preventive detention is not a "prosecution” in the sense 
contemplated by S.403(l) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Self ,-Incrimination
2Differring from the American and the Indian Constitutions, the 
Constitution of Pakistan has afforded no protection against self-incrimination. 
Nevertheless, the privilege, to the extent practicable today,has been 
incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act^
The doctrine against self-incrimination emerged, in England, out of 
a feeling of revolt against the inquisitorial methods* of interrogating 
accused persons, adopted by the Court of Star Chamber in the exercise of its
/
Criminal jurisdiction. The principle was firstly laid down in the case of
Lilburn - which resulted in theabolition of the Court of Star chamber - that
the accused should not be put on oath and that no evidence should be taken from 
4>
him. In course of time the doctrine attained the status of a privilege of 
the accused and was further extended to witnesses, who could not be compelled 
to give oral testimony or to produce documents, which could incriminate them.
Though the Criminal Evidence Act, 1669, brought an amendment to the privilege
to the extent that an accused person could be a competent witness on his own
1. P. Arumu<jham V. St. of Med.; 11953) M.L.J.5^1; see seervai, 3p* cit p. 424 
see also Prof. Alan Gledhill, India, p 198 __ _
2. See Art. 20(3) of the Indian Constitution; and TV and T Amendments to the 
American Constitution.
3* See S.342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (India or Pakistan) and S.132
of the Indian (Pakistan^ Evidence Act; see also ss.l64 and 3&4, Criminal
Procedure Code and ss24 - 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. N.B. These sections 
will be dealt with in the context of applicability of the privlege, infra.
4. 3 State Trials 1315«
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behalf, if he so desired, but it did not affect the protection against the 
incriminating oral testimony or the production of documents*
Before it was amended in England by the Statute, the doctrine was
2
carried to America and was adopted as part of its common law* It was 
incopporated in the V Amendment to the American Constitution, in its widest 
form, so as to include all aspects of self-incrimination, including compulsory 
oral testimony and production of documents* The doctrine was further extended 
to the protection against unreasonable search and seizures of documents; the 
evidence and documents thus obtained being held to be inadmissible in evidenced
The Indian Constitution adopted the doctrine from the American
Constitution; but, unlike the Vth Amendment to the American Constitutuion, Art*
20 (3) of the Indian Constitution does not provide protection ©gainst search and
seizures. It was held in Sharma* s case that the search and seizure do not
violate the right guaranteed by Art* 19 (l) (f) of the Indian Constitution*
It was further pointed out that search by itself does not affect any right of
property, though the secure does affect it; the affect of seizure, in the
instant case, was temporary, and was a reasonable restriction on the exercise
L
of the right to holdani deal with property •
Ever since the establishment of the protection against self­
incrimination in England, its utility has been the subject of debate and the 
view has been expressed that the privilege has a tendency to defeat justice,
1. See Phipson on Evidence, 9th ed. 213 and 274#
2* See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol*8 p*301-303; for history of the origin
3# See for development of "doctrine against self-incrimination", M*P*Sharama V*
Satish chandra, (l95k) S.C.R.1077, per Jngannadhadas J. See also Seervai, 
op. Cit pp. 428-429.
4# Supra.
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in so far it closes one source of obtaining evidence, Wigmore points out that;
” Indirectly and ultimately it works for good - for the good of 
innocent accused and of the community at. large. But directly and 
concretely it works for ill - for the protection of guilty and the 
consequent derangement of civil order. There ought to be an end to 
judicial cant toward crime. We have already too much of what a wit 
has called "justice tempered with mercy”. The privilege^therefore 
should be kept within the limits the strictest possible”•
It has been said that the privilege has become a shelter to ciminals that 
only the guilty claim the privilege or are protected by it. Hence Knox observes;
”Tt is the experience of each one of us.,. If he can be content to 
maintain silence in the face of direct accusation, or of incriminating 
circumstances we immediately conclude that he cannot exculpate him­
self. In ninety-one cases out of a hundred, we know that such a 
conclusion is justified... The only answer that I can formulate is 
that law, in seeking to be property sensitive to the rights of2a 
culprit, has developed a callousness for those of the public?
Wigmore finally suggests that "Courts should unite to keep the privilege 
strictty within the limits directed by historic fact, cool reasoning,and sound 
policy'1^
In modern times, with the development in the scientific detection 
of the crimes, the applicability of the doctrine, except against compulsory or 
forced oral testimony, cannot be extended to other aspects of self incrimin­
ation; such as physical examination, medical examination, or, blood or urine 
test, a examination of the specimen of the handwriting or finger or foot­
prints; exhibition of the body or the taking of photography voice or face
1. Wigmore, op.cit, pp 314-15; see also Sarkar, Law of Evidence, 11th ed.p 1192.
Knox, Self- incrimination, 74 U. Pa. L. Bev. 139, 148 (1924)*
3« op.Cit, 519*
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identification, examination for determination of insanity or
psychological truth and deception test.^ It has been eleborately observed 
by Williams that;
"'In the American legal writing, the concept of the privilege against 
self-incrimination has been applied to medical examinations of
accused persons by police surgeons, the use of stomach-pumps and such
like* In England we should not think of these problems as raising
the issue of self-incrimination; they relate merely to the limits on
the powers of the police in relation to the detained persons*
Although there is little anthority, it can be said with some confidence 
that the use of force against the body of a detained person for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence is an illegal battery. There is, 
however, a commonlaw power to search arrested persons ( the police 
have not tried to assert that this extends to a search of the body, as 
distinct from a search of the clothes or exterior); and magistrates 
have statutory power to authorise the taking of finger prints"
As regards applicability of the doctrine in modem ^imes, there is 
conflict of opinion. One group holds that the protection underlying the
doctrine includes a safeguard both against compulsory oral testiraory and the
forced production of documents exclusively, on the baSis that historically the
doctrine has been applied against these two forms of testimory^ Another
expresses the view that, irrespective of the f o m  of incriminating testimony, 
the test should be the active or passive participation of the accused ini
furnishing the testimory; for instance, he may be compelled to submit his body,
1. See Wigmore, op. Cit; Me CorwtLck, Evidence. (1954) >Knox, Self Incrimination 
op* cit; Histoiy of Criminal Law of England, by Stephens, Vol. 1.p.442(1883) 
Inisii', Self Incrimination(l950) ; Model Code of Evidence,prepared by 
American Law Institute,1942,and Luther House, Criminal Procedure - Self 
Incrimination - Scientific Tests of Body Substance as Evidence, 44 Kentucl^ 
L.J. £53*356 (1955-567 see also Self-Incrimination "published by Indian Law 
Instute (l963)*
2. See Gt&ntVille L. Williams, The Privilege Against Self-IncriminationL An 
International Symposium (England) 31 J. of Cr.Law pp. 165,169 (1960-61)
3. See Wigmore op. cit. p.375, Inbau, op. cit;Model Code of Evidence op.cit. 
p.201-5.
221
but cannot be forced actively to co-operate in the sense of rendering himself 
"to be a witness" or-to give evidence" against himself; he could be compelled 
to submit finger prints or an extract of blood, but he could not be required to 
aid in re-enacting the crime . But according to the third view, any evidence
secured by compulsion from the accused, whether by requiring to act or by his
2
mere passive submission, is within the purview of the doctrine «
Professor Gledhill points out that the protection against self-in­
crimination envisages that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled
"to be a witness" against himself. "To be witness" means "to furnish evidence", 
and includes the production of air/ evidentiary material under his control. The 
ban applies to any process to compel a person to produce such material, not
only when he is on trial, but also when he is in a situation which, in the
3
normal course of events, will result in his prosecution • It has also been
observed that it is only when a person is formally accused, or officially
suspected of a crime that he may not be examined as a writness at all. In all
other situations the witness must answer non-incriminating questions and must
suffer the humiliation of claiming his privilege when the question is incrimin-
4
ating. Not much is left of his privacy then .
In India, it has been argued that, though the doctrine against self­
incrimination should not be extended to cover aspects of self-incrimination 
other than the compulsory taking of oral or documentary evidence, within this
1. See McCormick, op. cit. 263
2. See Luther House,Criminal Procedure-self-Incriminaticn^Scientific Tests of
Body Substance as Evidence, 44 Kentucky L.J. pp.355-358 (1955-56)
3. See Professor Alan Gledhil, Constitutional Protection of Life and Liberty,
op.cit.p. 135; see also M.P.Sharma v. Satishchandra,supra, atp.1008.
4. See MoCormic, op. cit. p. 288
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limited area, it should be given full effect and not be drained of its
ocntent, as envisaged by Art* 20 (3) of the Indian Constitutidn, by any
narrow interpretation or by countenancing evasion^ But an unrestricted
application of the doctrine even within that limited area is impracticable
in the context of the various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and Indian Evidence Act, which allow the admission or confession of the
accused to be admitted in evidence if it is recorded by a Magistrate^ or if
2
it is made before the Court conducting the trial; s*342 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and s*l£2 of the Evidence Act authorise the Court to put 
questions to the accused, the emswex'S lb which m a y  he tTicrrmma-fm^.
Nevertheless, S*j&2, Criminal Procedure Code, provides that no oath 
shall be adminstered to the accused, and the proviso to S*132 of the Evidence 
Act lays down that no answer, which a witness is compelled to give, shall 
subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or to be proved against him in any
CL
criminal proceeding* S*2A, Evidence Act, renders/”confession1*made by an accused 
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, if it appears to the Court to have been 
caused by any inducement, threat or promise# S.25, Evidence Act, makes a 
confession, made to a police officer, inadmissible in evidence against a 
person accused of ary offence* S*2f, Evidence Act, lays down that a confession, 
made by any person whilst he is in custody of a police officer, unless it is 
made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall not be proved as 
against such person. S.lft. of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers a power
1 * See Jagannadhdas JTs observation in Sharma1s case, supra; see also ~ 
Seervai, op* cit* p. A28.
2* See S.26, Evidence Act, and ss* lft and 3ft- of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure*
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on a Magistrate to record Statements or confessions made to him in the course 
of an investigation and requires that he should explain the person making it 
that he is not bound to make a confession and if he does so, it may be used 
as evidence against him, and that he should not record ary such confession 
unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that 
it was made voluntarily; and, when he records any confession, he shall midfa. 
memorandum - as prescribed by the section itself* S.3ft. of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure lays down that a confession of statement, recorded by a 
Magistrate under S.lft., Criminal Procedure Code, should be interpreted to the 
accused in a language which he understands, that he should be at liberty to
explain or add to his answers and the record should be signed by the accused
and the Magistrate or Judge or Court, and such Magistrate and Judge sho\£ld 
certify under his own hand that the examination was taken in his presence and
hearing, and that the record contains a full and true account of the Statement
made by the accused.
In view of these provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act, it is submitted that the protection against self-incrimination 
or against compulsory taking of evidence or .production of material which may 
incriminate the accused has been sufficiently provided for and there is no need 
to incorporate a provision against self-incrimination in the Constitution. It 
seems likely that this consideration caused the framers of the Constitution of 
Pakistan to think unnecessary to repeat these provisions in the constitution.
Even if the protection is guaranteed by the Constitutionals in case 
of the Indian Constitution, the practical applicability of the doctrine is not, 
and cannot be, extended further than the limit put by various provisions of the
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Code of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, as discussed above and these 
provisions have not been invalidated so far in India* On the other hand there 
are other provisions, both under the Code of Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Actm which hake various forms of incriminating testimony admissible in 
evidence* Hence S.27 of the Evidence Act provides that, when any fact is 
deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person, 
accused of apy offence, in custody of a police officer, so much of such 
information, whether it amounts to confessionor not, as relates distinctly to 
the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. S*9 of the Evidence Act lays down 
that facts identifying relevant facts are admissible in evidence. S.75»
Evidence Act enables the Court to take a specimen of handwriting, figures or 
signature of any person alleged to have been written by such person for the 
purpose of comparing the writing before the Court; this section applies also, 
with necessary modifications, if any, to finger - impressions or foot-prints.
S* 165, Evidence Act, gives the Court power to put questions or order 
production of any document and the party has no right to object to such 
question or cross examination without leave of the Court; he can only refuse 
to answer such question or production of document tinder ss.121 to 131, Evidence 
Act, if it is asked or called for by the adverse party. S.51 of Code of 
Criminal Procedure empowers the police officer to whom a person, arrested by 
an officer or private person, is made over, to search such person and place in 
safe custody all articles, other than necessary wearing-apparel, found upon him. 
Ss.464 to 469 lay down the procedure incase of the accused being insane and 
authorise: the court, if he appears to the Court to be of unsound mind, to 
determine first the fact of such unsoundness and incapacity by the report of 
a medical officer, Furthermore S.4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act,
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1920, lays down that non-convicted person, if so required by a police officer, 
should allow his measurements, including foot-print impressions to be taken 
and S.5 of the Act empowers a Magistrate, First Class., to order a person, who 
has been arrested in connection with a criminal investigation or proceeding, 
to be measured or photographed.^
It has been submitted that the reasonable search and seizure do not
2violate the protection against Self incrimination. The Indian Supreme Court
also pointed out that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of
S. 132 of the Evidence Act and the protection against Self-incrimination laid
down by Act.20(3) of the Indian Constitution^ As regards the provisions of
S.27 of the Evidence Act, it was, however, painted out that the evidence
otherwise admissible under the aforesaid section is rendered in admissible, if
4
obtained by compulsion.
Until 1955, in India, in a Criminal trial, an accused person was 
not competent to testify, but at the conclusion of the prosecution case, he 
was examined, not inquisitorially, but solely for the purpose of enabling him 
to explain the facts against him. An Amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
in 1955 has given him the option to give evidence. The Statute forbids any 
adverse inference, if he does not exercise his option, but no law can inhabit 
the human mind from drawing the inevitable conclusion about a man who could 
explain incriminating fact and does not. The Amendment is not, of course, in
1. See also S.34- of the Prisoners Act 1894; see also for the general power 
of police to investigate into conguizable offence, ss.156&157 Cr.P.C.
2. See Sharmafs Case Supra;
3. In Re Central Cal. Bank, A.I.R. 1957 Cal.320
4« gnoom Singh’s case, A.I.R. 1957 All. 197; see also Orissa V. Basanta Rag.
A.I.R.1957 Orissa _ 33*
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ary way inconsistent with the right to protection against self-incrimination.
The question of the inconsistency of S. 73 of the Evidence Act with 
Art. 20(3) of the Indian Constitution was considered in State of Bombay V. Kathi 
Kalu Oghad and it was held that it is not inconsistent. In this case the 
question before the Supreme Court was, whether, (l) compulsory obtaining of 
handwriting from the accused by the police during the investigation; or(ii) 
giving of a direction by a Court to an accused person present in the Court to 
give his specimen handwriting and signature under S.73 of the evidence Act; 
or (iii) compulsory obtaining the impression of the palms and fingers of the 
accused by the investigating police officer in the presence of a magistrate, 
is violative of the provisions^of Art.20(3) 9 aEd it was held that it is not 
violative.^
"/here a man was found in a State of intoxication, it was hald that 
there had been no violation of Art.20(3) when the police caused him to be 
examined by a doctor, on which the charge of drunkenness was established; he 
had not bee compelled to give evidence against himself^ 11 To be a witness” may be 
equivalent to furnishing evidence in the sense of making oral or written 
Statements, but not in the larger sense of the expression, so as to include 
giving 0f thumb impression or impression of palm or foot or fingers or 
specimen writing or exposing a part of the body by an accused person for the 
purpose of the identification!"
1^  See Prof Alan Cledhill, op. Cit." "pp. 137-138
2. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1808
3. In re Panali Gondan, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 546.
4* State of Bombay V. Kathi Kalu, Oghad, Supra.
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In order to invoke protection against self-incrimination,two facts 
should he established; (l) that the person concerned is an accused of an offence; 
and (ii) that he is compelled ”to be witness” against himself. If one of these 
facts and not the other is established, the requirement of the doctrine will 
not be fulfilled. Secondly there should be an element of compulsion in taking 
the incriminating testimony. If the taking of the testimoi^ r is allowed by
various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure /the Evidence Act, in
/
absence of any Constitutional guarantee, the protection against self-incrimination 
available in Pakistan must be found in the relevant provision of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act.
If the confessions recorded under S.164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure are found by the Court to be voluntary and true, they are admissible
under §.24* of the Evidence Acti But where the accused alleged that the
confession was extorted from him by torture but no marks of torture were
discovered <n physical examination and no evidence was added ta substantiate
the allegation, the confession in the circumstance of the case, was held to be 
2
voluntary • It was pointed out that, in cases of voluntary confession, the 
protection against self-incrimination cannot be invoked'? A confession, which 
failed to show in what words the accused made it, was held to be an extra­
judicial confession and was not allowed to be used against the accused as it
would incriminate against him.^ * A confession of the accused, made under s. 164*
ll State V. Minhum, P|L.D.1964 S.C.813; see also^UIP-rV on the Law of Evidence, 
Vol.1.p.168; State V. Jatindra Kumar, P.L.D.1968 Dac.742; andJan Hohd.V.state 
P.L.D.1966 Kar. 365.
2. Qasim V. State P.L.D. 1967 Kar. 233.
3* State V. Minhum, Sllpra.
4. Iqbal Husain V. State. P.L.D* 1969 Lah. 217, see also Sukkio V. State P.L.D. 
1967nKar. 800.
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Criminal Procedure Code, when he was not under the influence of police, 
being lodged in the judicial lock-up, was held to be saved by the provisions 
of S.28 of the Evidence Act, which states that, if a confession, as is 
referred to in S.24 of theAct, is made after the impression caused by ahy 
such inducement, threat or promise, has, in the opinion of the Court, been 
fully removed, it is relevant in evidence.^
Though it is not against law to use a voluntary confession of the
accused against him, where a boy of 18 years, charged with attempting to kill
the Head of the State, was arrested and detained in Ports at two different
places, it was held that the circumstances were such that, even in the absence
of the physical pressure on him, he must have been under extreme mental
pressure, which the police, far from alleviating, must have tried to aggravate
the voluntary nature of the confession,tinder the circumstances, was held to be
2
very doubtful; it was not allowed to be used against the accused.
YTnere there was nothing on the record to show that the warning to 
be given to the accused, as contemplated by S.164 (3) , Criminal Procedure Code,
had been given to the accused, a confessional Statement was not allowed to be
used against him, though the Magistrate recording the confession deposed at 
triak that such warning had been given; The confessional statement of the
accused under S.164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Should/read as a whole
/
and should not be allowed to be taken into consideration -ih
1. Gulzar Khan B. State P.L.D.3963 Pe s h. 178. ""
2. Mohd.Hussain Khan V. State, P.L.D. 1969 Pesh 347, see also Sawaran Singh 
Ratan Singh V. State of Punjab P.L.D. 1957 S.C.(lnd) 555; HGshim. V.State. 
P.L.D. 1960.Kar. 674; Haji Yar Mohd, V. Rahim P.L.D. I960 Kar.769 
Wazir V. State. P.L.D. I960 Kar. 74; Mst. Akhtar Begum V. State. P.L.D.1960
797.
3. Ramzan V. S^ .ate, P.L.D. 1966 Kar. 242.
piece meal in order to incriminate the accused^ * The Court cannot rely, on the
portion of a confession implicating him in the commission of an offence
and disregard another portion, simply because it would go against the
2
prosecution story • A confession made before a police officer and in the 
presence of Magistrate, was held not to be admissible under S. 23 of the 
Evidence Act and S. 27 of the Act cannot be attracted in such cases’^. Where 
the Magistrate did not record all the questions put to the persons making 
statements and did not disclose that he was a Magistrate, and failed to 
inform theg? that if they made statements, they would be sent to judicial 
custody and not to police custody, it m s  held that the procedure was illegal. 
Confessional statements conflicting with ocular evidence held to have been made 
under coercion and oppression of the police; it was not admitted^.
Though non-compliance with the provisions of Sb.I64 and 364 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure makes a confession extra-judicial and as such not
5
admissible in evidence to be used against the accused , the confessions in the 
cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947^, which dcJf\iot require the
formalities of S.I64 of theCode of Criminal Procedure, are not regarded as
H  Mohd Amin v* State, P.L.D. 1968 Quetta 29; see also State v. Minhum Supra.
2* Abul Subhara v. State, A.I.R. 1940 All.46; see also Balmukund v. Emperor, 
A.I.R. 1931 All. 1.
3. Hakim Khan v. State, EL.D.1961 Pesh. 142.
4. State v* Madad Aid, P.L.D.,1967 Kar* 612.
5. Iqbal Husain v* State, Supra; Sukhio v. State, Supra; and Addi«A.G.W.P.^.A. 
Magid P.L.D. 1963 Quetta 20.
6. See Pakistan Special Police Establishment Ordinance and W.P. Anti Corruption
Establishment Ordinance, 1961, -which set up special force to deal with
cases under Prevention of Corruption Act and lays down special procedure 
for prosecution of such cases which are immune from the formalities of Ss.
164 and 364, Criminal Procedure Code; see also s.23 of the Police Act, 1861 '
read with s.3(l-A) and (2) of the Azad J & K.Prevention of Corruption Act, 
discussed in the case of Mohd.A$zal Khan v. Sarkar,P.L.D.1969 Azad J-& K.22.
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being extra-judicial, despite non-compliance with the requirements of S.l£4, 
Criminal Procedure Code^
It is well established that, if an important piece of evidence is
not put to the accused under S.342, Criminal Procedure Code and he is not
given an opportunity to explain any incriminating evidence, then it cannot be
2used against him. UThere the Magistrate, while examining the accused persons
put one single question to all of them, it was held that S. 342 contemplates
individual statement by the accused persons and as such the recording of a
joint statement made by the several accused persons was illegal^ Where the
attention of the accused in examination was not drawn to incriminating
circumstances, relied upon by the prosectution for conviction, it was held that
omission was prejudicial to the accused and as such the trial was held to be 
4
vitiated. As regards the question whether the plea of guilty or not guilty 
under S.255, Criminal Procedure Code, forms a part of examination of the accused, 
it was held that it can never be taken to be a part of the examination, nor can
1. Mohd*SarwaT V.State P.L.D. 1969 S.C.2781 Mohd Amin V. State P.L.D. 1968 Quet.
29*‘Sain V. Azad J & K. P.L.D* 1961 Azad J.& K.23« However Decision in Chularfl
Abbas V. State, P.L.D. 1968 Lah. 101 was over ruled by the S.C.decision in 
the aforesaid case.
2. S. 342 Cr. P.C. confers the power to examine the accused and lays down that 
for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any evidence against, 
the Court may, at aly stage of ahy enquiry or trial without previously 
warning the accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers 
necessary and shall for this purpose question him... the answers given by the 
accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial and put in 
evidence for or against him; the accused shall not render himself liable to 
punishment by refering to answer such questions or by giving false answers
to them; but the Court may draw such inference from such refusal & answers.
3* Mohd Akbar Khan V.State,P.L.D.1967 Kar.l86;RahimBukhs V.Crown P.L.D.1952 P.C. 
l;Aminul Haque V.Crown P.L.D. 1952 F.C.63; Abdul Wahab V.Crown. P*L.D.1955 P*C, 
88,Abdus Salam Molla V.Crown P.L.D. 1955 P.C.129; and Munawar Ahmad V.State 
P.L.D.1956 S.C.(Pak.) 300.
4* Abdullah V. State, P.L.D. 1967 Pesh. 62. See also Emperor V. Shicalomal A.I.R. 
1937 Sind 304.
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be a Statement under S.256, Criminal Procedure Code, in reply to the question
as to which witness should he called for cross - examination by the accused,
because this is a simple question of procedure and one that does not touch
the circumstances appearing in evidence against the accused or the merits of
the case against him. It was, therefore, pointed out that it would be
erroneous to hold that a statement, made by the accused, in reply to the question
put to him under ss255 and 236, can be considered to form a part of his
examination, so as to require his signature in accordance with the provisions
of S. 364 (2), Criminal Procedure Code. It was, therefore, held that the
accused by refusing to sign such statement committed no offence under S.180 of
the Penal Code,^ The Court can properly question the accused under the
condition!mentioned in S. 342 (l)^ hence protection against self-incrimination
5
does not apply to a statement made by the accused before the Court.
Examination of the accused is an "integral part of the Scheme, under S.342, 
enabling the Court to discover the truth”. Hence, where no examination of the 
accused was made by the Court, it was held to be improper compliance with S.342 
and illegal^
T7 Ashra fuddin Ahmed V. State R.L.D.1964 Dac.704*
2i Svl80, P.P.C. provides punishment for any person who refuses to sign any 
statement made by him, when required by a public Servant legally competent 
to acquire it.
3* State V. Sardar Ahmad, P.L.D. 1967 75; see also Imperitix V.Sirsapa 4.I.L.B
Bom. 15. 
if. Supra.
5. Agha Khan V. State P.L.D.1967 Lah. 348
6. A.M. Noor Mian V. Mokhlesur Rahman P.L.D. 1967 Dac. 503; see also Emperor 
V. Almuddin 52.L.L.R. ^ P^Amiritlal Hazara V. Emperor, 42, I.L.R.cal. 957 and 
Bema Nath JVIu k h>rjee V. Emperor 50 I.L.R. Lah 5/8 Cal.
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A Court has wide power under S*54X5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
to summon material witnesses or to examine persons present on summons but the
very extent of these powers, imposes a reciprocal responsibility of the same 
magnitude to use these powers with care. It is only for the just decision of 
the case that the Court can have resort to S.540, Criminal Procedure Code for 
summoning Court witnesses. The Court cannot use these powers to advance the 
case of the prosecution, or that of the defence, and wherever such an order,is 
passed, putting one of the party in a position of advantage, Vis-a-Vis. the other, 
the High Court will be justified in interfering to correct the error*^ .
In one case, on information given by the coaccused, currency notes
vrorth Rs. 1,52,312 were discovered in the accused*s bag by the police, who
alleged they were the sale proceeds of smuggled gold, but there was no evidence 
to prove that the money was so obtained. The trial Magistrate, relying on the 
Statement of the co-accused, which he held to be admissible against the 
accused under s.27 of the Evidence Act, convicted him. It was held that the 
Statement of the co-accused, under the circumstances of the case, could not 
be used against the accused under the aforesaid S.27. It was pointed out the 
Statement of the Co-accused might have been correct and the notes, in fact,
might habe been the sale proceeds of smuggling gold, but there was not admissible
2  ^evidence on the record to substantiate that fact. Walizar V. State, and Crown
4
V. Saadullah are distinguishable from the aforesaid mentioned case, in as much
as, in these cases, the information given by the co-accused were used against
TI Zafarul Euque V. State, P.L.D. Lah. 437; and Mohd. Ashraf V.£*afar 
Ahmad, P.L.D. 1967 Lah. 1045*
2. Mohd Akbar V. State, P.L.D. 1954 Lah. 627
3. P.L.D. I960 Kar. 204.
4. P.L.D. 1953 Lah, 451; See also Abdus Samad V. State, P.L.D - 1964 S.C.167.
the accused persons under S.27 of the Evidence Act, because some facts relating 
to the offence were discovered on the information thus given, such as pointing 
out the accused by the co-accused.
Evidence as to the identity of the accused or stolen property by 
the owner of the property, in the Court, is admissible; an answer to the question, 
"who and what is this respondent" is not barred by S.9 of the Evidence Act}
It is a well established principle of law, as enmuciated by S.105 of
the Evidence Act, that the burden of proof to show that his case falls under
exceptions or any special exception of self-defence, or under the proviso to
the aforesaid section, lies on the accused, but he can be said to have
discharged this onus by referring to circumstances in the evidence led by the
2prosecution from which a reasonable doubt is cast on the prosecution case.
Y/here the accused failed to establish circumstances enabling him to plead the
protection of exceptions to criminal liability, but it appeared to the Court
that there were such circumstances, it was held that the accused must be given
the benefit of doubt, and that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that
there were not such circumstances.^ In another case it was held that the burden
was on the prosecution to prove that a boy of 15 years committed the murder in
4
self-defence while deseased tried to commit sodomy .
The Court has the right under S.73 of the Evidence Act to examine and
compare the writing of the accused with the alleged writing, or signature or any
Tj State V. Ashfaq^ . A. Sheikh, P.L.D.19^7 hah. 1231.
2* State V. Farman Shah, P.L.D. 1967 Pesh. 229
3. Mahim Mandal V. State, P.L.D. 1964 Dac.480 see also Wo&lmington V.D.P.P. 
(1935) A.C. 462; Prabhoo V. Emperor A.I.R. 1941 All. 402; Safdar Ali V. Crown
P.L.D. 1953 F.C.93 and Mohd Aslam V. Crown P.L..D. 1953 P.C.115.
4. Mchd. Idregs V.State, P.L.D. 1965 Lah. 533.
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impression of foot-print or finger impression and it is not a violation of
, the protection against self-incrimination^- The Court has the right, not only
to take and compare the signature or writing in the aforesaid manner, but also
to arrive at a conclusion, after analysis and comparison, quite contraiy to
2
the opinion of the hand writing expert.
The legal position which emerges from S.464 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, is that the Magistrate must have reason to believe that the
accused person before him is of unsound mind and incapable of understanding
«
the proceedings, and from S.465, is that if it would appear to the Court” at
the trial that the accused person suffers from unsoundness of mind and thus is
incapable of making his defence. In either case the action is to follow the
subjective reaction of a Magistrate or the Court to the situation that arises
before him. If during the enquiry nothing comes to the notice of a
Magistrate to induce a belief in him that an accused person is of unsound mind
and consequently incapable of making his defence, there is nothing for him to
do except to proceed with the trial in the normal manner. The words "appear to
the Court” are used in S.465, while the words ”has reason to believe” occur in
S.464. But it is clear that in practical effect both the expressions: mean
almost the same thing. The phrase ”to appear” , it is submitted, is used, in
the context of S.465, in its meaning nearest to the expressions "to be in one’s
x
opinion” as given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Hence enquiiy is necessary
only when the Magistrate under S.464 has "reason to believe” or under S.465
it "appears to the Court" that the accused is of unsound mind.
l! -^^ 4. Niwaz V, Mohd.YUSUP P.L.D.19^3 S.C.51; Eskandar A^ •V.Alhawi'a Beguim, 
P.L.D.1969 DAC.2»\4 Majhavayya V. Achamma,P#L.D.1949 P.C.80.
2. Mohd*Umer V* State, P.L.D.1968 Kar. 875; Ali Niwaz V. Mohd.Yusuf, Supra, and 
Kassa bai V. Jethabhai Jiwan, A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 277.
3. See also Emperor V. Bahadur A.I.R.1928 Lah. 796 and Emperor V. Durga^
Charan, A.I.R.1938 Cal.6.
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In the instant case, the Magistrate, on the subsmission on behalf of the
accused, that he had suffered from insanity since birth, refused to order
an enquiry and proceeded with the trial. It was held that it is within the 
sole discretion of the Court to adjudicate upon the question of insanity. If 
the Magistrate or Court finds that insanity is feigned, it has simply to ignore
it and proceed with the case.^ "
The words "shall in the first instance, try the fact of unsoundness 
and incapability" in S a n d  the word "appearing” in Cl.(2) of S.M55 leave 
no manner of doubt that the question of unsoundness of mind and hence 
incapability of the accused of making, his defence shall be decided first and 
such trial shall be deemed to be part of the accused^ trial before the Court. 
The onus of proof, in such a trial, that the accused is of sound mind is on 
the prosecution and therefore prosecution has to begin first, and after the 
prosecution closes its evidence, the accused is to be given a chance to prove 
that he is of an unsound mind and therefore incapable of making his defence.
In the instant case the accused was not given an opportunity to prove his 
unsoundness of mind, which, inthfc Courts opinion, seriously and adversely 
affected the accused's interest. It was, therefore, held that the provisions
p
of S.465 were not complied with and hence the trial was illegal.
T* Ata Mohd.V. S^ate. P.L.D. 19^0 Lah. 111.
2. Manga V. Sarkar, P.L.D. 1963 Azad J«& K. 88 and Abdur Rahman V. Sarkar, 
P.L.D. 1963 Azad X & K. 41
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CHAPTER 7.
PEBVENTIVE EETEENTION.
Constitutional Provision*
Sub clause (b) of clause (3) of Right No.2 provides another 
exception to the provisions laid down in clauses (l) and (.2) of Right 
No.2 and states that the safeguards afforded by Right No.2 (l) and (2) 
are not applicable in the case of a person, who is arrested or detained 
lander a law relating to preventive detention. The protections afforded 
to a person so detained are laid down in clauses (4) and (5) of Right 
No. 2. Clause (4) states that no law providing for preventive detention 
shall authorise the detention of a person for a period exceeding three months, 
unless the appropriate Advisory Board has reported, before the expiry of the 
said period of three months, that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause 
for such detention. Clause (3) lays down that the authority making the 
detention order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to the detenu the , 
grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest 
opportunity of making a representation against the Order. The proviso to 
Clause (5), however, entitles the detaining authority not to disclose facts 
which such authority considers it to be against the public interest to 
disclose.
But it must be noted that clauses (3) to (3)»°f Right No.2. do not 
themselves enunciate any law relating to preventive detention. It has been
seen, clauses (4) and (5) simply provide safeguards for a person who has been
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so detained. Ihese clauses lay down the limitations on the law making power
of the State, in as much as ihese constitutional guarantees cannot he
violated by any legislation relating to preventive detention. The power
to make laws relating to preventive detention is derived from Art J31 read
with Third Schedule, paragraph (34) in case of Central legislation, and from
Art, 76 read with Third Schedule to the Constitution of 1962 - matters not
covered by the aforesaid paragraph (34) - in respect of Provincial legislation1,
The Central legislature is empowered by the aforesaid paragraph (34) to make
laws relating to preventive detention for reasons connected with defence,
external affairs, or the security of Pakistan; Provincial Legislatures cannot
2
make laws for these purposes • Laws relating to preventive detention should 
conform to the requirements of the aforesaid clauses (4) and (5) of Eight No,2. 
However, if any statute fails to incorporate the provisions of these clauses 
but does not expressly or by necessary implication negative these provisions, 
the provisions can be read into such statute^. But a law which negatives these 
provisions expressly or by necessary implications,is void to the extent of the
h
inconsistency •
Clauses (4) to (6) of Art,22 of the Indian Constitution correspond
to clauses (4) and (5) of Eight No,2 of Pakistan's Constitution 1962, with
the exception that clause (7) of Art.22 of the Indian Constitution confers
powers on the legislatures to exclude the right of reference to an advisory
board and lays down that the validity of such laws cannot be challended in any 
I! See also Constitution of 1936; Fifth Schedule, entry IS of the Federal 
list and entry 5 of the Provincial list#
2. Eahmat Elahi v# Govt#of West Pakistan, PID#,1965, Lah#112#
3. See Behram Khan v# State. ,1957, Kar.709, Khair Mohd. v. Govt, of West
Pakistan, PID. ,19^ 6, Lah.668.
4. Ibid; Govt.’of E.PakLstan v. Kowshaa, Pip. ,1966,SC.286; Eahmat Elahi v#
Govt#of W.Pakistan, IJip. ,1963,Iah. 112; Parid Ahmad v. Govt.of West Pakistan, 
EJLD.,1965,Lah. 135 and* "Bazal - Ahmad Ayyubi v# Proy.of West Pakistan,^ip., 
1957, Lah.388.
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Court; they are immune from judicial review * But the Pakistan1 s Constitution 
does not confer such unfettered and unrestricted powers on the legislatures 
to make laws relating to preventive detention nor does it lay down any 
limitation on the power of Courts to rule on their validity; preventive 
detention laws, even if the Legislature manifests its intention in clear 
terms that such laws-,cannot be called in question in Court of law, are not 
immune from judicial review in Pakistan, Legislatures cannot, by subsequent 
amendment curtail the powers of judicial review afforded to the superior courts 
in Pakistan under Art.98 read with Art.2 of the Constitution of 1962 .
The word 'preventive1 in the expression 'preventive detention' is 
distinguishable from the word ' punitive'; it denotes a precautionary measure 
and does not amount to subjecting a man to punishment. By preventive 
detention a man is simply prevented from doing something which it is 
apprehended he is doing or is likely to do and which the law prohibits him 
to do. The acts which law prohibits him to do are acts which are prejudicial 
to the security of the State, the State's external relations, public safety 
or the maintenance of public order. 'Preventive detention* should be a war­
time measure and it is argued that in time of peace preventive detention 
laws sho&ld be obliterated from the statute book. As Mahajan J., observed
in Gopalan's case, preventive detention during peace is unknown to the
3
democratic constitutions except the ^Indian . The Pakistan Constitution has
1. Gopalan v. State of Madra, AIR, ,195°> SC.27.
2. Begum A.K. Sorish Kashmiri v. Govt, of West Pakistan, Supra.
3. Supra.
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also permitted preventive detention during peace. Kania C.J. said in the above 
case that neither the United States nor the Japanese Constitution provides for 
preventive detention in normal times, that is without a declaration of 
emergency, but in India, as in Pakistan,preventive detention in normal times
A
has been recognised as a normal topic of legislation . The history of 
preventive detention laws in their present form begins with the First World 
War, when the British Parliament was obliged to enact the Defence of Realm 
Act, 1914* for the effective prosecution of the War and to maintain internal 
and external security* Since then the accepted theory of the State involves 
a devaluation of the right to personal liberty; the right to personal liberty 
has been subjected to increasing interference by the State and the limitations 
on it, in the form of preventive detention, have been deemed to be necessary 
in the interest of the security of State, foreign relations, public safety and 
maintenance of the public order. The Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 196 5 , and 
the Defence of Pakistan Rules made thereunder are framed on the lines of the 
Defence of India Act and the Defence of India Rules which were drafted on the 
pattern of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, and the Regulations made 
thereunder.
According to Mahajan J. there is no authoritative definition of the 
term * Preventive detention1. The expression was first used by their lordships 
in England to explain the meaning and nature of ‘detention1 under Reg. 14(b ) 
which was framed under the Defence of the Realm Consolidated Acts 1914* iu
1. Ibid.
Rex v. Haliday, Lord Atkinson pointed out that" 1 preventive/justice1, as it 
is styled, which consists in restraining a man from committing a crime he may 
commit but has not yet committed or doing some act injurious to members of 
community, which he may do but has not yet done, is no new thing in the laws 
of England.*1 He further cited with approval the observations of May C.J. in 
R.V. Justices of Cork that -
,!Preventive justice consists in those persons whom 5 
there is probable ground to suspect of future mis­
behaviour, to stipulate with and to give full assurance 
to the publiCgthat such offence as is apprehended shall 
not happen... ".
Lord Atkinson further observed that -
"Where preventive justice is put in force, some 
suffering and inconvenience may be caused to the 
suspected person. This is inevitable. But the 
suffering under this statute indicates something 
much more important than his liberty or inconvenience, 
namely, for securing the public safety and the defence 
of realm... And preventive justice proceeds upon the 
principle that a person should be restrained from doing 
something which, if free and unfettered, it is reason­
ably probable he would do; it must necessarily proceed 
in all cases, to some extent,*on suspicion cr anticipation 
as distinct from proof.
The decision of the House of Lords in Rex v. Haliday. for the first time,
explained the nature of ’preventive detention* in its modem form. It was
observed that *The detention is not in the nature of punishment, but is a
precautionary measure, taken for the purpose of preserving the public peace
and order and the security of the State. The only essential preliminary to
the exercise by the Minister of the powers contained in Section 4 is that he
x. (1917) Ap.260
2. (1882) 15 Cox C.C.78.
3. Rex v. Haliday, Supra.
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should have formed opinions on the matters specifically mentioned in this
section* The validity of such opinions cannot be questioned in any Court\
In R. v* Clarkson, it m s  observed that 'any preventive measures, even if they
involve some restraint or hardship on individuals, do not partake in ary m y
of the nature of punishment, but are taken by m y  of precaution to prevent
2
mischief to the State1 *
'Preventive detention' can properly be contrasted to 'pumitive 
detention*, one having reference to apprehension of -wrong doing, and the 
other coming after the illegal act is actually committed* 'Preventive detention* 
is justified by a reasonable probability of the commission of a prejudicial 
act by the suspected person, whereas, his conviction can only be justified by 
legal evidence. It is for the detaining authority to judge and to put its own 
interpretation on the suspected prejudicial acts of a suspected person. The 
two actions 'preventive* and 'punitive' are not mutually exclusive and resort 
can be had to either or both, depending the choice of the executive authority, 
with this limitation that the Courts will certainly interfere in aid of the 
accused person or detenu, if it is found that the action is taken to deprive 
him of his legal rights by committing him to trial under a punitive law while 
action was taken under preventive law, or when it appears to the Court that 
the Order was manifestly malicious and mala fide?
Art.98 of the Constitution of 1962, confers, in express terms, on 
the High Court vast power to probe into the power of an executive authority
1. Ibid
2* (1961) 1 All. E.R. 557.
J.Mairaj Mohd. v. Govt, of West Pakistan, Pip. ,1966, Kar.282.
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howhighsoever. Hven the highest executive authority's action, detaining a
person under preventive detention law, is subject to judicial review under Art.
9 8  • Furthermore Art.2 is a safeguard and ensures the protection of personal
liberty. It enjoins that it is an unalienable right of the citizen of Pakistan
'to be treated* in accordance with law 'and only in accordance with law' and
that no person can be deprived of his life or liberty 'except in accordance 
2
with law.'
Right No.2 (k) and (5) read with Art. 9 8  and Art.2 confers tremendous 
powers on the Superior Courts to protect a citizen.against arbitrary deprivation 
of his personal liberty under preventive detention laws, against both legislat­
ive as well as executive acts. This right of the High Courts cannot be curtail­
ed or taken away by any legislative amendment; the amendment will be
3
ineffective and the power of High Courts unfettered . It is through the 
implication of Art. 9 8  read with Art.2 that the superior Courts of Pakistan 
have protected, in a number of cases, the citizens of Pakistan against the 
arbitrary use of 'preventive detention' for political ends by the party in
kpower .
The use of 'preventive detention' has been more extensive in India 
throughout the history of preventive detention lav/s. Though the superior 
Courts have always been alert to protect the citizens against improper 
exercise of 'preventive detention' by the executive, they cannot travel beyond
the limitations imposed on their powers in respect of 'preventive detention'
5 6by the Constitution itself. Since Gopalan''s case- was decided, the Preventive
1. Govt, of W. Pakistan v. Begum A.A.K. Sorish Kashmiri', Pip.,1969* SC.l^ f.
2. Govt, of W. Pakistan v. Begum A.A.K. S.Kashmiri, Supra, see also Abc|ul
Baqi Baluch v. Govt, of W.Pakistan, I^ LD.,1968, S^ C.313.
3* Govt, of VJ. Pakistan v. Begum A.fi.K.S. Kashmiri, Supra.
h* Abdul Baqi Baluch v. Govt, of West Pakistan, Supra.
3. Gopalan v. State of Madras,Supra.
6. Ibid. ;
Detention Act has been progressively amended in the interest of the detenu
and the number of detenus has been considerably diminished; at the end of 
1956, there were only 1 3 *+ persons under preventive detention in the whole 
of India. Prof. Alan Gledhill comments on the statement with realistic 
approach and says -
TtIt should, therefore, be possible to approach this subject 
with less emotion than it has aroused earlier,11
but Prof.Gledhill feels obliged to say that -
n..in circumstances which have prevailed in India since 
independence, preventive detention is an essential 
iiytrument for ensuing peace and good government, and 
that it is irrelevant that lawyers dislike it, that 
democratic politicians denounce it; and that there is 
a convention in the United Kingdom that preventive 
detention laws should not be on the statute book in 
the time of peace.”
He further says that -
"The Indian Founding Fathers were aware of the existence 
of various preventive detention laws in India, and clauses 
(*f) to (7) of Art.22 were intended not to restrict the general 
scope of those laws, but to ensure some protection against 
their abuse. In Gopalan1s case it was obviously impossible
successfully to impugn the statute as ullra vires the
enacting legislature or as an unreasonable or inexpedient 
exercise of legislative powers and the main ground of 
attack was that it was repugnant to Art.21 because it 
deprived a person of his liberty otherwise than by ’procedure 
established by law.1 This failed, as the Court declined to 
assign to this phrase anything other than its literal meaning 
and in doing so, it seems clear that it correctly interpreted 
the intentions of the Constituent Assembly, for the words 
'procedure established by law1 in the draft Constitution had 
been deliberately eliminated in favour of the phrase which 
the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret. S.3 of the 
Preventive Detention Act 1950 empowered the Central Govern­
ment and the State Governments, if satisfied with respect
to any person that, with a view to preventing him from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, 
the security of a State, the maintenance of public order 
or the maintenance of the essential supplies and services, 
it was necessary to do so, to make an order directing him 
to be detained. It was contended that the Court could go
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into the question whether the grounds on which the order 
was based were such as would justify a reasonable man in 
making the order of detention, reliance being placed on 
Lord Atkin’s dissenting judgement in Liversidge’s case, 
on the interpretation of similar language in Regulation 
18b made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act,1939; 
he did not suggest that the Court should sit in appeal 
from the detaining authority, but he thought that the 
matter should be treated in the same way as the ac t of 
a police officer empowered to arrest a person reasonably 
suspected of committing an offence; the Court should be 
satisfied that the police officer had acted reasonably 
in the circumstances in which the arrest was made* It 
is of course immaterial that the Preventive Detention 
Act does not use the word ’reasonably’ in conjunction 
with ’satisfied*, for the assumption is that an official 
exercising the power given by the Statute will act reason­
ably* Some of Law Lords would have accepted Lord Atkin’s 
views if they had been interpreting a permanent statute, but they 
did not regard them as representing what Parliament intended 
when enacting a war time emergency statute. Though the 
Supreme Court did not regard the Preventive Detention Act 
as a temporarypiece of emergency legislation, like the 
Statute before the House of Lords in Liversidge’s case, 
it disclaimed the power to enquire into the sufficiency 
of the materials on which the satisfaction of the detain­
ing authority was based, but it would consider whether the 
grounds were relevant to the circumstances in which the 
Statute authorised detention, and the professed object 
of detention set out in the order; it would also consider 
whether the order^was made for a purpose other than stated 
in the order...."
The Detaining Authorities Satisfaction.
The Indian Supreme Court followed the majority view in Liversidge*s
2 3
Case and upholding the dictum laid down in Gopalan’s Case that the Constit­
ution has empowered Parliament to enact laws relating to preventive detention, 
which are immune from judicial review; if Parliament makes the detaining 
authority the judge of its own1 satisfaction*, the Courts have no power to
adjudge the reasonableness of its ’satisfaction’; the ’satisfaction* is 
Tl Op.cit, pp.lMf-lW>.
2. (19^2) AC.206; State of Bombay v. Atmaram, Supra; Shibban Lal,fs case,AIR.,
S.C.179. "
3. Supra.
245
subjective and the objectivity or the satisfaction of the grounds of detention
is outside the scope of the enquiry by the Court • Makherjea J*, on the
question whether the Court could rule on the validity of detention order,
laid down three principles: first, the propriety of reasonableness of the
satisfaction upon which an order of detention is based, cannot be questioned
in a Court of Law; second, the Court is not competent to undertake an
investigation into the sufficiency of the matters upon which the satisfaction
is purported to be grounded; but third,the Court is competent to examine the
grounds of detention to see if theya^e relevant to the object which the
legislation has in view, namely the prevention of acts prejudicial to the
defence of India or the Security of the State or the maintenance of law and
order* In Makhan Singh v* State of Punjab it was held that the Court had no
jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of power to detain on the subjective
2
satisfaction of the authority so empowered by the legislature • In reviewing
the orders of detention in Ram ^ anc^an v* State of Bihar^, Godavari v* State of
4 5Maharashtra , and Durgadas v* Union of India , under the Defence of India Rules,
the Supreme Court of India held that, where an authority has power to pass an
order, the Courtcannot enquire whether such grounds existed objectively*
In Pakistan, the Lahore and Karachi Benches of the High Court, relying
£
on the majority view of the House of Lords in Liversidge's case and the
decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Emperor v. Sibnath
7
Banerji held that the Satisfaction' contemplated by r*32 of the Defence of
Tl Shamsher Singh v* State of Pepsu, A.I.R*193^»sp*276;Dayanaud Modi v. State 
of Bihar, A.I.R.1931|Pat*zf7»
2. Shamsher Singh's Case; A.I.R.193^>S#C*276*
3. A.I*R*196*f, S.C.381*
*f. A.I*R*1966, ^C*?^.
3. A.I*R.1966, sp.lkob.
6* a .I.r *1966, sp*10?8.
7* Supra*
Pakistan Rules 19&5 Is subjective and it does not fall within the province of
the Courts to probe into the ’satisfaction* or to analyse the substance and the
quantum of evidence on which the satisfaction is based. Courts will interfere 
only where grounds alleged for detention are not relatable to the objects of 
detention and detention law, or where such detention is made mala fide by the 
detaining authority .
It was further pointed out that -
"It is true that an executive authority cannot be permitted 
to exercise its authority except honestly and without malice 
and that it is duty of the Courts to see that the fraudulent 
exercise of such power or the colourable exercise of it to gain
an ulterior object is not achieved; but the question as to mala
fide exercise of power is one of fact in each case and the onus 
is on the detunu to show that the order of detention is in fact 
a fraudulent exercise of power vested in the Government and that 
he can sustain that burden only if he can suecessfully2 rebut the 
presumption of bona fides on part of the Government.."
The meaning of the expression ’satisfied*, as used by various preventive 
detention laws was considered in Abdul Ghafoor v. Crown, It was observed that -
"Where, for the specified purposes, and official act is performed 
by a person, so authorised by law, in full and strict compliance 
with the conditions laid down in the law, and the record shows 
that he was * satisfied*, a presumption shall arise in favour of 
its legality and the onus should shift to the citizens to prove 
to the contrary. The expression ’satisfied* means ’satisfaction* 
of the officer concerned, as he alone is in possession or knowledge 
of the material to which others have-no access. His ’satisfaction* 
means nothing more or less than his*own satisfaction* and the 
Courts cannot hold an inquisition into its reasonableness
1, Nasim Fatima v.^ovt.of West Pakistan,P.L.D. 1967,Lah. 103; Mairaj Mohd v. Govt 
of West PakistanVj-966,Kar.282; see also Abdul Ghafoor v, Crown,P,L,D. 1952, 
Lah.62A.
2. Ibid; see also Abdul Ghafoor v. Crown P.L.D.1952.1ah.62zf; Lahore Electric 
Supply Co.Ltd.,v. Province of Punjab,I.L.R.19^5jLah.6l7; Sec.of State for 
India v. Mask & Co. ,I,L.R,19^0iMad.599(P.C}; King v. Governor of Brixton, 
L.R.19l6,2 K.B.Vtetfky); and Liversidge v. Anderson,19^1,All,E.R,558,Vol.Ill
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or otherwise but the1satisfaction• must be real not sham; 
bona fide and not actuated by malice; fact and not a pretext 
and this can properly be determined from all the facts and 
circumstances of the case* Where the factum of •satisfaction* 
is not established, it is not only the right but the duty of 
the Court to protect the citizen against^the excesses of the 
executive and restore his liberty.•....M
Similarly in The King v* Governor of Brixton Prison, Lord Reading observed -
flIf we are of a opinion that the powers were being misused, we 
should be able to deal with the matter. In other words, if it 
was clear that an action was done by the executive with the 
intention of abusing those powers, this^Court would have 
jurisdiction to djal with the matter.11
The meaning of the word 'satisfied*, as used in some of the Defence Regulations
was discussed and considered in Liversidge v* Anderson and another; Viscount
Maugham observed -
MI can now deal much more shortly with the question whether 
an onus is thrown on the first respondent, the Secretary 
of State, who made the order for detention, to give 
evidence to show that he had reasonable cause to believe 
the appellant to be a person of hostile associations, and 
that by reason thereof, it was necessary to exercise control 
over him. The order on its face purports to be made under 
the regulation, and it states that the Secretary of State 
had reasonable cause to believe the facts in question* In 
my opinion, the well-known presumption omnia acta rite esse 
praesumuntar applies to this order, and accordingly, assuming 
the order to be proved or admitted, it must be taken prima 
facie - that is, until the contrary is proved - to have been 
properly made and it must be taken that the requisite as to 
the belief of the Secretary of State was complied with. It 
will be noted that on the view, I have expressed as to the 
construction of the regulation, it is the personal belief 
of the Secretary of State which is in question, and that if 
the appellant's contention on this point were correct, the 
same question may arise in the numerous cases where an 
executive order depends on the Secretary of State or some 
other public officer of
1* Abdul Ghafoor v* Crown, Supra* 
2. L.R.1916, 2 K.B. 7^2, 7^9.
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being ’satisfied* of some fact or circumstance. It has 
never, I think, been suggested in such cases that the 
Secretary of State or public officer must prove that he 
was so ’satisfied’ when he made the order. Just as the 
fact that the act of the Secretary of State acting in a 
public office is prima facie evidence that he has been 
duly appointed to his office, so his compliance with 
provision of the statute or the order in council under
which he purports to act must be presumed unless the
contrary is proved,”1
In the Lahore Electric Supply-Company Limited, Lahore v. Province of Punjab
i
it was laid down that -
"the Court can interfere it it is satisfied that either 
the order under the Act is ultra vires or that the 
order was not made bona fide but for some collateral 
object. Sec.16 (Defence of India Act) in such a case^ 
is not a bar to the Court dealing with the matter..."
Where the adverb ’reasonably’ qualifies the expression ’satisfied* no 
difficulty arises as to the interpretation of the expression, and it is inter­
preted that the ’satisfaction’ of the detaining authority must be such that a
rational human being would consider it ’reasonable’ under the circumstance of
3
the case. But where the word ’reasonable’ does not qualify the expression
’satisfied’ and the contention was that the adverb may not be there but the
intention of the Legislature was so, the Court rejected the contention and
held that the Court could not read into the Statute the words which were not
intended by the Legislature to be there and that the ’satisfaction’ in S.3
of the West Punjab Public Safety Act,19^8, cannot be construed as being
qualified by the adverb ’reasonably’ . Reference was, however, made to
n  (19*n) All. E.R.3 3 8 , Vol.III.
2. IL.R. ,19^3»Lah.6l7; see also Sec.of State for India v. Mask & Co. ,IL.I!. I?***! 
Mad,559(P.C.)
3. Ghulam Jilani v. Govt, of West Pakistan, Supra.,see the different explanation 
of ’satisfaction* under, r.32 and r.20*f of the Defence of Pakistan Rules,
1 9 6 5  - The Defence of India Rules r.26 and r.129; see also Vimla bai Deshpande 
L.R.73,LA.,lzO.; Shearer v. Shields (191*0 AC.8 0 8 . *
*+. Abdul Ghafoor v. Crown, P.L.D.,1952, Lah.624.
1 2 Prabhakar Keshor Tare v. Emperor and Kamla Kant Azad v. Emperor on behalf of
the petitioner#
In the former case^the Nagpur High Court was interpreting the Defence 
of India Rule 26(f) and ^.2 of the Defence of India Act. The words were 
identical, that the Provincial Government 'if it is satisfied#.# make an order.' 
The contention of the Crown, in that case was that this provision abrogated the 
remedy provided by S.^91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that it was no
longer open to the Courts to enquire into the detention so ordered. The
learned judges did not accept this contention and it was held that 'the Courts 
have jurisdiction to see whether there has been fraud upon the Act or abuse 
upon the powers granted by the Legislature.' It was also held that this juris­
diction was not taken away by S.16 of the Defence of India Act, which stated
that no order made under the Act could be called in question by any Court.
This case has been supposed to be no authority for saying that the 'satisfaction' 
required is that of the Court and not of the authority empowered to act under
3
the Rules .
In Kamla Kant Azad's case, the word 'satisfied* in r.26(l)(b) of the
Defence of India Rules, was construed as meaning 'reasonably satisfied'. It
was further observed:
,f..the powers of this Court are not the powers of the Court
of Appeal. We do not know the material on which the orders
were made* We cannot compel the Crown to disclose them and,
therefore, we S^notOTonou^Mon their validity or otherwise.But the power to order a detention oi a man unSer r.2o.
Defence of India Rules, is not an arbitrary power. There are
limitation on it and this Court may be and is bound to satisfy
1. A.I.R. 19^3, Nag,126.
2. A.I.R. 19^t Pat.35^.
3. Prabhakar Kesh&v Tare, supra.
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itself that these limitations have not been exceeded.
If the executive has gone beyond them and has used rule 
in a way not intended, the order is not bona fide^order 
but a ’sham1 order, and this Court may interfere. "
The distinction between r.129, Defence of Indian Rules, corresponding
to r.20^, Defence of Pakistan Rules, which states, ’...if reasonably suspects," 
and the rule 26, D.I.R.corresponding to r.32 D.P.R. which uses the expression,
’...the Government or... if satisfied1 is indicated in the following cases.
2 3In Sibnath Benerji and Vimlabai Deshpande the Judicial Committee drew a sharp
distinction between the pov/ers under r.26 and r.129 of D.I.R. placing apprec­
iable reliance on the difference of status between a high officer of the 
Provincial Government - under r.26 - and a police constable - under r.129 -•
The argument is delineated with clarity in the following extract from the
judgement in the Deshpande case -
"On the first question it is important to notice the difference 
between r.26 and r.129* Under the former rule an order of 
detention can be made only by the Central Government or 
Provincial Government, though this power may be delegated 
under the Defence of India Act; and the Government may make 
an order of detention, if it is satisfied with respect to 
any particular person that, with a view to preventing him 
from indulging in the subversive activities as specified, 
it is necessary so to do. It is to be noticed that the 
Government must be satisfied; mere suspicion is not enough, 
but there is no qualifying adverb such as ’reasonably1 or 
’honestly* attached to the word ’satisfied’. On the other 
hand, under r.129, any police officer can arrest any person 
on mere suspicion, but the suspicion must be reasonable, ^
the exact words being ’any person whom he reasonably suspects’" .
In Shearer v. Shields, the House of Lords had to construe a provision
under the Glasgow Police Act, authorising constables to arrest, if they had
reasonable grounds of suspicion and the House held that the burden rested on
TT A.I.R. ,19^|Pat.33^ at p.367 per Shearer J.
2. L.R.72 IA.2^1.
3* L.R.73 IA.lVf.
b. Ibid.
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the constable concerned to show that his suspicion was reasonable and his act,
1
therefore, justified • It can be noted that the same result follows under 
r*129i D.I.R*
^  Liversidge v. Anderson the House of Lords was impressed by two 
facts; in the first place the authority empowered to detain under the Defence 
of Realm Act, 191^, was a high officer of the state, namely, the Home Secretary; 
and in the second place the obvious inconvenience and danger to the public 
interest, which might ensue, if the Home Secretarywas bound to disclose the 
confidential information on which he acted* It was, therefore, held that the 
Home Secretary was not bound to disclose the facts on which he had taken the 
action^.
The view that the * satisfaction' of the Government under r.26 of the
3
D.I.R* was immune from judicial review, rested on the case of Sibnath Benerji , 
where the judicial Committee had found that the power given by r.26, D.I*R* 
to the Central Government to act in certain ways was derived from the first 
sub-section of S.2 of the Defence of India Act, which gave the general powers 
to the Central Government to make rules such as appeared to be pecessary or 
expedient inter alia for the maintenance of public order. In Keshav Talpade, 
it was expressly held that this power as afforded by r.26 of the D.I.R* was 
not relatable to clause (x) of sub-section (2) of S.2 of the Defence of 
India Act, which gives power to apprehend and detain persons 'reasonably 
suspected of having acted or acting or being about to act' in certain pre­
judicial ways. The Judicial Committee found that this judgement of the Federal
Court of India, in which the vires of r.26 of the D.I.R. in relation to Cl.(x)
T. (191*0 AC.ttOS.
2. Supra.
3. Supra.
252
1
of S*2(2) of the D*I*A* had been construed, was wrongly decided •
2
The Lahore High Court, in Ghulam Jilami v. Govt*of West Pakistan , 
relying on the dictum laid down in Liversidge v* Anderson , held that the 
detaining authority was not bound to disclose the facts which led to its 
•satisfaction1 to take action tinder r*32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules,
1965? and that the burden was on the detenu to prove that the order of detention 
was not bona fide; it was 'sham1 and •colourable*• The Supreme Court of 
Pakistan) overruling the decision of the High Court, for the first time, 
established that the detaining authority was Hound to satisfy the Courts, to 
which the citizen is entitled to have resort, for the determination of the 
question, whether he had been treated in accordance with ]sw, and whether the 
detaining authority had acted on reasonable grounds* It was, pointed out 
that it was too late ro reply, as the High Court had done, on the dictum in
the English case of Liversidge v. Anderson for the purpose of investing a
be.
detaining authority with complete power to/judge of its own satisfaction, and 
that public power is now exercised in Pakistan under the Constitution of 1962, 
of which Art*2 requires that every citizen shall be dealt with strictly in 
accordance with law* It was further observed that r*32 of D*I*R* has been 
framed under the powers afforded by clause (x) of sub-section (2) of S*3 of 
the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, which requires inter alia the existence 
of 'reasonable grounds* for depriving a citizen of his personal liberty. By 
reading clause (x), according to tenure of its language, and bearing in mind 
that it makes legal provision for restraint upon personal liberty, which is 
a fundamental right of citizens of Pakistan, the conclusion that appears
1. (19^3) F.C.R.^9.
2* Supra*
3- Supra-
253
unavoidable is that to gain protection for any action under any rule made 
under the aforesaid Cl#(x), the existence of ‘reasonable grounds1 is essential * 
this should be proved before a Court of Law, and mere declaration of 
‘satisfaction1 is not sufficient* If then r*32 owes its vires to clause (x) 
of S.3(2) of the aforesaid Ordinance, it must follow that, by use of the 
words ‘reasonable grounds*, cl.(x) has unmistakably imported into this rule* 
controlling the exercise of public power, the requirement that to gain protect­
ion of the rule for its action thereunder, the detaining authority should prove
-1
and satisfy the Court that the ‘reasonable grounds' existed#
It was, it seems, the type of Government in Pakistan that has made 
the Superior Courts conscious of the necessity to protect individuals against 
the arbitrary exercise of power by the executive, specially by the party in 
power# But at the same time, it is submitted, that they have been realistic 
in their approach to the problem. Long before Ghulam Jilani's case was 
decised, they always showed ‘their determination to keep a proper balance 
between the needs of law and order on one hand, and the liberties of the 
individuals on the other.
In Ghulam Mohammad Locyid Khwar v. State, where the detaining authority
failed to produce, as required by the Court, the record of its*satisfaction,*
it was held that no order under S. 3 of the N.W.F.P. Public Safety Aci^could be
passed, unless the Provincial Government - or, by delegation, the D.M. - was
that
satisfied of its necessity, ana/it is because of the 'subjective satis­
faction* that the Courts are precluded from examining the adequacy of the
1. P.L.D. 1967, Sp#373.
2* Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law, 1967, p. 124*
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material on which the 'satisfaction* is based. Where, as in the instant case, 
there is no record of 'satisfaction', the order is ab initio void .
In Hami duz Zafar v. P.M. Lahore, it was -held that the grounds of 
detention should be reasonable in fact and that the 'subjective' satisfaction of 
the detaining authority is not enough; particulars justifying the 'satisfaction'
v
should be put before the Court. It was, however, pointed out that S.12 of the 
Security of Pakistan Act, 1952 requires the existence of 'reasonable grounds,' 
before an order is passed. Reasonable ground means reasonable in fact. The 
wording of the aforesaid section shows that it is not merely the 'subjective 
satisfaction' of the detaining authority passing the order that would validate
an order; the detaining authority has to prove that the grounds on which the
2action was taken were reasonable in fact •
In Abuzar v. Province of West Pakistan, where the Courts required 
the posters, allegedly containing material 'prejudicial to the public order,' 
to be put before the Court and it was found that the posteiswere nothing but 
a sort of election manifesto, it was held that not only the grounds but also 
the facts should be relatable to the purposes.of preventive detention law under 
which the action is taken^.
In Rafique Ahamad v. State, a very comprehensive observation was made 
on the interpretation of the expression, 'the Government, if it is satisfied., 
necessary... to deprive any person of his liberty at any time,' in S.3 of the 
West Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, i960. It was pointed out that the judge
of the necessity being the Government itself, and the right to be confiscated as
lT P.L.D.1957»Lah.497.
2. P.L.D.1960,Lah.95a.
3. P.L.D.1960,Kar.260.
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a result of that judgement being the most cherished possession of all free 
individuals - the right to personal liberty, the power is very wide indeed. The 
question arises whether the Legislature should be presumed to have given this 
power to the executive without any check, or at least without ensuring that it 
is not exercised without due care, caution and attention. The Court 
answered the question in the negative. It further pointed out that the 
expression 'the Government should be satisfied of the necessity' should be 
presumed to mean that the Legislature intended to impose limitations on the 
executive for the purpose of securing due care, caution and attention, before 
depriving a citizen of a free country of his personal freedom. Therefore, if
there is any doubt about this requirement of being 'satisfied', whether of
doubtful apprehension of the breech of public safety and public order, or of 
issuing of order without compliance with the procedure laid down in the 
statute, or of passing the order by ^authorised person, no such deprivation can 
be allowed under any circumstances whatsoever •
In Hussain Ali Chagla v. P.M.Lahore, the Lahore High Court went
further, As to the privilege claimed by the Government under S.ll^ f of the
Evidence Act, 1872, that 'there is essential presumption in favour of the
legality of two impugned orders being 'official acts' of the D.M.Lahore, in
exercise of the power delegated to him by the Provincial Government', it was, h
held that the presumption is optional and even its probative force depends upon
2
the circumstances of each case • The Court rejected the contention on behalf
/of the Government, which was based
1. P.L.D.1963,Lah.337*
2. See Hari Kishandass v. Bnperor, A.I.R.19^»Lah.33*
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on the dictum laid down in Liversidge v* Anderson that the decisive factor in 
the case was the factum of ‘satisfaction* which had been amply proved by the 
sworn affidavits of the detaining authority, that it was itself satisfied of 
the necessity of the detention in the instant cases and that it was not open 
to the Court to substitute its own judgement for that of detaining authority, 
especially when the question in essence was the sufficiency or otherwise of 
the reasons leading to the 'satisfaction* of the detaining authority* Conceding 
the argument advancejby the counsel of petitioner that real question in the 
instant cases was not that of the sufficiency or otherwise of the reasons 
justifying detention orders but the question really was the factum of 'satis­
faction, ' which is the condition precedent for a valid exercise of power under 
r.32 of the D.P.R*, the Court observed that there appeared to be a number of 
circumstances in the instant cases, which required that the record of 'satis­
faction' should be put before the Court; the scrutiny by the Court showed that
the 'satisfaction* of the detaining authority was fictitious, colourable and
2
insufficient to maintain the validity of the impugned orders .
In Govt* of East Pakistan v* Rowshan, the Supreme Court of Pakistan^
observed that it is to be noted that it is not sufficient that the Provincial
Government should be 'satisfied' as to the necessity of the detention; it
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt that there were sufficient facts which
led to that 'satisfaction'* It was further pointed out that how much material
is necessary for coming to such a conclusion is a question of fact, which depends
upon the circumstances of each case, the determination whereof is a judicial or
quasi-judicial function *_____________________________________________________
1* Supra.
2. P.L.D.1966,Lah*309.
3* Which must be regarded as a first step by the S.C.towards establishing the 
principle of objective satisfaction.
P.L*D.1966,S.C.286.
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In India, emergency powers have remained in force since 1962 of
A
which several commentators have "been critical . A number of judicial decisions
2
bear witness to the fact that a great deal of power can be exercised by the 
authorities* subjective satisfaction under the emergency rules but as far as 
possible the Courts have maintained their high traditions of scrutinizing care­
fully all legislation, superior or subordinate, to make sure that nothing has
4
been done ultra vires . It has been held that, even though the Proclamation
of Emergency, made under Art. 35^ °f the Constitution, suspended the normal
methods of challenging the validity of an ordinance made under it, yet a
citizen is not deprived of his right to move the ^ ourts for write of habeas
-1
corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered mala-fide ; and if
1. Chatle^ea & Parmeswara Rao ' Inroads into Fundamental Eights in India1, 
1967, 2? Bull. Int. Comm .Jurists 24; V. Maya Krishnan 'Sixteen Years of 
Experience with Law of Preventive Detention in India - A retrospect®, 
(1966), 2 Madras L.J.2^ (though he believes the Courts have played a 
useful part in safeguarding so far as possible the personal liberty 
of individuals). Cf.S.R. Karemungikar, 'The Emergency Provisions and 
the Indian Federation* (1966) 2 Madra L.J. 6 (defending staunchly the 
existence of emergency powers, and their exercise by the President as 
the Constitutional Head of State; see also Annual Survey of Commonwealth 
Law,1967. 1967
2* See the preceeding pages; see also Ghasi Ram- v. State,ADR./,Raj.247; 
Rajnikant Keshaw Bhandari v. State,AIR. ,1967,SC.243; see also Annual 
Survey of Commonwealth Law, 1967, Supra.
3. Jagannath Misra v. State,AIR. ,1966,SC.U40; Sadanandajs v. State of Kerala, 
AIR. ,1966,^3.1925; Karandikar v. State,AIR. ,1967P°m.ll. (the Court should 
make sure that the detaining authority took the right things into account 
in being ' satisfied® of the need for order) Cf.Pio Fernandes v. Union of 
India^IR. ,1967,Cal.231, (Limitd,nc the locus standi of a complainant); In 
State of Maharashtra v. Atma Raifr>^'66,SC,1786); See also Annual Survey of 
Commonwealth Law (1967) Supra.
4. Durgadas Shirali v. Union of India,AIR. ,1966,SC. 1078 (though on facts the 
petition failed) Arbind Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar ,AIR. ,1966,Pat. 391; 
See also Godawari S. Paiulekar v. State of Maharashtra,A1R. .1966,Sp. 1404; 
and the State of Bihar v. Rambalak Singh JJR.,1966,S£.1441,(habeas corpus 
cases); see also Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law,(1967) Supra.
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the State cannot at least say on oath that it was not mala fide, he is entitled 
1
to be released •
In Sadanandan v, State of Kerala the Supreme Court reiterated its
earlier view that as a detention order could be issued on the subjective
satisfaction of the executive,it could not be judicially scrutinized nor could
such an order be challenged on constitutional grounds. Subject to these
limitations, however, the Court asserted that the detenu must be afforded the
maximum protection provided by the statutory safeguards, A detention order
will be set aside, if there is evidence to show that the detaining authority
has not applied its mind to the problem or has acted mala fide, as in the inst- 
2
ant case ,
The procedural safeguards afforded to the cibtenu were considered by the
Supreme Court in Lakhanpal v. Union of India, where the continuation of detention
was in question. According to the Court, the continuation of the detention
must be based on objective facts and circumstances and is, therefore, a quasi-
3
judicial function. As such, it must comply with the rules of natural justice ,
Ghulam Jilami1 s case is a judgement of great importance, in which the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the question of the judicial review of 
detention and established the principle of ’objective satisfaction*, The detenus 
who were leading politicians, were alleged to have fermented public agitation 
against the Tashkent Declaration and the existing regime. The Court - per
1, Benoy Kumar Bis$was v. State of Bengal^XR, ,1966,Cal.509(habeas Corpus 
granted)
2, A£R..1966,SC, 1925; Cf,Jaichand Lai Sethia v. State of W.Bengal,AIR. ,1967,
SC.4B3. * , ’
3, AIR, ,1967,SC.I5O7,See also Annual Survey of Commonwealth Iaw,^ 1967),supra,♦ *
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Cornelius,C.J. - held that a mere declaration of the executive Satisfaction*
is not sufficient to Justify detention. The existence of the 'reasonable
grounds' , though not expressly required by the Rule - r.32, Defence of Pakistan
Rules, 1965 - is essential. It has been observed that 'There is no doubt that
this is a bold and solitary decision and is in refreshing contrast to the
opinion of the Indian Supreme Court that detention is a matter solely for the
.4
subjective satisfaction of the executive.'
The Supreme Court came to the above conclusion '.on two grounds. The 
first was that since r.32 and r.202*. of the Defence of Pakistan Rules - 
corresponding to r.26 and r.129 of the Defence of India Rules - had both been 
framed in exercise of the power granted by clause (x) of S. 3(2) of the Defence 
of Pakistan Ordinance, 1965> they must both be subject to the condition that 
there must be 'reasonable grounds' for the detention of a person as required 
by the aforesaid clause(x). Ihe second ground was that since Art. 2 of the 
Constitution of Pakistan, 1962 requires every citizen to be treated strictly 
in accordance with law and Art.98 of the Consititution gives the power to the
High Court to probe into the power of an executive authority howhighsoever,
2 3
the principle laid down in Liversidge v. Anderson and Vimlabai Deshpande was
like all other actions relatable to the power derived from the aforesaid clause
(x) equally be susceptible of Judicial review and the detaining , authority
had to show that there existed a state of mind, -which had been induced by the
existence of reasonable grounds, under which he could only say that he was
1. See Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law, (1967) at. p. 58.
2. Supra.
3. Supra.
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satisfied that the action was necessary in the circumstances of the case* The 
Court then proceeded to examine the evidence to satisfy itself as to whether 
' justification' existed for the satisfaction expressed by the Deputy Commissioner 
in his order of detention.'
In further clarification of the scope of judicial review, it was 
pointed out:
"Under a constitutional system which provides for 
judicial review of executive actions, it is, in my 
opinion, a fallacy to think that such a judicial 
review must be in the nature of appeal against the 
decision of the executive authority* It is not the 
purpose of the judicial authority reviewing executive 
actions to sit in appeal over the executive or to 
substitute the discretion of the Court for that of the 
administrative agency. What the Court is concerned 
with is to see that the executive or administrative 
authority had before it sufficient materials upon 
which a reasonable person could have come to the 
conclusion that the requirements of law were sat­
isfied* It is not uncommon that even high executive 
authorities act upon the basis of the information 
supplied to them by their subordinates. In the 
circumstances it cannot be said that it would be 
unreasonable for the Court, in the proper exercise 
of its constitutional duty, to insist upon a disclosure 
of the materials upon which the authority had so 
acted, so that it should satisfy itself that the authority 
had not acted in an unlawful manner*"
The view taken in case of Ghulam Jilani is not new or radical; indeed 
it seems that it was the conventional view generally accepted even in England 
until the House of Lords in the case of Liversidge 7/ Anderson gave the 
doctrine of the 'subjective satisfaction' a new dimension under the 
circumstances of the case. As a matter of fact, the majority decision in the 
instant case followed the dissenting judgement of Lord Atkin in Liversidge's 
case and gave the principle of 'objective test' a new dimension* It is______
1* Supra.
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submitted that the majority judgement of the House of Lords in Liversidge^,. 
case was distinguishable from the principle laid down earlier by the House of
Lords itself in Shearer v. Sheilds^ and it had not been accepted in toto by
2
the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande' • Its 
soundness has been doubted in a subsequent case in England itself, namely,
Nakuda Ali v. F.M. De.S.Jayarandte^.
The principle of ‘objective satisfaction* was laid down as early as
bin 1950 by the Burmese Supreme Court in Tinsa Maw Naing v. Commissiotf^of Police •
Professor Alan Gledhill has realistically commented that this decision *is,
5
however, of outstanding importance.* He further says that *on the question 
whether a court can review a detention order on its merits,* the Indian Courts, 
during the British period, not without reluctance, followed the majority in 
Liversidge v. Anderson and disclaimed jurisdiction; the Pakistan Courts had 
done likewise. As the case mentioned was decided mainly on the Emergency 
character of the English legislation, a different view might have been, but 
was not taken in Gopalan*s case. Nevertheless the Burmese Supreme Court, in 
effect, adopted the minority view in Liversidgete case .
Hamoodur Rahman J., as he then was, observed in Abdul Baqi Baluch v. 
Govt, of Vest Pakistan that the majority decision in Ghulan Jilani*s case 
altered the law laid down in Liversidge*s case, only to the extent that it is 
no longer sufficient for the executive authority merely to produce his order, 
saying that it is satisfied. It must also place before a Court material upon
1. Supra.
2. Supra.
3. (1931) A.C.66
b. B.L.R.(1950) SC.17.
3. »The Burmese Constitution* p.9 (A reprint from the Indian Year Book of 
International Affairs,1953•)
6. Ibid.
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which it so claims to have been satisfied, so that the Court can, in discharge cf 
its duty under Art, 98(2 )(b )( i), be in turn satisfied that the detenu is not 
being held without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner, r^he wording of 
Cl.(b)(i) of Art, 98(2) shows that not only the jurisdiction but also the manner 
of the exercise of that jurisdiction is subject to judicial review. If this 
funcion is to be discharged in a judicial manner, then it is necessary that 
the Court should have before it the material, upon which the authorities have 
purported to act. If any such material is of a nature for which privilege 
can be claimed, then that too would be a matter for the Court to decide as to 
whether the document concerned is really so privileged. In exercising this 
power, however, the ^ourt does not sit as an appellate authority. Nor does 
it substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the authority concerned. It 
was further pointed out that the detaining authority is expected to exercise 
the public pOY/er of apprehension and detention strictly in accordance with lav/-, 
as enjoined by Art.2 of the Constitution of 1962 and not arbitrarily or 
perversely. Not only laws made by the legislatures but also rules made under 
delegated legislative power and action taken under these lav/s should conform to 
the provision of the Constitution. The judicial power will be reduced to a 
nullity, if laws are so worded or interpreted that the executive authorities 
may make what statutory rules they please in the exercise of the power afforded 
to them and may use this freedom to make themselves the final judges of their 
own 'satisfaction* for imposing restraints on the enjoyment of fundamental 
rights of citizens, and Art.2 of the Constitution would be deprived of all 
its contents through this process and the Courts would cease to be guardians
of the nation's liberties? The ratio of Ghulam Jilani* s case was reaffirmed in
1. P.L.D. 1968,Sp.313; See also Ghulam Jilani v. Govt, of West Pakistan, supra; 
see also Green v.Secretary of State,(1941) All.^R*388; Nakuda All's case 
supra; Faridson Lid v. Govt, of Pakistan,?.L.D. 1961,SC. 537; Harward law 
Review, Vol,$6, p.808.
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in Abdul Baqi Baluch
By an ordinance - Defence of Pakistan Ordinance (Amendment) Ordinance
1968 - which was promulgated a few weeks before the judgement in Abdul Baqi 
Baluch and after the decision in Ghulam Jilanifs case, the aforementioned 
clause (x) of 8,3(2) of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1965* was amended
rather than 'satisfied' - that detention is necessary; and 'for for the avoidance 
of doubt' it was declared, that 'the sufficiency of the grounds on which such 
opinion, as aforesaid, is based shall be determined by the authority forming
available to validate a detention order made in 1966, retrospectively - the 
validity of an order depended on the law at the time it was made* The Court 
did not find it necessary to express any opinion as to the prospective effect
of the amendment, however t
The vires of the aforesaid amendment was considered in Govt, of West 
Pakistan v Begum A.A.K. Sorish Kashmiri* The question whether, according to the 
aforesaid amendment, the jurisdiction of the High Court to examine either the 
sufficiency or the reasonableness of the ground of detention had been taken 
away, was considered. The Court held that the amendment is ultra vires of the 
constitutional provision of Art.98(2)(b)(i) which cannot be amended by the
considered the validity of the detention order according to the unamended 
provision of the aforementioned clause (x)* Belying on the ratio of Ghulam
so as to provide that the detaining authority need only be 'of the opinion'
such opinion,' the Court held that this amendment had no effect, and was not
The Court ignored the amendment and
1. Ibid.
2. Abdul Baqi Baluch v. Govt, of West Pakistan, Supra
3. Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law, 1968.
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Jilani* s case, reaffirmed in Abdul Baqi Baluch, it was held that the Court 
would satisfy itself that the 1 satisfaction* of the detaining authority was 
based on 'reasonable grounds*and that the action taken was not merely a colour­
able exercise of power or a fraud upon the Statute, and that in Pakistan now, 
the onus is initially on the detaining authority to justify the dentention by 
establishing the legality of his action. A large number of decisions,mainly 
from India and Australia , were cited on behalf of the Government to show that, 
where the statute simply requires the authority to be 'satisfied* or to act 
'if he has reason to believe,* then neither the sufficiency nor the reasonable­
ness thereof can be examined by a Court in the exercise of its power of judicial 
review and it has to leave it to the‘'subjective satisfaction'7 of the authority 
so empowered. The observations of Professor C.K. Allen that ’where the word ' 
satisfied' simplicitor is used in a statute delegating powers to executive 
authorities, then the statute is almost ' judgeproof,* for the effect of these 
words would be virtually to exclude judicial review on the ground that
2
ministerial action taken under their authoriiyis purely administrative 11, was hot 
accepted. The Court, reproducing the reasoning afforded in Ghulam Jilani that 
both r.32 and r.2G4 of the D.P.R. are framed under cl(x) of S.3(2),of D.P.O., 
which required the existence of 'reasonable grounds' for action taken under 
either rule,rejected the contention and held that it has been well settled that, 
even if the expression * satisfied* is not expressly qualified by the adverb 
'reasonable* in r.32, it is so qualified, by necessary implication, by the
expression 'reasonable grounds* in the aforesaid cl.(x) delegating pov/ers to
1. LLyed v. Wallach (,1915) 29 C.L.R.299; Adelaid Company v. Commonwealth,1^43j 
67 C.L.R.116; Little v. Commonwealth (1947)73 C.L.B.94; Eliezer Zabrovsky
v. General Officer Commanding (1947) A.C.246; Gopalan* s case supra; UB.Khare 
v. State of Delhi^.I.R.1950,SC.211; and Virendra v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.
1937, 93.296.
2. 'Law and Orders' 2nd ed.p.291
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frame the rules concerned^. On the examination of the material put before the 
Court, as required by it, it was found that there was only one speech on the 
‘record of satisfaction* alleged to be made by the detenu which the Government 
failed to show, on evidence, had caused or was sufficient to cause a breach of 
public order2.
The Lahore High Court in a recent case, relying on the dictum laid
3 4down in Ghulam Jilani* s case as reaffirmed in Abdul Baqi Baluch and Begum A.A*
5
&  Sorish Kashmiri* s cases, observed that the * satisfaction* detaining 
authority, in Pakistan, is not immune from judicial review* The detaining auth­
ority has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the material was reasonable 
enough to bring him to the * satisfaction* that the detunu must be prevented from 
acting in the alleged prejudicial manner. It was further pointed out that it 
has been established by the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court that 
A~rt*98 of the Constitution 1962 casts a duty upon the High Courts to examine the 
‘reasonableness* of the 'satisfaction* of the detaining authority and that
the matter no longer rests finally with the ' subjective satisfaction* of the
£
detaining authority •
It is submitted that the doctrine of 1 objective satisfaction, has 
been now well established in Pakistan and the Courts will not accept argument 
in favour of * subjective satisfaction* whether a state of emergency exists or 
not.^.
1. P. L.D. 1969, SC. 14 per Hanoodar Rahmar J.
2. Ibid*
3. Supra.
4* Supra.
5* Supra.
6. Begum S.^.Hayal Khan v* Govt.of West I&kistan,P.I3D. 1969,Lah,985.
7. See Govt, of West Pakistan v. Begum A. A.K.Sorish Kashmir^i,Supra; see also
Abdul Baqi Baluch and Ghulam Jilani*s Cases, supra*
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j Successive Orders of Detention:
i
I
The questionsinvolved when considering successive orders of detention 
I are (a) whether the subsequent order is a fresh order of detention; ©r (b)
whether it is an order extending the previous period of detention. There is 
a material distinction between a fresh order of detention and an order extend­
ing the previous detention; a fresh order is not affected by the previous
detention having been illegal, whereas an order of extension becomes illegal,
1
if the detention which it extends was itself illegal • When an order purports
to be one of extension of detention, it cannot be regarded as an original order,
2
unless there are circumstances which impel the Court t© such a conclusion , 
whereas every fresh order becomes an original order of detention and as such 
unaffected by the illegality of the previous ©rder.
In Masum v. State, where the first order of detention for three months
jwas passed under S.3(1) of the N.W.F.P. Public Safety Act 19^8, a second 
order was made under the same secion of the aforesaid Act, which extended the 
period of detention to six months, after the Act had been repealed and replaced 
by the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance; consequently a third 
order, extending further the period of detention was made under S.3(1) and (3) 
of the Ordinance. It was held that the second order of detention was illegal, 
because it was passed under a statute which had been repealed at the time of 
making the order; the third order of detention which\es merely an order of
extension of an illegal order could not be treated as valid order of detent-
3
ion . In Arab Mohd. - H.Khhn’s case, Akram J., the Acting C.J., dissenting
T. Masum v. State, P.L.D.19(>l,Pesh.268.
2. Ibid.
3* Ibid. the principle was laid down in Arab Mohd. H.Kahn v. Crown,P.L.D.195^ 
FJC.1.
from the majority, took a different view and observed
"No doubt the wfcjpd •extension* has been used rather 
loosely in several orders of detention, at times 
it has been used for specifying a particular period 
of detention and at times for specifying the lengthening 
of that period, but if, in the light of the circumstances 
known to the Government, an order of detention is made, the 
mere use of inappropriate language or the statement that it 
is an extention will not invalidate the order, if the order 
itself is a proper order, which carries out the purpose ©f 
the Statute. In doing substantial justice in the exercise 
of prerogative powers, mere technical errors or formal 
defects are hardly to be taken into consideration* one 
has to look to the substance of the thing and not to the 
form of it. I cannot say that in this case there has in 
fact been any injustice to the detenus, even if the word 
•extension* is considered to be inapt with regard to some 
of the orders"*
In view of the majority opinion, the detenu*s petition was accepted and he was 
released"'.
In above case, where the first order of detention for six months
was made under S.3 of the N.W.F.P.Public Safety Act on 8th June,1951 and th©
detenu was entitled to be released ©n December 8,1952, an order extending the
period of detention was made on December,10 1952; it was held by the Federal
Court of Pakistan that the detenu’s detention on December 9*1952, not being
under any order of detention,was illegal and therefore the order of December
10,1952, and a subsequent order of extention of May,16,1953* were also illegal
2
as they were extending the period of illegal detention.
In Basanta Chandra Chose v. Emperor? Spens C.J.^had held -
"The analogy ©f civil proceedings in which the rights ©f 
parties have ordinarily to be ascertained on the date of 
the institution of the proceedings cannot be invoked in 
habeas corpus proceedings. If at any time before the
1. Arab Mohd. Hashem Khan v. Crown,P.L.D.195^*EC.l. 2. itid
2. A.I.R.19^5* EC.18.
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Court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order 
directing his detention is produced, the Courtcannot 
direct his release merely ©n the ground that, at some 
prior stage, there was no valid cause for detention.
The question is not whether the later order validates 
the earlier detention but whether, in face of the later 
valid order,^the Court can direct the release of the 
petitioner."
In re; Javantilal Nathu Bhai Parekh a full bench of the Bombay High Court
observed that -
"Where a person^arrested illegally and imprisoned, and 
when in imprisonment an order of detention under 
Bombay Public Safety measures Act, is served upon him 
and the detenu applies for a writ of habeas corpus, 
what the Court is concerned is not whether the arrest 
of the applicant is legal or illegal but whether his 
detention under the order passed is legal ®r illegal.
The detention of which :he complains by his application 
is the detention in the jail on the date when he made 
the application, and it is immaterial for the determin­
ation of the question as to whether his prior arrest and 
his prior detention were or were not legal.. The question 
under the habeas corpus Act is as t© whether the detention 
of which the detenu complains, that means the detention 
at the time he seeks to take out a writ,; of habeas corpus, 
is valid or not, which again resolves itself into the 
question whether at the moment there is for his detention 
a valid order in existence, and if there be such an order, 
then no writ of habeas corpus can be issued in his favour
It is not as if, in this case, after an illegal order for
detention was made, subsequently, because of powers
conferred, an order was made continuing the original order
for detention, which was in itself illegal. In such case?,
where the subsequent order, even though made after the
amendment conferring greater powers, continued the original ^
order for detention which was bad, the subsequent order is also badV
It is submitted that views of the Indian Federal Court and the Bombay High
3
Court are not different from the view taken in Arab Mohd. H.Khan’s case.
1. A.I.R.19^5, IJ3.18.
2 '. A.I.R.19^9, Bom.319.
3. SUPRA.
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In a recent case, during the course of hearing, an application was
moved on behalf of the Governement urging that, as the detention order in
question did not conform t© the requirements of law, as declared by the Supreme
1Courtof Pakistan in Ghulam Jilanifs case, the detention order may be allowed 
t© be withdrawn without prejudice t© the Government's powers and jurisdiction 
to pass, if necessary, any fresh order in accordance with law; the order was 
allowed to be withdrawn and the immediate release of the detenu was directed, 
but as the detenu had just come out of the inner gate of the Central Prison, 
a police officer, specially deputed for the purpose, served a fresh order of 
detention, passed by the Governor of West Pakistan under r.32. Defence of 
Pakistan Rules, 1963? on him for a period of two months. The instant writ 
petition was made against the second order of detention. Upholding the second 
order ©f detention, the Court observed that there is nothing unconstitutional 
in passing successive orders ©f detention against a person ©n the same grounds, 
and that it is open to the authority making an order to revoke an order of
detention found to be defective for any reason and substitute a fresh order
2
against him. The Court further pointed ©ut that in Basaht Chandra’s case
the Indian Federal C©urt laid down two propositions, namely, (a) that^where
an earlier ©rder of detention is found defective merely on formal grounds, there
is nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being passed on the same
grounds; and (b) that if at any time before the Courtedirects the release ©f
detenu, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the Court cannot
direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no
valid cause fer detention^.______________________________________________
Ti Supra.
2. Supra.
3* Begum Sardar Mohd.Hayat Khan v. Govt.of West Pakistan,P,L.D.1969iLah.895*
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S.3(7) of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1932, authorises a detaining 
authority to revoke its order at any time that he chooses, and provides that 
such a revocation shall not prevent the making of a fresh order to the same 
effect as the order revoked. In face of this provision it cannot be argued, 
merely on the ground that the previous order was revoked and a fresh order 
passed as in the instant case, that the subsequent order was mala fide. It 
may be due to negligence that the mandatory provisions of the Security Act were 
not complied with and, when the detaining authority came to know of the non- 
compliance, it realised that the further detention of the detenu was illegal 
and consequently revoked the previous order, but at the same time it felt that 
further detention of the detenue was necessary and so it passed a fresh order.
In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the Court was wrong in holding 
that, under the circumstances of the case, the order was bona fide • Whether 
there is a provision in a particular statute for the revocation of previous 
order and passing of subsequent order to the same effect or not is immaterial; 
a detaining authority can revoke its order of detention at any time and can 
pass a fresh one, if in its view further detention of the detenu is 
necessary, before a High Court is approached by writ of habeas corpus; even 
during the writ proceedings, the detaining authority can withdraw the detention 
order and later on can pass a fresh order to the same effect if it appears to
it that there are some statutory or procedural defects in the previous order,
2sufficient to defeat the probative value of the order • An order of detention
3
can be passed against a person who is already in detention .
1. Mohd.Ahmad v. Crown, P.L.D.1935iSind.73.
2. Begum Sardar M. Hayat v. Govt.of West Pakistan,Supra.
3. Sibte Hasan v. Crown, P.L.D.195^, Lah.142.
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Advisory Board:
Clause (^t) of Right No,2 declares the detention of a person for a 
period exceeding three months illegal, unless the appropriate Advisory Board 
has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that 
there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention. The explanation 
to the aforesaid Cl,(*0 provides for the constitution of the *approprate 
Advisory Board1 and lays down qualifications for its members; that (i) in the 
case of a person detained under a Central law, the Board will consist of a 
Judge of the Supreme Court, who shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of 
that Court, and a senior officer in the service of Pakistan, who shall be 
nominated by the President; and (ii) in the case of a person detained under 
a Provincial T,aw, the Board will consist of a Judge of the High Court of the 
province concerned, who shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of that Court, 
and a senior officer in the Service of Pakistan, who shall be nominated by 
the Governor of the province concerned. The constitution does not prescribe 
a maximum period of detention. Once an Advisory Board recommends the detention 
of a person beyond the period of three months, there is no limitation on the 
length of period a detenu may be kept in preventive custody. However, there 
are some statutes, for instance the Security of Pakistan Act,1952, and the 
Preventive Detention Laws Amendment Act, 1962, which require that cases of 
detention for more than three months should be referred to an Advisory Board 
every six months and its opinion as to,justification of further detention 
obtained, and that the decision of the Advisory Board should be communicated 
to the detenu.
In India, Parliament has been authorised to prescribe minimum periods
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of detention and also classes of detenus who may be subjected to prolonged
detention without recourse to an Advisory Board # But under the Preventive
Detention Law Amendment Act, 15)5 2,in its present form, a detention order made
f*;
by any authority other than the Government is only valid/twelve days and the 
case must be referred to the State Government forthwith# If the State confirms 
the order, it must be referred forthwich to the Union. The case must be 
referred to the Advisory Board within thirty days of the order# The Advisory 
Board has power to call for any information it wishes but the detunu has no 
right of audience. However, no person can be detained for more than twelve 
months • Unlike the Pakistan Constitution,Art (22(^ f) of the Indian Constitution 
requires that a law of preventive detention for a period exceeding three months 
must provide for the establishment of an Advisory Board consisting of persons 
who were or had been, or are qualified to be Judges of a Right Court and that 
the Board has to report before the expiration of a period of three months that, 
there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention. But the proviso 
to Art.22(*f) further provided that, even if the Board are of the opinion that 
there is sufficient cause for such detention beyond the period of three months, 
such detention is not permitted beyond the maximum period, if any, prescribed 
by Parliament under Art#22(7)(b)# However, Art.22(A-) (a) *is made inoperative 
by Art#22(4)(b) in respect of an Act for preventive detention passed by 
Parliament under Cls.(7)(a) and (7)(b)! of Art.22^. Art.22(7)(a) permits, 
in respect of an Act on preventive detention passed by Parliament, detention
1. Constitution of India, Art.22(7)
2# See Prof,Alan Gledhill, India, p#202; see also H.M.Seervai, Constitutional 
Law of India, pp.^ 47-*+i8.
3* See Gopalan’s case, supra at p.117, see also Seervai, H.M.op.cit.p.^7#
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beyond the period of three months without necessity of consulting an Advisory 
Eoard if the Act complies with the requirements of Art.22(7) (a.) • But Art,22(7) (b) 
does not make it obligatory on Parliament to prescribe a maximum period of 
detention. Art.22(7)(c) empowers Parliament to regulate the procedure to be 
followed by the Advisory Board in an inquiry under Art,22(b)(G)• In Gopalan1s 
case, Fazl Ali and Mahajan JJ.,dissented from the majority view taken by 
Kaniya C.J., Patanjali Shastri, Mukhergea and Das JJ.,according to which it 
was held that Parliament must prescribe either the circumstances under which or 
the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for a longer 
period than three months without reference to an Advisory Board .
Though there is no provision regarding the procedure of an Advisory 
Board ana the detenu has no right of audience before the Board under the 
Pakistan Constitution, S.8 of the Security of Pakistan Act provides for the 
procedure of an Advisory Board*S.8(1) lays down that the Advisory Board shall, 
after considering the matter place before it and, if necessary, after calling 
for such further information from the Government or from any person concerned 
or affected, as it may deem necessary, submit its report to the Central Govern­
ment,S.8(2) requires that the report of the Board shall specify;in a separate 
part thereof the opinion of the Board as to whether or not there is sufficient 
cause for the passing of the order, and except for that part of the report in 
which such opinion of the Board is specified, the report shall be confidential.
S.8(3) prohibits the deten*s attendance in person or by legal representative 
before the Advisory Board; he c:-;nnot produce any witness before it, 3.8(A) lays
1. Ibid.
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down that, on receipt of the report of the Board, the Central Government shall 
consider the same and shall pass such order thereon as appears to it just and 
proper. But the proviso to S.8 nakes it obligatory on the Central Government 
to review 'all such orders' every six months from the date of order, unless 
revoked earlier and to inform the detenu detained under S.3(l)(b) of the Act, 
of the result of such review.
The meaning of the expression 'such orders', occuring in the aforesaid
proviso to S.8,was considered in Mohd.Sarwar v. Ch.Settlement Commr. The point
in question was whether the review contemplated by the proviso has to be made
every six months from the date of original order made by the detaining authority
or from the date of order passed by the Central Government after the report of
the Advisory Board was obtained under the aforesaid S.8(4) of the Act. The
majority followed the view taken by the Single Bench of the Lahore High Court in
2
Sibte Hasan v. Crown and held that six months should be construed as running 
from the date of the order passed by the Central Government after obtaining the 
report of the Advisory Board Lari J., dissenting from the majority, adopted, 
the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Sind High Court (Lari J. was one of 
Judes of the Division Bench) in Mirpaldas v. Crown^and observed that the six 
months should be counted from the date of the original order made by the detain­
ing authority. The reasoning of the Single Bench was that*the assumption, there­
fore, that the original order of detention'- under S.8(4) of the Security of 
Pakistan Act-'is to form the subject of a review every six months, is without 
substance.' The argument of Lari J., based on the view of the Division Bench,
1. P.L.D.1955 Sind.331
2. P.L.D.1954 Lah.142 (149)
3. P.L.D.1954 Sind 25.
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was that the aforesaid provision should be read as a whole, with the 
'preceeding clauses of S.8 and also with the proceeding sections of the Act, 
which deals with both the original and subsequent order, and that from such 
perusal both the interpretations, namely, six months from the date of oridinal 
order or six months from the date of the subsequent order passed by the Central 
Government are possible* But, it was pointed out, *the Court should lean 
towards the interpretation which is favourable to the subject - to the detenu 
whose personal liberty is in danger - and which is in accordance with the 
object in view as the provision is in the nature of protection and Safeguard 
to the Detenu*. It was, therefore, observed that * in view of the matter it is 
obligatory on the part of the Government to review orders of detention every
-j
six months from the date of the original order of detention * * On the basis
of the Court's policy of giving maximum protection to the detenu, the following
observation was made in Mirpaldas's case:
”It is a general rule which has been always acted upon 
by the Courts of England, that if any person procures 
the imprisonment of another, he must take care to do so 
by steps, all of which are entirely regular and that, 
if he fails to follow every step in the process with 
extreme regularity, the Court shall not allow the 
imprisonment to continue.”
The same consequences follow if a detention order is made under the Sind Control
Order and Retention Act, 1952 as its provisions are similar to the Security of
Pakistan Act. In this case the Provincial Government, instead of the Central
Government was required to review the detention order every six months. Vhere,
though the Central Government had revised the detention order, after having
obtained the decision of the Advisory Board, as required by Priviso to
1. MohcLSarwar V. Ch.Settle, Commr. supra.
2. Supra.
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S.8 (4.) of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, the result of such review was
not communicated to the detenu, it was held that the failure of the Central
Government to comply with Statutory obligation in respect of detention order,
made the further detention illegal^ In another case where the detention order,
as required by the Security of Pakistan Act, was not referred to the Advisory
2
Board at all, the detention of the applicant was held to be illegal,
However, the Preventive Detention Laws Amendment Act, 1962, deleted
the provision for six monthly review by the Government under S.8 of the Security 
and
of Pakistan Act/laid down that no person should be detained under any 
preventive detention law for a period longer than two months without the
authority of an advisory board - the qualification for membership of which was
the same as that laid dcwn by Eight No 2 (4) of the Constitution, 1962 but 
this period of two months within which a detention order had to be referred to 
the advisory board, was to run after the expiration of the first fifteen days 
period provided for the communication of the grounds of detention. If the 
Board authorised the detention of a person for aperiod longer than two months, 
the Central Government could detain the person concerned for such period as it 
may think proper; even for an indefinite period.
The West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, i960, made it
illegal to detain a person for a period longer than two months without obtaining
the opinion of an Advisory Board for such detention. A case was referred to the
Advisory Board, before the expiration of the said period of two months and the
T. Sirajuddin V. State P.L.D. 1957 Lah. 962. 1
2. Mohd. Ahmad V. Crown. P.L.D. 1955 Sind 72.
3* See Ss 3 (7-a) and 6-, A (2) of the Preventive Detention Laws Amendment Act
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Board reported that there was sufficient cause for detention beyond two months;
the Provincial Government extended the initial period of detention to Six
months* It was held that, as the Board recommended the detention beyond two
months, but not beyond three months, the detention beyond three months was
unconstitutional. It was, pointed out that, in such a case, the time factor
could not be ignored# It was, however, contended that, by virtue of the
provisions of Right No. 2 (if) , an extention of an order of detention was not
permissible, and that the period for which the Government considers it
necessaiy to detain a person must be determined and specified before the case
laid before an advisory board, so that his incarceration would not be
continued for an indefinite period. The Court, rejecting the contention,
observed that there are no words in Right No. 2 (4 ), which may be interpreted
to mean that the period of detention once fixed by the Government cannot be
extended thereafter, or that the order passed by the Government in the first
instance must state the outside limit on the period of detention. The sine
qua non for the attraction of Cl. (4 ) of Right No. 2 is, thus, detention for
a period beyond three months and not the period set out in the initial order
of detention. There may be circumstances which render it impossible for the
detaining authority to fix in advance the period for which a person may be
detained in preventive custody. For example if enemy alien is taken into
custody during a war, no one can predict when the war will end and till the
event happens, it will be endangering the Security of Pakistan to release him 
1
from Custody,
1. Rahmai Elahi V. Govt of 'W.P.^ Supra.
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In a case where the Government had ordered the detention of the 
detenu "until further orders’*, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the 
expressions 1 the Government can continue the detention of a person for " such 
period as it thinks fit” - occuring in S. 19 (d) of the East Pakistan Public 
Safety Ordinance, 1958# after the concurrence of the Advisory Board under S.
19 - A of the Ordinance - which corresponds to Right No. 2 (4) of the Constitution 
- does not contemplate any uncertain period; a certain and definite period 
must be mentioned. It was, therefore, held that the inpugned order suffered 
from uncertainty or indefiniteness of the period of detention and hence was 
illegal.
S.3 of the Y/est Pakistan Public Safety Act - as subsequently amended -
did not provide for the reference of the detention order to the Advisory Board,
as contemplated by Art. 7 (4) of the 1956 Constitution, under which the
action was taken, but the provisions of Art.7 of the Constitution,1956 were
strictly followed by the detaining authority, that is, the case was
referred to the Advisory Board, despite the amendment introduced in the
impugned Act in this respect by the Yfest Pakistan Preventive Detention Laws
Amendment Ordinance, 1956. It was held that neither the Statute nor the
detention order suffered from any legal or constitutional defect on this 
2score.
The Supreme Court has held that the Pakistan Constitution, unlike 
the Indian Constitution, does not pequire the clause regarding the reference
of the detention order to be inserted in every Statute. It simply puts a
1. Govt, of E.P.V. Rowshan,Supra.
2. A Aziz V.D.M. Lahore, P.L.D.1958 Lah.104#
limit on the exercise of the power of preventive detention for long periods;
it lays down that under no law the detention of a person for a period longer
than three months will be permitted without the concurrence of an appropriate
Advisory Board for such detention. The constitution of the Advisory Board and
the reference of the detention for a period longer than three months has been,
no doubt made obligatory by the constitution if detention is ordered for more
than three months,* It is ho?vever, not mandatory that the constitutional
provisions should be repeated in a Statute authorising detention for more than 
1
three months.
Where one of the members of the Advisory Board sas the person Ydio
had recommended the detention order, it was held that the constitution of the
Advisory Board was against the principle of natural justice that no one man can
be a judge in his own cause and the reference of the case to such an Advisory
2Board was invalid and the detention was illegal,.
It is not correct that a detenu is not entitled to pray for writ 
of habeas corpus before his case is referred to an advisory board, when the 
detention is to exceed three months* There are so many grounds, discussed 
in the following, pages, on which a detenu can challenge the order of detention 
by writ petition and pray for habeas corpus immediately after his detention?
Grounds of Preventive Detention
Clause (5) of Right No. 2, which corresponds to clause (5) of Art.22 
of the Indian Constitution, requires that a detaining authority shall, as soon
as may be, communicate, to the person detained, in pursuance of an order made
T T  A Aziz V.W. Pak. P.L.D. 1958 S6. 499 see also Prof.Al angle dhill,Pakistan.
2. Rahmat Elahi V. Govi. of W.P., Supra. P*200
3. Farid Ahmad V. G-ovi, of W.P., Supra.
<1
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under any law providing for preventive detention, the grounds on which the 
order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making 
a Representation against the order. The object of this clause is to enable 
the detenu to prepare his defence and apply for habeas corpus or bail, and to 
provide him with sufficient information as to why his personal liberty has been 
restrained.
This clause confers two distinct rights on a detenu, namely (i) the 
right to be informed of the grounds of detention; and (ii) the right to be 
enabled, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against the order. 
As far as clause (5) is concerned, the moment the grounds are communicated, the 
first requirement is complied with, but the second requirement is fulfilled only 
after the deteun has been supplied with such information as to enable him to 
make an effective representation. Therefore, if there is an infringement of 
either of these two conditions, in other words, if any of these requirements is 
not complied with the detenu has the right to approach the High Court for the 
writ of habeas corpus. The clause also envasiges a further condition that the 
grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu,”as soon as may be” under 
the circumstances of the case which implies that the detenu should not only be 
enabled to make an effective and adequate representation but he should be afforded 
an opportunity to do so as soon as possible.
Detention without communication of grounds is Void ab initio. Where 
the grounds, on which the impugned order was made, were not communicated to the 
detenu and it was contended that two previous similar orders in which grounds 
were mentioned, were not challenged by him, it was held that he could not be 
estopped from challenging the validity of the third order, which was violative
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of the constitutional guarantee*
It is a condition of lawful detention that the person arrested should
know on what charge, suspicion or crime he has been arrested, so that he can be
in a position to communicate information to his counsel for the purpose of
making representation and arranging his defence. Hence, where even after
streneons efforts were made by the petitioner to meet the detenus, the police
officer did not disclose where the detenus were and what were the grounds of
detention, it was held that their detention wqs illegal, as no proper remedy
2
could be sought to secure their release. S. 8 of the security of Pakistan Act, 
1952,required that the Central Government should review the order of detention 
every six months, after having referred the matter to the Advisory, Board, and 
that the decision of the Advisory Board should be communicated to the detenu 
every time. Where, though the Central Government had reviewed the order of 
detention, after having obtained the decision of the Advisory Board, but the 
result of such review was not communicated to the detenu, it was held that the 
failure of the Central Government to comply with Statutory obligation in respect 
of detention order, made further detention illegal^
In one case the detenu was arrested and detained in custody for six
days by a police officer for ”pre judicial acts*1, under S.41 of the East Pakistan
Public Safety Ordiance, 1958; this was, however, subject to the passing of a
final detention order by the Provincial Government, under S.17 of the Ordinance,
on the report of the detaining officer, which was required to be furnished within
l7 Abdus Salam v. A.M. , P.L.D. 19^9 Pesh. 1^7; see al so Mirza Mahiaood' Beg. v. 
Commr. Multan, P.L.D. 1966 3.C. Zol; see also Prabhu v Emperor, A.J.p.^944
2. farocq Badar V. H.G. Police, P.L.D. 1969 Lah. 1020.
3* Sirajuddin V. State. P.L.D, 1957 Lah. 962.
thirty days of such arrest. No grounds of arrest and detention were
communicated to the detenu by the police officer. On receipt of the aforesaid
report by the arresting officer, the final detention order, furnishing the
grounds of detention, was passed by the Provincial Government, under S.17 of
the Ordiance within six days of the arrest. It was held by the majority that
the first arrest and detention of the detenu by the police officer under S.41
of the Ordianance, which does not relate to preventive detention, without
compliance with the constitutional requirement, which require communication of
grounds of arrest and detention, was void ab initio and consequently the second
order of detention, made by the Provincial Government under S.17 of the
Ordinance, in furtherance of the first illegal order, was also unlawful.
Cornelius, C.J., dissenting from the majority view, however, observed that
Ss.41 and 17 of the aforesaid Ordinance are reproductions of rr.129 and 2 6  of
the Defence of India Rules, that S.41 is interrelated with S.17 of the
Ordinance in the same sense as r.129 is with r.26 of the Defence of India Rules
and that S*Ul of the Ordinance relates to such detention as may be described as
” preliminary precautionary preventive detention’*, with a view to making of
enquiries as to whether the’*final order” of detention to prevent the doing of
’’prejudicial Acts” should be made under S. 17 of the Ordinance. Therefore, in
his view, the arrest and detention of the detenu under S.41 of the Ordinance
was not subject to the constitutional requirement of communication of grounds
or report to the nearest Magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest. The
interpretatio^r.129 of the defence of India Rules was afforded by the Pull 
1^  Govt, of East Pak. V. Rowshan P.L.D. 1S>££ S.C.286.
Bench of Lahore High Court In re Subrahifflmyflni in the following words;
” The rule (i.e.r.129) to my mind, was provided to enable police 
officers or other officers of the Government to detain dangerous 
men immediately and to hold them in detention until the Provincial 
Government or the Central GovemmenJ issued order of detention under 
r.26 of the Defence of India Rules”.
But the majority opinion was that S.41 relates to preventive detention and as
such a person cannot be detained in the custody by the police officer under S.41
2
without communication of grounds to the detenu.
The grounds on which the preventive detention order is said to be 
based, should actually exist and should be suceptible of rational proof. If 
the alleged grounds do not exist at all^ or one or more of them are not of 
rationally operative value, then the order of detention cannot be upheld by the 
Courts; it must be declared to be illegal^
The grounds communicated to the delenu should not be too vague to
enable him to make an earliest representation against the detention. "'Vagueness’'
is the anti-thesis of definiteness that is to say, if the grounds are not
5
definite, they are said to be vague. According to the Supreme Court of India,
"vagueness” is a. relative term, whose meaning must vary with the facts and
circumstances of each case; what ca^ y be said to be vague in one case may not be
so in another* Hence it could not be asserted, as a general rule, that a
ground was necessarily vague, if the only answer of the detenu could be to deny
it; if the Statement of facts was capable of being clearly understood and was
1. A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 329, per Harries C.J*
2. Govt, of East Pak. V. Rowshan, Supra.
3* Dayanand Modi V. State of Bihar, A.I.R.1951 Pat. 47*
4* Abdul Qayytim V. Povt. of East Pak. P.L.D. 1967 Dac.268; and Hasan 'JNav&£V.
Crwon. P.L.D.1933 Sind.37.
5. Sibte Hasan V. The Crown P.L.D. 1934 Lah. 142.
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sufficiently definite to enable the detenu to make his representation,
it could not be said to be vague]' Lahore High Court observed, that, what
information should be communicated to the detenu in order to enable him to
make an adequate representation depends upon the circumstances of each case.
The test is, however whether the grounds communicated convey sufficient
information to enable the detenu to make an effective representation. Where
the information left the petitioner in no doubt as to what the accusation
against him was, it was held to be enough for making the representation against
2
the detention order. On the contrary,. if the statement; b'f the grounds was so 
indefinite and insufficient as to make it difficult for the detenu to make an 
effective representation, it would be declared to be vague^ The detaining 
authority should make its meaning clear beyond doubt, without leaving the person 
detained to his own resources td interpret; otherwise such grounds would be 
regarded as vague^
The grounds should not be couched in such general terms, giving no 
particulars as to what crime or "prejudicial act” has been exactly committed 
by the detenu. Where the detention order stated that " the Government was 
satisfied that the applicant was believed to be notorious thief”, it was held 
that the aforesaid information was of a general nature; it certainly communicated 
nothing about the matter from which the authority*s order sprang. In another 
case, where the grounds were that the applicant worked for and was trained by 
the Communist Party, that he was engaged in directing the activities of the
1. Naresh Chandra V* State of Bengal A.I.R.1959 S.C.1335*
2. Sibte Hasan ^ .Qrown Supra.
3. RamkrishjadV. State of Delhi A.I.R. 1953 S.C.138
4. Ibid.
3* Sardaru V. Crown P.L.D. 1953 Sind* 4*
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Communist Party, under different assumed names and remained underground to
escape notice and that his activitieswere prejudicial to the security
Pakistan, it was held that these grounds did not disclose what particular
activities of the applicant endangered the security of Pakistan and, as such,
the grounds were indefinite and vague^ Also where the grounds communicated
to the detenu were that he Was Man ace criminal, most desperate bad character
and excise criminal of great notoriety and that his activities were prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order” , it was held that the grounds were wholly
general and did not provide sufficient information, on the basis of which an
effective representation could be made by the detenu and therefore the detention
2
order was illegal* The grounds that the petitioner had been fomenting
agrarian trouble between landlords and tenants, and inciting tenants in a manner
likely to endanger peace and tranquillity of the area, could not be said to have
been stated in such detail as to enable the detenu to make an effective
representation; the grounds were vague and detention on their basis was illegal^
The test can, however, be said to be that the detenu should have particulars "as
full and adequate as the circumstances permit”, so as to enable him to make an
4effective representation.
The "prejudicial acts” as defined by S.17 of the East Pakistan 
Public Safety Ordinance, 1956* include a variety of activities and unless he is 
informed as to which of the prejudicial activities the detenu was involved in,
it could not be said that there was sufficient compliance with the provision
T. Hasan Nasir V. Crown P.L.D.1953 Sind J?.
2. Iv'dhd. Ahmad V. Crown. P.L.D.1955 Sind. ?3.
3* Ghulam Mohd.Khan V. State P.L.D.1957 Lah. 497
4* BefS! am. A.I.F-.1951 S.C.138; and Ram Krishana V.State of
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of Right No. 2 (5) of the Constitution. In one case,the nature of the
prejudicial activities, in which the detenu was alleged to he involved, was
not particularised nor were the alleged illegal activities or the objectives of
the alleged secret association, with which he was said to have associated
himself, specified. It was not also specified what sort of alleged propaganda
was being carried on by the detenu, by quoting the offending passage or giving
their gist or substance. It was therefore, held that the grounds were vague^
In Mahbub Anam V. Government of East Fak., tjje facts of which were similar to
those in the aforesaid case, it was observed that it is not possible to lay down
any hard and fast rule as to what grounds should be contained in the order so
that the detenu may be able to make a representation. But it can certainly be
said that, in a particular case, if the groundsof detention are found to be too
vague and indefinite to enable the detenu to make an effective representation,
2
the detenu would be entitled to be released.
If the information conveyed by the grounds is sufficient to enable 
a detenuto make an effective and adequate representation, the grounds cannot be 
said to be vague and indefinite. 7/here the grouricb were that the detenu, 1 is 
member of a gang of decoits and an association of dangerous criminals”, it was 
held that as it was clearly stated, by disclosing the connection of the detenu 
with the notorious gangs of dacoits and dangerous criminals, and that the 
activities of the detenu were such as to be prejudicial to the public safety and 
the maintenance of public order, it could not be said that the information 
communicated to the detenu was not sufficient or the grounds were vague^
1. Govt, of East Pak.Y* Rowshan P.I..D. 1366 S.G* 286.
2. P.L.D.1959 Dac. 774.
3. luuzaffar V. Grown, P.L.D.1950 Sind. 113.
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In one order of detention it was disclosed that the G-overnment was satisfied 
that the detenu was acting in a banner prejudicial to the security of Pakistan 
as he was engaged in conspiring with other communist leaders and planning to 
overthrow the G-overnment established by law; it was held that, in view of the 
grounds communicated to detenu, which were based on solid particular facts, '
it could not be said that the grounds were vague and indefinite?’ 7/here it was 
stated that the central G-ovemment was satisfied that, with a view to preventing 
the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and 
maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain him, it was held that, 
on the principle of omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta and various decision 
of the Privy Council and the Federal Courts and numerous decisions of the 
High Courts, it had to be presumed that the grounds were sufficient, that the 
Government believed that the detenu had been engaged or was about to be 
engaged in activities which were prejudicial to the public safety and main­
tenance of public order and that it had become necessary, especially on account 
of his previous record and his present activities, to arrest and detain him, 
with a view to preventing him from engaging himself in those activities. It 
is to be noted that these activities were not disclosed in the grounds
communicated to the detenu but were proved by the evidence produced by the 
2
Government. In Fazle Karim V. Government of East Pakistan 'where the facts were 
more or less similar to the aforesaid case, it was held that as the grounds 
supplied to the detenu were sufficient to enable him to make a representation, thq
1. Sardaru V. Crown. P.L.D. 1953 Sind 4.
2. Inayatull ah MashriqiTV. Crown P.L.D.1952 Lah. 331
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could not be open to any objection?- In a case where it was stated that the
detenu had been receiving substantial amounts of money from the diplomatic
mission of a country unfriendly to Pakistan, for organising objectionable and
subversive activities in furtherence of that country's designs to disrupt the
unity of the people of Pakistan and to cause serious cleavage between various
sects of Muslins in Pakistan, it was held that the grounds were sufficient to
2
make effective representation possible.
The grounds should not be couched in such a general way as to appear 
to be a mere reproduction of the objects of the statute authorising detention. 
Where the grounds were that the two detenus were acting in a manner prejudicial 
to national security, public safety or the Defence of Pakistan, the maintenance 
of public order, Pakistan's relations with ary other power, maintenance of 
essential supplies and services or the efficient prosecution of war”, it was 
held that these grounds were simply a reproduction of the words of r 32(l) of the 
Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965* and, as such, the detention orders on the face 
of it, verged on absurdity^ as there was no indication, in the two detention 
orders and the afidavits v. “tiled in support thereof, as to how and in what
3
manner the detenus were engaged in the activities alleged to be prejudicial.
In another case where it was stated that the G-overnment was satisfied that, . 
with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public 
safety, maintenance of public order and maintenance of peaceful conditions in 
the District” it was necessary to detain him, it was held that the grounds were 
W  (1956) . ;.D.L.R. 700. '
2. Moina. Khatoon V. Govt, of Pakistan P.L.D. 1957 Kar. 530
3. Husain Ali Chagla V.L.M. Lahore. P.L.D.1966 Lah. 309.
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just the reproduction of the provisions of r.32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules 
and that, in as much as no particular activity of the detenu amounting to 
breach of public safety or public order, or destruction of security of Pakistan 
was specified, the order was illegal.^ *
The grounds of detention should conform to the purposes envisaged by
the statute authorising detention; in other words, they should be relevant to
the provisions of such statute* The grounds should be such as a rational human
being would consider connected in some manner with the objects, which the statute
2
sought to achieve. The Court should examine the grounds of detention, m
order to ascertain whether they were relevant to the objects which the
legislation had in view^ If a reason is given for the detention of a person,
which is not within the scope and ambit of the Act conferring the power upon
L
the G-cvemment to detain, then the whole order is vitiated. The grounds .
supplied to the detenu must be connected with the order 'of detention under the
particular statute. If it is found that they are not so connected, it cannot
be said that the requirements of Art. 22(l) and (5) of the Indian Constitution -
Right No. 2(l) and (5) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962 - have been complied
with. Failure to establish a rational connection between them and the order of
5
detention would render it invalid.
In a case where the grounds were that the detenus party - Jamat-e- 
Islami-was attempting to create disaffection among the Armed Forces, by
1. Begum Sardar M. Hayat Khan V. Govt. Of Pak. P.L.D.1969 Lah. 985.
2. State of Bombay V. Atma Ram. Supra.
3. Shamsher Singh Y. State of Pepsu, A.I.R. 1954 S.C.276.
4* In re Rajdhar Kalu Patil, A*I.R. 1948 Bom. 334*
3. Har Tirath Singh V. The Crown, A.I.R.1950 (East) Purg. 222.
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means of objectionable speeches by its leaders and that the detenu, in his
monthly periodical, had published a vicious and unwarranted attack on Iran and
its royal family, with the objects of undermining friendly relations between
Pakistan and Iran, it was held that the grounds fell outside the purview of S. 3
of the Yf.P. Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, I960, under which the order
was passed and, as such, the detention order was illegal,. It was pointed out
that, with respect to matters relating to "preventive detention for reasons
connected with defence or external affairs of Pakistan^ the Central Legislature
had exclusive power to make laws. A Provincial Statute, like that under which
action was taken, cannot and does not have these matters as its objects. The
objects of S.3 of the Y7.P. Maintenance of Public Ofcder 0rdinance,1960, are
acts or activities which are "prejudicial" to the "public safety and maintenance
of public orderIr The activities of the detenu mentioned in the grounds were
prejudicial to the defence and external affairs of Pakistan, which cannot be said
2
to be within the fourview of S.3 of the aforesaid Ordinance.
In another case, where the petitioner was detained on the ground that 
he had made speeches in which he criticised the President, after citing certain 
instances of "his hands being strengthened " and exhorted people by saying " we 
wish those hands should be broken" and also criticized the police force for 
indulging in tyranny, it was held that the grounds which were communicated to 
the detenu were beyond the purview of S.3 (l) of the IV.P. Maintenance of Public 
Order Ordinance, I960, as those speeched did not amount to incitement to create 
hatred and contempt for the G-overnment established by law or to commit
1. See Third Schedule to the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962.
2. Rahmat Elahi V. Gowt. of W.P. P.L.D. 1965 Lah. 112.
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” prejudicial acts” as contemplated by the Statute. According to S.3 (l) of 
the W.P. Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, I960, the acts which would 
justify the detention are the acts which are ”prejudicial to the public safety 
and maintenance of public order”. Hence any activity which threatens the public 
safety and the maintenance of public order, attracts the operation of S.3(l) of 
the aforesaid Ordinance. On the examination of the speeches made by the 
petitioner, the Court ccame to the conclusion that there was no direct or 
casual connection between them and the maintenance of public ordrr, neither had 
such speeches of the petitioner created a breach of public order in the past nor 
was there any threat to the maintenance of public order in future. It was further 
observed that, in order to get at the intention of the speaker, the central theme 
of the speeches, their objects and circumstances in which they v/ere made, should 
be considered. As, in the present case, the petitioner was making speeches 
in connection with an election compaign and was anxious to win the electorate . .
to his side, by criticizing the policies of those who were in power, he simply 
wished to introduce the mainfesto of the Opposition in his propaganda campaign. 
Such political activities should not be interfered with, unless thqy transgress 
the limits imposed by the various laws, purporting to establish the security 
of the State and the maintenance of law and order, as every citizen of 
Pakistan has the rigfrt to freedom of speech subject to reasonaltorestrictions 
under the Constitution. The test laid down for adjudging whether a particular 
speech was likely to incite the commission of ”prejudicial actd”, as contemplated 
by various laws, however, is that they should be proved to be likely to create 
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil^
1. Farid Ahmad V. Govt, of "WiPak# P.L.D. 19^5 Lah.see^'also, Arthur Terminiello 
V. City of Chicago, 337 U.S.l; American Communication V.Douds, 31+ 0 U.S.260* 
Dirk De Jonge V. State of Orgegon, 229 U.S.333,336. *
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Nearly the same observation was made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, In 
Province of East Pakistan V. Tofazzal Husain; the court said that, to determine 
whether a particular speech was itself an incitement to hatred and contempt for 
the Government established by law and whether the publication of that speech 
constituted a Mprejudicial report" in the sense that it had the effect of 
inciting tbs commission of a "prejudicial acts", as contemplated by S.7 of the 
East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, it is important to "consider the v;hole 
speech, to determine its scope, and to analyse the directions into which it 
was designed to guide the minds and actions of the audience. The law would, 
however, not begin to apply, unless the words used were in themselves of a 
character that would bring about, in the minds of the audience, a strong 
revulsion of feeling against the established Government, so that a state of 
active contempt for it would be created. As the Government failed to show that 
the speeches in question were calculated to produce any such effect, it must be 
declared that the grounds were irrelevant to the objects of the Statute^ If 
the grounds furnished to the detenu were the printing and distribution of posters, 
allegedly containing material "prejudicial to the public order" but on the 
examination of the Court, the contents of the posters were found to be a sort 
of Election Manifestos on behalf of the combined Opposition Parties against a 
candidate of the Ruling Party and not such as to be likely to incite the 
general public to commit acts of violence or cause a breach of law and order, 
the detention order would be void. 2t was held that the grounds were not 
relatable to the purposes of preventive detention under S.3 of the V/est
IT P.L.D.19^5 Sit'. 520.
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Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, i9 6 0 }
The membership of a particular party cannot be a valid ground 
for detention, in as much as it cannot be said to be relevant to the purposes 
of any preventive detention law. 'Jlhere the grounds simply stated that the 
detenu was associated with and was a member of the Communist Party of Pakistan 
but they did not disclose ary particular activity on the party of the detenu 
nor did they reveal any particular objective or activity of the Communist Party 
it was held that the grounds were irrelevant to the objects of S. 3 (l) (b) of the 
Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. It was, ho7/efer, observed that a member of the 
Communist Party may be presumed to have a certain ideology, but merely holding 
certain views cannot possibly affect the security of Pakistan. It is well 
established that the Court can examine the grounds, to see if they are relevant 
to the object, which the legislation has in view and for which detention has 
been ordered, the safety of the State in particular, because satisfaction in
this connection must be grounded on material, which is of rational operative
, 2value.
The question whether membership of a particular party can be a 
relevant ground for the detention of a person has benn considered in various 
Indian cases. In Nek Muhammad V. Province of Bihar, the question was whether 
membership of the R.S.S. or the Muslim League National Guard could be a 
relevant ground for detention. The high court observed that, in the absence of 
ary indication of the nature of the activities and particulars thereof, the
grounds that the detenu belonged to a particular party and participated in its
1* Abuz'ar V. Province of West Pakistan P.L.^.1960 Kar.260.
2; Hasan Nasir V. Crown P.L.D. 1953 Sind 37; see also Rahmat Elahi V. Govt, 
of West Pak P.L.D. 1 9 6 5  Lah 112*
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activites, must be held to be no grounds at all under S*4 of the impugned Act 
which is equivalent to S.6 of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952 - . In R.L.
Reddy V. Provincial G-overnment the question before the court was whether 
membership of the Communist Party of India, which had not been declared unlawful,
i
without anything else, could prima facie attract the provisions of the Act under 
which the detention order was made. The reply was Returned in the negative 
and it was held that mere membership of the Communist Party, apart from ary
specific prejudicial activity*1, could not prima facie attract the provisions
2of the Act and the detention would be illegal. In Har Tirath Singh V. The Crown, 
the grounds, interalia, stated that the detenue had communist views. It was 
held that merely holding certain views or being a member of a particular party 
could not be a relevant ground for detention under the impugned statute, unless 
it was shown that the activities of the detenu fell under the purview of the 
Statute.-^
The grounds should conform to the objects of the particular section 
of the statute under which the order is passed. If an order is made under a 
particular section and the grounds actually correspond to the purposes of 
another section, the grounds cannot be said to be relevant .V/here an order of 
detention was passed by the Provincial Government under S./£L of East Pakistan 
Public Safety Ordinance, 1958, and it was found that the grounds were not 
relatable or relevant to the objects of S.41 but related to the purposes laid 
down by S. 17 of the aforesaid Ordinance, it was held that it was not a proper
T T  A.I.R.1949 Pat. 1 — —
2. A.I.R. 1949 Nag. 146; see also Kalamoni uMohanty V. State A.I.R. 1951 Orissa 20 
J>. A.I.R. 1950 (East) Punj. 222; see also In re Rajdhar Kalu Pa til A.I.R.1948
Bom 334.
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order,as envisaged by S.4l; it should have been made under S.17 of the 
Ordinance^.
All the grounds should be relatable to the purposes of the Statute
under which the order of detention is made; if one of the grounds supplied
to the detenu falls outside the purview of the objects contemplated by the
Statute, then the order must in its entirety, be declared illegal. Where one
of the three grounds was that the detenu threatened the Head Master of a
particular school for removing the manuscripts and objectionable posters, from I
the school premises, it was held that, as the foresaid ground, which in itself
could not be a valid ground for detention, could not be dissociated and isolated
from the other two grounds, in a&mueh as there was nexus linking all three
grounds, namely, the presidential election, and as that ground did not bonform
to the objects of S.17 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance,1958,
under which the order was made, the defeat of that ground would render the
detention order illegal in toto. It was further observed that the vision
presented by the grounds was inconsistent with the objects of the Ordinance
as the activities mentioned therein, for the most part were of a criminal
2 !nature and were much too limited to be likely to create public disorder • j
Similary in Mahboob Anan v. Government of East Pakistan it Was observed that,
when a detaining authority gives general grounds for detaining a man, and |
out of these grounds, one or more, but not all, grounds are beyond the scope
and ambit of the Statute authorising detention, the detention will be illegal,
/unless such ground or grounds are of an
1. Mukhtear Ali v. Province of East Pakistan,P.L.D.1965iDac.277*
2. Abdul Qayyum v. Govt, of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1967* Dac.268.
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insignificant and unessential nature . Where the grounds, inter alia, were 
that the detenu and the member of his family had been smuggling articles 
into Pakistan from outside and had been flooding the local market with such 
articles, which had been banned by the Government, and, as such, their 
activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies to the 
community, it was held that their detention was illegal, in as much as 
detention for their smuggling activities was not contemplated by the concerned 
statute, the Sind Maintenance of Public Safety Act, 19^8• It was, however, 
observed that ’smuggling” includes both smuggling out and smuggling in and in 
so far as they were smuggling in, their activities could not be said to be, 
in any way, ’prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies in Pakistan, 
as contemplated by the Act, on the contrary it increased, though illegally, 
the supply of articles in Pakistan. Their activities might be anti-social or
anti-national or whatever one chose to call it, but they certainly did not
I 2come within the purview of law, as envisa^l 3*3 of the aforesaid Act •
The words ’reasonably suspects’ in S.^l of the East Pakistan Public 
Safety Ordinance, 1958,r.20*f of the Defence of Pakistan Rules,1965 and r.129 
of the Defence of India Rules, which authorise a police officer, not less in 
rank than an inspector, to arrest a person whom he ’reasonably suspects" of
1. P.L.D.1959 Dac.77^; See also Keshav Talpade v. Emperor,A.I.R.19^3»F.C.l;
Rajdhar v. Patil,A.I.R.,19^8,Bom.33^; Eayaz Ali v. D.M.Kanpur,A.I.R.19^9*
All.138; M.R.S.Mani v. S.M.Mathural,A.I.R.1930,Mad.162; Harinath Singh
v. Crown,A.I.R.1950.Punj.222; Sibban Lai v. State of U.P.,A.I.R.15^ SC.179;
See also Dwar Kadas Bhatia v. State of «L.& K.A.I.R.1957iSp l6*f; and
Mohammad Ali v. Crown,P.L.D. 1950 F.C.1
2. Abdullah v. Crown P.L.D.1955 sind 384-; see also Misrilal and others,
A.I.R.1951, Pat.13^.
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having done, or of doing, or being about to do acts prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public safety, do not mean that there must, be grounds, beyond 
doubt, for such apprehension* Whether the suspicion of the police officer was 
reasonable is a justifiable question. The arresting officer, therefore, had to 
prove that he entertained the suspicion against the detenu on reasonable grounds
The words "other particulars”1 in the expression 1 the communication to
the detenu of the grounds on which the csder is made as well as other particulars
in S*4 of the Sind Maintenance of Public Safety Act, 1952, signifies, it 7/as
observed, that particulars of the grounds of detention should be communicated to
the detenu. It was further observed that, in enjoining the communication of
particulars to the detenu, the legislature has sought to ensure that the right
and opportunity of the detenu to make representation against the detention
order is a substantial and real one, and that it is not impaired and rendered
ineffectual by the generality of the terms in which the communication is
couched. The term ”particulars” connotes facts on which the grounds are based}
The facts which are necessary to make theeffective representation possible
and which it is not against the public interest to disclose, should be stated,
because all facts except those, which are against public interest,should be 
2
disclosed.
The meaning of the word ”grounds" was considered by the Allahbad 
High Court. It 7/as observed that "grounds” do not merely mean the conclusions 
or abstract reasons for the action taken. Besides the conclusions arrived at,
1. Covt of East Pak. V. Rowshan Supra.
2. Sardaiu V. Crown Supra; Mohd. Anwar V. Govt of West Pak. Supra.
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they comprehend the basis and reasons for those conclusions and so include the 
facts on which those conclusions or reasons are basedJ’ A similar view was taken
p
by the Calcutta High Court. The above observations find support from two 
decisions of the Supreme'Court of India. It was observed that a detenu should 
have particulars ”as full and adequate as the circumstances permit”, so as to 
enable him to make an effective representation against the order of detention^ 
The Sind High Court observed that the word 1 ground” has as one of its meaning” 
a premise, reason or collection of data, upon which anything is made to rely 
for cogency or validity, as facts are the grounds of scientific theory or belief'
The detaining authority, while furnishing grounds for detention, is required to
state the facts, on account of which he is satisfied that the detention is 
necessary in the interest of the security of the State, or the maintenance of 
public order, or any spatter connected with the objects of detention law. The 
only privilege a detaining authority can claim against disclosure of facts, is 
on grounds of public interest. If no facts at all leading to the detention of 
a person are mentioned in the grounds which are furnished to him, then 
obviously the intention underlying the enactment of Art.22 of the Constitution
‘ c:
of India - Right Mo.2 of the Constitution of Pakistan - will be frustrated.
The detenu has a right to ask for "additional grounds”, if he thinks 
that the grounds furnished to him, are insufficient to enable him to bake an 
effective representation. The detaining authority can also furnish
1. Inder Prakash V. Emperor, A.I,R. 1949 All. 41,
2. Safatullah Khan V. Chief Secretary, A.I.R.1951 Cal.194*
3. State cf Bom. V. Atma Ram, Supra; and Ram Krishna V. State ofGQelhi A*X.R.
4. Mohd. Ahmad V. Crown, P.L.D.1935 Sind. 73* Scolo
5« In re Pandurang Kashin ath More A.I.R.1951 Bom. 30.
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”supplementary grounds”, if it is found that the grounds formerly communicated 
to the detenu, v/ill not be adequate and sufficient to enable him to make the 
representation. Furnishing nsupplemental grounds” does not mean that the 
detaining authority can derive new conclusions from the earlier facts, because 
it is incumbent on the detaining authority to furnish all the necessary 
information or relevant grounds to the detenu in the first instance which led 
to its satisfaction, subject to the reservation of such facts whose disclosure 
is against public interest. The expression ”supplementary grounds” connotes 
that there should not be new conclusions from facts but ”additional facts” in 
support of old conclusions, which were not available or were not given in the 
first instance,. It will be against the spirit cf Art. 22 of the Indian 
Constitution - Right No. 2 of the Constitution of Pakistan - if new conclusions
1
from facts are allowed to oe added to justify the detention at a later stage. 
TJhere the detenu was previously detained by the order of a District Magistrate 
but the period of detention was extended by the order of State Government, it
was held that he was entitled to claim that fresh grounds of detention should
2
be furnished to him*
The detenu should be enabled not only to make an effective 
representation but he should have the earliest opportunity to make the 
representation. It is required by the Constitution that grounds of detention 
should be furnished to the detenu ”as soon as may be”. The expression ” as soon 
as may be” must be considered with reference to the circumstances of a 
particular case. The question whether the grounds had been furnished to the
detenu ”as soon as may be” is question of fact, which depends upon the
1. State of Bombay V. Atraa Ram. Supra.
2. Fasal Ahmad Gha zi V. State P.L.D. 1957 Kar. 191. 
see also Murat Patwa V. Crown A.I.R.1948 Pat. 135*
300
particular circumstances of each case. It was observed that the expression
oonnotes that the detaining authority should, as early as possible, enable
the detenu, by furnishing the grounds of detention, to make an early
representation to the authority concerned. Where the question before the Court
was whether the delay of two months in communicating the grounds of detention,
was such as to lead to an inference that it was in keeping with the spirit of
words "as soon as may be" as provided by S. 3 (5-A) (i) of the Baluchistan
Public Safety Regulation, 1947 or clauses (l) and (5) of Art,7 of the
Constitution of Pakistan, 1 9 5 6 , it was observed that it was difficult to read
the words "as soon as may be" to mean an indefinite period; as contended on
behalf of the G-overnment; the delay was held violative of spirit of the 
1
Constitution,
There the grounds of detention were not communicated, until the
notice by the Court was served on the respondent, after the detenu had
approached the Court for habeas corpus it was held that the delay contravened 
tu.
the Constitional as well as the Statutory provisions, which require that the
* * 2
grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu "as soon as nay be"'.
The grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu normally 
within twenty-four hours. The words "as soon as may be" have nearly the same 
meaning in cl.(9 ) as in cl, (l) of Art, 7 of the Constitution of 1956. The 
grounds on which the detaining authority makes the order of detention should 
be known to it on the day when the order is made and should be served on the 
detenu, along with the detention order, unless some extra - ordinaiy
circumstances render it impossible, Where the grounds were communicated
T.Ghulamuilah Khan. V.D.LI. P.L.D. 1 9 6 7  Pesh. 195.
2. Ibid
301
sixteen days after the detention, without any reasonable excuse, it was held
that the order of detention was illegal. The case is, however, distinguishable
from the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Tarapada De V, State of West
Bengal, in which a delay of sixteen days was held not to be violative of the
constitutional requirementunder the circumstances of the case'i The delay in
that case resulted from the fact that the Provincial G-overnment had to deal
with a large number of detention cases, a hundred or more, in one day# But
the delay in the aforesaid case resulted from an ordinaiy negligence on the part
of detaining authority* It was, therefore, held that it could not be allowed
3
to : €vade.,a constitutional guarantee# The Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, 
requires that the grounds for a fresh order of detention should be 
communicated to the detenu within fifteen days of receipt of the decision of 
the Advisory Board, by the detaining authority# Where the communication 7/as 
not made within fifteen days, it was held that the fresh order of detention was 
illegal* It was, however, observed that to know the grounds of detention on the 
day of detention, or within twenty-four hours; or, as required by the aforesaid 
•Act, within fifteen days of the detention, is the right of the detenu* It is 
the protection guaranteed to the detenu against the restraint on his personal 
liberty# A contravention of such constitutional requirement for the protection 
of personal liberty, is a denial of one of a few and extremely valuable rights 
of the detenu^ " The time taken in furnishing the grounds for detention must 
be a reasonable time, reasonable in the circumstances of each case. It is 
impossible to lay down a definite and unchallengeable yardstick, by which the
1# MuZaffaruddin V# Crown P.L.D. 1 9 5 0  Kar. 6 8  
2 , A.I.R.1951 S.C.174 
3* Muzaffarnddin V. Crown Supra#
4. Abdul Sanaa V. State P.L.D.1963 Kar.833.
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court must judge as to whether the time taken in a particular case was
reasonable or not?- The words "as scon as may be" must be interpreted as
2
meaning "with reasonable promptitude in the circumstances of the case; 
or "as soon as is reasonable" in the circumstances of each case^
Non-Disclosure of Facts in the Public Interest
The proviso to cl.(5) of Right No. 2. empowers the authority making
the order of preventive detention to refuse to disclose facts which such
authority considers it to be against public interest to disclose. This seems
hard to reconcile with the rule that a full disclosure of the grounds for
detention is imperative^- However the distinction between the terms "grounds"
and"facts" renders the proposition less difficult,* It was pointed out that
"grounds" are the conclusions drawn from the detenu’s activities and intentions,
as ascertain from the information to the detaining authority, whereas "facts"
are particulars in the information supporting the groundsJ all the grounds
must be disclosed but facts the disclosure of v/hich the detaining authority
5
considers to be against public interest, may be withheld by it. In another
case it was observed that "grounds" are the conclusions and "facts" are the
£
evidence on v/hich the conclusions are based.
All grounds should be communicated to the detenu but it is not
required by law that "all the material facts in possession of G-overnment should
1* In re Pandurang Kashinath More A.I.R.1951 Bom.30.
2 . In re Maganlal A.I.R.1951 Bom. 3 3 .
3* State of Bombay V. A'tma Ram, Supra.
4. See Cl.(5) of Right No.2. Constitution of Pak; 1962*
5. Bombay V. Atma Ram, A.I.R. 1951 S.C.157.
6 * Safatuilah Khan V. Ch. Sec. A.I.R.1951 Cal*194 see also Fazle Karim V.G-ovt
of E.Pak (1956) D.L.R* 700; and Govt of E.P.V.Rawshan,Supra.
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be embodied in the grounds to be served"; not all facts, but only those
2
whose disclosure are against the public interest may be withheld*
To justify refusal to disclose the evidence or facts in its 
possession, a detaining authority has to claim an absolute privilege against 
its production under the aforesaid proviso to Right No 2 (b)* As regards the 
privilege so claimed, two questions are involved; firstly,whether the evidence, 
in respect of v/hich privilege is claimed, is one relating to the affairs of 
the State; and secondly, whether the disclosure would be against the public 
interest. The question whether evidence withheld is concerned with "affairs 
of the State” is a matter for the Court to rule on, though there is always 
presumption under S.114- of the Evidence Act, in favour of the legality of the 
order passed by the detaining authority being regulary informed in exercise of 
the power delegated to him by the Central or Provincial Government; however, 
this presumption is optional and even its probative force depends upon the
3
circumstances of each case.
The test was laid down in L.C.Duncan V.Camaelj# Laid & Co. As regards
the privileged thus claimed, it was pointed out that,
"The principle to be applied in every case is that the document 
otherwise relevant and liable to production must not be produced if 
the public interest requires that it should be withheld. This test 
maybe found satisfactory either (a) by having regard to the contents 
of the particular document, or (b) by the fact that the document 
belongs to a class which on the ground of the public interst,must 
as a class be withheld from production".
1. ibid, Fazle Kariis Case Supra.
2* Govt of E.P.V. Rowshan, Supra.
3* Hussain Ali Chagla V.D.IvI. Supra.
(1542) A.c.624.
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While it is entirely for the authority to claim privilege and
the Court is bound to allow that claim, it does not follow from this that the
Court is not entitled, according to the circumstances of each particular case,
to draw an inference adverse to the party claiming privilege"; If the authority
2
fails to produce evidence in, his possession, adverse inference can be drawn .
It was held by the Indian Supreme Court that the discretion to 
withhold the evidence is with the authority^ It can only be challenged on 
grounds of rrtqla fides*
The Federal Court of Pakistan pointed out that the presumption, under
the aforesaid S.114, applies to all cases and cases of preventive detention
cannot be excHuded from the operation of the presumption. It is, of course,
open to the detenu to point to any material on the record to show7 that, even if
the presumption has to be made, It has been sufficiently rebutted. If he can
point to any suspicious circumstances,., it would be open to Court in a
particular case to hold that the presumption should not be made and the Crown
should be called upon to prove that the officer ordering detention had
L
sufficient reasons to pass the order.
It was observed in Governor-Ceneral-in-Council V* Pir Mohd. Khuda 
Baksh that the Court can hold an enquiry into the validity of the objection 
that the document does not relate to the affairs of the State. It is, never­
theless, true that, once the Court comes to the conclusion that the document
1. Mohan Singh V. Emperor, A.I.R.1940 Lah. 217,
2. Azad J.&K.V.Omar Shad P.L.D. 1 9 6 4  Azad J.A JC«1.
3* Sharma Rao Vishnu Parulker V.D.M* Thana (1956) S.C.R.644*
4. Mohd. Hayat V. Crown. P.L.D.1951 F.C.15.
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relates to the affairs of the State, the decision of the authority to give 
or withhold permission to its production must he accepted as final^
It is imperative that the authority claiming privilege, in respect of 
any document or evidence, should have gone through it and satisfied himself as 
to the contents of such document; otherwise it cannot he said that he has applied 
his mind to each part of the document. Thus, in a case where privilege was 
claimed by the Additional Chief Secretary, G-overnment of West Pakistan with 
regard to entire office file and it was evident that only a few documents out 
of the file were put before him, and on them only he had formed the opinion 
that it was a fit case in v/hich the detention order ought to be passed against 
the detenu, it was observed that ”it is to be deplored that, without knowing 
the contents of remaining documents on the file and without even applying his 
mind to them , the Additional Chief Secretary should have ventured to claim 
privilege in respect of the whole file. In order to claim privilege the 
authority should have gone through the whole file pertaining to the matter. It 
is not propei’ for him to consider the particular documents put before him 
and claim privilege for the whole record or file ”• The privilege was,
O
therefore, not allowed.
3Until G-hulam Jilani’s case was decided, Pakistan Courts, like Indian 
Courts, following the English tradition,leaned in favour of the presumption of
validity of the privilege claimed by the detaining authority against the
1. A.I.R.1950 Punj. 228. see also Robinson V. South Australia,A.I.R. 1931*4.C.25ty
and Crown V. Abdul G-hani, P.L.D.1955 Lah.39.
2. Begum Sardar S.M.Hayat V. Govt, of TC.P.,P.L.D.1969 Lah.985 see also Chandra
Dhar Tewari V. Dy.Commr. Luck Now, A.I.R. 1939 oudh 6 5 .
5. . Supra.
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disclosure of certain facts or evidence in the public interest. The ruling of
the High Court in Ghulam Ali V. Abdul A z i and Nasim Fatina V. G-overnment
2 3'of W.Pak. which was based on English Judgements that, if an objection is taken
in the proper form, by a detaining authority under the proviso to clause (5)
of Right No.2 against the production of evidence on the ground that it relates
to affairs of the State, it is conslusive, and the onus lies on the detenu to
rebut it.?, then the Court is left with no say in the matter. This was reversed
by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ghulam Jilanis case; the plea of privilege
taken by the West Pakistan Government was disallowed. It was pointed out that
the Central Government's instructions to the authority reviewing cases of
detention under r.32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1963, against which the
privilege was claimed, had already been shown to detenus and exhibited in the
it
case before the High CourtJ/could not constitute "affairs of the State’}* on the 
contrary as a result of these circumstances, the instructions had become an 
"affair of Justice," and as such the privilege was disallowed.
The wuestion was thoroughly considered and answered in Abdul 13a 
Baluchis case, in which the privilege was claimed against the disclosure of 
certain facts, by the West Pakistan Government. It was observed that, by the 
decision in Ghulam JilamTs case, it has been established, that the detaining 
authority must place before a Court the material upon which it so claims to have 
been satisfied, so that the Court can, in the discharge of its duty under Art.
98 (2) (b) (i), be in turn satisfied that the detenu is not being held without
l7 P.L.D.1962 Lah. 7^ 5.
2. Supra.
3« See Duncan V. Canunell, Supra.
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lawful authority or in an unlawful manner, and the wording of clause (b)
(.i) of Art.98 (2) shows that, not only the jurisdiction but also the 
manner of the exercise . of that jurisdiction is subject to
judicial review; if this function is to be discharged in a judicial manner, 
then it is necessary that the Court should have before it the materials up0n 
which authority might have purported to act. If any such material is of a 
nature that privilege can be claimed, then it would be for the Court to decide 
whether the evidence concerned Is really so privileged. The privilege, 
therefore, was disallowed. On the examination of the evidence concerned by 
the Supreme Court, the onus being on the detaining authority to prove that 
it was so privileged, it was found that it was not so privileged as it did 
not relate to ft affairs of State”
Depending upon the circumstances of each case, the Court can under 
S.114 (-) of the Evidence Act, make a presumption as to the validity of the 
privilege claimed by the detaining authority under proviso toC 1.(5) of R.No2^ 
from the terras of the order itself when the order, on the face of it, is
regular and unobjectionable in any way. In this connection it was observed in
Emperor V. Sibnqth Banerji.that:
1 It is auite different thing to question the accuracy of recital
contained in a duly authenticated order, particularly where the
recital purports to state as a fact the carrying out of a condition 
necessary to the valid making of that order. In the normal course 
the existence of such a recital in a duly autheticated order, will, in 
the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by a 
Court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled. The 
presence of the recital in the order will place a different burden on 
the detenu to produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish even 
in a prima facie case that the recital is not accurate,"2
1. Abdul Baqi Baluch V* Govt, of 1V.P* Supra.
2. A.I.R.1943 E.C.73 - see also Eohd Hayat V. Crown P.L.D.
1951 B.C.13; Sharma Rao Vishnu V.D.M. Thana Supra.
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The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in support of its arguments in
A
Ghulam Jilam* s case, reproduced the following remarks from the judgement
2
of the Privy Council in Vimlabai Deshpande*s case;
nIn their Lordships* opinion, therefore, the High Court was right 
in holding that the burden lay on the police officer to satisfy the 
court that his suspicions were reasonable and it is plain that on 
the evidence he had not discharged that burden”♦
and commenting on this the Supreme Court has observed that the Jidicial
Co mmittee felt no hesitation in holding that there was an onus on the police
officer to satisfy the Court that he had reasonable grounds for his suspicion*
But from these observations of the Supreme Court it cannot be inferred that the
3
view of the law in Sibnath Banerji*s ease in respect of the aforesaid privilege 
has been overruled*
The court may not allow the privlege claimed by the detaining
authority and enquire into the document or evidence concerned, only when the
mala,fides of the detaining authority has been pleaded by the detenu and
supported/evidence. As to the scope of enquiry, it was observed in Abdul
Ba^i Baluch*s case that it is not to be turned into a paving enquiry, permitting
the detenu to hunt for some ground to support his case of Mala fides nor
should an enquiry be launched merely on the basis of vague and indefinite
allegations. Mala fides must be pleaded with particularity and once one kind
7
of mala fides is alleged, the detenu should not be allowed to adduce proof ofK
L.
any other kind of mala fides*
1. Supra*
2. A.i.k.1946 P.O.12.
309
It was pointed by the Supreme Court in Govt, of Pak. V.Begum 
A.A.K. S.Kashmiri that it must be remembered that initially the onus is on 
the detaining authority to justify the detention by establishing the legality 
of his action*'*' for under principles of English Law, which have been adopted 
in the legal system of Pakistan, also, the presumption is that eveiy 
imprisonment without trial and conviction is prima facie unlawful, and it 
is only then that onus shifts on the detenu to show mala fides# Again having 
regard to the fact that, in such cases, materials upon v/hich the relief is 
based, will be mainly in the special knowledge of the detaining authority and 
not to the detenu; S.106 of the Evidence Act itself would'require the detaining 
authority to discharge this burden. The contention that the detaining authority 
may avoid doing so by claiming privilege under proviso to cl.(5) of R.No.2 - 
S.123 of the Evidence Act omits to take into account that even where such a
claim is preferred, 3.162 of the Evidence Act gives the Court abundant power to 
inspect the document or the evidence in order to determine the validity of the 
claim of privilege. The privilege is indeed h narrow one, as pointed out by
3
Lord Blanesburgh in the case of Henry Green Robinson V. State of South Australia
and it is lawful for the Court to inspect the document or evidence for the
purpose of deciding that the privilege is not being claimed inadvisedlyor lightly
4or as a matter of routine.
V
It is submitted that, according to the doctrine of "objective satisfacticn 
the inititial onus lies on the detaining authority to show that he was in fact
1. Ghulam Jilam1s case supra.
2. See Liversidge V. Anderson, Supra, Per Lord Atkin.
3. A.I.R.1931 P.O.254.
4. Supra.
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satisfied about the necessity of the detention of the detenu before the order
was passed; it indeed is a condition precedent before the detaining authority
can claim privilege under proviso to cl.(b) of R.No*2. But depending on the
circumstances of the particular case, the presumption will have to be in
favour of the validity of the privilege c3.aimed by the detaining authority,
and the onus will be shifted on the detenu to show mala fides on evidence,
1
if duly authenticated and a regular order of detention is produced*
1. Begum S*S*M* Hayal V. Govt of 1UP. Supra*
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CHAPTER 8.
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND PERSONAL LIBERTY:
Right No*3 of the 1962 Constitution - Art 11 of the 1956 Constitution 
- guarantees to every citizen of Pakistan, subject to the reasonable restrict­
ions imposed by law in the public interest, the right to move freely through­
out Pakistan and to reside and settle in any part thereof* The purpose behind 
this safeguard is to remove territorial barriers within the country. It is 
designed to be a check against provincialism, regional discrimination and all 
parochial considerations. To a citizen of Pakistan the whole of his country, 
the East and West, is his cherished home, freely and equally, accessible to 
him . Like Art. 19 (l)(d) and (e) of the Indian Constitution right No.5 
emphasizes that the whole of Pakistan is one unit, so far as the citizens 
of Pakistan are concerned, they can freely move from and settle in any palce 
in an part of Pakistan. The right can be restricted only in accordance with a 
law which imposes reasonable restrictions in the public interest; it makes 
available to the citizens of Pakistan the right to be treated in accordance 
with law, guaranteed by Art. 2 of the 1962 Constitution. The right affords 
protection against unreasonable restriction on the freedom of movement and 
residence and protection against unreasonable internment, externment or 
banishment•
1. See Abul Ala Mandomdiv. State Bank of Pakistan, P.L.D.1969* 
Lah.908.
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The right, though it affords protection against unreasonable 
curtailment or infringement of the liberty of movement of a citizen of 
Pakistan, does not contemplate the protection against deprivation of personal 
liberty guaranteed to every person, whether a citizen of Pakistan or alien 
under right No.l. Professor Gledhill has, therefore, observed that the 
right is independent of and in addition to the right to personal liberty; 
it is a protection against parochialism and provincialism • It does not also 
include the freedom of universal locomotion.
2
Mohd. Akram J. in Abul Ala Maikdoodi v. State Bank of Pakistan , 
wrongly it is submitted, observed that freedom of locomotion is part of the 
personal liberty of the people; Fundamental Right No. 5 affords protection 
to freedom of movement, but Right No.l is more extensive in application to 
all persons and is in the nature of a safeguard for the personal liberty, 
jus personarum in the people. In Pakistan, the personal liberty of a person 
is guaranteed to him under Right No.l and, as a necessary corollary following 
from it, he also enjoys the undeniable right, vested in him, to go abroad for 
travel and to return to his country, subject, of course, to reasonable 
restrictions imposed by law. For coming to the conclusion he relied on the
3
decision in Kent v. Dulles , in which it was held that the right to travel 
aboud is a part of the ‘liberty*, of which a citizen cannot be deprived with­
out the *due process of law*, in accordance with the Vth Amendment. A 
citizen's right of exit can be regulated only pursuant to the law...*
1. See Prof. A. Gledhill, India, p.189; see also Gopalan v. State of Mad.
Supra.
2. Supra.
3* Supra.
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Similarly in Asserwathan v. Permanent Secretary , the Supreme Court of Ceylon
held that there should be no unreasonable restrictions placed on a person's
freedom of movement and clearance to go abroad* He further relied on the
2
judgement in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. A.P.0*New Delhi . In this case, Subbaroa, 
C.J. expressing the majority view, held that a person in India enjoys the 
fundamental right to travel abroad. In this connection the Court observed 
that "the want of a passport prevented a person from leaving India, and the 
Government, by withholding such passport, deprived him of his right to travel 
abroad. This right was one which every person in India, whether a citizen or 
not, enjoyed., No person should be deprived of this right to travel, except 
according to the procedure established by law. There existed no law made 
by the State regulating or depriving persons of the right to travel, the 
petitioner should not be deprived of his right to go abroad. It is submitted 
that the majority view expressed by the Indian Supreme Court is not tenable.
It seems that Mohd. Akram J. when citing the aforesaid authorities, 
failed to take the notice of the minority judgement in Satpvant Singh Sawhney*s 
case delivered by Hitayatullah J., as he then was, which appears to be 
comprehensive and correct. He observed that a person is ordinarily entitled 
to a passport unless, for reasons which can be established to the satisfaction 
of the Court, the passport can be validly refused to him. Since an aggrieved 
party can always ask for mandamns, if he is treated unfairly, it is not
1. Reported on p.319* Journal of International Commission of Jurists,
Vol.No.2, Winter,1965 part.
2. A.I.R. 1967,S,C.I836; see also International Commission of Jurists,
Vol. VIII, December 1967* Part,No.2.
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permissible by straining the Constitution, to create an absolute and funda­
mental right to a passport, where none exists in the Constitution. There is 
no doubt a fundamental right to equality in the matter of granting a passport 
- subject to reasonable classification - but there is no fundamental right to 
travel abroad or to the grant of a passport. A passport is a political document 
The enactment of a law relating to passports will not make things better. Even 
if such a law were to be made , tfie position would hardly change, b e c a u s e  the 
discretion would have to be allowed to the issueing authority to decide upon 
the worth of an applicant. Where the passport authority is proved to be 
wrong, a mandamous will always set right the matter
It is further submitted that the minority view of Hitayatullah, J.,
is supported by the majority decision of the tndian Supreme Court in an earlier
2
case, Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. ; whereas the majority view expressed by
Subbarao, C.J.^has advanced the minority judgement in Kharak Singh*s case.
The above view of Hitayatullah <J.* -also finds support in the" Madras High
3
Court*s decision in V.C. Row v. State of Madras in which it was observed that 
the issue of a passport is the part of functioning of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, not open to judicial review by Courts. It was further point­
ed out that *a passport is a document enabling a citizen of a country to enter
another country.
1. Ibid, per Hitayatullah if.
2. A.I.E. 163, S,C.1295.
3. A.I.E. 1954 Mad. 240.
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Nor is it a document under which a citizen of a country is permitted to leave 
the country. By its terms it requires in the name of Sovereign, all those 
whom it may concern, to allow the bearer to pass freely, without let or hind­
rance and to afford hi?1 every assistance and protection, of which he may stand 
in need. In granting a passport the Government does not purport to exercise 
any power at all, but, by reason of its status as a sovereign State, it 
purports to request another Foreign State to give certain facilities to one 
of. its citizens. Such rights are recognised in a Sovereign State under all 
established rules of International law, and, therefore, the exercise of those 
rights cannot be impugned on the ground that a power, not found in the 
Constitution, has been exercised by the executive. No person has a legal 
right to obtain a passport to any particular country.”
The view expressed by Mohd.Gul J., differing from the opinion of 
Mohd.Akram J.^ iin Abul Ala Maiidootli v. State Bank of Pakistan, appears to be 
correct, and is in line with the observation of Hitayatullah J.,in the afore­
said case. He pointed out that Right No.5, which guarantees the freedom of 
movement, cannot be regarded as forming part of the general right to personal 
liberty guaranteed under Right No.l. He further observed that Right No.l comes 
under the caption 'security of person1, which stands in sharp contrast to the 
caption of Right No.5* which guarantees 'freedom of movement'. The word 
'security* in the caption is plainly used in the sense of protection, so as to 
guarantee freedom from physical restraint. The word 'deprived' in the operative 
part of the provision, which qualifies both 'life* and 'liberty' is equally
1. See also Manzoor Khan v. Govt.of Pakistan,P.L.D.1966,Pesh.29i and Abdul Ala 
Mandoodi v. State Bank of Pakistan, supra.
2. Supra.
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significant, Acoording to Blackstone's Commentaries 'deprivation* means 
total loss and, therefore, has not the same meaning as a restriction on free 
movement. What is sought to be protected by Right No.l is loss of life and 
personal liberty, that is to say, freedom from physical restraint of the person 
and from incarceration as distinguished from restriction or partial control of 
the right to move freely. It is true that 'liberty' is a very comprehensive 
term and in its widest sense, as held in Kent v. Dulles, might include 'freedom 
of locomotion' in any part of the world. But 'liberty' in Right No.l cannot be 
defined independently of 'life'. We have to interpret the word with-reference 
to the context in which it is found - according to the rules of the interpretat 
ion of Statutes. If the word 'liberty' in Right No.l is understood to compre­
hend, freedom of 'universal locomotion' in any part of the world, Right No.5, 
which guarantees freedom of movement to every citizen throughout Pakistan, 
would be a redundancy. In effect it would be a repetition of what has already 
been ordained in Right No.l, which is available to every person, citizen and 
alien alike. No such anomaly would arise if the word 'liberty' is understood 
in the sense of 'personal liberty* of the individual, that is to say, freedom 
from restraint or incarceration. This would be in accord with the principle of 
interpretation that a statute must be read as a whole, with a view to deter­
mining the intention of each part, and the conctruction must be uniform and 
harmonious^.
But this does not mean that a citizen of Pakistan has no right at all 
to leave his country. He can leave Pakistan, subject to any reasonable law, 
such as one providing for the grant .-of a passport or for foreign exchange,
1. Adbul -Ala Maudoodi v. State Bank of Pakistan, Supra; per Mohd.Gul;J.
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regulating his exit from Pakistan to travel abroad and re-enter Pakistan. A 
person, who has a valid passport and the requisite permission with regard to 
foreign exchange from the State Bank of Pakistan, can leave Pakistan to travel 
^}road •
In the instant case, the petitioner had a valid passport and also a
return ticket from an organisation is Saudi Arabia, but the requisite grant of
foreign exchange was refused by the State Bank of Pakistan. The only allegation
against the petitioner was that, on secret information received, the Government
had reason to believe that the petitioner, if allowed to go abroad, was likely
to receive funds and import the same into Pakistan, without allowing the funds
to be dealt with under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 19^7* At best,
according to the allegations, there had been some preparation but no direct
movement or overt act or attempt on the part of the petitioner to evade the
aforesaid Act. He did not appear to have committed any actionable wrong. The
Act, as it stands, does not take cognizance of the mere apprehension or even
the belief in the mind of the authority that the petitioner is likely to
1
commit an evasion of the Act, if allowed to go abroad • Therefore, it was 
pointed out that the petitioner could not be held guilty of any evasion, 
cognizable under S.8.(1) read with S.23 or any other provision of the Act.
1. See Ss 1 to 27 of the Foreign Exchange Act, 19^7, as well as S.19 of the 
Sea Customs Act which has been adopted in S.23 of the former Act. Under 
S.8(1), no person, shall except with the permission of the State Bank, 
bring or send into Pakistan, any gold or silver or any currency notes or 
Bank notes, whether Pakistani or Foreign. S.23 lays down the Penal 
provisions and says that whosoever contravenes....the Act, shall be liable 
to be tried by a Tribunal... and shall be punishable with imprisonment or 
fine or both. Under these provisions the respondents were empowered to 
act in anticipation and to refuse to issue the permission to go abroad 
on the ground that he was likely to commit an evasion of the Act in the 
foreign country.
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He was \ allowed to go abroad. As to the contention that due to the 
Proclamation of Emergency by the President in 19&5, Kight No. 5 stood 
suspended, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked to 
enforce the right; it was observed that no doubt Right No.5 remained 
suspended but not Right No. 1 which was available to the petitioner. It was, 
therefore, held that writ of habeas corpus would issue to enforce Right No 1 
under At.98 to protect the right to move freely. It is submitted that this is 
straining Right No. 1 to protect the freedom of movement guaranteed under 
Right No 5, in the sense discussed above. It seems that the period of emergency 
had become unnecessarily long and the High Courts remained unable to protect 
the people against the violation of those basic fundamental rights, which 
remained suspended, though conditions had long been normal. Hence, without 
ruling on the invalidity of the continuance of the State of emergency, the 
Courts went out of their way to prevent the violation of those rights* The 
proper attitude would have been to hold that, as the petitioner had not been 
treated in accordance with law, as envisaged by Art. 2, he had been illegally 
prevented from going abroad, and mandamous would have been issued to grant him 
suffieient foreign exchange.
Personal liberty, guaranteed by Right No 1 and protected by Right No.
2, is distinguishable from the freedom of movement guaranteed by Right No 5;
these two freedoms are entirely different concepts. Both punitive and
2preventive detent ions are thus outside the purview of Right No 5* But externment 
banishment and restriction to a particular area, which do not come within the 
scope of preventive detention, are within the purview of the right guaranteed by 
Right No. 5.
1. Abul Ala Maiidoodi V. State Bank of Pak. Supra.
2. N.B. Khare V. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1950 S.C.211.
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It has been pointed out that, as not all cases of detention fall within the 
purview of the clauses (l) and (2) or (3) to (3) of Art .7 of the 1956 
Constitution - Right No, 2 of 1962 Constitution - unreasonable restrictions on 
the freedom of movement or externment or restriction to a particular area would 
be protected by Art, 11 of the 1956 Constitution - Right No, 5 of the 1962 
Constitution^ The order of restriction within a particular area under S,5 of
the Prinjab Public Safety Act, 1949^, or under S. 6 of the Prinjab Control of
3
GoondasAct, 1951 > falls more appropriately within the purview of Ar,ll than 
within the scope of preventive detention dealt with in Art, 7 of the 1956 
Constitution, The restriction put on the freedom of movement under these sections 
are no doubt akin to those falling within the scope of preventive detention, but 
they do not certainly come within the purview of preventive detention; Art,ll would 
apply and not Art. 7 of the 1956 Constitution1'.
As to the question whether a person, deprived of his right of free 
movement or freedom of residence, can be regarded as being "detained" , TTharton's
Lav; Mexican affords an answer in the affirmative. It was held in Mohd.Aslam
6 7 37. Grown, Mohd. Umar V. Crown and Ghulam Haider Shah V. Sarkar, that restriction
to a particular area does not result in "detention" of the externee; the
meaning of "detention" was laid down to mean "locked up". But the.Lahore High 
TI Jumma Khan V.Pak. P.L.D. 1957 Kar. 339;
2, Rao Mahroz Akhtar V, D.M, Dera G-hazi, P,L.D. 1957 Lah, 676.
3, Bazal Ahmad Ayyubi’s case, Supra.
4« Jumma Khanfs case, Supra; Rao Mahroz Akhtar's case Supra; Bazal Ahmad 
Ayyubi’s case Supra;Abdul Quddus V. Ch. Commr. Kar, P.L.D.1956 Kar,533;
Lizi^Ahmad v D.M^P.L.D. .1958 Kar. 92; see also N. B. Khare V. St. of Delhi, 
A.I.R. 1950 S.C.211; Guayi Bachan Singh V. St. of Bomby, A.I.R. 1952 S.C.211, 
Gopalan V. St. of Madras, Supra;Ganga Ram V. Eim Ram Charan, A;%R, 1952 
S.C.9j Jesingh Bhai V. Emp. A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 363(?*B.) ; Ismail V.St.of Orissa, 
A.I.R. 1951 Orissa 86; Ibrahim Vazir V.St.of Bom. A.I.R.1954 S.C.229*
5. 14th ed. 1938 as reproduced in Chitaley's Cr.P.C., Vol III, 4th ed. p.2750
6. P.L.D. 1954 Lah. 720
7. P.L.D. 1955 Lah; 180.
8. P.L.D. 1959 Axad J & K. 15.
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Court, in Mohd. Anwac V. Covt. of W.F% overruling the principle laid down
in the aforesaid cases, held that restriction to a particular area amounts to
"detention” ; illegal externmerrt or restriction to a specified area was held
1
to be"unlawful detention". In coming to this conclusion, the High Court relied
2
on an earlier decision in Rao Mahroz Aktar's case. In that case the Division
Bench of the Lahore High Court pointed out that the judgement given by the
3
single judge in Mohd. Umar*s case did not lay down the law correctly. It was
Ip 5
further pointed out that the decisions in Mohd. Aslam* s case and Mohd Umar * s
case were made at a time when the Constitution of Pakistan, which for the
£
first time guaranteed the fundamental rights, had not come into force. It is 
submitted that the Lahore High Court was wrong in holding that an illegal 
externment or restriction to a particular area amounted to unlawful "detention". 
The proper attitude should have been that illegal restriction to a particular 
area, as laid down by the earlier decisions, cannot be held to mean unlawful 
"detention" so as to invoke the provisions of Right No. 2 Vbut it does certainly 
mean "wrongful deprivation of freedom of movement" as guaranteed by Right No.5 
of the 1962 Constitution; Habeas Corpus could have still issued to protect the 
wrongful deprivation of the freedom of movement. It is further submitted that 
this was the view which had been expressed by the Lahore High Court*s Division 
Bench in Rao Mahroz Akhafs case
J* ■■■.■. — ■ ■ 1 ■ I ■ mmmmrnrn
The question arises whether, in a case of preventive detention, the 
Right of freedom of movement and residence guaranteed by Right No. 5 is
1. P.L.D. 1963 Lah. 109.
2. Supra.
3. Supra
4* Supra
5. Supra. w
6. Mohd Afljar V. G-ovt of Y/.P. Supra;
v \
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involved♦ It was answered negatively in Province of E.Pakistan v* Roshan • But
if a law does not exclusively or expressly provide for preventive detention
and permits ad interim custody of a person for two months, which may or may not
be followed by a preventive detention order, it places a curb on the liberty of
the citizen to move about freely, as it does not guarantee the production of
citizen before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours or the communication to
him of the grounds of detention. It was, therefore, observed that, in this
sense, the E.P.Public Safety Ordinance,1950* and the order made thereunder
2
contravened Right No.5 •
As the V/.P.Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959* permits the imposition 
of restrictions on the movement of a citizen who has been declared a goonda and 
further authorises the restriction of his residence within a specified area,
it was pointed out that an element of preventive detention is there, but
3
it does not amount to preventive detention ; Right No.5 would apply. It is
submitted that this is the proper view which should have been adopted by the
k
Lahore High Court in Mohd.Anwar1s case; the Supreme Court has laid down the law 
correctly.
Right No.3 is not an absolute right; ’reasonable restrictions* can be 
imposed in the public interest on the freedom of movement of citizens by a 
relevant law. The expression ’reasonable restrictions* is also used to 
qualify the provisions of the Constitution regarding freedom of assembly, 
association and speech . It has been pointed out that a ’reasonable restricts 
ion* is one imposed with due regard to the public requirement, which it is
1. Supra; see also Gopalan v. State of Madras, Supra.
2. Govt, of E.Pakistan v. Rowshan, Supra.
3. Ghulam Ali Shah v. State, P.L.D,1970,SC.233* 
b. Supra.
3. See Professor A. Gledhill, Pakistan, p.203.
. 322
designed to meet; anything -which is arbitrary o± excessive will be outside the 
bounds of reason in the relevant regard. But in considering the disadvantage 
imposed upon the subject, in relation to the advantages which the public derives, 
it is necessary that the Court should have a clear appreciation of the public 
need, which is to be met. Where the statute prescribes a restraint upon an 
individual, the Court should consider whether it is a reasonable restriction, 
in the sense of not bearing excessively on the subject and at the same time being 
the minimum that is required to preserve the public interest"'•
Professor Gledhill suggests that the matter has to be examined from
the .standpoint of a reasonable man, considering whether the cure is worse than 
2
the disease • S.A.Rahman J. observes that it should be considered from the view
point of the nature of the right affected and the character of the restrictions
in question; the mischief sought to be suppressed and the circumstances in which
3
the restrictions are intended to be imposed would be the determining factor •
According to Hamoodur Rhahman J., as he then was, if the circumstances do not
demand such action or the action is disproportionate to the mischief to be
prevented and can be exercised without any check, then the restriction will be
4
entirely unreasonable ♦
Professor Gledhill points out that laws empowering the making of 
restrictions on movement come within the purviewr of Right N o . n°t the rights
1. East and West Steamship Co's case, P.L.D.1958,SC.A1
2. Op.cit p.203.
3. Abul Ala Maudoodi v. Govt.of '.V.Pakistan, P.L.D. 1964,SC.673
4. Ibid.
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relating to arrest and detention discussed above and their reasonableness
must be determined on a consideration of their procedural as well as their
1
substantive provisions * As Sec,5 of the Punjab Public Safety Act,1949 which
empowers the authority to intern a citizen of Pakistan, fails to provide for
communication of the grounds to the internee, so as to afford him an opportunity
to make a representation against the order, it was declared to be unreasonable
and inconsistent with Art. 11 of the 195& Constitution. It was observed that,
in assessing the reasonableness of the provisions of a statute, placing
restrictions on the free movement of a citizen, the substantive as well as the
procedural part of the law must be brought under scmtiny* Not only the nature
and the extent of the restrictions in question, but also the procedure by which
2
the final result is achieved must be reasonable .
Professor Gledhill has further observed that the laws usually impeach­
ed as repugnant to the right of free movement enable public authorities to 
restrict reputed criminals or political agitators to particular places or for- 
bid them to enter particular areas or to banish them * The Karachi (control 
of Disorderly Persons) Act, 1952, in so far as it authorises the authorities 
to make an order requiring a dangerously disorderly person to report periodic­
ally at a police station, was held not to be repugnant to Art. 11 of the 195&
Constitution, but to the extent that it empowers the authorities to banish him
4
for an indefinite period it was declared to be so repugnant •
1. Professor A. Gledhill, Pakistan,p.203.
2. Hao Mohroz Akhtar v. D.M.Dera Ghazi Kh. Supra
3. Professor A. Gledhill,op.cit.p.203
4. Laiq Ahmad v. D.M#Kar, P.L.D. 1958,Kar.92.
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In so far as the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, omits to provide 
for communication of grounds to the externee, so as to afford him an opportunity 
of making representation against the order, it was held that the Act imposes 
unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of movement and residence; to this
A
extent it is inconsistent with Art. 11 of the 195^ Constitution *
S. 152 of the Punjab Municipal Act does not exclusively prohibit
prostitution but simple gives a power to forbid it in any specified area of
the town, in recognition of its injurious effect on morals, as certain locality
may be particularly susceptible to injury. This is not an unreasonable
restriction. A resolution of the Municipal committee, requiring prostitutes to
move to another locality, was held not to infringe the right of free movement and
residence, in as much as the purpose behind the resolution was to confine
«
prostitution to one out-of-the-way locality. Had the resolution been intended
to burn prostitutes out of one locality after another, without providing for
reasonable steps to be taken in respect of their livelihood, it would have been
2
unreasonable and repugnant to Art. 11 •
S. 14(2) of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951» empowers the 
Tribuna. 1 to direct that a person, who is declared a dangerously goonda, shall 
be restricted to any area specified in the order; there is no limit in the Act 
on the extent of the area within which such person can be confined, nor is 
there any limitation on the period of restriction; it puts unreasonable 
restrictions on the freedom of movement and residence. It was pointed out 
that the objection cannot be sustained in so fhr as there are rules for regulat­
ing the cases of restriction to a particular area, framed by the Provincial
1, Abdul Qudrtas Bihari v. Ch.Commr.Kar; P. L.D,1956*Ka*\(^l?)533*
2* Mehlah Jan VAP.M. P.L.D* ,195$, Lah.3;>g
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Government in exercise of powers given by S. 16 of the Restriction of Habitual
Offenders (Punjab) Act, 1918, which has been adopted by S.17 of the Punjab
Control of Goondas Acty1951* These rules are guiding principlies for the
exercise of the discretion vested in the relevant authority making Order of
1
restriction to a particular area * In the light of these rules such persons
cannot be turned out of the district within which he normally resides; a
villager can only be restricted to the area of the village where he resides
o£ to contiguous villages in which he owns or Occupies any immovable property
or practices any trade or calling; a resident of a town may be retricted to
the area of the town. In special circumstances, the Court or the Tribunal may
fix a larger area, but, in any case, the restriction cannot amount to
externraent from the whole district in which the person normally resides* In
the circumstances it cannot be said that the contemplated resistrictions are
unreasonable. It was, therefore, held that the aforesaid S,12f(2) is not
2
repugnant to Art*11 of the 195& Constitution .
1. Rule 2 or rules framed under S. 16 of the Restriction of Habitual Offenders 
(Punjab) Act,1918, expressly declared that area to vhich person may be 
restricted shall ordinarily be, if a person resides in the village, the area 
of that village* * and if he resides in town, the area of that town* It is 
only in the case of persons twice convicted and who are not owners of land 
or occupancy tenants that the area of restriction may be settlement 
established under S. 16 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1911* Even then the 
authority concerned must obtain the concurrence of the Dy.Commr. for Criminal 
Tribes before passing such an order.
Under S.27 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951 further machinery is 
provided for bringing under scrutiny the cases of individuals against whom 
orders have been passed under the Act from time to time, and they may even 
be released from any bond for good behaviour or from an order of prohibition 
or detention if it is found that the person concerned has reformed his ways* 
Even his name may be removed on that ground, from the list of goondas or 
dangerous goonds, as the case may be* The position is therefore not that an 
order of confinement, within an area is left entirely on the sweet will of 
the Tribunal.
2* Bazal Ahmad Ayubis Case, Supra.
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It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that the various 
provisions of the W#P.Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959, in 1 pith and substance 
are intended to control the activities of disorderly persons within the district 
and thereby to prevent anti-social activities, which are calculated to cause a 
breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquillity, public safety and social 
security# -^he subject matter of the Ordinance may be said to be relatable to 
the maintenance of * public order1 * The movement, r esidence or activities of a 
person declared a goonda must, therefore, be restricted to certain areas in the 
district^.
Rule 51 °f the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulations, empowers the
Dy.Commissioner, if he is satisfied that the presence in the district of a
person who is not a native of the district, is or may be injurious to the peace
and good administration of the district, he can order him to leave the district,
or, if he is outside the district,forbid him to enter it# There is no provision
for giving the aggrieved party any opportunity to show cause why shouldy^iot be
ordered to leave the district, nor is there any provision for such person to be
represented before the Dy*Commissioner, so that he can challenge the information
on which the order has been passed. It was held that such unlimited power 'vvith
such far reaching consequences and without check or remedy of a judicial
character being provided to enable the aggrieved party to obtain redress,
cannot be said to be reasonable; the rule is repugnant to Right No*5 of the
2
1962 Constitution guaranteeing freedom of movement and residence *
Rule 32(l)(c) of the Defence of Pakistan Rules,1965, is in two parts;
1. Ghulawn Ali v. State* P.L.D#1970,^}.253.
2* Mustafa Ansari v# Dy.Commr.P, L.D* 1966,rDac, 576#
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the first part authorises the officer concerned to direct a person not to enter 
or remain in the area specified in the order, and the second part begins with the 
word * except1 and says that conditions and restrictions may be imposed requiring 
that the ’person may be permitted to stay in the area subject to the observance 
of such conditions as are specified in the order1 by the authority making it.
In the instant case, where the petitioner was ordered not to enter or reside 
withi^ fcen miles of Indo-Bak, border of Lahore. District, it was contended that 
the conditions and restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement and residence 
of the petitioner were repugnant to Right No. 5. In the alternative it was 
argued that the Dy. Commissioner could not make a direct order of extemraent, 
without the occurrence of a breach of such conditions, a condition precednet 
to themaking of the final order. It was pointed out that the purpose of the 
aforesaid rule was dear from insertion of the word ’except1 before the latter 
part of the clause. The authority could impose conditions before making the 
final order of externment but it was not obligatory; it was not a condition 
precedent to the final order of externment. It was, however, held that the 
conditions and restrictions impossible tinder the rule are not unreasonable in 
so far as they are to be imposed in the interest of the State. It was observed 
that the liberty of an individual cannot be allowed to override the existence 
of the State itself, for if the latter loses its sovereignity, the citizen, 
whose liberty is sought to be protected, would not onlyllose such liberty but 
would be subjected to other consequences which follow enslavement by a foreign 
power •
1. Mohd.AJsbar v. Dy.Commr.Lah.P.L.D, 1968 lah. 3^7
A
Professor Gledhill , viiile discussing the right to freedom of
movement and residence in the Indian Constitution, observes that the
expression 1 in the interest of general public1 is synonymous with * in the
public interest' • He further points out that the expression contemplates
laws intended to prevent the spread of infectious decease by prohibiting
2sick persons using public transport or forbidding entry opon defence 
3
works and laws empowering officials to expel potential trouble makers 
from a local area.
1. Professor A* Gledhill, India, p.189,
2. See S. 117 of the Railways Act,1923*
3. See S.3 of the Official Secrets Act,1923*
I*-. See Prof.A.Gledhill, India,p. 189; see also Thatlinkarantavila v. Island 
Inspector Officer,A. I.R. 1957,Mad.4-33*
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CHAPTER 9.
HABEAS CORHJS.
Nature and Scope;
Habeas corpus is a Latin term. It means 1 you may have the body1 . 
Several forms of habeas corpus were known to common law; they are the writs 
of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, habeas corpus ad test if icandum. habeas 
corpus ad testifiendum, habeas corpus ad prosequendum, habeas corpus ad 
deliberandum, ad habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum commody known 
as habeas corpus cum causa. Their general object was to secure the production 
of an individual before a court or Judge for various 'purposes as their names 
indicate. All save the first two are in practice obsolte •
Out of these writs, the writ which has most frequently been used for
securing the liberty of a subject by affording him an effective means of
immediate release from unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in 
2
private custody , is the writ of habeas corpus ad sub j iciendum. It has been
used *for protecting the liberty of a subject by examining into the legality of
commitments for criminal or supposed criminal matters, or any other forcible
detention including imprisonments, and also for admitting to bail a person
3legally committed.* It is ‘directed to the person detaining another, and 
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner with the day and cause of 
its caption and .detention, ad faciendum subjiciendum et recipiendum, to do, 
submit to and to receive whatever the Judge of the Court awarding such writ
1. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd3cLVol.II,p. 24*
2. R. v. Eanls of Ferres (1758) l.Burr,631
3. Short and Mellor*s, Crown Cffice Practice,(2nded. )p.318)
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-i
shall consider on that behalf. * As liberation from illegal detention is the
prominent function of the writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum has in practice
appropriated the name 1 habeas corpus* to itself so that if the term habeas
2
corpus is used simpliciter, it is this writ which is signified •
Habeas corpus ‘ is the prerogative writ by which the Queenbas the . 
right to inquire into the causes for which any of her subjects are denied of 
their liberty. It is an extraordinary remedy, which is issued upon cause shown,
3
in cases where the ordinary legal remedies are inapplicable or inadequate . It
4 5is also a writ of right , and is granted ex debito justitiae . Though it is a
writ of right, it is not a writ of course, and therefore may be refused where
there is an alternative remedy available by which the legality of the detention
6 7can be questioned . Both at common law and by statute , the writ of habeas
Q
corpus is granted only upon reasonable ground for its issue being shown . If 
there is no legal justification for detention the party is ordered to be releas­
ed. Release on habeas corpus is however not an acquittal, nor may the writ be
9
used as a means of appeal . T/hen the order of committal by a Magistrate is 
questioned before the Court on an application for habeas corpus» the Court 
cannot re-hear the case; all it can do is to enquire whether the Magistrate 
had reasonable grounds for exercising his discretion as he did or whether he
1. Blackstone1 s Comm « Book,p. 131
2. Markj^ose,Judicial Control of Administrative Actions in India, p. 131.
3. R.V.Cowle(l739) 2 Burr,834 at P.855 per Lord Mansfield: see also Crawley* s
case (1818) 2 Swan, 1.at p.48 per Lord Eldon,L.C.
4* R v. Heath (1744) lf^ir. 19 per Marley C.J.
5. Cowle* s and Crowley* s cases supra.
6. R v. Commanding Officer.. Expate Ferguson (l917)l-K*B.176 P*179; see also
Ex parte Corke (1934^-2 All.E.R.440*
7. Habeas corpus Act 1679,31 Car.2C.2.
8. Halsbury Laws of England,op.cit.p.26.
9. Ex parte Corke supra; R.V.Commanding Officer. .Ex parte Eliot (1949) All, 
E.R. at p.379 per Lord Codttard C.J.; see also Halsbury* s Laws of England 
op. cit.p.26.
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A
had jurisdiction to do so ,
Habeas corpus is a remedial measure and cannot be used for punitive
purposes. If a person in^cusiody or under detention has been released before
the petition for habeas corpus is filed, the "writ becomes infractuous, it can- 
2
not be granted « The primary purpose of the writ is to ea quire into the legality
3
of the detention * The question is whether the cause given for detention is 
justifiable in law, if improved to be unjustifiable the applicant for the writ 
is entitled to be realised instantly. But it does not follow from this that 
he is immune from civil or criminal proceedings which may properly be brought 
against him by the person who has detained him or by another. Equally it does 
not follow that the gaoler is automatically guilty of aiy civil or criminal 
of malicious prosecution in separate proceedings. All that the habeas corpus 
enables him to do is to recover his liberty •
Where an individual is detained under process for supposed criminal 
causes, the jurisdiction of the Court and the regularity of the commitment may 
be inquired into. Where the restraint is imposed on civil grounds, under claim 
of authority, the legal validity of the claim may be investigated and determined, 
and where as frequently occurs in the case of infants, conflicting claims for 
custody of the same my be inquired into, which is generally done on the return
1. Schtraks v. Govt, of Israel (1962) 3 W.L.R.1013; see also Heuston,R.P.V., 
Essays ih Constitutional law, 2nd Ed.pp. 108-109.
2. Basant Chandra v. Emperor Supra; Arab Mohd. Ha shin Khan v. Crown, P. L.D. 1954* 
P.C.l; Begum S.M.Hayat Khan&s case, supra.
3. Sampath v. Govindammal, I.L.R.(1952) Mad. A68.
A* Houston, op. cit. pp. 108-109•
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of the writ of habeas corpus and custody awarded to the right person. In other 
words where personal liberty of an individual is wrongly interfered with by 
another, the release of the former from the illegal detention, may be effected 
by habeas corpus. The illegal detention of a subject, that is a detention or 
imprisonment which is incapable of legal justification is the basis of 
jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases.
Historical Evolution:
In England habeas corpus is of common law origin though its effective-
2
ness has been enhanced by statutes • The right to habeas corpus exists at common
law independently of any statute; the right has been confirmed and regulated by 
3
the statutes • At common law the jurisdiction to award the writ was exercised by
the Courts of Queen’s Bench, Chancery and Common Pleas, and, in a case of
k
privilege, by the Court of Exchequer • This jurisdiction is now vested in the
High Court of Justice, and is exercised by the Queen's Bench Division and the
Judges of the High Court of Justice. The jurisdiction of the old Courts of
3
common law is now, under the Supreme Court of Judicature •
The writ of habeas corpus is said to be the unique contribution of
6 7
British Jurisprudence and the most celebrated writ in English law • The writ
in England is closely related to the constitutional struggles of the English
ll See Barnardo v. Ford, Gossege's case (1892),A.C.236.H.L.at P*339i per Lord 
Herschell; see also Halsbury's Laws of England, op.cit.p.2^-25.
2. Habeas corpus acts of 1640; 1679; l8l6; and 1862.
3. Ex parte Besset (18M+) 6Q.B.^8l.
Back^Abp, ,Habeas corpus (B),l;2 Co.1st.55; 5 Bl.Com.129; see also Halsbury's 
Laws,op.cit.p.27•
5* Consolidation Act of,1925 (15 and 16 Geo.5C.26)SS.l^ and 18; and Administrat­
ion of Justice Act,1928,(18 and 19 Geo.5*C.26)S.6; See also Halsbury's Laws 
of England,op.cit.p.28.
6. See Prof .FrenjoL,Administrative Powers over Person and Property, (1926) at p.232; 
see Lord Denning, Freedom under the Law (1950) at. p. 9-
7. 3 B.L.Com.Ch.VIII,p.129.
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people • It has been observed by Lord Wright that the basis for the Statutory
writ of habeas corpus is found in Magna Carta; the right to freedom from
unlawful detention, which the writ was said secure,is guaranteed by the words 
2of Magna Carta .
3But Darnell1s case, in which it was held that if a man were committed 
by the command of the King, he could not be delivered by habeas corpus, proved 
the inefficacy of the mere constitutional guarantee afforded by Magna Carta, in 
the absence of an efficacious statutory measure to enforce the guarantee. It 
resulted in the passing of the Petition of Rights of 1628 by Parliament. But 
still the enforcement of the right to personal liberty was not secured, as, 
under exectuve pressure, the effect of habeas corpus could easily be mullified. 
Consequently the statute, entitled *an Act for the regulation of the Privy 
Council, and for taking away the Court commonly called the Star Chamber,1 was
if.
passed in 16^0 • The statute recites the provisions of Magna Carta and the 
statutes of the reign of Edward III, relating to the liberty of .the subject.
The statute, which is still in force - subject to the partial repeal contained |
in the Statute Law Revision Act, 19^ -8 , was intended further to secure the (
liberty of the subject by regulating the issue of the writ in the particular j
cases of infringement of the right to personal liberty at the hands of the King 
or of the Privy Council, and was necessitated by the cases of arbitrary imprison-
6 Iment , which were prevalent at the time of the Statute. It entitled the aggrie- 1
T~. Ibid, p. 133
2. Green v.Secretary of State,(L9^2) H.C.25^ at p.301.
3. (1627) 3 St.Tr.l. !
16 Car.l,C.10.
5. 11 and 12 Geo.6c.62. j
6. See Darnell’s case.
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ved person to the immediate issue of a writ of habeas corpus, upon demand or 
motion made m  open Court. It also requires the person to whom-the writ is 
directed, at the return to the writ, to produce in open Court the body of the 
person, so committed or restrained, and to certify the true cause of his 
detention or imprisonment; within three days after such return, the Court 
must proceed to examine and determine whether the cause of such confinement 
appearing upon the return is just and legal or not, and must deliver, bail or 
remand the prisoner accordingly .
Holdsworth regards the right to the statutory writ as simply a
result of the Act of 1679? Before the Act of 1679, there was no authority
for say thing that, if a writ was refused, or if on the return the prisoner
was remanded, an application could be made to another Court* It is no real
exception that by the Act of 1640, which abolished the Star Chamber, the Judges
of the King1 s Bench or Common Pleas were enabled to grant the writ where there
had been imprisonment by the Star Chamber or similar Courts* Before the Act
of 1679, the King* s Bench or a Judge thereof, in vacation was the only Court
from which the writ issued* Although Coke says that 1 it ought to issue out of
the Court of King’s Bench in term time and out of the Chancery in term or
vaction, it was not till 1679 that the Chancellor could issue the writj there
is no trace of writ ever having been granted by the Exchequer^.
Jenke1 s^  case is ccmmonly supposed to be the cause for enactment of
1. lord Halsbury, op#cit,28(2).
2* See History of English Law.
3. See Lord Goddard ;‘*A note on habeas corpus T 63 L.Q.R.30.
4* Ibid*
3* Cited by Taswell-Langinead in Constitutional History,(11th Ed. pp. 33-34)*
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A
the habeas corpus Act. 1679. But Hallam considers this common belief to be 
2
erroneous • According to him the arbitrary proceedings of Lord Clare don led
to the passing of the Act. Jenke* s case, -where the Lord Chancellor refused to
issue habeas corpus t during the vacation showed that habeas corpus was still
not an efficacious remedy. Many other vexations shifts were practised; the
gaioler used to delay the return by waiting for the second and third writY known
as alias and pluris. detunus were shifted from one prison to another in order
3
to evade the writ or its issue was refused during the vacation .
The Act of 1679 was passed * for the better securing the liberty of 
the subject1 • It was designed to overcome the aforesaid difficulties in the 
enforcement of the writ. It was primarilly applicable in criminal cases; all 
other cases of unjust imprisonment were left to habeas corpus at common law. It 
was required by the Act that the writ of habeas corpus should immediately be 
issued without any delay and obeyed without wating for alias or pluries; the 
writ was made readily accessible during the vacation; penalties were prescribed 
for causing delay or disobeying the writ; the issue and grant of the writ was 
regulated and the procedure upon its return laid down. Any person committed 
or detained in vacation for any crime, except for felony or treason, plainly 
expressed in the warrant of commitment, was entitled to apply to the Lord Chanc­
ellor, or any Judge of the High Court of Justice, for habeas corpus. The Act 
of 1679 also did not satisfactorily cover all the cases of wrongful detention 
otherwise than on a criminal charge, as, for instance, the illegal detention of
1. See Constitutional History, Vol.II. Ch.I. p. 11. (8th Ed.)
2. See Lord Goddard op* cit.
3. See 3 BL. Com. p. 133
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children by persons not legally entitled to their custody; wrongful restraint 
of lunatics and custody of illegal confinement of one person by another did 
not come within its scope.
The Habeas Corpus Act,1816 was enacted to remove the defects discussed 
above* It applies to all cases of wrongful detention or imprisonment, whether 
civil or criminal, except the cases of persons imprisoned for debt or by process 
of civil courts; the cases of persons imprisoned by the decision of a Court 
on a Criminal charge or detained during the trial on a supposed criminal charge, 
were not covered by it, except that the prisoner could be released on bail in 
the last case.
It will be remembered that, before the Act of 1816, a Court had no 
power to inquire into the facts; they could only see whether on the face of 
the committment, the detention was lawful. The truth as to why the prisoner 
was committed could only be inquired into by means of an action for false
A
return . It was not until early in the 19th century that the practice of
moving for rule nisi was started. Previously the writ had always been granted
ex parte, and the grant of writ decided nothing except that there was a case
2
calling for an answer by the gaoler •
The Act of 1816 was not applicable to the King1 s domain; it was 
only enforceable in England. After the Act of 1816, habeas corpus continued 
its progress in setting subjects, wrongfully detained or imprisoned, at
3liberty except for occasional extradition cases until the *irst World War.
1. See Wilmot C.J* s opinion delivered in the House of Lords on the second 
reading of the Habeas Corpus Bill of 1758, which never became law; Wilmot* s 
opinion, p. 108 see also Goddard,op.cit.
2. See Goddard op. cit. p. 34.
3. See Stephen, History of Criminal Law in England(l883)Vol.2,pp.65-74; see for 
the Law on Extradition, Clarke, 4th Ed.
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The Habeas Corpus Act,1862, was passed in consequence of the decision 
in Ex parte Anderson that habeas corpus could issue in Canada* It provides !tno 
writ of habeas corpus shall issue out of England into any colony or foreign 
dominion of the Crown where H.M. has a lawfully established Court having authority 
to grant and issue the said writ.*
Formerly, before the Act of 1816, the writ of habeas corpus lay to any
part of the dominion of the Crown , including Ireland, Berwick-upon-Tweed,
The Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and the colonies; the writ may still issue
from the English Courts to the Isle of Man, that Island not being a foreign
2
dominion of the Crown within the meaning of the Act of 1862 .
The writ will not issue in respect of persons detained in foreign terr­
itory, not forming part of H.M* s.Dominion, thou^i H.M. may have certain 
jurisdiction there, derived from treaties and from the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 
18903 and I S y h
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued against a person who is
abroad, it being issuable only for immediate service on a person, who is within
the jurisdiction of English Courts at the date of issue'*; or against a person
who is on board a public vessel of war of a foreign State, though in British 
6
waters; or in respect of an alien detained in England, in a foreign embassy or 
legation of the Country to which he belongs^.__________
1* See 2 Roll.Abr.£>9; Brown*s case (1^19;,Cro.Jac.543; R*v.Pell and Offly 
(1674) 3 Keb*279$ see also Halsbury* s Law of England,op. cit*p. 30.
2. See re Brown;(l864) ,33 L.J.Q.B.193; see also Halsbury op, cit.p.30.
3* 53 & 54 Vict*C.37j See also Ex parte Sekgome (1910) 2K.B.576 C.A.; and
re Ring Yi-Ching (1939),56 T.L.R.3*
4. 3 & 4 Ceo.5C.l6*
5. R.v.Pinckney (l904)2K.B.84,C.A;see also Brown*s case supra; R.v.Cowle (1759)
2 Burr* 834 at 856.
6. See Oppenheim* s International Law; 8th ed.p.851.
7. Re Sun Yat (1896), cited in Short & Mellor* s Crown Office Practice ,2nd Ed. 
p. 318; See also Halsbury Laws of England op* cit*p.31*
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Suspension of habeas corpus:
The operation of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, has at various periods
been temporarily suspended by the legislature on the ground of urgent political 
1necessity * In the reign of George III, the Habeas Corpus Suspending Act, 1793,
■was passed and continued for seven years by annual re-enactments* This led to
the passing of the Indemnity Act, 1801, by Parliament. The uncertain legal
position, which resulted from the enactment of the Indemnity Act, to remove
the effects of Habeas Corpus Suspension Act,1793* persuaded the executive in
Britain during the First World War, to avoid it by acquiring direct powers
to detain any person in custody in the interest of the defence of the Realm,
without bail or trial, under the specific legislative sanction, notwithstanding
any law to the contrary. The Defence of Realm Act, 1934-1915* empowered the
Executive to make Regulations by Order in Council for securing the public
safety or the defence of the Realm. This kind of preventive detention gave
the Executive immunity from any action for false imprisonment and trespass
2
and precluded release of the detenu- on a writ of habeas corpus • Lord Shaw, 
in his dissenting opinion in King v* Haliday^, refused to infer, from the 
mere delegation of power to make regulations for public safety and defence, 
the authority to detain individuals without accusation or trial, since Parliament 
had not expressly said that such powers to detain arbitrarily had been conferred 
on the Executive. During Second World War, Parliament, in order to avoid such
1. See Halsbury* s Laws of England, op. cit.p. 29.
2. See Markose op. cit.p. 123-124*
3. (1917) A.C.260
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criticism, gave the Executive powers in express words; The Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act,1939, authorised the making of regulations by Order in Council 
to detain individuals without trial in the interest of the public safety and 
defence. The powers of detention without trial granted to the Executive by 
the Emergency Powers Act, 1939, is sometimes alleged to be equivalent to 1 suspend­
ing the Habeas Corpus Acts.1 But it is submitted that Habeas Corpus Acts were 
not touched by the Act of 1939; it was fully open to any person detained under 
the Act to question the legality of the detention. All that had been done 
was that, by the Emergency Powers Act, 1939, and the Regulations made thereunder, 
the area of lawful detention had been greatly widened. But if the application 
for the writ was successful and it had been shown that the cause of detention
was illegal, the writ would be enforced against the Executive so far as the Court
1 2 could do so . Previously the writ had been issued to free slaves , to question
3
the imprisonment of persons by the order of the House of Commons , to challenge 
extradition proceedings^, and to release a young lady who had been convicted by 
the ^ice Chancellor of Cambridge University to a local prison known as the 
Spinning House, for ‘walking in the street with a member of the University^.*
Even detention orders under the Emergency Powers Act and Regulations 
of 1939 were challenged. Liversidge v. Anderson^ and Green v. Home Secretary^
1. See Wolfe To^e* s case (1798) 27 St.Tr.6l4; see also Heuston op. cit.p. 109.
2. See Somerset*s case,(1772) 20 St.Tr.l.
3. See the case of Sheriff of Middlesex (I84O) 11 A ,&  E.273*
4. See Denko v. Home Secretary (1959) A.C.654*
5. Ex parte Daisy Hopkins (1891) 61L.J.Q.B.24O; see also Henston, op.cit.109.
6. (192*2) A.C.206.
7. (1942) A.C. 284.
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were the most important cases in which detention under the Secretary of the 
State orders was contested in the Courts* The dissenting opinion of Lord Atkin 
in the Liversidge1s case was so cognnt that it has been followed by the Courts 
of various countries • Lord Atkin expressed the view that preventive detention 
during peace time should stand the test of 1 objective satisfaction.* In one case 
the applicant detained under the Regulation 18-B of 1939> secured his release
by means of habeas corpus proceedings, but he was immediately re-arrested under
2
a valid order of detention •
In order to give protection to detenus under the Regulations of 1939 >
Advisory Committees were set up and the detenus were given facilities to make
their objections to the detention orders before such committees. They were also
afforded the right to legal advice, The Home Secretary was obliged to report
to Parliament monthly the number of persons detained and also the number of cases
3
in which he refused to follow the recommendations of the Adisory Committees . 
India:
In India the writ of Habeas corpus is of statutory origin and was 
first conferred on the Supreme Court of Calcutta in 177^* The writ was there­
fore imported into India subject to the common and statute law, that governed
A
the issue of habeas corpus in England • But the jurisdiction on the Courts in
5
India, in the earlier period was not as extensive as in England *
1* In Burma and Pakistan; see the topic in the preceeding Chapter;/Objective 
satisfaction.*
2. Ex parte Budd (19^2) 2 K.B.l^*
3. Markose, op.cit.l2*f.
*f. Markose,op.cit. ll*f.
3* See Leach C.J*s. remarks in Grindra Nath v. Biremdra Nath PauJ\(1927)Cal.
727-
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The Supreme Court of Calcutta was established by the Regulating Act
>1
of 1773 • Clause A of the Charter of 1774 gave to the Judges of theSupreme
Court power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. In 1798 Recorders Courts were
2established at Madras and Bombay, with power to issue the prerogative writs •
But an Act of 1861^ abolished these Courts and authorised the Crown to establish 
by Letters Patent, High Courts at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, which were called 
Presidency High Courts. Under S.9 of the Act, the High Courts thus to be 
established were to have 1 all jurisdiction and every power and authority what­
soever in any manner vested in any of Courts in the same Presidency abolished 
under the Act, at the time of their abolition* * But by the same section the 
jurisdiction of the High Courts to be established was made expressly 1 subject 
and without prejudice to the legislative powers,. • of the Governor-General of 
India in Council.1 Clause 44 of the Letters Patent Act of 1865, specifically 
stated that the legislative pov/er of the ^overnor-General in Council included 
the power to alter the jurisdiction of the High Courts. However, the opinion 
was expressed by the Judges that the common law writ of habeas corpus could be 
issued outside the original jurisdiction of the earlier Supreme Courts, and
4that the power was inherited by the High Courts .
Soon after this opinion was expressed, the Criminal Procedure Code of 
1872 was enacted. Though, in the case of detention of European British subjects
1. SS.13-22
2. Cls.ll and 47 of the Letter Patent Act,1798.
3. See 24 and 25 Vict.C.lOA.
4. In re kp eer Khan,(l870) 6 Bengal L.R.392; for an instance of writ being 
issued in Bombay see Reg. v. Soulter, 8 Bom.H.C.R. Crown Cases 13*
5. Act X of 1872.
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S. 81 of theCode conferred the right to issue orders in the nature of habeas
corpus, both within and outside the original jurisdiction of the Presidency
High Courts, in the case of British European subjects, the power of High Court
and its Judges to issue the writ of habeas corpus beyond the Presidency towns
in the case of Indian subjects, was taken away by S.82. It is to be noted here
that there was no provision for habeas corpus in the Code of Cr. P. of 1861. In
1875, another Cr.P.C. was passed , S. I48 whereof gave the Presidency High Courts
the power to issue direction in the nature of habeas corpus on certain conditions
but it took away the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue the common law
writ of habeas corpus for any of the purposes mentioned in the section. The
2
section also excluded five laws from its application; detention under these
3
laws could not be reviewed by the High Courts •
Though S.49I of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1882, conferred powers 
on the Presidency High Courts to issue, directions in the nature of habeas 
corpus, they were substantially the same as those provided by S. 148 of the Code 
of 1875, with the difference that the powers were to be exercised within the 
limits of their ordinary original civil jurisdiction and not their original 
criminal jurisdiction. By the Criminal Procedure Code of 18^8, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1882 was repealed but S. 491 was reproduced in the former 
Code* Though S. 491 of the Cr.P.Oode was amended by the Repealing and Amending 
Act of 1914, the prohibition agains t the issue of the common law writ of habeas 
corpus still continued and even the three Presidency High Courts did not have
1. Act X of I875
2. Infra.
3. See Markose, op.cit.p.129.
342A
the power to issue habeas corpus regarding an Indian, who was outside the
1
jurisdiction of the Presidency Towns • In 1922 the Madras High Court, in
2
a Full Bench decision , held that the common law writ of habeas corpus
was issu* able by the Madras High Court within its appellate jurisdiction.
This view was held to be erroneous by the Privy Council in 1939 in Mathen v.
3P.M. Trivandarum •
An amendment in S.^ -91 Cr.P.C.in 1923 settled the matter finally, 
by S.3 of the Amending Act, habeas corpus was made available to almost every­
one in India, The power to issue orders in the nature>of habeas corpus was
15
conferred on all the High Courts • Whereas previously an order under S,^91 
Cr.P.C.1898 could be made only with regard to the persons residing within the 
ordinary civil jurisdiction of the three Presidency High Courts, the Amending 
Act of 1923 gave jurisdiction of all the High Courts to pass orders with regard 
to persons in places within the limits of their criminal appellate jurisdiction.
The marginal note of the amended S. ^-91 Cr.P.C, is to the effect that the High
6
Courts could issue directions in the nature of habeas corpus . The Amending 
Act of 1923 brought the S.^91 Cr.P.C. to its present form. The position 
continued like this till the Partition of the British India and emergence of 
India and Pakistan.
In the period 177^-1780, the struggle between the Supreme Court at
Calcutta and the Supreme Council for India resulted in the complete withdrawal
1. See in re the Justices of the S.C.of Bom.^ L2 EP.22.
2. In re Sovindan Nair, (1922) Wj Mad.922 F.B.
3« A.I.R.1939,P.C.213; see also Markrose op.cit.130.
Cr.P.C.(Amendment) Act (XII of) 1923*
3« See Haridas Awadi v. King/Emp.I,L.R.19^8, Nag.933»957»9^0 per Sen J.
6. Subclause (b) of Cl.(l) of ^91 Cr.P.C.lays down, the Principle of
English law that habeas corpus be issued against all cases of illegal 
detention whether by a public authority of private person; see Mohd.Amwar 
v. Govt, of West Pakistan, Supra.
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of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to interfere with the orders of the
Governore-General-in-Council, affected native stibjects, made in exercise of
powers conferred on the Executive by the Revenue Laws* Many people had been
detained by the East India Company* s Administration, who were liberated by
the Supreme Court on habeas corpus* Later, though habeas corpus was made
available to people within the jurisdiction of the Presidency Towns j there
were five laws, enumerated in the proviso to 8.14-8 of the Cr*P*C.of 1875*
detention under which could not be challenged in the Presidency High Courts*
This proviso was continued in S.491 of the Cr*P*Codes of 1-82 and 1898 and was
1retained even after the amendment of S.491 in 1923*. Special statutes were 
enacted periodically to exclude in effect the remedy of habeas corpus for the 
purpose of curbing occasional political upheavals. These statutes either
2
expressly or by necessary implication suspended the remedy of habeas corpus *
During the First World ’Var the Executive of India obtained very vast
powers under the Defence of India Act, 1915* an<l there was a complete ouster of
the jurisdiction of the High Courts for all practical purposes in the cases of
preventive detention. During the Second World War, the Defence of India Act,
the
1939, was enacted; under S. 2/Central Government was authorised to make such
rules as appeared it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of
the British India, the efficient prosecution of war or the maintenance of
public order and public safety. R.26 of the Defence of India Rules, made under
the aforesaid Act, empowered the Central or Provincial Government, if it was
satisfied with respect to any individual that he was acting or about to act in 
Y. The Rowlatt Act IXI of) 1919; The Bengal Cr.Law (,Amendment)"Act, 1925;
and the Sholapur Ulartial Law Ordinance (IV of) 1930 and VIII of 1932.
2. See Pratul Mitra v. Commandant High Detention Camp,16 Cal.197; see also 
Markose op*cit.pp.136-137.
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a manner prejudicial to the aforementioned purposes, to pass an order directing 
that he he detained. Under r.129 of the D# l/ji.939, any police officer empowered 
by the Central or Provincial Government could arrest any person whom he reasonably 
suspected of having acted or of acting or being about to act in a manner pre- 
judicial to the maintenance of public order or public safety •
After the partition of India and the emergence of India and Pakistan
in 1947, the political situation became very tense, due to communal riots and
communist activities. IBhen, therefore, the Defence of India Act, 1939, and the
Defence of India Buies had expired, the Provincial and Central legislations of
2
India and Pakistan had to enact special statutes , to provide for preventive 
detention in the interest of the public order and public safety. These 
statutes were drafted on the lines of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act,
1939# QJsi the Regulations made thereunder, and the Defence of India Act, 1939, 
and the Rules framed thereunder.
Habeas corpus in Pakistan;
Soon after independence, the Indian Constitution was framed in 1950. 
Art.226 of the Indian Constitution empowers the High Courts to issue writs 
including habeas corpus within their territorial jurisdiction and Art* 32 
confers powers on the Supreme Court to grant the writs to enforce throughout 
India and. fundamental rights, including the right to personal liberty* Arts.21 
and 226 provide remedies for the deprivation of personal liberty by the
executives the person arbitrarily and illegally detained or imprisoned is
1. See Markose op.cit.p.137
2. See for India; C.P. & Berar Bib.Safety Act(XXXVTII of) 1947;Bom.Pub*Security 
Measures Act, 1944 and 1947 (Act VI of 1947); Mad.Maintenance of Bib.Order 
Act (I of)1947; U.P.Maintenance of Pub.0rd.Act.(lV of 1947) M.B. Maintenance 
of PUb.Ord.Act. 1949; Bihar Maintenance of Pub. Qrd. Act,1947; Orissa Maint.
/Contd....
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entitled to the writ of habeas corpus which is available against any kind of 
detention not authorised by law.
In Pakistan the issue of the writ was governed by S.491, Cr.P.C. till 
1953, when S.223-A was inserted in the Government of India Act, 1935, which act 
continued to be Constitution of Pakistan till 1956. S.223-A. gave the High
Courts powers to issue writs including habeas corpus. This situation continued 
till 1956, when the first Constitution of Pakistan was framed. Art.170 of the 
1956 Constitution conferred on the High Courts powers to issue habeas corpus 
and other writs. By Art.22 of the 1956 Constitution the right to move the 
Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights was guaranteed; the 
Supreme Court was empowered to issue writs including habeas corpus for this 
purpose. Art.170 conferred on the High Courts power to issue writs, not only 
to enforce the fundamental rights but also * for any other purpose*. However, 
there was a difference between the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the 
High Courts,’ whereas the right to invoke the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction for 
the enforcement of fundamental right was itself a fundamental right, the right 
to apply to the High Court for the issue of habeas corpus or any other writ, for 
*any other purpose* was not. The High Courts had a discretion to grant or refuse
A
the writ, unless it v/as made to protect a fundamental right . The High Courts
jurisdiction was governed by the corpus juris which had accumulated in England,
Contd. from previous page.....
of Pub.Ord.Act, 1948; and in Pakistan: W.Punjab Public Safety Act (lIof)l947*
(XVIII of)l949, Baluchistan Public Safety Regulation (lof)l9A7; (lof)l949/ 
N.W. P.P. Public Safety Act (iof) 1949; Sind Maintenance of Pub. Safety Act 
(XVof)l948; East Bengal Pub.Safety Act (XII) of 1948,(iof) 1950; Security 
.of Pakistan Act.1952.
1 * See Sheo Shanker v. State of M.P, A. I.R. 195l*^ag*58; Himmat Lai v. St. of M.P* 
A.I.R.1954 SC.403: State of Bom, v. United Motors, A,I.R. 1953 SC.252.
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India and Pakistan .
The Constitution of 19^6 -was abrogated on 7th Oct.19^8 ■when the -whole 
of Pakistan was placed under Martial Law. But even during the Martial Law 
period, the power of the superior Courts to issue writs continued, because a 
provision for the issue of writs including habeas corpus was made in the Laws 
(Continuance in Force) Order,195^ . Then in 1962, a new constitution was 
promulgated.Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution conferred on the High Courts very 
wide powers for the issue of writs. Under this Constitution, the jurisdiction 
formerly exercised by the Supreme Court for enforcing the fundamental rights 
was transferred to the High Courts. The High Courts* power to issue orders or 
directions, except where fundamental rights are involved, is discretionary and 
the Supreme Court can interfere only by granting leave to appeal from the judge­
ment of a High Court. Art.98 is unique in the sense that it gives powers to 
the High Courts to issue prerogative writs, without mentioning their technical 
names, but the limits within which this jurisdiction is to be exercised are in 
some respects narrower and in others wider than before^. Art.98(2 )(b)(i) 
confers on the High Courts power to set at liberty persons detained in *unlawr- 
ful custody* or * in an unlawful manner.* It is noticeable that, while with 
regard to other orders mentioned in Art.98, a Higih Court can grant relief 
only at the instance of a person aggrieved, there is no such restriction with 
regard to the person who can move the Court when the matter brought before 
l.See Munir J.,Constitution of Pakistan, p.327.
2 .Mehboob Ali Malik v. Prov. of West Pakistan,P*L,D.1963 I^h.575J see &iso 
Prof.G-ledhill, Pakistan, p. 180; see also Mimir J.,op. cit.p. 327.
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the Court relates to setting a person at liberty . The jurisdiction of a High
Court to issue habeas corpus or any other writ can be invoked when there is no
2
other adequate remedy provided by law *
Art.98( 2 )(b)( i) the 1962 Constitution lays down that a High Court
may, on the application of a person^not necessarily an aggrieved party, if there
is . nd other adequate remedy, direct a person in custody in the Rrovince to be
brought before the High Court, so that it may ’satisfy* itself that the person
is not being held in the custody*'without lawful authority*' * or*" in an unlawful
3
manner". The provision is similar to S.491 of Cr.P.C. 1898 , but, being a
4Constitutional guarantee, it is of higher authority and is not subject to the 
restriction imposed by subsection (3) of S.491 Cr.P.C. with regard to certain 
laws, mentioned above, which were put outside the scope of High Courts' 
jurisdiction under S.491 Cr.P.C. Furthermore Art.98(2)(b)(i) requires a 
High Court to be ’satisfied* of the legality of the detention, whereas S.491 
states that a High Court may direct that a person under detention he set at 
liberty whenever it thinksr,it fit;" Art.98(2)(b)( i) does not say, as S.491 Cr.
P.C.does, that it may order him to be set at liberty, but setting the person
detained at liberty is a necessary corollary to the egression that a 'High
Court* should 'satisfy* itself that the person is not held in custody 'without 
lawful authority* or * in an unlawful manner*. It can,there fore, be said that 
Art.98(2)(b)(i) confers on High Courts jurisdiction which corresponds broadly 
to that possessed by the Courts in England to issue the prerogative writ of
1. Mohd. Anwar v. Govt, of V/est Pakistan, supra.
2. See Art.98 of the 1962 Const.,see also Prof.Alan Gledhill,Pakistan,p. 180 
and Munir J., op. cit. p. 327*
3. As amended by Amending Act of 1923*
4. See Mohd.Ali v. Mohd. Bashir, P.L.D.1963 Lah«230
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habeas corpus ad subjiciendeum to safeguard the liberty of the subjects *
There are periods when the issue of habeas corpus has been suspended 
in PteJdLstand. The Constitution of Pakistan "was abrogated by the Proclamation of 
Martial law Order, 195&> issued by the President;Martial Law was declared through­
out the country; M.L. Orders and Regulations were passed; and special Courts were 
established to try the offences in contravention of these Orders and Regulations 
as well as offences under the Ordinary Law* Though the existing jurisdiction of 
the Courts was maintained by the L.C.F.0*, 195? - a new legal order or an interin 
constitutional document - but the order was silent about the fundamental rights* 
In State v* Dosso it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that even the jurisdic­
tion of High Courts and the Supreme Court would be determined according to the 
new legal order; the fundamental rights which were abrogated along with the 
Constitution of 1956, could no longer be enforced by the Courts; and the ^apeior
Courts, deriving their jurisdiction under the new legal order, could only be
*
moved for a writ when a right preserved by the L.C.F.0* ,195^» was infringed •
Though Martial Law was brought to an end by the promulgation of the 
1962 Constitution, the fundamental rights were not incorporated in the 
Constitution; they were included in the Constitution by the Constitution (First 
Amendment) Act of 1963# But 31^ Orders and Regulations of the Martial Law period 
were preserved and protected against avoidance for repugnancy to the fundamental 
rights, if challenged in the Courts*
On September 6, 1965, on account of war with -^ndia, a Proclamation
of Emergency was issued by the President under Art* 30 of the Constitution of
1. See Mimir J* op* cit.p*326
2. See Art* 2( 4) p fee. F* 0. ,193?
3. P*L*D.1938,S.C^; See also Prov.of East Pakistan v* M.Mehdi Ali Khan,P.L*D.,
1959,SC.38*7, and Mian Iftekharuddin v* Mohd.Sarfraz, P.L.D. 1961,SC.583*
4* See the ‘Fourth Schedule* annexed to the Constitution of 1962*
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1962. On the same day an order under cl.(10) of Art.30, suspending the right to 
move a High Court for enforcement of certain fundamental rights; the proceedings 
pending in the Courts for the enforcement of fundamental rights were also 
suspended. Right No.l, which protects life and liberty vas not touched but Right 
No.2 which lays down the safeguards against arrest and detention was, along with 
other Rights, suspended, but, if a person could not be protected against arrest 
and detention, his personal liberty could no longer exist. On the lines of 
D.I.A. and D.I.R.,1939i the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1965* and the Defence 
of Pakistan Rules, 19&5* were framed; r.32 and r.20^ f of the D.P.R. correspond 
respectively to r.26 and r.129 of the D.I.R.,1939«
Art.2 of the Constitution of 1962 lays down that no person shall be 
deprived of his life, liberty or property 'except in accordance with law*; the 
Indian Constitution says, •...except* "the procedure established by law." The 
Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ghulam Jilani's case, where the detenus were detained 
under r.32 of the D.P.R.,1965» and when the Emergency Proclamation,1965* had not 
yet been revoked, held that, in view of the provisions of Art.98(2)(b)(i) of the 
1962 Constitution, which requires the High Court to be 'satisfied* as to the 
legality of detention, as well as the provision of Art.2, which requires that no 
person should be deprived of his life or liberty 'except in accordance with law,* 
the High Court is enjoined to protect the person against arbitrary deprivation 
of personal liberty; the 'satisfaction* of the Court; thut is the 'objective 
satisfaction,* as to the legality of detention, is required; this can only be
obtained by scrutinizing the facts which led the detaining authority to detain a ,
i
person; and the 'subjective satisfaction* of the detaining authority can no long- j 
er be regarded as final under Art.98(2)(b)(i) read with Art.2 of the 1962 j
Constitution, whether in time of emergency or peace time."1 j
T l Supra; the principle thus laid down by the SC.has been followed in A.Baqi j
Begum A.K.S.Kashmire*s case supra and other cases dis- jcussed m  the pr^c eaing chapter. J
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As Righ No.l, as discussed above, was not abrogated, Courts have
sometimes gone out of their way to issue the writ of habeas corpus to protect
a right which does not come within the purview of Right No.l, by straining Art.2
probably in consideration of the unnecessarily?prolongation of the state of
Emergency, which made it impossible for the High Courts to protect the people
against the arbitrary deprivation of their rights; mandamous could have been i
1
issued under the circumstances • I
The state of Emergency continued until the Constitution of 1962 was ;
abrogated and Martial Law was once again imposed throughout Pakistan on 25th 
March,1 9 6 9 . M.L.Regulations and Orders were promulgated; special Military Courts 
were established and the Courts1 jurisdiction, inter alia, to call in question 
any M.L.Regulation or Order, or any finding, judgement or order of Military Courts 
was ousted by the M.L.Proclamation of 1969- In the Proclamation of 19&9> there 
is a significant difference from the Proclamation of 1958, in that the jurisd­
iction of the superior Courts to issue writs against any of M.L.Authorities has 
been expressly and completely taken away.
A few days later, the Provisional Constitution Order,19&9i was
promulgated. The crucial difference between the Provisional Constitution Order
1 9 6 9  and the L.C.FP .,1958, is that whereas the L.C.F.O.,1958, was silent about
the fundamental rights, though the provisional Constitution Order,1969, has
abrogated and annulled the fundamental rights, enumerated in paragraphs 2, *f, 5*
6 1 7i 8, 9* 15, 1^ and 15 of Chapter 1 of Part II of the 1962 Constitution, which
2includes the safeguards against arrest and detention ; the other rights remain ;
in force. For the purpose of this study, the most remarkable effect of the
1. See Abul AlCt Maudoodi v. State Bank,Supra; discussed in the preceeding 
Chapter.
2. Paragraph 2 - Right No.2 - deals with safeguards against *arrest and 
detention.1
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Provisional Constitution Order,1 9 6 9 , is that it deprives a person preventively- 
detained of the right of recourse to an Advisory Board, as laid down by Right 
No.2(^), if it is proposed to detain him for more than three months. The 
Provisional Constitution Order gives arbitrary powers to the M.L.Authorities 
to deprive a person of his liberty, in as much as the power of the judicial 
review of the actions of the M.L. Authorities as well as the jurisdiction of the 
superior Courts to enforce the specified Rights, has been expressly annulled.
It is, therefore, submitted that, though the Right No.l which guarantees the 
right to life and liberty, and Art,2 which requires that no person can be 
deprived of life and liberty 1 except in accordance with law,1 have not been 
abrogated, habeas corpus cannot issue to protect the people against wrongful or 
arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty by the M.L.Authorities.
In a recent case, the Lahore High Court held that the M.L.Authorities
could not make any law repugnant to the Provisional Constitution Order; in
accordance with the provision of Art.2 of the 1962 Constitution, no public
authority could take any action infringing the rights of the people, in exercise
of the power conferred on it by any statute made in contravention of the
Provisional Constitution Order, without lawful justification; and the action
of any authority, including the C.M.L.A. could not be immune from being struck
down by the Courts of Pakistan under Art. 9 8  read with Art.2 of the 1962 
"]
Constitution . It is submitted that the President/C.M.L.A. has unchallengeable 
legislative power and the Lahore High Court was wrong in holding that the M.L. 
Authorities could not make any law repugnant to the Provisional Constitution 
Order, or that action of M.L.Authorities under the repugnant law could not be 
immune from judicial review.
TZ Mir Hassan v. State, P.L.D., 19&9» Lah.786.
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Soon after this decision, presumably on the same day, the jurisdiction 
of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order, 1 9 6 9  was promulgated to remove the doubts 
as to whether the Courts still have jurisdiction to challenge the actions taken 
by M.L.Authorities or to issue writs to enforce the specified Fundamental Rights. 
The Order lays down that no Court, including the Supreme Court and High Courts, 
shall have jurisdiction to receive any application, petition or any other 
representation against the dedision of the Military Courts or the Orders passed 
by the M.L.Authorities. The matter has thus been finally settled.
Arts.98(2)(b)(i) and 2 of the 1962 Constitution:
Art.98(2)(b)(ii) of the 1 9 6 2  Constitution is radically different from 
Art.170 of the 1956 Constitution, which was equivalent to Art.226 of the Indian 
Constitution. Under Art.98(2)(b)(i), unlike Art.170 of 1956 Constitution or 
Art.226 of the Indian Constitution, a duty is cast upon a High Court to be 
Satisfied* that a person is not being held in the custody ’without lawful 
authority1 or 'in an unlawful manner. 1 The real significance of these 
expressions has been shown m  the case of Baqi Baluch • It has been pointed out 
that the expressions ’without lawful authority1 and ’in an unlawful manner’ 
occuring in Art.9 8 (2 )(b)(i) are not tar^ tologous. A definite meaning has, there­
fore, to be given to each of them. The Constitution, it appears, casts a heavy r< 
responsibility upon the Court to satisfy itself with regard to both these two
■ I1
matters. It is agreed that in ’without lawful authority’ will be comprised 
all questions of vires of the Statute itself,and of the person or persons 
purporting to act under the statute, that is, there must be a competant law 
authorising the detention and the officer issuing such an order must have been
1• Supra•
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lawfully vested with the power. But the expression 'in an unlawful manner' 
covers all matters within the scope of judicial review, apart from the question 
of vires.
The words 'in an unlawful manner* have been used deliberately to give 
meaning and content to the solemn declaration under Art.2 of the 1962 Constitut­
ion that it is the inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance 
with law and only in accordance with law. Therefore, in determining how and in 
what circumstances a detention would be 'in an unlawful manner.' one must first 
see whether the action is in accordance with law; if not, it is action in an 
unlawful manner,'Law' is here not confined to statute law alone but is used in 
its generic sense as connoting everything that is regarded as law in Pakistan, 
including even judicial principles laid down from time to time by the superior 
Courts. It means 'according to the accepted forms of legal process' and postula­
tes a strict performance of all the functions and duties laid down by law. It 
may well be, as has been suggested, that in this sense it is as comprehensive as
the American 'due process' clause in a new garb. It is in this sense that an
action which is mala fide or colourable is not regarded as action in accordance 
with law. Similarly, action taken upon extraneous or irrelevant considerations 
is also not an action in accordance with law. Action taken upon no ground at all 
or without proper application of the mind of the detaining authority would also 
not qualify as action in accordance with law and would, therefore, have to be
struck down as being action taken in an unlawful manner .
It would seem, therefore, that by these words,'without unlawful 
authority' or 'in an unlawful manner*, so far the deprivation of the liberty of 
a citizen is concerned, the Constitution makers intended that this most cherished
1. See Govt, of W.Pakistan v. Begum A.K.Sorigh Kashmiri, Supra.
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right should not be taken away in an arbitrary manner and hence, by sub-clause(b) 
of clause(2)of Art*98, they advisedly left it to the High Courts to review the 
actions of the detaining authority, untrammelled by the formalities or technical­
ities of either S.^91 of the Cr.P.C. or the old prerogative writ of habeas 
corpus, not only with regard to the vires of the law or the officer concerned, 
but also to satisfy themselves that the decision is not in any manner contrary 
to law. The scope of enquiry is, therefore, not in any way fettered by the 
procedure of a writ of habeas corpus or rules laid down under the various Habeas 
Corpus Acts. The Court must nevertheless, in deciding this question, necessarily 
have regard to the language of the Statute under which the power is exercised, 
the purpose for which the detention is sought to be made and the circumstances 
in which it came to be ordered. The content of the power vested by the 
Constitution in the High Courts under Art.9 8 (2)(b)(i) cannot be limited or 
taken away by sub-constitutional legislation, that is, the enactments made by 
legislatures in their legislative capacity •
The question, however, that remains to be considered is whether the 
reasonableness of the action taken by the detaining authority can be examined 
by the High Court, when the statute itself does not require the authority to
act upon reasonable grounds, but leaves him to act upon his own ‘subjective
2
satisfaction.1 It has been pointed out in Abdul Baqi Baluch , following the
3
principle of ‘objective satisfaction* laid down in Ghulam Jilani*s case, that, 
in view of the provision of Art.98(2)(b)(i), the degree of reasonabless of the 
authority‘s satisfaction should be established by High Courts only •
_________ Since the issue before the Court is one of ‘lawful authority1 the____
1. Govt.of W.Pakistan v. Begum A,K.S.Kahmiri, supra.
2. Supra.
3. Supra.
b. Govt.of W.Pakistan v. Begum A,K.S.Kashmiri, supra.
High Court’s jurisdiction in cases under the special Acts or statutes will be 
invoked to enquire into whether the document authorising detention is on the 
fgce of it valid; whether the authority acting under the special statute was a 
competant authority constituted in accordance with the statute; whether the 
authority acted within the limits and under the conditions prescribed by the 
statute; and whether the contravention of the right to personal liberty was
Ij
’in accordance with law,* It is a general rule that any detention will be !
1
illegal unless it can be shown to be in accordance with law .
The writ under Art.98(2)(b)(i) or habeas corpus under S.^91»Cr.P.C. 
will not issue, if there is any other adequate remedy provided by law to give rel­
ief to the aggrieved party; habeas corpus can issue only when there is no adequate
and proper remedy provided by the ordinary law. The alternative remedy, however,
2 3should be specific, adequate, prompt and efficacious . Ferris observes that
’...ordinarily, habeas corpus will not lie where there is another adequate remedy,
by appeal, writ of error, maudamus, motion or otherwise.' He further observes:
”But where constitutional rights cannot be otherwise adequately 
preserved, as where there was no other speedy and efficacious
remedy open to petitioner in the usual and orderly course of
criminal procedure, and there could be no inquiry whether the 
charge constituted an offence against the statute until the 
meeting of a grand jury, and no relief from imprisonment, 
meantime except the writ o f habeas corpus, or by furnishing 
bail, circumstances are presented which call for summary 
inquiry and habeas corpus is proper.”
But the existence of an alternative remedy is not per se a bar to the 
issue of an order under Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution. If a remedy
is available, but it is not adequate, it will not be a bar to invoking the
1. Begum S.M.Hayat Khan v. Govt.of W.Pakistan, Supra.
2. MohcL. Baqui v. Supdt.Cent.Prison, P.L.D.1957* Lah.69^; see also Pasmore v. 
Oswaldwistle Urban District Council,(1898) A.C.587 (H.L); see also Hamesh 
Gul's case,P.L,D.1953iPesh.l.
3* See 'Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies,(1926th Ed.)p.3^»
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jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.98 • The question whether or not a
particular remedy is an adequate remedy, will always depend on the facts of
2each case* In Mehbooh Ali Malik v* Province of W.Pakistan , the scope and 
extent of Art.98 with specific reference to the * other adequate remedy* has 
been explained. It was pointed out that the adequacy of an alternative remedy 
is to be judged in relation to the requisite relief. If the relief available 
through the alternative remedy, in its nature or extent, is not what is necessary 
to give the requisite relief, the alternative remedy is not * other adequate 
remedy* within the meaning of Art.98. If the relief available through the 
alternative remedy, in its nature and context, is what is necessary to give the 
requisite relief, the *adequacy* of the alternative remedy must further be 
judged, with reference to a comparison of the speed, expense or convenience of 
obtaining that relief through the alternative remedy, with the speed, expense 
or convenience of obtaining it under Art.9 8 . The steps to determine whether a 
suitor has an alternative adequate remedy were also laid down; those are 
'(a) formulate the grievance in the given case, as a generalised category;
(b) formulate the relief that is necessary to redress that category of grievance
?
(c) see if the law has prescribed any remedy that can redress that category of 
grievance in that way and to the required extent; (d) if such a remedy is 
prescribed, the law contemplates that resort must be had to that remedy; (e) if 
it appears that the machinery established for the purposes of that remedy is 
not functioning properly, the correct step to take will be a. step that is 
calculated to ensure, so far as lies in the power of the Court, that that 
machinery begins to function as it should. It would net be correct to take
over the function of that machinery. If the function of another organ is taken
1. See Prof. A.Gledhill op.cit.p.l80; See also Mehboob Ali Malik*s case,infra.
2. P.L.D.1963 Lah.575.
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over, that other organ will atrophy, and the^organ that takes over, will break 
down under the strain; (f) if there is no other remedy that can redress that 
category of grievance in that way and to the required extent, or if there is such 
a remedy but conditions attached to it which for a particular category of cases, 
would neutralise or defeat it so as to deprive it of its substance, the Court 
should give the requisite relief under Art.98, and (g) if there is such other 
remedy but there is something so special in the circumstances of a given case 
that the other remedy, while generally adequate to the relief required for that 
category of grievance, is not adequate to the relief that is essential in the 
very special category to which that case belongs, the Courts should give the 
required relief under Art.98.*
The decision given by the Full Bench in Mehboob Aki Makikts case 
and the basis laid down for determining whether the alternative remedy is or is
not adequate, has to be followed whenever a question comes, up before the Courts.
As to the question whether an alternative remedy by way of an appeal under S.l8 
of the V/.Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 19&31 can operate as a bar to 
entertaining a petition under Art.98 of the Constitution, it has been held that 
if the remedy provided by the appeal wao not an adequate remedy, the aggrieved 
party could invoke the jurisdiction under Art.98, without resorting to the 
remedy of the appeal . In cases of excess of jurisdiction, the litigant could
directly apply to the High Court for the issue of the writ under Art.98 without
2 3
exhausting the other remedy of appeal ; the writ of habeas corpus will issue •
T l Fazal Din v. Commr. P.L.D.1968,Pesh,1968.
2. Ali Abbas v. Visham Singh, P.L.D.1967i^C.29^.
3- Abdus Sabur v. ^.M.P.L.D.1969 Pesh.
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Pendency of an appeal will not stand In the way of the aggrieved 
party seeking relief under Art.98, where there are allegations of mala fides. 
excess of jurisdiction or failure to observe the rule of natural justice; the 
establishment of any of the aforesaid allegations corrodes the very foundation 
of the jurisdiction of the Court making the impugned order"* , and habeas 
corpus will issue^.
An accused person may be discharged by a writ of habeas corpus if it 
is established that his conviction was by a Court without jurisdiction, even 
though an eappeal had been taken against his conviction and dismissed, as there 
will be no other remedy available to him to question the validity of his convict­
ion which was illegal. In going into the validity of the conviction, the High
3
Court will not function as a Court of appeal on facts .
Under the Constitution of 1962, the existence of another adequate 
remedy is a constitutional bar. It is well settled that, when an adequate alt­
ernative remedy is available to the petitioner, he is required to pursue that 
remedy first and not to invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to 
issue write of habeas corpus under Art. 98(2)(b)(i). The Court will refuse to 
grant habeas corpus where there exists an alternative remedy, which is equally 
efficient, efficacious and adequate**. In all the cases decided before 1965* 
prior to the enforcement of the 1962 Constitution, the High Courts ordinarily
did not issue writs, if there was another adequate remedy available to the
1. Mohd.Amir Khan v. Controller,P. L.D.1961,SC.119; Murrey Brewery Co.Ltd. , v. 
Pakistan,P.L.D. 1970 Lah.821; Mohd.Swaleh v. M/s Kaud United Fodder,P.L.D.196A, 
SC.97; V s  Farid Sons Ltd. ,v.Govt.of Pakistan, 1961,§0.537; East and West Steam 
ship Co's, case supra; R. Wandsworth ex parte read,1942, A11.E.R.1
2. A Sabur v. A.M. Supra.
3. Muslem uddin Sikdar v. Ch. Sec. Govt, of E*Pakistan,P.L.D. 1957,Dac.l01; see 
also In re: Authors; 22Q.B.345; i11 re Baker: in re Bailey, E & B. 607;
2H and H. 219.
A* Sardar Khan v. D.M. ,P.L.D.1970, Pesh. 1.
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petitioner. The decisions prior to Constitution of 1962, cannot be pressed 
into service in interpreting Art.98, because the Courts then adopted the 
principle of adequate remedy as a rule of policy, prudence and discretion, 
rather than a rule of law. Under Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution, the 
.jurisdiction of the High Courts cannot be invoked, if there exists another
'I
adequate remedy; the *adequate remedy* clause is incorporated in Art.98 itself • 
Aggrieved Party:
The person who applies for the writ of habeas corpus, unlike the 
other writs, and the person who is detained need not be same, under Art.98(2) 
(b)(i). An exception is made to the general rule that a petitioner must urge 
his own grievance, because a persom may be incarcerated in circumstances
2
making it impossible for him to communicate with the Court or his legal adviser •
In England, a person illegally detained or imprisoned, is, bo$iat common law
and by statute, entitled to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, but it is not
essential that the application should proceed directly from him; any person is
entitled to apply for and obtain the writ for the purpose of liberating another
3
from illegal detention • But a mere stranger or volunteer, however, who has 
no authority to appear on behalf of a prisoner or right to represent him, will
not be allowed to apply for habeas corpus ♦__________________________________
1. Fazal Din v. Commr. Supra.
2. See Prof. Gledhill, Pak. p.182.
3* R« v. Clarke (1758) 1 Burr.606; and Gregory's case (1766) 4 Burr.1991•
4- Ibid; see also Halsburys Laws of England, op.cit.p.37*? MUnir J. op.cit., 
p.377; See also Ashley v. White, 14 St.fir.695; In re Agrarellis , (1883)
24 Ch.D.317» andShxvramv. Commr. of Police 50 Bom.LR.210; In re Rajendra,
50 Bom.LR.I8 3 .
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A question before the Supreme Court in an application for ceriorari 
(and not for habeas corpus)was whether#© petition filed by the son of a convict 
was maintainable; could he not be regarded as an Aggrieved party1 in the sense 
contemplated by Art*98? It was peinted out that his father being incarcerated, 
the son was naturally afflicted by the tragedy; he had an inherent legal right 
and interest to avert it, so he must be an aggrieved party. . A writ of 
certiorari, under the circumstances of the case, to quash the proceedings, which 
were without jurisdiction, could be treated as one for a writ of habeas corpus 
for the release of the convict, whose illegal confinement and detention could
'I
be challenged by any person under Art.98(2)(b)(i).
An application,under Art.98(2)(b)(i), challenging detention should 
normally be made by a relation sufficiently close to him or by a friend, who 
can satisfy the Court that there is no one else among the relations of the 
detenu to challenge the detention otfder. Such friend should be very close to 
the detenu and know all the facts and circumstances of the case, so as to be 
able to help the Court in coming to a correct decision on facts alleged or 
contrayerted. Where the person, pretending to be friend of the detenu, failed 
to establish friendship with the detenu to the satisfaction of the Court and 
other facts showed that his connection with the detenu was doubtful and there
were near relations of the detenu capable of challenging the detention order^
2
the petition for habeas corpus was rejected • But a petition from a friend of
the detenu for his release from illegal detention was accepted where there was
no relation of the detenu to challenge the detention and the petitioner was an 
intimate friend, knowing, the alleged and controverted facts of the case^.
1. Prov. of E.Pakistan v. Hirajal Agrawal, P.L.D. ,1970,S#C.399*
2. Azizul Haque v. Prov. of E.Pakistan, P.L.D.,1968,Dac.728.
3. Mazhar Hussain v. Prov. of E.Pakistan, P.L.D.,1970,SC.397
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Though a petition for habeas corpus may be filed by a person other than a detenu 
such person should, in fact, be seeking a remedy for the detenue and be closely 
related to the detenu so as to disclose the facts of the case •
HVhere a “writ petition, aimed at securing the release of some 
foreigners, who were detained as illegal immigrants for deportation to their 
own country, was not made by the relation of the detenue or friends, but by 
the secretary of a semi political body who displayed ignorance of the fact ■
relating to the detention, it was contended that such a petition was an 
abuse of law. The High Court, while recognising the general soundness of the 
submission, was not inclined to dismiss the petition on this ground, as the 
objection to the party was raised at almost the conclusion of the arguments*
It was, however, remarked that it was difficult to see why the detenus, who 
were absolute strangers in Pakistan,presumably without any personal friends 
and relations, should be deprived of the chance of coming to the ^ourt for 
the writ of habeas corpus * The petition was dismissed on another point; it 
had become infractuous, on account of the deportation of the detenus to their
country* It is submitted that, under the circumstances of the case, the detenus
2
should not be deprived of the right to be represented, even by a third person *
The question who may apply and in what manner, is one to be regulated 
by the High Court by Pules to be framed under Art. 101, but it seems that, 'until 
such nles are framed, any one may apply, even a stranger, though the relief 
being discretionary, the Court may decline to make the order asked for, where 
the applicant has no interest whatsoever in the matter. In the case of a minor,
1. Fazal Din. v. Commir.Peshawar, Supra,
2. Jumna Khan v. Govt* of Pakistan, P.L.D, ,1957 Kar.939
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however, the application should be by a person who is entitled to the custody
of the minor and, in the absence of such a person, by a person interested in the
1 2 welfare of the minor and the rule is the same in case of a lunatic •
Successive Applications for Habeas Corpus:
In England until recently, the applicant had a right to apply success­
ively to every Court competent to issue the writ and to every Judge of such
3
Court ; each Judgehaviig^separate jurisdiction to issue the writ, as many 
applications on the same ground as the number of Judges might be made^, and each 
Court and Judge was bound to determine such application upon its merits, 
unfettered by the decision of any other Court or Judge of co-ordinate jurisdict­
ion, even though grounds were exactly the same. By the Appellate Jurisdiction 
Act, I960, the position has been changed. S.14(2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction 
Act, 1969, lays down that, when an application for habeas corpus has been made 
in a civil or criminal matter, no such application shall be made on the same 
grounds in respect of the same person to any Court or Judge, unless fresh 
evidence is produced in support of the application.
Under Art. 226 of the Indian Constitution, the jurisdiction to issue 
the writ is conferred on the High Courts as such and not upon any Judge or 
Judges of the High Court. When a Division Bench has rejected an application for 
habeas corpus, it is not open to the applicant to approach the Full Bench or any 
other judge or judges of the High Court for a similar purpose. To make a second 
application on the same ground would be to apply for a review by the High Court
of its decision. No Court has an Inherent power to review and there is no power
T. Raj Bahadur v. Legal remembrance (1953) 47 CWN.507,(504)*
2. Ex parte Child (I854) 15 CB. 238; see also Mumir J. op.cit.377*
3. See Goddard op.cit; and Heuston, Habeas Corpus Procedure,66 H3.79.
4. Ibid., see also Halsbury1 s Laws of England, op.cit. A.I.R. 1951>Bom.23(27)
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conferred on the High Court to review its decisions in the matter falling 
under Art.226. The decision of the High Court is, therefore, final qua the 
High Courts, notwithstanding that the protection of Fundamental Rights guaran­
teed to the citizen is involved . Under Art.32 the Supreme Court of India has 
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, 
But an applicant whose application., has been rejected by the High Court cannot 
move the Supreme Court for the writ of habeas corpus on the same ground directly\
he can approach to the Supreme Court only after obtaining leave from the High
2
Court to appeal, as the rule of res judicate will apply to such case • It has 
been pointed out by the Indian Supreme Court that the rule of resjudicate is 
not merely a technical rule but is based on public policy);? it can be invoked 
against a petition under Art.32 of the Constitution. It was further observed 
that 'it is in the interest of the public at large that a finalty should attach 
to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it 
is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over 
with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the foundation 
of the general rule of res judicata, they cannot be treated as irrelevant or in­
admissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petition filed under Art.
3
32.' Successive applications for habeas corpus on the same ground cannot be 
made to the Supreme Court of Burma*.
■ In England no appeal lies against a decision of the Court granting a
writ of habeas corpus because the grant or refusal of a prerogative writ is not
5
technically a judgement . It was laid down in Cox v. Hakes that a prisoner
2. Daryao v. St. of U.P.,A.I.R.1961,SC.1457.
3. Ibid.
if. (19^9) Bur. LR.(SC,) 137 (139)* »
3* Goddard, op.cit*
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discharged tinder the writ is free once and for all; error never lay in respect
1
of habeas corpus proceedings . Commenting on this Lord Goddard says that:
" It is true, but the tenor of Lord Halsbury's speech 
and that of Lord Bramwell may well lead to the belief 
that this was because of law* s anxiety to protect the 
liberty of subject and so it was intolerant of anything 
in the nature of an appeal."
He further observes that..
"...it was quite another and highly technical lesson 
that prevented any sort of Appeal."
Appeal against the grant of writ was refused by the House of Lords in Secretary
2
of State v. C^Brien , on the principle laid down in Cox v. Hakes. The decision 
of the House of Lords in Ex .Armaucp puts the question whether an appeal
against the grant of habeas corpus lies or not beyond controversy, as indeed 
did the earlier cases cited above.^
Under the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, the earlier jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court to issue writs concurrently under Art. 22 of the 19 £6 
constitution has come to an end; the Supreme Court of Pakistan cannot issue 
the writs directly, even if the Fundamental Rights are involved. Only the 
Hi^i Courts are empowered under Art.98 of the Constitution of 1962 to issue 
the writs initially and the appeal from the decision of the High Court lies 
to the Supreme Court only on the leave to appeal is granted; if the leave is 
not granted, the aggrieved party cannot move the Supreme Court. Under Art.98 
the power to issue habeas corpus or any other writ, is the power of the High 
Court as such and not of individual Judges, and once it has disposed of a
1. 15 App.Cas.5O6.
2. (1925; A.C.603.
3. (1943; A.C.147.
4* See Goddard op.cit.
petition one way or the other, the High Court is functus officio ai^ the only 
remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for leave to appeal under 
Art.58(3)1.
A subsequent application on the discovery of new facts which, although 
they existed at the timeof previous application, were not known to the applicant 
at that time, can be made to the same High Court* But grounds which were 
available to the applicant at the time of a prior application for habeas porpus 
but not’incorporated in that application, cannot be raised by means of a second 
application; the application will be dismissed.
In the absence of a rule framed by the High Court as to who may apply,
which is necessary to avoid repeated applications, the Court always finds itself
in an embarrassing position where a petition by a stranger has been dismissed
and is followed by one by the detenue himself or someone interested in him,
2
who is more conversant with the facts .
But there is no bar to making a subsequent application on the reject­
ion of the first, on new grounds or facts or the production of new evidence, 
which was not known to the petitioner at the time of the institution of the 
prior application. KVhere the sentence imposed on the petitioner exceeded 
what the petitioner should have served after the remission ordered, by the 
Provincial Government under S. if01 of the Cr. P.C. but there were technical
difficulties with regard to the proof of remission orders, the petitioner was
1. See Xishori v. The Crown^l94-5) 26 Lah. 573\ Mirza Mohd.Yaqub v. The Chief 
Settlement Commr. Lah. ,P.L*D.1965,SC.254.
2. See Mujjfir J. op.cit. p.379.
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allowed to withdraw the petition with permission to file it again after proof 
had been obtained. It was pointed out that, if the detention of the convict 
was illegal at the time when the petition was filed, in view of the aforesaid 
facts, it was a continuing wrong; there should be no bar to the making of a fi*esh 
petition under S.491, Cr.P.C. read with Art.98(2)(b)(i), for habeas corpus to
A
set rigjit that wrong.
The ri$it to the custody of a minor is, in any event, in the nature
of a continuing right, as for each day the minor is kept out of the custody of
person lawfully entitled thereto, successive petitions can be made to obtain
2
the custody of the child •
Nature of Habeas Corpus Proceedings:
Prior to the Independence, High Courts in the Indo-Bak sub-continent 
could issue the writ of habeas corpus only under S. 491 Cr.P.C. and when they 
issued such a writ, it was the view of High Courts that they did so in the 
exercise of their appellate criminal jurisdiction. The position has, however, 
now considerably changed-. In India due to the incorporation of Art.226 in the 
Constitution, and in Pakistan on account of insertion of S.223-A in the Govt, 
of India Act, 1935, it certainly could not, by any stretch of imagination, be 
said to act as a criminal Court or a civil Court. At the most it could be said 
that it exercised an extraordinary jurisdiction to grant speedy justice to help- 
less persons kept in captivity • The position was the same under Art. 170 of
the 1956 Constitution and has continued in the Constitution of 1962; by Art. 98
1. Mazhar Hussain v. Prov. of E. Pakistan, supra*
2. Khizar Hayat Khan v. ^ ainab Begum, P.L.D. 1967,SC.402.
3. Hamesh Gul v. Crown, P.L.D. 1955/Pesh*!*
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(2)(b)(i) the right to personal liberty has been vindicated, so far as the 'writ 
of habeas corpus is concerned, by providing an easy and effective means of 
immediate release from an illegal and unjustifiable confinement, 'whether in a 
civil or criminal proceedings, by a private person or person in authority.
The right of a person to a petition of habeas corpus is a 
constitutional remedy for all matters of illegal confinement, guaranteed under 
Art.98(2)(b)(ii) of the 1962 Constitution. There being no limitation placed 
on the exercise of power by the High Court under Art.98(2)(b)(i), it is 
untrammelled and unfettered by limitations put on it by an ordinary legislation; 
the legislation restricting the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.98 will 
be ignored, and the power^ conferred on the High Court to set the person, illegally
-i
confined or detained^ at liberty,will be given effect to . The content of the
power vested by the Constitution under Art.98 cannot be limited or taken away
2
by an enactment made by the legislature in its legislative capacity ; the bar 
put on the powers of the High Court under Art.98(2)(b)( i) by the Defence of 
Pakistan (Amendment) Ordinance, 1968, that a valid order of detention under the 
Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1965> or Rules made thereunder could not be called 
in question by the High Court was held to be invalid; the order of detention 
made under r.32 of Defence of Pakistan Rules was scrutinized and the detune was 
set at liberty on an application for habeas corpus .^
1. Farid Ahmad v. G-ovt. of W* Pakistan; P.L.D.1965 Lah.135•
2. Govt, of W. Pakistan v. Begum A.K.S. Kashmiri, supra.
3. Ibid.
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3,23 of the W.P. Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, i9 6 0 ,
completely bars the jurisdiction of the Courts to call in question the matter,
if the detention order is made under the Ordinance, Explaining the vast and
unfetted powers given to the High Court under Art#98 (2 ) (b) (l), it was pointed
out that the bar does not operate in view of these vast powers.'*' The limiting
provisions of S.l6 (l) of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1963, which completely
bars the High Court* s jurisdiction to hear the petition under Art.98 (2)(b)(i)^
cannot in any manner be construed to exclude or curtail the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court* It was pointed out that the High Court would not be subject
to such limitation but would step in to grant redress, if any order, purporting
to be made under the Ordinance or Rules made thereunder, transgresses any
2provision of the Constitution or is otherwise mala fide .
£*60 of the F.C.R. expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the Courts
by providing that no decision given, sentence passed or order made by the
authorities authorised under the F.C.R. could be called in question or set aside
by any civil or criminal court. It was pointed out that if the order by any
authority is proved to be mala fide or ultra vires the powers conferred on such
authority, the order in the nature of habeas corpus under S.4 9 1 , notwithstanding
3
the limiting provision of S.60 of the P.C.R,, would lie. Under S. 6 of the 
Pakistan ( Recovery of Abducted Persons) Ordinance, 1949, the matters referred 
to and decided by the Tribunal constituted under the Ordinance, were to be
final, subject to the revision or review by the Central G-overnment. It was held
1. Mohd Anwar V. Govt, of V/.P. Supra.
2. Hussain Ali Chagla V. D.Bf* Supra.
3. Sammundar V. Crown, P.L.D. 1954 F.C. 228, see also Hamesh Gul V. Crown*
Supra;
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that the section does not bar the jurisdiction of the.-High Court for all purposes 
If the detention of the abducted person is the result of mala fides of the 
Tribunal’s decision, the detention wi^l be illegal and it does not by stretch 
of imagination mean that, in the absence of any other adequate femedy, the 
jurisdiction of the High Court to issue habeas corpus to set the person at 
liberty illegally detained, is ousted by the aforesaid section of the Ordinance^
There are certain specified Tribal areas in relation to which}
notwithstanding any provision of the Constitution of 1962, neither the Supreme
Court nor a High Court can, unless the Central Legislature by law provides
otherwise, exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution, It is obvious
that the High Court can not exercise their power under Art, 93 to issue writ
2
to any aggrieved party from such areas#
V/rit jurisdiction has not so far been conferred on the Azad Kashmir 
High Court, "hide it is for the Government to decide whether the time is or is 
not opportune for the conferment of such powers, citizens should have speedy and 
summary remedy available for what they may consider as arbitrary curtailment cf 
their fundamental rights, which are inherent in every free society, by executive 
action. It was, therefore, pointed out that within the four corners of law,
> read with Art.93 (2) (b) (i) ought to receive a liberal 
interpretation, Where, therefore, the liberty of petitioner was infringed by 
executive action, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus would run into
1. Sakhi Daler Khan V.Supdt, P.L.D.1937 Lah. 8ly.
2. See Art. 223 (5) Constitution of 1962#
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the territory of .A sad Kashmir to protect the people against the arbitrary 
deprivation of their personal liberty^
Illegal detention
It is well settled that any detention will be illegal unless it is 
shown that it was made ” in accordance with lawtf • In each case of arrest, if the
Court.comes to the conclusion that the Constitutional safeguards provided by
3 i-Right No# 2, or the statutory requirements of the lav.^  habe been contravened,
it will issue the writ of habeas corpus. The proof that action has lawfully
been taken against the aggrieved person is a complete answer to a petition for
habeas corpus, XIhere for the specif3cpurposes laid down by the law, the
official act is performed by a person so authorised^ in full and strict
Q
compliance with the conditions prescribed by the law, and the record of the case
Q
shows that there was no mala fides on the part of detaining authority, the wT.it 
would be refused.
As a general rule the writ of habeas corpus will be granted if the 
accused is illegally detained in custody without being produced before the 
Magistrate within twenty-four hours of the arrestwhere he has been detained
1. See Tfalayat Jan V. State, Supra.
2. Sakhi Daler V, Supdt. Supra;and Abul Ala MaUdoodi V.State Bank,Supra,
3. Aboulggaqi Baluchis#case supra;and Nkssain Chaglafs case,supra;and Rafioue 
a n xira us^case,supra; x
4*  ^Mohd, Anwar V.G-ovt of W.P,, supra;and Khair Mohd V.G-ovt of y.P.supraq
SfraJuddin V.State, Supra,
3, NaroO'p Radar1s case supra; but the writ was granted as the Court failed to
give such proof.
6* Muzaffar Ivlahmood V,Crown,supra,
7. Jumma Khan V.Pak.P.L.D.1337 Kar.939.Crown V. Mohd. Afzal.ifra P.L.D.19 5 6  F.C,
8. Inayatullah Kh*I.Iashriqi V.Crown P.L.D,1932 Lah,331
9. Ibid.
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1 2 "in the C.I.D. or C.I.A. office instead of the "police-station or “judicial
lock-upf or where there is nothing on the record to show what crime had been
committed by the accused or no reasons for the detention have been communicated
the prisoner or detenu^ ' 7/here an illegal order of remand to “public custody"'
namely the “police-station" or the "judicial lock-up was made without any
justification or reasonable ground^ where the Magistrate making the remand
order did not disclose that he was a Magistrate; where the reasons for the
7
remand order were not stated in writing; where the prisoner was not produced
g
before the Magistrate malting the remand order, where the Magistrate did not
9
allow the accused to arrange for counsel to appear and represent him, where the 
remand order was inviolation of the lav/ under which the accused was being tried^ 
where the accused was remanded to the C.I.A. or C.I.D. office instead of "public
custody"^ where the remand was ordered by a Magistrate while he was walking in
12 * the street, where the Dy. Commissioner fead not been "satisfied" as to the
validity of making the remand order, as required by S.6 of the F.C.R* before he
1 5referred the case to the Jirgha; or where the authority making the remand order
1. Aiysha Begum1s case,supra.
2. State V.Mohd. Yusuf P.L.D.19jS5ihah*324
g. ibid ^
4* Ghuls/mftulla^ Khan V.D.M. Supra: Mahmooda, Begum' s V. Commr.P.L.D. 1%6.S.C.701, Aisnya Begunrs case supra and state v. Mohd rasar, supra.
5* Farooq Bader's case, supra;
6. Jahangiri Lai V. Emp. Supra.
7, Khairati Ram's case, supra.
8* Crown V. Shera Supra;
9. Farooq Bazar's case supra.
10. Nazir Ahmad V. State, supra.
11 .v‘ State vTlkohd Yu^usysuppa; and Aishya Begum's case,supra.
12. Edward V.Ferris,supra;
13. Hamesh G-ul V. Crown; Supra.
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m s  not a Magistrate , the aggrieved person were held to be entitled to habeas 
corpus*
“When the right of the accused to be defended by the counsel of his
2
choice has been contravened , the detenu was not allowed to be defended by the 
3
counsel , when if the aggrieved person and his counsel were excluded from the 
4
court and the proceedings were held in their absence, habeas corpus was granted*
In England the detenu may be set at liberty by a writ of habeas corpus *
if it is established that his conviction was without jurisdiction, even though
5
an appeal has been filed against his conviction and dismissed • The law is the
same in India and Pakistan* The condition precedent to making of an order of
reference to a Jirga under the is that these should be a prlma facie case
against the accused* IShere there was no prima facie case against the accused,
his detention in the prison during the trial by the Jirga, was held illegal,
6
habeas corpus was granted • Habeas corpus was also issued, where a case against 
the accused was pending before a magistrate for enquiry, but was transferred to 
the Tribunal for trial under the W.p# Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963 but 
there was no evidence against the accused and the transfer was held to be with­
out jurisdiction^* Where the authority empowered to try a case was the
Political Agent, but the accused was convicted by the Additional Political
Q
Agent and where the authority to detain was vested in the
1* IChair Mohd's case,supra,; but Dy*Commr*under P.C.R*is a Magistrate; he
makes a remand order, see state v. Dosso, P.L.D.195^ Sp*5 P«3«
2* Khair Mohd* s case, supra; and I.iaq Ahmad* s case,supra.
3* Muslemuddin Sikdar V.Ch. Sec* P.L.D* 1957 Dac*101; Warryan^v* State 195^ Iah.151
and Basal Ahmad Ayribi1 s case, Supra*
4* Bazal Ahmad Ayynbif s case*
5* In re: Bailey,(1864) 3 E.B.607; in re: Barker,2 H.N.219; In re:Authors
(1889) 22 Q.B.345; in re. Coiler: 16 Q.Digest 254,257 and King Governor 
of Lawes Pidson, Ex parte Doyle (1917) 2 K.B.254.
6. S.N*Haji MohcLKhan v* Addl.Commr*P.L.D*1964 lah. 401; and Sher Mohd v* 
Sibghatullah P.L.D.1967 Pesh*l67.
7. Mehar Jang v. Commir.P.L.D.1969 Pesh*lll.
8* Bahadur Z&man v Crown, P.Ii*D*1957> Pesh,41* ,
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D.M. but the order of detention was made by the A.D.M. , habeas corpus was 
issued. The authority to order three years R.I. for failure to furnish 
security to keep the peace under 3.123(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
vested by reference to the P.C.R., in the Commissioner; where the order of
imprisonment was made by the Dy. Commissioner, it was held to be without
2
jurisdiction and the petitioner was set at liberty •
Even if the matter has been properly referred to a Jirga under S.11
of the P.C.R., to rule on the guilt or innocence of the accused, Art.98(2)(b)(i)
of the 1962 Constitution confers power on the High Court to interfere, if the
Statutory requirements of the P.C.R. that there should be a prima facie case
3
against the accused , Dy.Commissioner should be satisfied before he makes the
kreference to a Jirga , and no reference can be made- to a Jirga if a complaint
has been dismissed under S.203 of the Cr.P.C. unless further enquiry has been
3
ordered for a revival of a case on a fresh application , have been contravened; 
the detention of the accused under such circumstances, violating the mandatory 
requirements, will be without jurisdiction and the detenu will be set at liberty
Where the petitioners were arrested and convicted for possessing the 
foodstuff's in excess of the permitted amount, the proof whereof was not given 
by the authority, as required by the E.P.Food Control of Movements and
1. Mohd.Ali v. Pakistan,P.L.D.1961.Kar.88.
2. Ajab Khan v. State,P.L.D.1963 Pesh,22^.
3. Mohd.Aslam v. State,P.L.D.1963 S.C.373*
Ali Mohd. v. Commi.P.L.D.198^ Quetta 1; Mohd.Aslam v. State,P.L.D.i9 6 3 .SC.
373 and S.N.Haji Mohd.Khan v. Addl.Commr.P.L.D.196*f Lah.401. The decision 
in Samundar v. Crown,P.L.D.195^ ^C.228,was dissented from as the powers 
under Art.98(2)(b)(i) were held to be wider than that enjoyed by the High ,
Court under S,^91,Cr.P.C.; which was qpplicable when that case wqs decided.
3* State v. Nawab Gul,P.L.D.1963 SC.270.
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Distribution) Ordinance,1936, it was held that the conviction was illegal; the
'I
convict was released • Habeas corpus was' also granted when a detenu was placed 
in the jail under a 'warrant of Commitment1 issued by the Central Government for 
'reasons connected with the maintenance of public order,' it was held that the 
warrant was invalid as the 'warrant of commitment' for the aforesaid purposes 
could, under the Bengal State, Prisoners Regulation,l8l8,only be issued by the
Provincial Government) the detention was held to be illegal, and the detenu was
2
set at liberty •
y The rules of natural justice apply to all tribunals, quasi-judicial
or administrative, who are called upon to pass orders depriving a person of his 
liberty, they must keep an open mind, that is a mind which is not so biased as 
to be prompted by any personal motive to pass an order of imprisonment. They 
should act on the maxim that, not only should justice be done, but it should
be manifestly seen to be done. Thus where it was proved that the authority
3
making the order of detention was biased , where the prosecuting authority and
if
the judge were one and the same person , where one of the members of an Advisory
5
Board was the person who passed the detention order and where opportunity to 
be heard was not given before action was taken^, the petitioners were released 
by writ of habeas corpus.
(ii) Preventive Detention:
Even in the cases of preventive detention, habeas corpus will issue,
if it is established that the order of detention was feham, colourful or
1. Muslemuddin Sikdar's case supra.
2. Mohd.Anwar Bepari v. Crown, P.L.D.1933 Lah.3 8 5 *
3. Sher Mohd.Khan's case supra.
*f. Mohd.Mohsin Siddiqui v. Govt.of V/.Pakistan,supra.
3. Rahmat Elahi v. Govt.of West Pa: kistan,supra.
6. Liaq Ahmad's case; supra Bazal Ahmad Ayyubi's case supra; Mustafa Ansari's 
case supra; ^ ofazzal Hussain's case supra.
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A
malafide . Before the decision in Ghulam Jilani1 s case, which laid down the 
principle that ' objective satisfaction' , • the 1 subjective satis­
faction' of the detaining authority 'was regarded as final; production of a
valid detention order, made under the relevant preventive detention law, was
2
accepted as a complete answer to a petition for habeas corpus • But since,
Ghulam Jilani1 s case was decided, the principle of 'objective satisfaction*in
3
the case of preventive detention, has been established in Pakistan • It was held
in that case that, on a petition for habeas corpus .the Court must, in exercising
its powers under Art.98(2)(b)(ii) of the 1962 Constitution, be satisfied that the
detenu is not being held without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner. The
ipse dixit of the detaining authority is not enough, ^he material on which it
claims to be satisfied must be proved. If the detaining authority fails to
satisfy the Court on facts that there existed justification for the detention
L
of the petitioner, the writ of habeas corpus will issue •
Vi/here a person, who has been detained under a preventive detention law, 
applies for a writ of habeas corpus, what the Court is concerned is not whether 
the arrest of the petitioner was legal or illegal but whether his detention 
under the order passed is legal or illegal at the time he makes application.
1. Ghulam Mohd.Loondkhwar' s case, supra, Hamidnzhafar' s case supra; Abuzar's 
case supra* Refique Ahmad's case^supra; Hussain Ali Chagla*s case supra; 
Govt, of E.Pakistan. v.Rowshan, supra; Jagannath Misra v. State ,A. I.R. 1966 
SC. 1140; Sadanandon v. State of Kerala,A.I.R. 1966 SC. 125 Kurandikar v. 
State Cal.A*I.R*1967 Bom. 11* Pio Fernandes v. Union A.I.R. 1967 Cal.231; 
State of M. S.V.Almarane ,A. I.R. 1966 ,SC. 1786.
2. See Inayatullah Mashriqui*s case,supra; and Nasim Fatima's case supra.
3. Ghulam Jilam* s case, supra. Abdul Baqi Balach'e case supra; Govt.of W. 
Pakistan v. Begum A.K.S.Kashimri* s case, supra; and Begum S#M.Hayat Khan 
v. Govt, of W*Pakistan, supra and Mohd Aslam v. Govt, of W.Pakistan,P.L.D. 
1968, Iiah.667.
4. Ibid.
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The detention which he complains by the petition, is the detention in the jail 
on the date when he makes application, and it is immaterial for the determination 
of the question as to whether his prior arrest and detention were or were not 
legal* The question in the habeas corpus proceedings is whether the detention of 
which the detenue complains, that is, the detention at the time when he seeks a 
writ of habeas corpus, is valid or not* The question is whether at the moment 
there is for his detention a valid order in existence; if there is such an 
order no writ of habeas corpus can be issued * It follows from this that 
successive ordeig, correcting defects in previous order of detention can be made 
and what is required is that the petitioner must be detained under a valid order 
of detention at the time of instituting the writ proceedings* But where a
subsequent order merely extends a previous order of detention, which itself was
2
illegal j it cannot be regarded as valid order of detention, and habeas corpus
3
will be granted . Repeated orders of detention without given the detenu an 
opportunity to desist from his activities may, in certain cases, be regarded as 
vindictive, dishonest or punitive and not preventive and where such a view can 
fairly be taken, the High Court will hold the order invalid and set the detenu 
at liberty • But renewal of an order of detention from time to time is 
justified, if the Government is satisfied and honestly forms the opinion that the 
detenu, if released, would engage in the same activities* Such successive 
orders of detention were held valid and a writ under Art.98(2)(1) was refused^.
 ^ --------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Basant Chanjra Ghose^ case,supra; in re Jayarartilal N.Parek supra* and Begum
S.M*Hayat Khan*s case, supra.
2. Mohd.Aslam v. Govt.W.P. supra.
3* Mohd.Masum v. State supra; Arab Mohd.Khan*s case, supra; Begum S.M.Hayat 
Khan, supra.
Inayatullaly Kh.Mashriqi v. Crown P.L.D.1952,Lah.331*
3* Mirzachughtai v. Govt.of W.P^P.L.D.1968,infra; see also Inayalull^
Mashriqu*s case supra.
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In preventive detention cases, the writ under Art.98(2)(b)(i) or under
S.491 Cr.P.C. has issued where the grounds of detention were not communicated to
1 2 the detenu , where the grounds did not exist at all , where the grounds were
3vague as to render the detenu unable to make the representation , where the
grounds were so general as to be a mere reproduction of the purposes enumerated
k
in the preventive detention law , where the grounds were not relevant to the
5
purposes of the statute , and where on of the grounds was illegal or outside
£
the scope of the preventive detention law • Speeches not calculated to disturb
public order^ and membership of a political party, unaccompanied by the commission
8
of subversive activities by the detenu , cannot be grounds for the detention of
any person, and if anybody is detained on these grounds, he will be released on
the writ of habeas corpus. But if the grounds are sufficiently clear and relevant
to the purposes of the preventive detention law, the writ of habeas corpus will 
9
not be granted • Delay which cannot stand the test of 'as soon as may be* 
in the communication of the grounds will entitle the detenu
1. Ghulamullah Khan's case supra; Farooq Badar's case,supra; Sirajuddin's case, 
supra; and Govt.of E.P. v. Rowshan supra.
2. Abdul Qayyum's case supra; Hasan Nasir's case supra; Sibte^asan's case supra
3. Hasan Nasir's case,supra; Sardaru v. Crown P.L.D.1933,sind'f Ghulam Mohd.Khan
Loond Khwar's case supra.
*f. Hasan Ali Chagla's case, supra; and Begum S.MHayat Khan's case,supra;
3. Farid Ahmad Khan's case supra; Rahmat Elahi's case,supra,Mukhtear Ali's case
supra; Abdullah v. Crown P.L.D.1950,Kar.68.
6. Mahboob Anam's case, Supra
7. Farid Ahmad Khan's case, supra; Prov.of E.P.V. Tofazzal Hussain,supra;
Abuxar v. Prov.of W.Pakistan.
8. Hasan Nasir's case supra; Ralmat Elahi's case, supra; Farid Ahmad's case supra
9. Muzaffaruddin v. Crown,P.L.D.1950*Sind.113; Inayatullah Khan's case supra, and 
Moina Khatoon v. Govt, of Pak.P.L.D.1957,Kar.530*
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1to habeas corpus. Habeas corpus will also be granted in cases of detention under 
2
an invalid law.
In cases of preventive detention fox’ a period exceeding three months,
if.the constitutional requirements, that the matter should be referred to the
Advisory Board constituted under Bight No.2. (4-), and that the Advisoiy Board
should report before the expiration of three months about the validity of the
continuation of the detention, are contravened, habeas corpus will be issued^
Habeas corpus will also be granted where the decision of the Advisory Board is
not communicated to the deteuJj; or where the Advisoiy Board is not properly 
5
constituted. A detenu is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus even before his 
case has been referred to the Advisory Board; a detenu can challenge the order 
of detention by the writ petition for habeas corpus immediately after his 
detention^
Freedom of Hovementj_
Y/rit of habeas corpus is also available to a person aggrieved by
wrongful deprivation of his right to move freely in Pakistan* A writ or
direction in the nature of habeas corpus was issued in a case where the movements
of a person were restricted to a specified area, thereby depriving him of the
1* Basal Ahmad Ghazi's case, supra ;G-hulamullah Khan* s case,supra;but writ was 
refused where the delay was justifiable under the circumstances of the case; 
see Iviuzaffaruddin* s case supra.
2. See Behra.tn Khan v State, P.L.D. 1957 Ear.409,but habeas corpus will not be
granted where the statute does not contravene any of the safeguards provided
by the constitution,ibid;
3. Ivlohd Sarwar's case supra;Sibte IJdLssaflLnicase,supra;and MirpeO-das* case supra;
4-, Sirajuddin's case,supra;Mohd Ahmad1 s case supra.
5, Rakmat Elahi;s case,supra.
6. Farid Ahmad's case,supra; Farooq Badar's case supra.
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liberty of free movement. "There an order of externment is not relatable to the
2
object of the Statute authorising externment, where the authority passing the
3externment order was not satisfied as to the reasonableness of the exterment^
where the grounds of the externment order were not communicated to the externee^
and where an order under S.108-A of the Cr. P.C. was passed without following the
5
mandatory procedure laid down in ss.112,113,114, 117 and 118 of the Cr.P.C., and 
?7here the externee was directed to remove himself from the district in which he
g
resided, in violation of the Statute authorising externment, habeas corpus was 
r^uhted.
Wrongful refusal to bail
The remedy at common law for the improper refusal of bail was the vjrit 
of habeas corpus? An exception to the authority of the Courts to admit to bail is
Q
where the commitment is for contempt or execution, for the adjudication that an 
act is contempt or breach of privilege amounts to conviction, and the commitment
9
in consequence is execution. Ydien a court decides to make a complaint to a 
magistrate of an offence committed in relation to a proceeding before it under
S.476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it nay order the accused to appear before
1* Rao Mahroz Akhtar1 s case",supra;i/ohd Anwar1 s case,supra;Hari Khemu C-awali* s cas
supra;N.B. Khare v state,supra; Guru Bachan Singh1s case suprajRanji Luxman v. 
State,supra; Jesinghbhai v.Emperor,supra;and Bazal Ahmad Ayyubi’s case supra. 
2* Mohd.Anwar*s case supra.
3. Abid Ali Mirza v.G-ovt.of W.P. ,P.L.D. 1967 Kar.408.
4. HakimAli V.A.M. ,P.L.i).1965 Lah.418
5* 'Jalayat Jan v.State,P.L.D. 1970 Azad J.andK.27.
6. Hakim Ali*s case supra,see also G-hulan Mohd.V.state,P.L.D. 1969 Lah.767,and
Ghulam Ali v.State,P.L.D.1970 S.C.253.
7« 4,Co. Inst. 70
8. 4 ,Bl.Com.296.
9. Brass Crosby’s case (1771), 3 "Tils. 188 at p.199, per De Grey,£.J.see
also R.v. Beardmore (1754) 2 Burr.792;see Halsbury’s Laws of England op.Cit 
P. 53.
380
the magistrate only when it has recorded its findings and decided to make a 
complaint* Before passing a final order that a complaint should he made, the 
court has no power to confine or put on hail. Therefore, where a Court, before 
finally deciding to make a complaint under S.476, Cr.P.C*, ordered the accused 
to be detained in the judicial lock-up, the proper application would be for 
habeas corpus and not for bail, because the court has no power,at this stage 
to grant bail3
T7here the accused was brought before the city Magistrate for the
verification of the sureties to be furnished for his release on bail, the
accused was asked to appear next day with sureties for an enhanced amount.,
Meanwhile he was ordered to be detained under ss.ll and 14 of the Y/.P.Control
of Goondas Ordinance, 1959, by the D.M. In a writ petition for habeas corpus
it was held that his detention in the jail was without any lawful authority,
in so far as he had been deprived of his right to be released on bail; he
should be released on furnishing the proper amount of security. It was
emphasized that the Magistrates and Tribunals should not demand an excessive
amount of security and that the amount should be fixed v;ith proper regard to
2the financial Status of the person concerned. The principles for the guidance 
of the Magistrates and Tribunals fixing the amount of security or number of 
sureties, were enumerated in Mohd.Sarwar.v Stated
Extradition
Under Art.2 of the Constitution of 1962, an :inalienable right to
the enjoyment of the protection of lav; and to be treated in accordance with law 
SKEMia NaKff'V.S'.D.a'abha A.l.K.X^ Lah.J32fl.-----------------;------------
2. Abdus Sabur V.D.I.'. P.L.D. 1 9 6 9  Pesh.l67
3. P.L.D. 1965 Pesh.14.
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has been guaranteed to two categories of persons; firstly to every citizen
of Pakistan, and secondly to eveiy other person who is for the time being in
Pakistan* The seoond category includes a foreigner, who has been committed by
a Magistrate on the warrant of a foreign Government for extradition in respect
of an offence committed abroad^ and such foreigner is entitled to invoke the
jurisdiction of the High Court in challenging the validity of an extradition
2
order and praying for habeas corpus*
Even in the report of the Asia Regions Conference, Kyote, held on
25th and 26th of September,1967| the right and responsibility of the judiciary 
of the country from which extradition is sought to enquire into the question of 
the claims has been acknowledged^* Also, in the Extraditions Acts themselves, 
there are references to petitions of habeas corpus and the right of a person 
sought to be extradited to file such a petition has been clearly admitted* Hence 
the high court has beyond doubt, jurisdiction to entertain a petition for habeas 
corpus» even after the extradition orders have been made against the petitioner 
and he has been put in charge of the embassy of the country seeking extradition1"
An accused, not a British subject, but a native of Jind State, had l 
committed an offence within the cognizance of British Indian Courts and was arrested
in Jind State by the British Indian Police* Before he was tried by a court in Britisk
India, he as extradited and handed over to the British Indian authorities nearest to 
the border of Jind State, It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that 
the detention of the accused in British India was not illegal, as he was properly 
extradited and handed over to the proper authorities
1. See S*3 of the Indian Extradition Act (XV of 1903 as adopted in Pakistan.
2. Joseph Gonzale De Garcia Balseras v. State, P.L*D. 1969 Lah.129; see alsop 
Sandal v. D.M. Dehradun A*I*R* 1934 All*148, A.W. Goulter v.Emperor A.I.R/Slnd 244
3. See Halsbury*s Laws of England,3rd ed.vol. 16,paras 1190 to 1192 
4 Joseph Gonzalo De Garcia Balseras v* State, supra*
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so the writ was not granted* In another case the petitioner who had
previously heen arrested, was released on bail by the District Magistrate,
but later was ordered to appear in the Court of the Assistant Commissioner,
as it was intended to hand him over to the Karachi Police for the extradition
proceedings, on a simple message from the Karachi Police* It was held that
the handing over of the petitioner to the Karachi Police, on a mere message
and without a&y proceedings was preposterous and illegal; the D*M* was directed
2
not to hand over the petitioner to the Karachi Police.
In England, no one may be surrendered for extradition in respect of
an offence of a political character* When a Magistrate commits a person for
extradition, his decision that the offence charged is not of a political c
character, may be reviewed by the High Court on an application for a writ of
habeas corpus^ A person may be released firom custody by a writ of habeas corpus
if he has been committed for extradition where the offence is not extraditable;
5
where it is political offence, or is not covered by Extradition Treaty, but if
there is evidence that the offence alleged to have been committed is extraditable
no writ can be granted on the ground that the extradition is being asked for to
£
take action against him for political activites*
But the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, adapted in Pakistan, lays down
that, if the Central Government^ is of opinion that the crime, of which any
fugitive criminal of a foreign state is accused or alleged to have been convicted
is of a political character,it may, if it thinks fit, refuse to issue an order
1* Rahim v. Emperor, A.I.R.194**- P*C. 73.
2. Mohd Boata v. Sarker,P.L.D. 1939 Azad J & K 72. ^
3♦ See S.3(l) Extradition Act 1870 (33 & 34 vict.C.25)
4. Re Castioni (1891) 1.Q.B.249? Re Kolc^ynski (1935) 1 A11.E.R.31, Halsbury*s
5* In re Wilson (1891) 1 Q.B.D.42: Laws,opcit £.33*
6. Adibandhu v. Emp. ,A.I.R.1946 Pat.146; Munir J.opcit.p.38l
7. Words "for any Local Govt? were omitted by A.O. 1937#
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to any Magistrate who would have jurisdiction to inquire into the crime df 
it had "been an offence committed within the local limits of his jurisdiction, 
directing him to inquire into the case* In India or Pakistan, it is clear that 
the final authority to rule on whether a crime, of which a fugitive criminal 
of a foreign state is charged, is of political character lies with the Central 
Government; Courts are debarred from deciding the said question*
In India, with respect to British Statutes relating to extradition, 
which were applicable to India before the commencement of the Constitution 1950, 
the Law Commission of India has made the following observation*
"We have got a law of our own on the subject - the Indian 
Extradition Act,1903t This lays down the procedure to be followed 
in India after a valid requisition for extradition is received from 
a Foreign State* The right of a Foreign Government to make such 
requisition, however, rests on treaty between the two countries 
concerned1*1
"Now, so far as the right of England or any British possession to 
demand extradition from India is concerned, the law is provided by the 
English Statutes* •• and the Indian Extradition Act proceeds on the 
assumption that these Statutes apply to India* The Statutes,however, 
apply to "British possessions"* In State of Madras v* V.G.Menon, the 
Supreme English Statutes were,therefore, no longer applicable to India 
after it had become republic"•
"Observations were made by the Supreme Court as to the need of 
making fresh treaties with the Republic of India and need for fresh 
legislation in this respect’. Government should take early steps in the 
matter of fresh legislation, in view of those observations of the 
Supreme Court"?’
In Pakistan, as far as extradition matters are concerned, Indian Extradition Act, 
1903, is applicable and no observations of the effect, as made by the Indian Law
Commission and the Indian Supreme Court, has been made by the Pakistan’s Courts.
1. See S.3 of the Indian Extradition Act ,1903*
2* Extradition Act, 1870 & 1873*
3. iS>5A s.c.517
4. Fifth Report, dated 11th May 1957.
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Custody of Infanta
In England, a parent, guardian or other person who is legally
entitled to the custody of a child can regain that custody when wrongfully
deprived of it, by means of the writ of habeas corpus* The unlawful detention
of a child from the person who is legally entitled to its custody is, for the
purpose of issue of the writ, is regarded an equivalent to unlawful imprisonment
or detention of the child^ It is therefore, necessaiy to allege in applying
for the writ of habeas corpus that any restraint or force is being used towards
2
the infant by the person in whose custody and control it is for the time being*
It is submitted, law is same in India and Pakistan*
The question of the consent of the children does not - arise in a
3
case of habeas corpus for the restoration of custody of children who are minorsf 
Wher^, in a petition for habeas corpus by the divorced wife, it was contended 
on behalf of the father that the children were not being detained against their 
will, the contention was rejected and it was held that the question of the 
consent of the minor children did not arise at all, and that the detention of 
the children against the wishes of their lawful guardian, the mother, ^mounted to 
unlawful detention as contemplated by S.491, or P.C*; Habeas corpus was granted^-
The writ of habeas corpus is resorted to not only to obtain the custody
of the children wrongfully detained but also to determine the rights of the
1. R.V.Clarke (1875) 7 E & B. 18^ (l93) per Lord Cambell C*J«
2* See Ex J?arte M*Clellan (I831) l*Dowl*81; see also Halsbury Laws op*ci*p*34*
3* 14 yrs* in a case of a boy and 1.6 vrs in case of a girl*
Safia Bibi v* Ghulam Hussain SlS^lMaqsood Begum v.Mohd.Aslam Khan,P.L*D.
Azad J*£*K* 13*
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parties to their custody?' If by an erroneous view of the law or an erroneous
assumption of the facts, the jurisdiction to rule on the conflicting rights of
the parties to the custody cf the children is assumed or denied by the Court
to which the application for the custody of the children is made by the person
fully entitled for such custody, remedy by writ of habeas corpus will.be 
2
available.
iVbon-the parent has voluntarily parted with the custody of the child 
by entrusting it to another person, a writ of habeas corpus will be issued at 
the instance of the parent, even though the person whom the child was entrusted 
alleges that he does not know where the child is, for the parent' is entitled 
to acquire a return to be made to the writ, so that the facts may be fully 
ir.ve st igated.^
The availability of another remedy at law', -such as the remedy under 
the Guardians and hards Act, for obtaining custody of a minor child is not a 
ground for refusing an application for habeas corpus by the parent or guardian o: 
the minor who is entitled to have his or her custody, where the minor is being
if.
illegally detained by another person.
The true principles deducible from the authorities, by which the Court
should be guided in an application for habeas corpus for the restoration of the
child by the real guardian are that the Court must judge upon the circumstances
of each particular case and that the welfare of the infant, irrespective of its
5
age, as the main factor to be regarded*
1. Khizar Hay at Khan v. Zainab Begum, P. L.D. 1967 S~.(T.402~.
2. See Burnardo v.Ford,Supra; see also Lord Halsbury ,0p.Cit p. 34*
3. Subbaswami Govindan v. Kamakshi Animal,A.I.R. 1529 Mad.654 _ - .
4 Khizar Hayat Khan v.Zianab Begun,Supra.
5. hrs. Annie Eesant v.C.Narayamiah.A.I.R.1914,P.C.4l(42) ;see also Loyors v.
Blenkin (1S2) Jac.Rep.245.
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The fact that the father:'had married a second v/ife is not a
sufficient ground for holding that he was unfit to be the guardian of his
children. There is no doubt that the welfare of tbs girls was the primary
consideration, which would influence the Court ultimately; at the same time,
it ought not to be forgotten that the Legislature advisedly draws a distriction
between the legal rights of husband and parents on the one side and those of
the other near relations on the other side. In the first class of cases, it must
be established that any act or conduct of the husband or father renders him
unfit for guardianship; the fact that the child may be happier and more
comfortable with other relations is not sufficient to deprive the two relations
referred to of their right and duty, The same sanctity does not attach to the
1
■rights claimed by the other relations,
In England, as among the Hundus, the father is the natural guardian
of his children during their minorities, but this guardianship is in the nature
of a sacred trust, and he cannot, therefore, during his lifetime, substitute
another person to be a guardian in his place. He may, it is true, in the
exercise of his discretion as guardian, entrust the custody" and education of
his children to another, but the authority he thus confers is essentially a
revocable authority, and if the welfare of his children requires it, he can,
notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, take such custody" and education 
once more into his own hands. If, however, the authority has been acted upon
in such a way as, in the opinion of the Court exercising the jurisdiction of
the crown over infants, to create associations or give rise to expectations on
the part of tne infants, which it would od undersirable in their interests to
1. Audiappa Pillai v. NaUendran Pillai A.I.R. 1916 Mad.605 (D.B.)
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disturb or disappoint, such Court will interfere to prevent its revocation.
The custody of a miner may even be handed over to a Court of Wards
if it is legally entitled to superintendence over the minors and if it is to
o
the benefit of the minors. Where a person has been appointed as guardian of a 
minor by a Court, an application for habeas corpus for recovery of custody from 
him cannot be made, because his custody cannot be said to be improper or illegal. 
Habeas corpus cannot be resorted to for the purpose of nullifying the order of 
the Court in such a case^
The Court has -jurisdiction to make an order relating to the custody 
of an infant even when the infant is outside the jurisdiction, though it would 
be very unusual to do so and in many cases most undersirable to do so^l’
When the infants were residing in England, the Court in India had no 
Jurisdiction over themi Where the infants were in England and an Indian Court 
granted a mandatory injunction against the defendant, directing him to give 
possession of the infants so that they could be brought to India arid handed 
over to their father, it was held by the Priory Council that such an order ought 
not to have been made. Considering the age of the children an attempted 
compliance with the order would, if the infants had refused to return to India, 
have been contrary to lav; of England and would have at once exposed the 
defendants to proceedings in England on a writ of habeas c our pus. No Court 
ought to make an order which might lead to such consequence*.
T> Mrs. Annie Beasart v.G. Narayiah, A.I.R.191A P.C.41 (44)
2. Dy. Commissioner, Gond v. M.L. Shikoh, A.I.R, 193k Oudh 392 C393)
3. King. v. Greenhill. (1936) 4 Ad. & El. 624 Disting; see A.I.R.1931 Mad.7Z3 ,
4. H.V. Sadback Justices,Ex Parte Smith (1950) 2 AH, E.R.7 SI-7 8 3 ) \(t2)
5. Harris v Harris, (l94§) 2 All E.R.318 (322;
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Husband and wife
In England, a husband may obtain the custody of his wife by a writ of
habeas corpus, if she is detained by third person against her will^ but not where
2
she is living voluntarily and without any restraint. A wife nay also ask to be 
released from the custody of her husband who wishes to exercise his <conjugal: 
riJ ’its by force or confinement^
But in Pakistan, a Muslin husband has a right to the custody of his
wife and whether .she is living with third person according to her will or npt, is
immaterial; the husband is entitled to obtain her custody^ in both the cases, by
a writ of habeas corpus. The cases of Christian or other minority community wives
are, however, governed by the same law as in England. According to Muslim
Personal law, which is applicable to Muslins in cases of marriage, divorce, and
other cases falling under Muslim personal law, a wife has no right to exercise
her free will to live with any person other than her husband, so far as sh<?. is
married to the husband. If she -wants to live with or marry a third person she
5
will have to get first her marriage dissolved by the Family Court. Nor can a
wife ask by a petition for habeas corpus to be released from the custody of her
husband in cases of illegal or improper detention by the husband except in some 
extra ordinary circumstances,when whe is fearing death or other serious 
consequences, she can, no doubt apply for the writ of habeas corpus^
TI he Cochrane', (194$) Dcwl.630.
2. Place v. Scarle (I9g2) 2 K.B.497*
3. II.V. Jackson (1891) 1 Q.3.671;see also Munr. J.op.cit.p.381
4* Mushtaque Ahmad v. Mohd.Amin, P.L.D.1962 Kar.442.
3» See Painly Laws Ordinance,1962.
6. State v. Ashfaque Ahmad Sheikh,P.L.D.1967 Lah.1231,
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It has been observed by the Lahore High Court that a Muslin husband’s
custody of his wife is not normally illegal or improper detention, but it might
become so in the circumstances of the case, so a heavy duty is on the Court,
in cases where a Muslim husband is described as illegally or improperly detaining
his v/ife, to come to a definite conclusion that the husband is actually
detaining his wife illegally or improperly, before the Court can pass an order
setting the wife at liberty. The discretionary relief which the High Court is
supposed to provide under S.451* Cr.P.C., is not meant for promoting the cause
of vice^# A wife had Started cohabiting with her husband’s brother and was the
mother of a young son; she had not broken the marriage tie with her husband; she
could not produce a Nikah-Nama (marriage certificate) in proof of marriage ?dth
her husband’s brother; it was contended that she did not want to live with her
husband, but that she wished to live with her husband’s brother. The Court, on
a petition for habeas corpus, ordered that she should return to her husband. It
was pointed out that in an application for habeas corpus under 3.^51,Cr«P*C., by
the Muslim husband for the restoration of his v/ife, the Court, when exercising
<v
its discrebinary power, must be satisfied of the illegality of the detention”;
2m  the instant case the v/ife could not legally live with her husband’s brother. 
Insane Persons
In England, the writ oof habeas corpus is generally granted in the cases 
of persons alleged to have been detained on the ground of insanity. The writ 
may issue at the instance of any person v/h6 is wrongfully kept in confinement 
under the pretence of insanity or unsoundness of mind to the person having, the
custody of the person alleged tbbe’of unsound mind to produce him in Court, so that
1. ibid 
JZ. ibid.
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the legality of detention may be inquired intol It is essential in such a case 
that there should be an affidavit by the person alleged to be of unsound mind, 
or that there should be clear evidence that he is prevented from making an 
affidavitf
In India and Pakistan, the Indian Luna' cy Act of 1912, is in force* 
Under the Luna; cy Act, a lunatic can be detained in an asylum, on a reception 
order made to the officer in charge of the asylum under ss.7,10,14, 15 or 17 of 
the Act* If subsequently, on an application from the relative - in case of a 
husband, from the wife, and in case of a v/ife, from the husband, in other cases 
from nearest relations - or the Advocate General, an inquisition order is made
~y
by the District Court, and, in inquisition, if it is found that the concerned 
person is not of unsound mind or not incapable of managing himself or his affairs 
the person in charge of the asylum shall forthwith, on the production of a 
certified copy of such'finding, discharge the alleged lunatic from the asylum*
However, an application for the writ of habeas corpus under S*A91,Ur.
P.C*, lies to the High Court to challenge the finding of the inquisition Court,
amd if the High Court is satisfied that the Court was wrong in rejecting the
inquisition application, habeas corpus will issue to release the alleged lunatic 
ft
from the asylum;
What has to be found under the 'Lunacy Act is that the alleged person
is of unsound mind and that the unsoundness of mind is such as to make him
T] R. v.Purl ington( 1761) 2 Burr 1115; He S hut tie wo r t h (184 6) 9 Q.B.^51; H.v Pinde 
Re Greenword(l855) 24 L* J.G *B.148;R. v* Wright (17.31) 2 Stra.915.
2. Ex parte Child (1854) ,15 0.^238 Re;Carter(l893) 95 L.T.J.37; see
also Halsbury’s Laws,op*cit p, 
p. See chap.TV or V of .the Indian Lunancy Act,1912.
4« See chap V of the Indian Lunancy Act, 1912.
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incapable of managing his affairs, A person who is incapable ofmanaging his 
affairs is not necessarily of unsound mind and a person of unsound mind may not 
be incapable of managing his affairs. The Court must hold that both the un­
soundness of mind and incapability to manage his affairs are present and that
1
the latter is due to the former .
When HabeasCorpus is refused:
In England and India, no writ of habeas corpus will normally lie in
regard to a person who is undergoing imprisonment under sentence of a Court in
2
a Criminal trial on the ground of erroneousness of the conviction • A writ of 
habeas corpus is not granted to persons convicted or in execution under legal 
process including execution of a legal sentence after conviction on indictment 
in the usual course. It is refused there the effect of it would be to review
the judgement of one of the inferior courts which might have been reviewed on
a writ of error, or where it would falsify the record of a court which shows
3
jurisdiction on the fact of it ♦
T^e law is same in Pakistan* Detention in execution of a sentence,
ole indictment on a Criminal charge would be . „ >_ '
k
v-* ' . j a sufficient answer to an application for habeas, corpus . Detention of
5an abducted woman for restoration to her kins-folk , or detention during the 
trial by the Council of Elders under the orders of Dy.Commissioner made under 
the F.C.R. , is not illegal; it cannot be challenged by a petition for habeas
1. Mahipati v. Mt.Changuna,A.I.R.193^»Nag.27*
2. Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyd.A.I.R.1951»SC.217; see also Reg. v.Murphy 
(1869)2 P.C.235; Newton in Re (1 8 8 3 ) C. J.C.P.l^ fS; Rex C. Suddies (1801)
East,308.
3* In re Bonamally Gupta,A.I.R.1917 Gal.1^91 see also Reg v. Murphy Supra;
Reg v. Suddis, Supra. 
k. Mohd.Akram v. State,P.L.D.1963 SC.373
3. Jumma Khan v. Pak.supra.
6. Khair Mohd. v. Govt.of W.Pakistan,P.L.D.1938,Lah.6 6 8 .
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corpus; the v/rit will not be granted. Where a person is ordered by a Magistrate
1
to be detained in prison pending the orders of the Session Judge under s.123 ,
2
Cr.P.C. , where an order of imprisonment is passed on failure to furnish secur-
3
ity for good behaviour which is a 1 sentence* within the meaning of S.397 of
P.C.^ or where the petitioner has been ordered to undergo a term of 8 years R.l.
by the Dy.Commissioner on failure to furnish the required security to be of (
5good behaviour under S.^0 of the F.C.B* , the High Court has no jurisdiction to, 
entertain the petition for habeas corpus; the petition will fail.
In England the writ of habeas corpus is not granted to question the 
decision of an inferior Court on a matter within its jurisdiction^. In India 
and Pakistan, with regard to applications under S.^91iCr.P.C., review of de­
cisions on such applications is barred under S.3&9 of the Code. There is no 
provisions either in Cr.P.C. or any other law, for the time being in force, 
which enables the Court to rehear an application for a writ of habeas ;orpus, 
which has been disposed of on merits by the Court, after examing the matter pl­
aced before it, even though the party or counsel was not present at the time 
the petition was heard. An application for a writ of habeas, corpus is of a
7criminal nature and no review is allowed in such matters .
Martial Law:
In English law, a writ of habeas corpus does not lie in the cases of 
persons who have/convicted by a duly constituted tribunal. On this principle, 
the writ will not be granted to persons undergoing a sentence of
1. S.123,Cr.P.C,provides for imprisonment on default of security
2. Emperor v. Tula Khan, 30 I.L.R.p (sec) 33^«
3* S.397 lays down the sentence on an offender already sentenced for another 
offends#
4. Ajab Khan v. State, P.L.D.19^3 Pesh.22^.r*
3* Mohd.Akram v. State, Supra.
6. 5.V. Commanding Officer, ex Parte Ferguson (1917) I.K.B.176.
7. Godawari v. State of Bombay, A.I.R.1953» S.C.32(33)
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imprisonment after conviction by a duly constituted court-martial, the 
proceedings of which have been in due course confirmed by a competent 
authority^•
In England, martial law is considered to be a part of the law 
relating to' the maintenance of public order* Under English law, it is the 
duty not merely of the army but of every citizen to assist in maintaining 
the public peace, and failure of authorities to put down and of the citizens 
to assist the authorities in putting down, breaches of public peace is an 
indictable offence* Disturbances of the public peace by a stray, assault or 
affray raises no question of constitutional law, but important constitutional 
question^arise in connection with a riot. The occurrence of a riot imposes
onerous duties on all within the vicinity and particularly on magistrates and
3sheriffs • In suppressing a riot the magistrate may require the assistance 
of the military •
These principles have been recognised in India and Pakistan . S.*f2
Cr.P.C., obliges every person to assist a magistrate or a police officer~who
reasonably demands his aid in the prevention or suspension of a breach of the
peace and s.l87 of the Penal Code, makes the failure to render such aid an
offence, S.127 Cr.P.C* authorises any magistrate or officer in charge of the
1* A.W.Heads v. Imperator, A.I.P. 19^6 Lah.112(113); see also R. v, Lewes Prison 
Governor - Ex parte Doyle (1917) 2 K.B.23^ (269)
2. Dicey op.cit*p*288
3* Ibid, p.289; citing R v. Pinney (1832) 3 car & p.23^ • 
k. Keir and Lawson, p.^ O^ f.
3* See Seelfvai op.cit.p*732.
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Stale police tc command an unlawful assembly, likely to cause disturbance of 
public peace to disperse. Under 3.128, Cr.P.C. the magistrate is 
empowered to call upon any male person, not a member of the armed forces, to 
assist him in dispersing it. S.12? authorises the magistrate, if the assembly 
has not by other means dispersed, and it is necessary for the public security 
to disperse it, to get it dispersed by military force. Under S.ljO, an officer 
commanding troops is bound to obey the requisition from the magistrate to 
disperse such assembly with the aid of military forces under his command.Under 
S.Ipl, in the absence of a magistrate, any commissioned officer of the army 
can disperse it with the help of military force under his command and arrest 
and confine the personsforming part of it. S.132, Cr.P.C. affords protection 
to the acts done under ss.127 ta 131 and lays down that no prosecution against 
any person for any act purporting to be done in good faith under ss.127 to 131 
shall be instituted in any Criminal Court, except with sanction of the MLocal 
government'1!
Art.33 of the Indian Constitution provides that not withstanding 
anything contained in ArtfiT 12 to 32, relating to fundamental rights, Parliament 
may by lav/ restrict or abrogate fundamental rights in their application to the 
members of the Armed Forces or the Forces charged with the maintenance of public 
order, so as to ensure proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of 
discipline among them. Art. 34 enables Parl.ie.nent, (i) to indemnify any person 
in the service of the Union or of a State or any other person in respect of 
acts done by him in connection with the maintenance or restoration of order
1. words in inverted commas were su Destitute Ah’or tlie~lvorcLs ,rCc“veIuidrr'Uehe ral 
m  Council’1 by s.2 and Sch. 1 of the Jbvolution Act. 1920 (XXXVLLL of 1920)
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in any area within India where martial law was in force, and (ii) to validate 
any sentence, punishment forfeiture, or any other act done under martial lawr,
By this provision any Act of Indemnity, following the termination of martial 
law, cannot be declared void under Art, 13 of the Indian Constitution as 
violative of fundamental rights, Art, 35 (a) (i) excludes States' legislatures 
and entitles Parliament only to make laws with respect to any matters under 
Arts.33 and 3A. Art 35 (b) protects from challenge on the ground of violation 
of fundamental rights, any law in force immediately before the commencement 
of the Constitution with respect to any of natters referred to in Arts.33 and
Art. 6 (3) (i) of the Pakistan Constitution,1562, is analogous to 
Art,33 of the Indian Constitution, but unlike Art, 35 (a) (i) of the Indian 
Constitution, there is no provision in the Pakistan Constitution as to whether 
the Central or Provincial legislatures have power to make laws with respect 
to matters under Art. 6 (3) (i) • Art 6.(3} (ii) of the Pakistan Constitution 
excludes thirty-one Regulations and orders £5f the Martial Lav/ period which ' 
were in force immediately before the comning into force of the Constitution of 
1562, from the application of fundamental rights. It is provided by Art, 6 
(3) (Hi) that no law, either made in exercise of power under Art.6 (3) (i) or 
preserved under Art.6 (3) (ii) can be declared Void on the ground of repugnancy 
with fundamental rights. Art.223A. of the Pakistan Constitution 1962, 
corresponds to Art.3^- of the Indian Constitution and lays down that nothing 
in the Constitution shall prevent the Central Legislature from making any law
1. See Seervai op. Lit, p.751.
2. Art,196 of the Constitution of 1556.
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indemnifying any person in the service of the Central or Provincial Government, 
or any other person, in respect of any act done in connection with the 
maintenance or restoration of order in any area in Pakistan where martial law 
was in force, or validating any sentence passed, punishment inflicted, forfeiture 
ordered or other act done under martial lav/ in such area.
In an emergency where there is an insurrection, rebellion or
condition of war and the situation is such that it cannot be controlled merely
by calling in the aid of military and the citizen bodyy the civil authorities
can hand over the control of the area to the military authorities; martial lav/
is imposed, " supplementing the ordinary lav/ as may be necessary, but no more
o
than is necessary"7 for the restoration of order. The military officer may 
issue such orders, and enforce them in such a manner as may be necessary for 
restoration of order. The military officer has the power to try an offender 
and punish him under martial law, but he should not exercise this power beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the said purpose or when it is not possible to keep 
an accused person in arrest until he can be handed over for trial by the ordinary 
courts. If he has to try an offender, though this should only be necessary in 
very exceptional circumstances, the trial, should follow the forms of military 
law; and a record must be kept of every trial so held, and every punishment 
inflicted under martial law. Any punishment so inflicted must not be excessive
The conditions which justify the imposition of martial law are,(i) a
state of war or armed rebellion or insurrection must exist and not nerely a
1. as laid down by ss.127 to 131, Gr. P.C, discussed above. *
2. See Departmental Instruction to Military Authorities,Government of India, 
1942; see also Joseph Minattur, Martial Law and Pakistan,- Law Review, 
Monthly Journal of Law Society,Vol.1 No.4, School of Oriental & African Stud:
y. Mohd.Umar Khan,v. Crown, P.L.H.1953 Lah. 528.
* 
Kj
-J
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i
state of riot v/hich could be put down with the aid of military and other 
citizens; (ii) the military or the citizen can refuse or impose conditions on 
such aid; (iii) the necessity must be proved, not merely of recourse to the 
military, but also of the inposibility of functioning the ordinary civil laws 
and the necessity of their abolition for the time being, and the courts have 
posrer to go into the question whether such necessity existed; and (iv) it is on 
when the existence of war, whether against foreigners or rebels, and necessity, 
are established, that the jurisdiction of the court ceases.
The powers exercised by the military commonly but incorrectly known
as M martial lair/', infact, are no law at all and would be, if the fact of
necessity for a ?far is not established, illegal and therefore need Acts of
2
Indemnity, if they are not to be questioned.
It is in the sense discussed above that martial law is understood in 
England. As Pakistan was created by the division of British India: into two 
dominions, it inherited, along with India, the laws in force at the time of 
partition. Martial law was part of the existing laws thus inherited, Martial 
law under the common law rule was administered in 194.2 in Sind which later 
became a province of Pakistan, To the Government of Pakistan this was the late 
instance of martial law administration with v/hich they we re closely familiar^
Martial law has been imposed in Pakistan three times, in 1953,1958 
and 1969 of v;hich the martial Law of 1953 was of the kind known to common lav/,
Martial lav/ was proclaimed in Lahore on March 6, 1953 when other sects of
1, Chappana v. ^mperor, A.J.R, 1931 Bom, 57, per Beaumont,~"cVj.
2. ibid
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Muslims resorted to direct action against Ahmadiyas, a Muslim sect following
the leaching of Mirsa G-hulam Ahmad, In a matter of six hours, order was restored
by the Military forces* The military commander constituted himself the Chief
Martial Lav/ Administrator and conferred on himself authority to issue martial
law regulations and orders and to appoint military courts for trial and
punishment of persons contravening such regulations and orders. Ordinary
Criminal courts were permitted to exercise jurisdiction in respect of offences
other than those created by the martial law regulations or orders, or connected
with the disturbances. On May 0, 1953, the Governor General, acting under S.42
of the Govt, of India Act 1935 promulgated the Martial Law (indemuity) Ordinance^
1955^ indeminfying servants of the Crown and other persons in respects of the
acts done by them in good faith, under martial law and validating sentences
2
passed by military courts, and leaving the matter of determination of the 
martial law period with the Federal Government. The Martial Law period was 
defined by s.2 of the Indeminty Act, 1953, as the period beginning cn March 6, 
1953 and ending on lyay 15, 1953*
3
bo ham mad Umar Khan v, Crown, re Maulana Abdus Cottar Khan TTiazi, 
where an application for relief in the nature of habeas corpus t alleging that 
the detenu was being illegally detained in the prison in Lahore and praying that 
he be set at liberty, was made, the reply to the writ was that the detenu was 
undergoing a life sentence, validly passed by the Military Court, for the breach 
of Martial Law Regulation, 1953, which had been validated by the Martial Law
1. No. 11 of 1953
2. Sec Joseph Minaftur op cit pp.16-^7
3. P.L.D.1953 Lah. 528.
399
(indeminity) Ordinance, 1953*
The other objections which were* raised in the petition are worth* 
considering. It was further alleged that the imposition of Martial Law, 1953 
and the constitution of Special Military Court which sentenced the detenu were 
illegal, that the Court did not act in a judicial capacity, and, in the 
procedure adopted by it, it did not conform to the Ordinary forms of criminal 
trials, that the necessity for Martial Law, if it ever existed, had ceased on 
23rd March 1953 and thereafter the continuance of the Martial Law rep.me an(j 
the functioning of the Special Military Courts were illegal, and that the 
Indemnity Ordinance, 1953, in as much as it gave to the Central Government the 
power to determine the martial law period and purported to validate sentences, 
which -were essentially in the nature of advice tendered by the Special Military 
Courts to the Martial Law Administrator, was ultra vires,
The essential question in the instant case was whether the M.L.
Indemnity Ordinance, 1953, which not only validated the acts done or order made
in good faith, during the martial law period, for the purpose of maintaining
or restoring order tut also kept alive, after the martial law period, all
unexpired sentences of confinement passed by a Court of Martial Law Authority
2
in a judicial capacity. The quest inn, therefore, was whether this confirmatory 
povision conflicted with the principle that when martial law is withdrawn and 
civil power fully restored, all orders passed by the military must expire on 
such withdrawl.
1, Ordinance 11 of 1933*
2. See ss. 6 and 7 of the M.L, (indemnity) Ordinance, 1953*
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It can be noted here that, in England, no such confirmatory provision 
appears to have been passed since the time of Edward III, though there have been 
more than a dozen "indemnity bills" in the history of that country. In Ireland 
and other colonies also there have been several such bills without any confirmatory 
provision. In fact, in Anglo- Saxon law, the setting of the military tribunals 
to exercise what, in substance, are judicial powers, is not recognized at all,- 
This is the p u r e  effect of the House of Lords’ decision in Clifford V.Q* Sullivan1 
and the Privy Council’s decision in Tilonko's^case, where the true distinction 
between the "Courts" and "Courts Martial" has been brought out. The decision of 
the United States’ Supreme Court in Mayor v. Peabody" lays down very much the same 
principle.
In recent times, however, there have been several instances of such
confirmatory legislation. Thus in TllonbQ’s case an indemnity Act giving effect
to the sentence' imposed by a military tribunal in Natal was recognised by the
Privy Council to be valid. In the Cape of food Hope, the sentences were revised
by a commission and confirmed by S.5 (l) of Act IV of lfG2. In the Union of
South Africa, such legislation was first passed in 1914 and repeated in 1915 and
1922* In the Indo-Pak subcontinent' besides the Ordinance in question, there are
the ,
three previous instances of such legislation, namely,/Punjab Disturbances Act"} 
the 5 the
1919,/Sholapur Disturbances Ordinance, 1990, and/Sind Disturbances Ordinance,
€
1942. The validity of such legislation was taken for granted by the Bombay
High Court in Bmperor v. Chanappa Shantirappa^j the Court relied on the principle
1. - U-921) 2 A.C.570
2. TilonkO V. Ait, Gen. of Natal (1907) A.C.93.
3. 212 U.S.78
4. Act XX VII of 1919
5. Ordinance X V  of 1930
6. Ordinance XVIII of 1942
7. I.L.R.55 Bom. 2 6 3 .
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laid down in Tilonko1 s case and Phillip v. gyre1* The validity of the impugned
confirmatory provision, in the light of aforesaid decision, was upheld by the
2
Lahore High Court,
As regards the contention that M,L, (indeminty) Ordinance, 1953 
amounted to delegated legislation, it was pointed out that the Ordinance was an 
enactment of the federal Legislature in so far as it was promulgated by the 
Governor General in the exercise of power conferred on him under SJ+2 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935; n° exception could be taken to the Indemnity 
Ordinance on the ground that it amounted to delegated legislation. It was, however, 
observed that if the legislature defines the principle and policy of an enactment 
and subject to well defined restrictions and limitations * delegates to a named 
authority the pov/er to carry out the object of that enactment, including the power 
to make rules for that purpose, the legislation does not amount to delegated 
legislation ahd is perfectly constitutional.
It was further contended that, if the legislature had merely appointed 
the officer Commanding the Tenth division as the Chief Martial Administrator todo 
whatever he liked in the Martial Law area; it would have amounted to delegated 
legislation and, therefore, the lav/ giving such unfettered powers to him would 
have been ultra vires, and since what, if enacted by the legislature, would have 
^een u^tra vires t the acts done in exercise of an unlimited authority must remain 
invalid and could not be validated by retrospective legislation. The Crov/n’s 
reply to this contention, which the Court approved, was that the precise question
to be determined was not whether, if the legislation had been in the form
1, Supra. M
2, L'obd, TTnar's case, supra.
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suggested, it would have been ultra vires, but whether the validating legislation 
actually amounted to delegated legislation; the two questions not being identical. 
It was, therefore pointed out that the point sought to be made was that when the 
legislature passed the Indemnity Ordinance it must have known in what manner and 
on what principles M'e-martial law adminstration had to be carried on and that the 
validating legislation must have been passed keeping in view the manner and 
the principle of such, adminstration. The legislature, the argument proceeded, 
must, therefore, be presumed* to have approved the various regulation and orders 
by which courts ’were appointed, their powers and procedure defined, and the lav/ 
to be adminstered by them duly notified. If the legislature had passed In Act 
recognising or defining the principle on which martial lav/ was in fact administered 
no objection to it could have been taken on the ground that it did not contain 
the principle or policy of the legislation and that it delegated uncontrolled 
and unfettered ligislative functions to the Officer Commanding, '.That had been 
done could originally have been permitted to be done, and no objection to such 
expost facto legislation could be taken on the ground of retroactivity. It was, 
therefore, held that no exception could be taken to the Indemnity Ordinance that 
it amounted to delegated legislation.
As to the contention that the necessity of Martial Law, if it ever 
existed, ceased on 2 3rd March 1933* after the declaration made by the C.IvI.L.A. to 
the effect that "the first phase of Martial Law" to restore peace and order,
1 having been achieved, the second phase of reconstruction has been begun" any 
action on the part of military since 23rd March 1913* was clearly beyond the 
scope of their legitimate function and hence illegal, it was held that the
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contention, must fail on the ground that when the c«M*L*A# expressed tne 
aforesaid words, he did' not mean there ivas "no possibility of the recrudescence 
and disorder” after Cit'd 4! arch, It was pointed out that the terminus a quo of 
the Martial Lav/.period had been defined by the Statute itself and the mere fact 
’that the exp Nation of that period was left to be determined by the Central 
Government and was not determined by the Legislature itself, neither amounted to 
delegated legislation, nor to suspension of the Constitution*
A petition, for special leave to appeal from the judgement of the
2
Lahore HIrh Court, was filed In the Federal Court of Pakistan* There were three
main questions before the Federal Court to be considered,(ii) whether, after
23rd March 1953, the Major-General Kohd, Azam Khan had made a declaration to tho
effect that ”the first phase of restoring peace and order having been achieved,
the second phase of reconstruction has begun” , any action on the part of the
mil itcry si nee 23rd March 1953, was beyond the scope of their legitimate
function and contrary to the principles of constitutions1 law; conseouently
whether the sentence of death passed against the petitioner on Pay 7, 1953 and
commuted on Ij.ey 12*., 1953) "as unlawful and of no legal effect; (ii) whether
3
the Martial Lav; (indemnity) Act, 1953, which superseded the Martial Law;: 
(indemnity) Ordinance, 1933, was ultra vires of the Federal Legislature, as in 
fact it amounted to delegated legislation cf its own powers to the military 
personnel by giving them a free-hand in the civil admins trat ion while the martial 
lav; remained in force; and (ill) whether 3,6 of the Martial Lav; (Indemnity) Act,
] • Mohd. Umar Khan v. Crown, supra*
2. -Abdus Sat tar Khan Nias i v. Crown, P.L.h.lggy F.C. 187
3, Act XXXII of 1953.
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l^n3»validated all sentences passed during the Martial Law period'bp a Court 
or other authority constituted or appointed under martial law and whethrr the 
words acting in .a , judicial capacity”, implied the application of a judicial 
procedure as usually followed in the courts of justice; as, contrary to it, some 
of the defence v/itnesses, who v/ere absent, had not been re-summoned by the Court 
Martial for their re-examination.
As to the first Question it was pointed that it was not for the 
military authorities, but for the Executive C-overment to determine when it could 
take back the work of admi.ni stration with safety and without risk, since it was 
the executive C-overnrr.ent which called the military to its aid. Further, under 
S.2 of the Indemnity Act, ” Martial Law period” was defined as the period 
"beginning on the sixth day of March 1533, and ending on the 15th day of hay 195 
which obviously covered both the dates, when the death sentence was passed and 
-when the commutation was ordered.
T h e  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  Q u e s t i o n  w a s  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  L e g i s l a t u r e
was the legislative body possessing sovereign powers and no Question, therefore,
ultrq vires with regard to its legislative enactment could arise. Akram,
J. further quoted S.6 (2) of the Independence Act, 1S!47 which lays down thatj
"No law and no provision of any law made by the legislatures of either 
of the newr Dominion shall be void or in operative on the ground that 
■ it is repugnant to law of England, or to the provisions of this or any 
existing or future Act of Parliament of the U.K., or any order, rule or 
regulation made under any such, act and the powers of the Legislature 
of each Dominion include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, ordej
rule or regulation In so far as it is part of the Law of the Dominion”,
■and observed that the powers which the Federal Legislature then exercised were
as large and ample as those of the British Parliament itself. The Martial Law
(indemnity) Act, 1553 wes an Act of the Federal Legislature and no question
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therefore of a delegation of powers to anyone arose at all.
Cornelius ,1, though maintainiigthat the contravention of the constitut­
ional provision in relation to the administration of the Martial Law area during 
the material period was brought directly before the Federal Legislature, when 
it was asked to enact the Martial Law (indemnity) Act, 1953> suad it was open to 
the Legislature, in dealing with the Bill, to take such action as it thought fit 
in relation to the executive authorities which were responsible, held that such 
actions need not have involved any act of legislation, and consequently no 
question of abdication of legislative functions was involved in that aspect of 
matter. But he did not agree with the view expressed by Akram J. According to
y
him the powers of Federal Legislature were delved from, and were circumscribed 
by the express provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935> and the powers 
of the Federal Legislature, as distinguished from Legislature of the Dominion, 
were, in the existing circumstances, not as wide as those passed by British 
Parliament. It is submitted that the latter view is correct.
As regards the third question, Akram J. observed that the expression 
1 acting in a judicial capacity1 in S. 6 of the Indemnity Act, 1953, only emphasized 
that the duty of the adjudication must be distinguished from administration and 
meeting the requirements of military exegencies. The word Rapacity1 was not 
without significance; * one may be vested with various capacities for exercising 
various kinds of functions; 1 judicial capacity1 described only the character 
in which the work was to be performed. In any event the calling or not calling 
of witnesses by the Court Martialor or other authority constituted under Martial 
law was no ground for an order of release under S. 2f91 Cr.P.C. It must be borne 
in mind^the ’Martial Laws’ rwhich in a strict legal sense are no laws at all,
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are merely exceptional methods adopted by the military for preserving Order and 
safeguarding the interests and integrity of the State during the war and in­
surrection^ .
But Comeliu J. expressed the view that the words ’acting in a Judicial 
capacity* are not merely words of indication but, are intended to be, and are in 
fact, words of limitation.* So much appeared to him to follow from giving to 
each word in the phrase, its full and plain grammatical meaning, but he based 
his conclusion also upon the consideration that, when the Federal Legislature 
was considering the question of the extent to which the act performed by the 
self-appointed authorities during the extra-constitutional regime presented 
by the Martial law period could be maintained in their effect, it might well 
have considered that the saving should be confined to those particular acts, 
purporting to be acts performed in the administration of Justice, which were 
in fact performed in compliance with the minimum requirements of the 
consideration of Justice. It is submitted that the former view is correct* 
Cornelius J. failed to take into consideration the sole purpose behind the 
indemnity legislation; had the authorities, exercising power under martial law, 
been required to comply with the minimum requirements of the administratiop. 
of Justice, there would not have been any necessity, after Martial Law was 
over, for the statute indemnifying the acts done by such authorities in good 
faith, when martial law was in force. The petition was, however, dismissed.
2
The Martial law, imposed in Pakistan in 19^8 and 1969 , is not
martial law, in the strict legal sense or in the sense in which it is under-
1. ~&.Sattar Khan Niyazi»s case P. L.B. 195V51P.73 p*106.
2. The Proclamation of Martial Law, 1958, The Laws Continuance in Force Order, 
1958, the M.L.Proclamation of 1969 and Provisional Constitution Order,
1969 have been duscused in the preceeding chapter.
407
stood in common law. These events were, as held by the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, victorious revolutions vor successful tcouj> d* etat^. It was observed 
that, after a change of the character which has taken place in Pakistan, the 
national legal order must for its validity depend upon the new law-creating 
organ. Even Courts lose their existing jurisdictions, and can function only 
to the extent and in the manner determined by the new Constitution - Laws Contin­
uance in Force Order, 1958.
In 1958> the Constitution of Pakistan was abrogated by the M.L. 
Proclamation 1958* a s well as byA^t. 17 of the L.C.F.O. ,195^, but by Art.II 
of the L.C.F.O. it was provided that ’Pakistan shall be governed as nearly as 
may be in accordance with the late Constitution.1
In State v. Dos so, which was a Constitutional Criminal Appeal No.l of 
1957$ and preferred by the State against the decision of the Division Bench of 
Lahore, allowing a petition for habeas corpus, on the ground that the conviction 
of the petitioners under the F.C.R. was without valid legal sanction,having 
been obtained by a proceeding under S. 11 and other relevant provisions of the 
F.C.R.i which were repugnant to Art.5 of the 1956 Constitution, guaranteeing 
equality before law, and consequently void under Art. 4 of that Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that along with the abrogation of the 
Constitution, the fundamental rights were also abrogated and unless, as provided 
by Art. 4 of the L.C.F.O., the President expressly enacted the provisions relat­
ing to fundamental rights, they were not a part of the law of the land and no 
writs could be issued on this basis. As regards pending applications for writs 
or writs already issued but Tnfoich were either siib judice before the Supreme Court
1. State v. Dosso; supra.
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or required enforcement, the relevant provision, clause (7) of Art. 2 of the 
L.C.F. 0. was applied, according to which not only the application for the writ 
would abate hut also the proceedings which required the enforcement of the writ. 
The abatement was, therefore, held to govern all those writs which were the 
subject matter of appeal before the Supreme Court either on certificate or by 
special leave. The position in regard to future applications for writs, was, 
therefore, held to be that they would lie only on the ground of anyone ,or 
more of the laws mentioned in Art.4 of the L.C.F.O. or on contravention of any 
other right preserved by the Ij.aws Continuance in Force Order, 1958. The appeal 
before the Supreme Court and the enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus 
granted by the High Court were declared to have been abated.
It is submitted that two crucial questions, which would have been
important for the purpose of the study of this chapter, were not discussed by
the Supreme Court at all. These questions were (i) whether the Jailor of
Machh Jail was acting in compliance with a valid warrnat in detaining the
a
petitioners who belonged to Loralai*/*Special Area1 esasluded from the 
jurisdiction of the High Court, as well as of the Supreme Court by Art. 178 
of the Constitution of 1956; and (ii) whether in absence of the jurisdiction 
in respect of the things done within the ’Special Areas* in which Loralai, is 
included, the High Court acted properly in declaring that the conviction by the 
Dy. Commissioner of Loralai was an 1 illegal order* •
According to clause (4) of Art.2 of L.C.F.O. ,195°* Supreme Court 
and the High Courts were to have power to issue the writs of habeas corpss, 
mandamous, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, but clause (5) of Art.2 , 
L.C.F.O. »saysthat no writ shall be issued against the Chief Martial Law
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Administrator or Dy. C.M.L.A. or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction 
under the authority of the either, and clause (7) la^sdown that no writ or 
order for a writ issued or made after the Proclamation of 1958, shall have 
effect, unless it is provided by the L.C.F.O., and all applications and 
proceedings in respect of any writ which is not so provided for shall abate 
forthwith.
In view of these provisions, the High Courts and the Supreme Court,
by the passage of time, issued the writs where any provision of law preserved
the
by/L.C.F.O. ,1958, or of any Martial Law Regulation or Order was contravened or 
where an Order made by any Martial Law Authority was void Or illegal, being 
repugnant to Martial Law Regulations or Orders* The position of fundamental 
rights and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Hi^i Courts during 
the Martial law periods, 1958-1962 and 196 9 will be discussed later.
For the purpose of this chapter it is submitted that the writ of 
habeas corpus was not granted by the Lahore High Court in Manzoor Elahi v*
State where the Court held that sentence passed by the Special Military Court 
was on proper legal sanction; it was in accordance withthe valid Order 
promulgated by M.L.Authority comp.eir-ent to make it; no writ against such an 
order could issue. It was pointed out that the facts, which could have 
presented a good defence in his case or mitigated his offence, should have 
been brought to the notice of the Summary Military Court by the petitioner; 
whatever might be the position under the ordinary law, those facts could not 
give jurisdiction to the High Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus with regard 
to the order passed by the Summary Military Court under a valid Order of
1. P. L. D. 19 59 ,Lah. 243.
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Martial Law Authority,
1But in MohcL Ayyub Khoro v. Pakistan where the petitioner, who was
arrested by the police on a charge under the Hoarding and Blaclcmarket Ordinance
1956, was after the investigation and on a complaint by the Government put up
for trial before a Special Judge for offences under the aforesaid Ordinance of
1956 as well as under M.L.Reg.No.26 read with M.L.Reg.No.5 and on being
convicted only under the Regulations, the charge under the Ordinance of 1956
having been separated,was sentenced to five years R.I. and a fine of Rs.1,50,000
>
in default of the payment of which he was ordered to suffer another three years 
R.I# M.A.Khoro presented an omnibus application to the High Court which purpor­
ted to be a petition for appeal, a petition for revision and a petition for 
habeas corpus and certiorari. On objection being taken to the jurisdiction of 
the High Court to interfere with the matter, the ^ourt dismissed the petition 
holding that its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceedings of the 
Special Judge vdiich were subject to the incident of confirmation under the 
M.L, (Zonal) Order No,10 was barred. The Supreme Court, however, gave special 
leave to appeal from the judgement of the High Court because the case raised 
some questions of fundamental importance for consideration and decision. At 
the outset objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
interfere with the proceedings, which, sfter the judgement of the High Court, 
had been confirmed by the Dy. M.L.Administrator. The objection was taken on 
the basis of M.L. (c.M.L.A)Order No. 10 issued by the C.M.L.A. on 18th October 
of 1958, Tfihich provided that proceedings of the cases tried under the M.L. 
Regulations or Orders by the criminal courts, after confirmation by the Martial
1. P.L.D.1960,Sp.237#
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law Administrators would be forwarded to the Judge Advocate-General Rawalpindi, 
for final review. The Supreme Court, dismissing the objection, held that the 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts is barred, in this 
respect, only in the cases where decisions made by the criminal courts under 
the Martial Law Regulations and Orders sre valid and legal, then only the 
confirmation of such sentences will oust the Jurisdiction of the superior Courts 
but where the decisions made or sentences passed by the criminal courts are 
prima facia illegal, the confirmation will not be valid and consequently the 
superior Courts will have to protect the aggrieved party against the wrong 
sentences or wrongful deprivation of their liberty*
lir was observed that, in the instant case, in fairness to the Dy.
M.L.Administrator and M.L.Administrator, because it appeared that the sentence 
had been confirmed by him as well, that from the manner in which the Judgement 
was written by the Special Judge, it was impossible for the confirming authority 
to appreciate the legal and factual aspect of the case or to separate the 
alleged Martial law offences from the alleged pre-Martial Law blackmarket deal 
for which the appellant was admittedly not tried. The Court which tried the 
Martial Law offence was not set up by the Administrator; nor was the case sent 
to the ''ourt by the Administrator himself. The Jurisdictional aspect of the 
criminal Courts, especially where the intricate question of law arises, was a 
matter with which he was not supposed to be conversant, therefore, when he 
confirmed the sentences he could not have been conscious of the position tjpat 
what he was confirming was something that did not exist in law or that he was 
purporting to validate what could not be validated. On the merits, apart from 
the Statement of the pardoned accomplice there was no other evidence of any act
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or omission by the appellant subsequent to the promulgation of Regulation No.26/ 
there m s  not a single statement which could amount to independent corroborat­
ion; and in the absence of such corroboration the prosecution took a grave 
risk in separating the charge under the Hoarding and Blackmarket Ordinance,
19f?6 from that under M. L.Reg.No.26. An Officer of the Special Judge’s 
experience could not be unaware that law required corroboration of an accomplice 
by ’independent evidence1, and that *an accomplice’s own statements or 
confession of a co-accused is not corroboration by’independent evidence*.1 
There was, however, not one word in the Judgement on this vital point for 
the consideration of the confirming authority. The appeals were, therefore, 
accepted and the convictions and the sentence of the appellant were quashed.
Parliamentary Privilege;
In England a member of Parliament c ommitted by the Parliament for 
breach of its privilege cannot obtain his release during the seesion by means
of habeas corpus • Vflaere a person, -who is not a member, is committed by the
2 3
House of Commons or by the House of Lords , for breach of privilege, the Court
will not review the committal or grant a discharge on habeas rorpus. “When it is
clear that the committal was for contempt of either House of Parliament, it
was held that the °ourt had no power to investigate the allegejcontempt. Even
if where the writ was granted to bring the detenus before the Court, the Court
refused to inquire into the merits of the committal by the House of Commons;
the warrant of arrest was not bad for omitting to state the grounds on which
1. Earl of ShaftBbury* s case (1677) 1* Mod.Rep. 144
2. Hobhouse case (1920) 3 Aid.420.
3. R,v. Ey'io.w€r(l799) 8 Term. Rep. 314*
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A
the party had been adjudged guilty of contempt . A person committed for
contempt by order of either House of Parliament may be discharged on habeas
2corpus after a dissolution or prorogation of Parliament.
In India the controversy and difference of opinion as to whether the 
Parliamentary privilege under Art, 194 of the Indian Constitution can override 
the provisions regarding Fundamental Rights, laid down in Part III, and the 
writ Jurisdiction of the High Courts under Art,226 and of the Supreme Court • 
under Art,32 of the Constitution, arose in the case of Keshay Singh.
3
President* s Reference No,l of 1964 ♦ The facts of the case were that the 
petitioner was sentenced to seven days imprisonment by the Legislative Assembly 
of the State of U.P., for contempt. On an application for habeas corpus under 
S,491>Cr.P.C., the petitioner was released on bail by the Allabad High Court 
pending a hearing on the legality of the action of the Assembly. In consequence 
of action by the Speaker against the Judges, the President referred the matter to 
the Supreme Court,
In the opinion of the majority, though the British House of Commons 
had privilege to commit for contempt, under the Indian Constitution, this 
privilege of the legislatures is subject to review by the Courts; the Supreme 
Court and the High Courts under Art,32, and Art,226, respectively, could 
examine the unspeaking warrant issued by the House for the contempt to ascertain 
whether a contempt had in fact taken place, and that the privilege of the leg­
islatures under Art. 194(3^ is subject to fundamental rights. The minority view
1. See Sheriff of Middlesex case (184O) 11 Ad*& EL.273; see also Burdett v.
Abbot-( 1811) 14 East. 1, on appeal (1817) $ Dow. I65 H.L.
2. Speeter* s case (1654) Sty. 415; see also Earl of Shaft sbury* s case,Supra; 
and Sheriff of Middlesex case,supra.
5. A.I.R. 1965,SC.745.
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was that, on the basis of the authorities on the Constitutional Law, it
could be said that the right of the House- of Commons was a recognised privilege,
and that in thelight of the decision of the Supreme Court in M, S,M, Sharma v.
Sri Kisbna Sinha in which it was held that the privilege of prohibiting the 
publication of its proceedings did belong to the House of Commons in y/hich 
sense the Bihar Assembly also possessed the same privilege, it could be pointed 
out that such privilege is not subject to fundamental rights of a citizen.
He further held that to allow Art. 32 and 226 to prevail over the privileges of 
the legislatures under Art. 194(3) was not to harmonize two independent provision 
of the Constitution, but to destroy one of them. It is submitted that the 
minority opinion has expressed the correct view of law^ it is the view on 
which two independent provisions of the Constitution could be reconciled,
2
Fundamental Rights are no doubt subject to other provisions of the Constitution,
1. A. I.E. 1954,^3.636.
2. President's Reference No. 1 of 1964s Supra, see also Seeval, op.cit. 
p.583-587.
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CHAPTER 10 
MARTIAL LAW.
Nature and Scope;
It is difficult to define ’martial law* because of the 'haze of 
uncertainty which envelops it.* In constitutional jurisprudence, martial 
law is ued at least in four senses • In the first sense, it is the law relating 
to discipline in the armed forces of the State, which is administered by 
tribunals, called ’Courts Martial*. These Courts are constituted for the 
purpose of regulating the government of the armed forces and their jurisdiction 
only exceptionally extends to civilians. In Pakistan or India, martial law in 
this sense means the lav/ administered by the Courts Martial, constituted under 
the Army Act, the Naval Discipline Act and the Air Force Act.
In the second sense the word ’martial law’ means ’military government* 
in occupied territory* and is used to describe the powers of a military 
commander in times of war in enemy territory. It means the law by which the 
commander of a conquering army administers the territory, which he has conquered 
In this sense martial law is recognised by Public International Law as a part 
of the jus belli.
In the. third sense, in which it is a part of the English Constitut­
ional Law, 'martial law’ means the rights and obligations of the military under 
the common and statute law of the country to repel force by force, while 
assisting the civil authorities to suppress insurrections, rebellion or other 
disorders in the land. In American Constitutional Law, ’martial law* in this
1. C. Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule, p.19*
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sense is part of the police power of the State and means the law applicable
when the military arm does not supersede the civil authority but is merely
called upon to aid such authority in the execution of its civil functions. This
form of martial law is well recognised by the law of England and there are
several ancient statutes, which make it incumbant not only on civilians but
also Crown servants, including the army, to assist civil authorities in
1
suppressing disorders in the land •
2
Cases illustrative of this form of law are Pex v. Kenneth and Rex v.
3
Pinney , but its best exposition is to be found in Lord Tindal, C.J's charge
Zf
to the Bristol Grand Jury, on the Special Commission, on the 2nd January,1832 . 
He said:-
"It has been well said, that the use of the law consists 
first, in preserving menfs persons from death and violence - 
next, in securing to them the free enjoyment of their property; 
and although every single act of violence and each individual 
breach of the law, tends to counteract and destroy this its 
primary use and object, yet do general risings and tumultuous 
meetings of the people in a more special and particular manner 
produce this effect, not only removing all security, both from 
the persons and property of men, but for the time putting down 
the law itself, and daring to usurp its place. The law of 
England hath, accordingly in proportion to the danger which it 
attaches to riotous and disorderly meetings of the people, made 
ample provision for preventing such offences, and for the prompt 
and effectual suppression of them whenever they arise; and I 
think it may not be unsuitable to the present occasion if I proceed 
* to call your attention, with some degree of detail, to the various 
provisions of the law for carrying that purpose into effect. In 
the first place, by the common law, every private persom may 
lawfully endeavour, of his own authority, and without any warrant 
or sanction of the Magistrate, to suppress a riot by every means 
in his power. He may disperse, or assist in dispersing, those 
who are assembled; he may stay those who are engaged in it from 
executing their purpose; he may stop and prevent others whom he 
shall see coming up, from joining the rest; and not only has he 
the authority, but it is his bounden duty as a good subject of
1. See Umar Khan v. Crown, Supra at p.53^*
2. 5 Gar. SP.282.
3. 5 Car. & P. 25^ .
k. (1832) 172, E.R.966.
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the King, to perform this to the utmost of his ability*
If the riot be general and dangerous, he may arm himself 
against the evil doers to keep the peace. Such -was the 
opinion of all the Judges of England in the time of Queen 
Elizabeth, in a case called the Case of Arms^ , although 
the Judges add, 1 that it would be more discreat for every 
one in such a case to attend and be assistant to the Justices, 
sheriffs, or other ministers of the King in doing this.' It 
would undoubtedly be more advisable so to do; for the presence 
and authority of the Magistrate would restrain the proceeding 
to such extremities until the danger was sufficiently immediate, 
or until some felony was either committed or could not be 
prevented without recourse to arms; and at all events, the 
assistance given by men who act in subordination and concert 
with the civil magistrate, will be more effectual to attain 
the object proposed than any efforts, however, well-intended, 
of separated and dis-united individuals. But if the occasion 
demands immediate action, and no opportunity is given for 
procuring the advice or sanction of the magistrate, it is the 
duty of every subject to act for himself and upon his own 
responsibility in suppressing a riotous and tumultuous assembly; 
and he may be assured that whatever is honestly done by him in 
the execution of that object will be supported and Justified by 
the common law. And whilst I am stating the obligation imposed 
by the law on every subject of the realm, I wish to observe, that 
the law acknowledges no distinction in “tiiis respect between the 
soldier and the private individual. The soldier is still a citizen, 
lying under the same obligation and invested with the same 
authority to preserve the peace of the King as any other subject.
If the one is bound to attend the call of the civil magistrate, 
so also is the other; if the one may interfere for that purpose 
when the occasion demands it, without the requisition of the 
magistrate, so may the other too; if the one may employ arms 
for that purpose, when arms are necessary, the soldier may do 
the same. Undoubtedly the same exercise of discretion which 
requires the private subject to act in subordination to and in 
aid of the magistrate,rather than upon his own authority, before 
recourse is had to arms, or to operate in a still stronger degree 
with a military force. But, ’where the danger is pressing and 
immediate: where a felony has actually been committed, or cannct 
otherwise be prevented; and from the circumstances of the case 
no opportunity is offered of obtaining a requisition from the proper 
authorities; the military subjects of the King, like his civil 
subjects, not only may, but are bound to do their utmost, of their 
own authority, to prevent....
1. Popham’s rep. 121
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It has been observed in Mohd Umar Khan v. Crown -
"Martial law means the suppression of ordinary law 
in any part of the country by military authority,
'whose sole duty is to restore such condition of 
things as will enable the civil authority to resume 
charge. In order to attain that object, the military 
officer may issue such orders, and enforce them In 
such manner as may be necessary for that purpose only.
His authority is, for the time being, supreme, but in 
practice the amount of his interference with the civil 
administration and the ordinary courts is measured by 
military necessity. He should not interfere beyond 
what is necessary for the restoration of order, and 
should, whenever possible, act in consultation with 
the local civil authorities. Offenders should be 
handed over to the ordinary courts fear trial when­
ever this is possible; but persons charged with 
offences which are not offences against the civil 
law cannot be so handed over. The military officer 
has power to try an offender and punish him under 
Martial law, but he should not exercise this power 
except where it is necessary for him to do so for 
the purpose of restoring order or when it is not 
possible to keep an accused person in arrest until 
he can be handed over for trial by the ordinary courts.
Such occasion may arise if communications are interrupted 
during a considerable period, but even then the military 
officer can generally arrange for the attendance of a 
civil magistrate to whom prisoners can be handed over 
for trial, and this should be done when possible. If 
the military officer has to try an offender, though 
this ^ louLd only be necessary in very exceptional 
circumstances, the trial should follow the forms of 
the powers exercised by the military commonly but 
incorrectly known as 1 martial law* in fact are no 
law at all and would be, if the fact of necessity 
for a war is not established, illegal and therefore ^
need Acts of Indemnity, if they are not to be questioned.1
It will be seen that the justification of this form of martial law, 
if it can be so called, is the common law of J!ingland and several English 
statutes, which create rights in and impose obligations on citizens and 
servants of the Crown when suppressing riots or rebellions. In Pakistan and
1. Supra.
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India, rights and duties of citizens and the servants of the State, including 
the military, can only he gathered from the provisions in the Penal Code, the 
Cr.P.C., and the Folic Act, "which have been discussed in the preceeding chap­
ter.
On comparing the provisions of the Pakistan or Indian law with those 
of English Law, it will be apparent that the rights and duties of citizens, 
including public servants and the military, are substantialy identical in both 
systems. It is, however, a misuse of the term to describe these rights and 
duties as martial law; they are no more than a part of the civil law of the 
land.
If riot, rebellion or insurrection overcome the ordinary guardians of 
law and order, and assume such proportions that the civil authorities become 
powerless to deal with them, theState will naturally turn to its armed forces 
for assistance. If the military take over in any such contingency and the 
General commanding the army completely ousts or subordinates the civil 
authorities in the area, the law applicable by him during such a period is 
• martial law1 in sens u strictiore. During such period, all constitutional 
guarantees are suspended and the officer in chief command of the forces 
operating in the troubled area acquires for the time being supreme legislative, 
judicial and executive authority* In other words he himself fixes the limits 
and definition of his own authority. He makes his own law, sets up his own 
Courts, and no civil authority, when he is in command, may call in question 
what he does. In this sense, therefore, 1 martial law* is not law at all, but 
the will of the officer commanding the army. A commander, who steps in to 
quell a rebellion, inaugurates a reign of lawlessness and a civil authority,
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legislative or the executive, which hands over the civil populace of a locality
to the military, places the life, liberty and property of the people in the
1
hands of the General who commands the army in such a period . This was the
2
position in Pakistan in 1953» when martial law was imposed in Lahore •
Just as the transition from civil tumult into rebellion or from 
rebellion into war is easy and imperceptible, so the common law right to 
use force against force can be extended to justify the use of necessary force, 
where riots have assumed the form of armed rebellion or insurrection has become
war. There is authority for this proposition in the Privy Councilfs decision
3
in Tilonko v. A.G.of Natal , which was followed by the House of Lords in
5Clifford v, 0*Sullivan and in the Queen’s Bench case Phillip v. Eyre •
On such occasions, the civil courts may still function, though a 
delicate position may develop here, while the courts are functioning, the 
military seeks to oust their jurisdiction by setting up parallel tribunals 
and claiming paramountcy for them. The situation that actually arose in 
Wolfe Tone’s case^is illustrative of such conflict; the Court issued an Order 
in the nature of habeas corpus to produce the body of the detenu who was 
shortly going to be hanged and the Commander refused to obey the writ. Where
1. See Mohd.Umar Khan v. Crown, Supra at p.538.
2. This has been discussed at length in the previous Chapter.
3* (1907) A.C.93.
(1921) 2 A.C.580.
3. (1870) 6 q.B.l.
6. 0793J st.Tr.759
421
any such conflict between the civil and the martial law authority arises, the 
antagonism becomes so irreconcilable that in the conflict one or the other must 
give way; the civil Courts claiming that they have jurisdiction to judge whether 
war exists to oust their jurisdiction and the military commander asserting that 
there is war and that his will is supreme* The Privy Council were considering 
such a position when their Lordships observed in Marais v* G*0«C* Lines of 
Communications that when war prevails, the ordinary courts have no jurisdiction 
over the action of the military but it is for the civil courts to decide whether 
a state of war exists or not*
Most constitutional writers affirm that, where the civil power is 
deposed, suspended or paralysed by domestic disturbances, the military are 
entitled to step in to fill up the void, but these writers are equally dear in 
their opinion that, while so acting, the legality or excusability of any action 
taken by the military will be judged by 'necessity1 and that judgement on the
necessity can be passed by the Civil Courts ex post facto* Thus martial law
is the law of military necessity The moment that necessity come to an end, 
there is no justification to continue martial law further* After martial law 
ceases, the ordinary courts are open to any person aggrieved by an act not
2
justified by the circumstances then existing and the necessities of the case •
Martial law, in this sense, is not statutory in character; it is the
•public law of necessity;' necessity calls it forth, necessity justifies its
existence, and necessity measures the extent and degree to which it may be 
3
employed * Nothing short of necessity can justify a recourse to martial law;
1. (1902) A.C*109.
2* See Tilonkov's case, supra*
3* F.B. Werner, A Practical manual of Martial Law, p*l6.
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such, a necessity may exist before the blow actually falls# All that can be
said with certainty is that there must be reasonable and probable cause for
believing in the imminency of a peril that suspends the ordinary rules • Even
a proclamation of martial law is not necessary, if the exigencies of the
2
situation compel its initiation # Commenting on it, General Anthony writes
that the lawful existence of a state of martial law is a matter of fact; not a
matter of proclamation; the validity of any act done in the name of martial law
rests not upon the presence or absence of a proclamation but the existence of
3a military necessity justifies the act in question •
As martial law is said not to be law, it is obvious that, when the 
military step in and take charge of civil administration in the disturbed area, 
setting up their own courts, any action by them, unless justified by civil law, 
would render them liable to be sued or prosecuted for all encroachments on the 
rights of person and property unless, by subsequent legislation, their acts are
condoned or indemnified# Now because the professed justification for the
military to step in is the disturbance of public tranquility and the object is 
to restore civil authority to its normal condition, the scope of the activities 
of a military commander only extends to taking such actions as is necessary for 
the restoration of law and order, and all acts that fall within the scope of 
that activity will certainly be validated for the martial law period by an 
indemnity bill#
The characteristics of martial law, in this sense are:
1# J.I.C. Hare, American Constitutional Law, Vol.II,p.963*
2. Zimmermann v# Walker, 319 U#S#7^(19^3)*
3* Anthony, Hawaii under Army Rule p.6*f (California) 1933♦
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proclamation by the Crown of martial law is not 
necessary; the military can take over when, by war, 
insurrection, rebellion or tumult, civil authority 
is disposed, suspended or paralysed;
all acts done by the military which are justified by 
the civil law or dictated by necessity and done in 
good faith will be protected, even if there be no 
bill of indemnity;
though preventive action while the martial law is in 
force will be valid, punitive action will generally 
be invalid;
partial law will cease ipso facto with the cessation 
of the necessity for it;
sentences of imprisonment by military courts will expire 
with the expiry of martial law , but the tendency in 
recent years has been to pass an Act of Indemnity with a 
provision by which the unexpired sentences of martial law 
are confirmed and continued; this has been discussed in 
the proceeding chapter.
Martial Law and State of Siege:
Martial law as it is known in the common law countries, is an
emergency device designed for use in crises of invasion or rebellion, whereas
the ‘state of siege1, in the civil law countries of continental Europe and
Latin America, is the counter part of martial law. state of siege and
2
martial law are two edges of the same sword , and in practice there is a 
large degree of djnilarity between them. The same circumstances give rise to 
both, the same procedure is followed and the same purpose is sought to be 
served. An invasion or insurrection may give rise to both martial law and 
state of siege; suspension of civil rights,establishment of military courts 
for trial of civilians, and the substitution of the military arm for the regular
1. See Mohd. Umar Khan v. Crown, supra, pp.539-55^•
2. C.L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (19^ 4-8) p,l*tO.
fi)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(vi)
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police generally characterise the procedure in both. ?he object in view in 
both is the restoration of public order and normal government. In spite of 
these similarities, 1 martial law* and ’state of seige* arise from two different
4
legal systems, and from different political and military histories .
TOiat is remarkable about the stage of siege is its stamp of legality
2
and its thorough regulation by statutes . As -the state of siege is statutory 
in character, and the statutes dealing with the same subject matter in 
different countries may vary in their contents, the connotation of the term, 
if one looks at details, may vary from one state to another; though there 
appears to be general agreement about the meaning of the term. In the Dominican 
Republic a state of siege may be declared in case of a breach of public peace, 
while in Argentina, domestic distuibance or foreign attack endangering the 
the observance of the Constitution and the authorities created by it is a
3necessary prelude to such declaration * The general observations in this 
chapter are based on the institution as it obtains in Prance.
Another important characteristic of the state of siege is that
Parliament is assumed to be in decisive, positive control of the state of
siege, ^hile it is the responsibility of the Cabinet and the a rmy to s ee
to the successful termination of the state of siege, it has to be borne in
m-rnri that they act by the grace of Parliament alone^• It has been aptly said,
X  Ibid. p. 139
2. See J. Minattur: op.cit.p.18-19
3. Minattur, op.cit.p*19.
4* Ibid.
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MThe right to suspend the rule of the laws can belong 
to no one but the power which makes them.Mi
When a state of siege is in force in France, the jurisdiction of
civil courts is transferred to the military courts, which must, in exercising
it, follow the civil law and not issue hasty, ill-considered judgements.
Procedure may be simplified, duration of trials shortened, and technical
and dilatory pleas summarily brushed aside, but 'the essentials, even of
procedure, may not be dispensed with, and the guarantees of civil liberty,
so far as they affect trials for ordinary offences, normally punishable under
2
the Penal Code, remain in force.'
A further point of interest is that the judicial function in all 
routine matters is generally assigned to the ordinary Courts, which act on 
behalf of the military authorities during a state of siege. The military 
authorities may occasionally intervene and take cognizance of the cases them­
selves if they find it necessary to do so. This is not done except under 
pressure of actual necessity created by the situation. The military authorities, 
under the provisions of the Code of Military Justice, do take cognizance of 
offences like treason, espionage, sabotage, and other offences that interfere 
with the armed forces or the war effort. The trial of persons accused of such 
offences is seldom left to the civil authorities^.
As, in a state of siege, military tribunals are substituted for civil
civilians,
courts and exercise jurisdiction over the entire population, both soldiers and/
it can be assumed that * during this suspension of ordinary law, any man whatso-
1. Frank Chaveau in the Chamber of Deputies on Feb. 6th,l878, quoted in Rossiter, 
op. cit.p.8A.
2. M.Radin,'Martial Law and the State of Siege,* 30 (1941-42)Califomla law 
Review, p. 634-636.
3. J. Minattur, op.cit.p.22.
i
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ever is liable to arrest, imprisonment or execution at the will of the military 
tribunal consisting of a few officers who are excited by the passions natural to
A
civil way.11 But 1 the state of siege is not a condition in which the law is
temporarily abrogated, and the arbitrary fiat of a commander takes place, It
is emphatically a legal institution, expressly authorised by the Constitution
and the various bills of rights that succeeded each other in France, and
2
organised under their authority by a specific statufe.”
In spite of all the arrangements in respect of organisation and
£
procedure, which emphasize the character of the state of siege as a constitutional! 
and legal institution, the opportunities of abuse of power a**e great and 
military officials,given to common human frailities, may yield to temptation.
If and when they do, there is very little scope for redress for the victim.
By instituting civil or criminal proceedings against those guilty of abuse of 
power, some redress may be obtained, but the chances are slim, as it is often 
difficult to distinguish between the personal and the official responsibility 
of a public officer; the responsibility of redress from the civil courts or the 
administrative courts, though not non-existent, may appear to recede to the 
background in the circumstances envisaged in the stage of siege, because a 
declaration of a state of siege is regarded as an acte de gouvernement^.
Though ‘martial law is regulated by no known or established system of
4Code of Laws, as it is oyer and above all of them,*1 according to judicial
decisions in common law countries, however, those who yield this extra ordinary
1. A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (8th ed.1915) p.288.
2. M. Badin. op. cit. p. 637 •
3. See E.Laferriere, Traitede la Jurisdiction - Administrative.(2nd Ed.Paris, 
1896) Vol. II. p. 36. Henry Berthelemy disagrees with this view in his Traite 
Blementaire de Driot Administratif)(9th Ed. Par is, 1920)p. 443; see also 
Pelletier c. de Ladmirault ,SireyTl874)-2.28.
4. In re Egan, & Fed.Case.No. 4303
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authority under martial law should be able^prove to the Courts, when normal d y 
has returned , that the particular measures adopted by them were warranted by 
the exegencies of the situation, for they may be proceeded against both civilly 
and criminally.M In this respect also martial law differs from the state of 
siege. In a state of siege, the courts do not offer substantial redress to the 
individuals injured by the authorities during the material period, but the 
legislature maintains a continual check upon the arbitrary exercise of power by 
officials. Under martial law, it may be said that the courts act only at the 
termination of the emergency, but the fact that they do act at some future time 
is the main, though not very effective, deterrent to wanton acts on the part cf 
the officials. Even in this difference, there is an element of similarity, for 
in both systems, the checks are not as effective in practice as they appear to be 
in theory. Further, though the declaration and administration of martial law 
ordinarily remains an act of the executive exercisable in its discretion, there 
is only one occasion when the legislature may exercise ex post facto control over 
the executive acts of officials engaged in the administration of martial law, 
and this is when an indemnity bill is brought before it by the government. But 
this control, again, appears to be quite illusory. While the unpleasant pros­
pect of a trial for mis-application of power may tend to inhibit wantonness, 
the hope of indemnity legislation may encourage military authorities in their 
reckless activities. For it is the invariable practice of Parliament to pass an 
act of indemnity, giving statutory sanction to the measures adopted by the 
authorities and sentences passed by the courts martial or special tribunals 
instituted by them during the period of emergency. An act of indemnity is
1. See for instance, Wright v. Fitzgerald (1799) 27 St.Tr.759.
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usually passed after a regime of martial law; its significance rests in'* that 
it maintains parliamentary control over the executive in the exercise of 
emergency powers* It is usual to frame the indemnity provisions in such a 
manner as to give statutory sanction only to those acts done in good faith by 
the authorities, thus precluding immunity from judicial scrutiny of wanton 
exercise of authority* But the standard of a good faith is a very classic one, 
with the result that the authorities often find themselves protected from 
interference from the courts •
Uhder martial law as well as in the state of siege, special tribunals 
are ordinarily instituted* The difference between the two in this respect is 
that, while in the state of siege there is statutory authority for the mainten­
ance of such tribunals, under martial law the proceedings of these tribunals 
•derive their sole authority from the existence of actual rebellion, and the
duty of doing whatever may be necessary to quell it, and to restore peace and 
2
order' • In France the declaration of a state of siege is regulated by law and 
subject to known limitations, whereas in the Commonwealth countries as well in 
the United States of America, there is no law on the subject; in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the law governing the exercise of martial law rule is largely customary 
and judge made^.
Martial Law in Pakistan in 1958 and 1969:
•Martial Law' must be distinguished from 'military law1 which is the
law governing those in the armed services, and from 'military government*, which
1. See J. Minattur, o^.cit.p.27*
2* See Rex v* Allen (1921) 2 Irish Rep.2^1
3* C*Fairman , Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection', 23 Illion*L.R. 
766 at 776; see also JV Minattur, op.cit*p.27«
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is rule by an army of occupation in conquered territories, and from situations
in which military forces are called upon to assist the civil authorities in
maintaining public order without the existence of martial law* Where the
military forces are called upon only to assist, the civil courts continue to
function, and members of the civilian population may be punished only for
violations of the civil law, not for violations of military orders other than
those in implementation of civil law • Military law is the law applied to the
armed forces in peace as well as in war* It is generally codified and found in
such laws^fhe Army, Naval and Air Force Acts; it is administered for the most
part by courts martial, which theoretically have no jurisdiction to enforce
martial law* ’Military Government* is a descriptive term which applies to any
2
form of government by an army with or without the aid of civil authorities • 
While martial law theoretically exists for the purpose of restoring civil 
government as soon as possible, military government offers no such apology for 
its existence and is a relatively permanent order* As mentioned above, the
best example of the latter is seen in the government of a conquered territor
”A military Government takes the place of a suspended or 
destroyed sovereignty, while martial law, or, more properly, 
martial rule, takes the place of certain governmental agencies 
which for the time beinga:e unable to cope with the existing 
conditions in a locality which remains subject to the sovereignty* 
The occasion of military Government is the expulsion of the
T". Gayer ,J»K, fMartial Law,1 * Encyclopaedia Britannica, * (1967Sd* )Vol*l4,p*977«
2. T*Arnold, *Martial Law*,!Encyclopaedia of the Social SciencejVol*10*p*l65« 
3* E.S*Corwin, The President, Practice 8c Powers,(3rd ed*19W)pT450; see also 
Minattur op.cit.p.l^ f* 
k* See his reports on the Law of Civil Government in,Territories Subject to 
Military Occupation; cited in Mohd%Umar Khan v. Crown, supra, at p«33^*
The distinction between the ’military government* and *martial law*
Zf
is best drawn by Magoon • He says -
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sovereignty theretofore existing, which is usually 
accomplished by a successful military invasion* The 
occasion of martial rule is simply public exigency which 
may rise in time of war or peace* A military government 
since it takes the place of a deposed sovereignty, of necessity 
continues until a permanent sovereignty is again established in 
the territory* Martial rule ceases when the district is 
sufficiently tranquil to permit the ordinary agencies of 
government to cope with existing conditions."
The * martial law*, imposed in Pakistan from October 7*1958 to June
1962 and from March 25* 1969 onwards, in Hawaii from December 19^1 to October,
and in some African countries , falls under the fourth category of martial 
law; during these martial law periods in Pakistan the Constitution was abrogated
and a new legal order was set up* It is not martial law at all in the strict
legal sense; it is more akin to the military government, discussed above, in 
that it suspended or destroyed the government existing at that time, not in a 
conquered territory but in the home country. It has been observed by the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan that this form of martial law can be regarded as a victorious 
revolution or successful coup d»etat, which is an internationally recognised 
legal mode of changing the government or the Constitution* Where a revolution 
is successful, it satisfies the test of efficacy and becomes a basic law-creating 
fact. After a change of that character has taken place, the national legal order 
must for its validity depend upon the new law-creating organ, as the existing 
constitution has been abrogated by the revolutionary government; even the 
Courts lose their existing jurisdiction, and can function only to the extent and 
in the manner determined by the newConstitution* *If the territory and the 
people remain substantially the same, there is, under the modern juristic 
doctrine, no change in the corpus or international entity of the State and the
1. Infra* see the following pages.
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revolutionary government and the new Constitution are, according to Inter­
national Law, the legitimate government and the valid Constitution of the 
State.* ^
It is submitted that this form of martial law comes midway between 
the martial law, known in Commonwealth countries and the law administered by the 
military government in occupied territory. Prof.de Smith cites two types of 
situations found in the recent constitutional cases in Commonwealth countries; 
the first type is exemplified by the situation in Pakistan, in 1953 and Cyprus, 
the second by the situation in Pakistan in 1958* in Uganda and Rhodesia, and 
says that these cases fall in the first of the two categories but involve some 
consideration of the second category also *
It is apparent, from the declaration made by General Hohd.Ayub Khan,
as Chief Administrator of Martial Law on 17th October,1958, that, though martial
law purported to be imposed out of necessity, it was not to end with the mere
assertion of the extinction of that necessity. He said -
1 Let me assure everyone that, whereas Martial Law will not 
be retained a minute longer than is necessary, it will not 
be lifted a minute earlier than the purpose, for which it 
has been imposed, has been fulfilled. That purpose is the 
clearance of the political, social, economic and administr­
ative mess that has been created in the past. w
As the President on 30th October, 1958, he said -
nWe want martial law cover for the reforms we want to introduce, 
such as settlement of the refugees., and land reforms. For 
the bulk of, a population it is a good thing, but is bound to 
hurt some.
1.. State v. Dossc ',supra,per Mimur C.J. at p.539 *B and C* •
2. See 'Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations' in Western Ontario
Law Review * vol.7,1968, p.93* -    - * - . He points out that
incomplete reports of the judgements delivered by the members of the Appell­
ate Division of the Higja Court on Jan,29,1968, indicate that judicial opinion 
in Rhodesia is shifting towards an acknowledgement that the second class
of situatioh has arisen.
3. The 'Asian Recorder', November,I5-21,1958,p.23i»9.
4* See 'Dawn' Karachi, Octcber,31,1958.
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The jurisdiction 0f martial law was said to be the then prevailing 
situation; the legislative machinery had become defunct, civil administration 
had become corrupt to the core and law and order had broken down. The purpose 
of the martial law in the words of the President was 'to prepare the country 
suitable for the representative form of government to come in and flourish.'
It is from this point of State necessity that the legality of Martial
law, or the new legal order; *, as observed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, is
to be judged. Lord Camden, O.J., in Entic v. Carrington pointed out -
"••with respect to the argument of State necessity.•• 
the common law does not understand that kind of 
reasoning.•• If the master himself has no power 
to declare when the law ought to be violated for
reasons of State^ I am sure, we his judges have
no prerogative."
It is said that the Judges in Pakistan should not have gone so far
as to validate the abrogation of the Constitution by the President. But the
situation raises three questions, (i) what alternatives were open to them?
'ii) what ought they to say or do? and (iii) what respectable legal argument
could be advanced to justify the validity of the conduct which appeared manifestly
wrong? Professor de Smith says that the answer to these questions are fundamental
but
ally political judgements dressed in legalistic garb,>fae suggests, these 
questions should not be pressed too far. He further comments that, on the whole, 
the Judges trained in the British common law tradition hanker after that 'strict 
and complete legalism,' which Sir Owen Dixon commended as the only sure guide to 
the determination of political disputes set in a legal context; and, in so far
1. Address by General Mohd.Ayub Khan to Karachi Bar Association, on Jan.15,1959
quoted by M.Ahmed in 'Government and Politics in Pakiston, p.209*
2. 19 St.Tr.1030 at p.1073; see also Keir and Lawson, cases in Constitutional
Law, 5th Ed. 1967,p*312; see also Prof.de Smith, op.cit.p.93*
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as the narrowly positivist approach can provide a satisfactory answer to the 
problem, it will be eagerly pursued. Constitutional crices, which involve the 
very foundation of the legal order, where the old regime is replaced by a new 
regime as a whole, and not merely one aspect of it, should be answered in a 
legalistic way. Where the legitimacy of the regime itself or of the measures 
taken by the regime, which it considers vital to its survivalrare in issue, the 
pressure upon the judges to decide in a particular way, or not to decide in 
another way, may be irresistable,even if they wish to resist them. He further 
says that, if the politically ’right* answer can be delivered by pressing in an 
appropriate sequence the buttons which Judges are in habit of pressing, when 
deciding a case of constitutional importance, so much the better and if it can­
not be delivered by;this means, buttons hitherto mysteriously screened from view 
may be discoverable and a suitable answer can then be flourished amidst assever­
ations that the legitimacy of the political order has been demonstrated by 
reference to pre-existing criteria. The end result is that ostensibly unlawful 
action is shown to be lawful. He finally concludes that, if on the other hand, 
forensic and judicial ingenuity cannot conceal the obvious, it has to be 
acknowledged that a breach of legal continuity has taken place, so that the 
legitimacy of the political order cannot be ascribed to anything in the pre­
existing constitution; a different approach may be followed. Out comes Hans 
Kelsen’s "General Theory of Law and State11 and it is found that a successful 
revolution begets its own legality.
But he disapproves of Hans Kelsen*s "Pure Theory of Law," which, 
according to him, has always commanded a certain grudging respect among common 
law jurists, by saying that *Lon Fuller has dismissed it as*’an empty wheelbarrotf
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and Harold Laski as *an exercise in logic and not in life*'
Never to the best of his knowledge, has Kelsen been cited in an English Court,
1 2and *he is disregarded in our books on constitutional law** Sethna points out, 
■Kelsen1s jurisprudence is too abstract to be appreciated and is divorced from 
social order. It is not of much utility."
Kelsen*s estimate of the successful coup d’etat or victorious revolut­
ion* may be correct in International Law,in relation to the recognition of the
changed government by the nations of the world. As said by Mumir;C.J*^  in 
3
Dosso’s case , citing Kelsen, a foreign country cannot go into the questions who 
brought about the revolution and by what means was it achieved. The successful 
coup d*etat or victorious revolution, irrespective of whether it has been brought 
about by unconstitutional action of the Head of the State, as in Pakistan, may 
be regarded as having instituted a legitimate government by other nations for 
the purpose of International Law* But it cannot be justified under the 
constitutional law which is part of the Municipal law; International Law cannot 
be applied by Municipal Courts if it is repugnant to the Municipal Law . If an 
aggrieved citizen challenges the validity of a new regime, alleging it to have 
been established by unconstitional means, in the superior Courts of his country, 
it is difficult to see how Kelsen*s theory of *Law and State*, can be invoked 
to justify the unconstitutional action of the Head of the State.
Professor de Smith further, discussing the present situation in the
new Commonwealth, remarks that this is an era of constitutional breakdowns. When
1. See Prof.de Smith op.cit.p.96. It can be noted here that this was the
situation before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, that Mumir,C*J.relying on 
Hans Kelson’s theory of successful coup d’etat approved the abrogation of 
the Constitution by the President as well as the legality of the new regime 
and legal order.
2. Sethna,M.J., Jurisprudence, p.22.
3. Supra.
435
the Constitution ceases to function normally, when it becomes unworkable, when 
it is partly or wholly superseded or suspended or a government is overturned in 
a manner not authorised by the Constitution itself, the constitutional lawyer 
finds himself transported into an entirely new dimension* Ostensibly unconst­
itutional action has been taken by persons, who are wielding effective political 
power and have not the lightest intention of relinquising it •
This was the situation which the Judges of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan were facing in Dosses case, when the unconstitutional action was taken; 
the Constitution had been abrogated by the President who was exercising effective 
power* The Judges had no other alternative but to validate the unconstitutional 
action of the President by applying, it is submitted wrongly, Kelson1s theory, 
and to approve the validity of the new regime and the new legal order* Had 
they decided the case in an other way, they would have been ousted and the new 
Judges, most probably military officers, selected by the President himself, 
would have validated the abrogation of the Constitution, as well as the new legal 
order* Moreover, it is submitted, the situation in the country was deteriorating 
day by day and there was such a high degree of lawlessness that the martial law 
regime was welcomed by the masses of Pakistan* The realisation of the situation 
by the Judges is manifested by the frank remarks of Mumir C.J. himself on the 
validation of the unconstitutional act of the Governor-General, in dissolving 
the Constituent assembly in 1951* which was a main issue in Tftmizuddum Khan’s 
case, discussed in,the preceeding chapter; where no question of abrogation of 
the Constitution was involved and the question was not as serious as it was in 
1958* He said -___________________________________________________________
1* Prof* de Smith, op.cit* p.96.
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"The mental anguish caused to the Judges by these cases*•• 
was beyond description*•• no judiciary elsewhere in the 
world had to pass through what may be described as judicial 
torture*11
If the Court had found against the Governor-General, he was -
quite sure that there would have been chaos in the 
country"
and a revolutionary situation would have been precipitated* In any Case, who
eould say that -
"•••the coercive power of the State was with the Court 
and not with the Governor-General? At moments like this 
public law is not to be found in the books, it^lies else­
where, giz, in the events that have happened."
Commenting on these remarks, Prof.de Smith says that it was very
2
important for the Court, in Tamizuddun Khan1s case not to come to a conclusion 
adverse to the Governor-General on the main issues. Fortunately, it was 
possible for the Court to come to a favourable conclusion by using rules of 
public law found in books. Nor did the Court have to justify its decision by 
treating the Governor-General as a successful revolutionary; instead it was able 
to discern legal continuity by invoking the doctrine of necessity to abridge the 
gap between the law and the facts of political life. In 1958, as has been seen, 
this option was not available and the Court was faced with a revolution 
claiming the accolade of legitimacy^. It is submitted that this is the correct 
view.
Kelsen was invoked by the High Court of Uganda in 1966 • In 1966, the
Prime Minister, Dr. Obote, removed the President, suspended the Constitution
1. 5 Pakistan Bar Journal,16-18.(i960) quoted by Prof.de Smith,op.cit.p.97*
2. Supra.
3* See Prof.de Smith, op.cit.p.97*
k* Uganda v. Prison Commr., ex parte Matovu (1966) E.A.51^*
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and procured the adoption, by a procedure not sanctioned by the legitimate 
Constitution, of a new Constitution, under which he became President. The Court 
held that his coup d»etat had been successful and efficacious, in as much as the 
will of the Government was being generally obeyed, and accepted the legality of 
the new regime and the new Constitution of Dr.Obote; the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was dismissed by applying more citations from Kelsen .
It is submitted that the situation was not very different from that
in Pakistan. The unconstitutional action was taken by the man who was wielding
effective power and there was no alternative course open to the Judges than to
validate the action of the Prime Minister and accept the new regime and the new
Constitution by straining Kelsen's theory. It has been said that the Judges
should have resigned, as the Chief Justice of the Federation of Rhodesia and
2
Nyasaland did in i960 • But, it is submitted, their resignation would not have 
prevented the acceptance of the new regime and the new Constitution by other 
Judges.
I^ank, commenting on the unconstitutional action and the authentication
A.
of the revolution or new regime by the Judges, says that -
"•••it is interesting to note that perpetrators of illegal 
action have, in each case, made strenuous efforts to be 
readmitted to the mainstream of constitutional respectability 
by moving efficaciously to re-establish a rule of law, in 
terms scarcely less, and sometimes more traditional than 
the fundamental that the revolution overthrew. To debate 
whether a revolution is constitutional is pointless 
sophistry, and only a political not a legal answer can be given 
to the more sensible question, whether the revolution must 
necessarily number amongst its casualties the normative 
concept of rule of law. To some extent, the answer will 
depend on the quality of the system which the revolution
1. See Prof.de Smith, op.cit.p.103*
2. Ibid.
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overthrew, on the dispatch with which the rule of law is 
restored by the revolutionaries and how frequently the 
society indulges in revolution."1
It is submitted that this is a realistic analysis, which gives a 
comprehensive answer to the political question sought to be answered in a legal 
way by the constitutional lawyers. Whether the recognition of the revolution 
brought about by the unconstitutional action of the President was legal, when 
there was no provision in the Constitution of 1956 for its abrogation by the
President, when the Constitution itself was susceptible of such amendment or
2
reformation as the President intended to bring about to maintain the rule of 
law in the country and especially when the conditions represented as justifying 
the proclamation of martial law, did not, as previously indicated, justify its 
promulgation, no other answer is possible. It can, however, he said that, in so 
far as recognition of the revolution is concerned, there was no alternative 
open to the Supreme Court of Pakistan than to validate it. As to the question 
of overthrowing the existing system, it is arguable that, as it was not 
functioning in a way calculated to maintain the rule of law in the country, there 
was justification for its overthrow.
It is worth discussing at length the circumstances alleged to have 
lead to the promulgation of martial law in 1958 and the abrogation of the 1956 
Constitution. The legislative machinery had become impotent, the civil 
administration had. become corrupt and law and order had broken down. The
Constitution Commission, set up by the PresidentAyub Khan in February,i960 was
IT Franjc, Comparative Constitutional Process; Cases and Materials.
2. See Corneliuses observation in State v. Dosso supra.
the first step taken by him to restore constitutional government in the country; 
the former Chief Justice of Pakistan was appointed as its Chairman. The terms 
of reference of the Commission, inter alia, were to ‘examine the progressive 
failure of parliamentary Government in Pakistan, leading to the abrogation of the 
Constitution of 1956 and to determine the causes and nature of failure; to 
consider how best the said or like causes may be identified and their recurrence 
prevented.* The Commission came to the conclusion that the Parliamentary form 
of Government had failed in Pakistan and they suggested the following causes 
of its failure,
n(i) lack of proper elections and efects in the late 
constitution;
(ii)undue interference by the Head of the State with 
the Ministers and political parties, and by the 
Central Government with the functioning of the 
government of the provinces;
(iii)lack of leadership resulting in lack of well organised
and disciplined parties, the general lack of character
in the politicians^and their undue interference in the
administration.11
According to the Commission, it was the last mentioned group of facts 
which were the main causes of the alleged failure of parliamentary democracy 
in Pakistan. Eut it was strongly contended by the politicians that, as parliam­
entary democracy had not been given a fair trial in Pakistan, the question of
failure did not arise. The Commission seems to have been convinced that, even 
if a general election had been held, the right type of leader would not have 
been elected, so the failure to hold elections could not be regarded as a cause 
of failure of the Constitution.
1. See Report of the Constitution Commission, I960, quoted by Chohdhary G.W.
in Democracy in Pakistan, pp.132-133*
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As regards the defects in the Constitution of 1956* which were said 
to be one of the causes of its failure, if there were any defects, they could 
easily have been remedied by constitutional amendments without abrogating the 
Constitution. Regarding interference by the Heads of the State, the Commission 
seems to have taken a charitable view of theactions of Ghulam Mohammad and 
Iskander Mirza, whose arbitrary activities are in many quarters, regarded as 
mainly responsible for the breakdown of parliamentary democracy. The Commissions 
view was that they might have been responsible for the confusion in the political 
field; they were not free from personal responsibility but ‘history shows the 
power passed from the Head of the State to the people*s representative only 
when the latter became disciplined and stood together to oppose autocracy. Till 
that stage was reached, the Head of the State could always interfere with 
immunity; our not accepting the interference by the Heads of the State-as one of 
the real causes of the failure of the parliamentary form of Government does not 
amount to their exoneration. • • What we should like to point out is that 
interference by the Heads of the State would not have been possible, if there 
had been discipline and solidarity in the parties in power.*
It is submitted that Ghilam M[ohammad and Iskander Mirza actively 
engineered the breaking up of solidarity in the parties, a course unbecoming 
any Head of State in a parliamentary system. Ghulam Mohammad*s attempt to 
disrupt the Muslim League, the ruling political party in 1953^to oust the 
Nazimuddin Cabinet and Iskander Mirza's palpable encouragement of the formation 
of the Republican Party by a dissident group of Muslim Leaguers in 1956 are two 
glaring instances of Heads of the State actively contributing to the break up of
1. Ibid. p.l3*f.
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the parties* solidarity to consolidate their own power. Furthermore, the 
emergency provisions of the 1956 Constitution, which, of course, did not confer 
power to abrogate the Constitution, were used by Iskander Mirza seemingly to 
further his interests • The unconstitutional actions of both Ghulam Mohammad 
and Iskander Mirza were clearly abuse of power and breach of duty cast on them 
by the Constitution. The Constitution Commission, it is submitted, ignored 
unconstitutional action indulged in by these Heads of State for the purpose of 
personal aggrandisement in assessing the causes of the unsatisfactory working 
of parliamentary institutions in Pakistan.
Moreover, Iskander Mirza had endeavoured to induce the public to
believe that the Constitution was unworkable by making public statements to the
this was due to
effect that the/illiteracy and lack of experience of democratic government of
most of the people. Through his hirelings and henchmen, he put forward the idea
of setting up a 'Revolutionary Council* of which he was to be the head for a
2
term of fiver years * But by this time, the politicians were well aware of the 
intrigues and manoeuvres of Iskander Mirza and wanted to get rid of him. The 
election date, February,1959* was approaching and he was conscious of the designs 
of the politicians and the probability of his removal after the election. He had 
only assented to the 1956 Constitution under secret agreement with the Constitu­
ent Assembly that it would, in return, elect him as President. During this 
period, on account of his intrigues, he had irritated the Muslim League, which 
passed a resolution against him. The struggle for power between him and the 
politicians led to the proclamation of martial law, for Iskander Mirza regarded 
this as the only means of ensuring that he would continue to be President.
1. Chowdhary, op.cit. p.13^#
2. Z.A. Suleri, Pakistan's Lost Years, p.122.
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There were rumours of an alliance between Suharwardy, the former Prime Minister, 
and Feroze Khan Noon, who succeeded Suharwardy, that, after the election, 
Suharwardy would become Prime Minister and Noon would be President*
As to the undue interference by the politicians in the administration, 
the Commission cited a number of specific cases* They referred first to the 
East Bengal Police Committee Report, 1953* which gave an account of undue 
interference with the police and magistracy by Ministers in cases of rioting 
and robbery, and the way in which military assistance in preventing smuggling 
of goods out of East Pakistan, was interrupted by the Awami League Ministry in 
1937 • They added that criminal cases against certain representatives of the 
people, for misappropriation of public funds, were withdrawn in E.Pakistan by 
the Muslim League Cabinet on party considerations* Turning to West Pakistan 
they cited cases of favours granted to people to secure support for their party; 
these ranged from granting route permits to waiving of interest due on Taccavi 
(Revenue) loans, postponing the redistribution of land revenue arrears and 
promoting a Junior officer over a senior in consideration of his doing
propaganda for the party. The Commission referred to the note of despair in the
comment of the Court of Inquiry, appointed to inquire into the Punjab 
disturbances of 1933* that democracy seemed to mean subordination of law and 
order to political ends; the Ministers were so busy in helping their political 
supporters that they could not concentrate on questions of policy, whichvas 
their proper domain# They were so concerned with consolidating their position, 
that they meddled in minor administrative matters, which, in countries, where
the parliamentary democracy has been successful, are left to the experts and the
2services* ________________________________________________________________-
1#. Chowdhtiri, op.cit* p.115* ^
2* See Constitution Commission Report, op.cit*11,12 and 36, see also Chowdhtiri 
op•cit.pp.136-137• /
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As regards the Central Governments* interference in provincial politics* 
the Commission simply observed that *such interference shows that the members of 
the party in power at the Centre were more concerned with maintaining their own 
position than with working the Constitution *. But the Commission did not consi­
der whether such interference was on so large a scale as to justify the abrogat­
ion of the Constitution, the dissolution of Parliament and the imposition of 
martial law.
The Commission, however, rejected the ellegation that the services
were also responsible for corruption and the failure of the parliamentary
government in Pakistan. They admitted that there were cases of officers playing
2
up to Ministers in order to exploit the situation to their advantage • The 
defects which the Commission noted in the working of parliamentary democracy 
in Pakistan ’are but a reflection of indiscipline, lack of sense of duty and 
want of spirit of service and accommodation in an average member of society, 
noticeable particularly in countries which have emerged into independence, before 
attaining universal education and a minimum level of economic development•*^
As to dearth of leadership in Pakistan since the death of MoJid.Ali
Jinah (Quaid-i-Azam) and Liaqat Ali Khan, which was also referred to by Sir
4
Ivor Jennings , it is admitted that it was an important factor in the political 
deterioration of Pakistan.
It is submitted that, from the report of the Constitution Commission
5
and the statements of political leaders , it is clear that the country suffered
1. Const.Comm.Rep.p.9» see also Chowdhuri, op.cit.p.137*
2. Ibid p.13#
3« Ibid.p.14, see also Chowdhuri, op.cit.p.l4l
4. See Approach to Self-Government, cited by Chowdhuri, op.cit.p.l4l 
3» See replies of Ch.Mohd.Ali and Ataur Kalman to questionnaire issued by 
Const.Commission, June, I960.
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from extreme political instability, that parliamentary democracy in Pakistan ; 
did not work as satisfactory as it works in Britain and other parts of the 
Commonwealth. Whether the Heads of the State, the politicians or the civil 
servants were responsible for this is a question on which opinions might differ. 
But there is no denial that political confusion and chaos prevailed in the 
country. It is further submitted that the Commission took an unduly lenient 
view of the role of the Heads of the State in the political drama that brought 
an end to the country’s democracy and that the Heads of the Staje could not have 
played such a role, if there had been solidarity and discipline in the parties •
As regards the contention that the declaration of martial law was 
necessary because law and order had been completely subverted, it is submitted 
that the people were not responsible for it. It was the intrigue and manoeuv­
ring of the Head of the State and the politicians which created chaos and con­
fusion amongst the people and engendered agitations and demonstrations. The 
menace to law and order was not so serious that it could not be maintained without 
resorting to martial law.
The question of involvement of society generally in the revolution ,
* 2as observed by Frar^ k , is worth considering. It is to be noted here that it was 
neither society generally nor the military which brought about the successful 
coup d’etat or victorious revolutions in Pakistan in 1958 and 1969# It was 
the constitutional Head, the President, who extra-constitutionally abrogated the 
Constitution and exposed not only society but himself to the control of the 
Commander-in-Chief, who, being the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, ousted 
the President and declared himself President within 20 days of the abrogation of
the Constitution, that is on October, 27, 1958._______________________________
Li Chowdhuri, op•cit.pp•140-141
2. Comparative Constitutional Process, op.cit^
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Professor Gledhill has taken very practical and juristic approach
'I
to the question • He says that, though it may be contended that no other 
course could have saved Pakistan from disaster and that no law deserves 
enforcement when the reasons for its enactment have ceased to operate, the 
action of the President in proclaiming martial law on October,7,1958, was taken 
in circumstances which cannot be regarded as justifying it, according to the
principles accepted elsewhere in the Commonwealth. He further says, as has
2
been discussed above , when the Federal Court had to find a way to extricate
the Government of Pakistan from an earlier constitutional difficulty, it relied
heavily on the common law and the prerogative. But when the Proclamation of
October,7*1958 and the L.C.F.O., 1958 were impugned, no Crown prerogative or
rule of common law could be invoked to justify what had been done. Instead
resort was had to Hans Kelsen's 'General Theory of the Law and State* for the
proposition that a victorious revolution or a successful coup d'etat was an
internationally recognised method of changing a Constitution. That other
States are obliged, sooner or later, to recognise a government which has seized
power by force in a state is obvious. But the Constitution of 195$ had
provisions for its own amendment. If, in addition to these, the Conrts recognise
a right to change the Constitution by rebellion, are there any restrictions,
apart from success, on this right? Do the Courts approve -
"The good old law, the ancient plan 
that he may take who has the power 
and he may keep who can ?
He concludes that,coneeding. that, not for the first time, the Courts had been
embarrassed by a claim that they should find some basis for giving their approval
to extra-constitutional action and that, if they had not done so, the__________
1• Pakistan, op•cit•pp•108-109•
2. Federation v. Taznizuddin Khan, supra.
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-ill*-
probabilities $re that they would have been suspended and replaced by military 
courts, affording fewer remedies to the citizen who complained of the 
activities of the government# But the course taken was calculated to encourage 
an individual, wielding supreme power, to seek the approval of the courts for 
unconstitutional action# As discussed in the preceeding pages, this was not the 
first time that the courts were asked to approve pragmatic action# However, 
the Chief Justice recognised the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order as the 
•new Constitution’ which determined the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court#
Position of Fundamental Rights:
2
Mumir C#J# expressing the majority view in State v# Dosso , held that, 
along with the abrogation of the Constitution by the M . L . Proclamation of 
October,7,1958, the Fundamental Rights were abrogated. As to the question 
whether Art.2 of the L.C.F.O.,1958, which provided that ’Pakistan shall be 
governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution* could . 
revive the fundamental rights, it was pointed out that the provision did not 
have the effect of restoring the fundamental rights, because the reference to 
Government in Art.2 of the L.C.F.O. was to the structure and outline of the 
Government and not to the laws of the late Constitution which had been 
expressly abrogated by Art.4; Art*2 and Art#4 of the L.C.F.O#, could therefore 
stand together and there was no conflict between them* But, even if some 
inconsistency be supposed to exist between the two, the provisions of Art*4 
which were more specific and came later in the order must override those of Art# 
2.
Art.4 of the L.C.F.O. laid down -
ll Op.cit. ’Pakistan’ pp#10&-109*
2. Supra*
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1, Notwithstanding the abrogation of the late Constitution! 
and subject to any Order of the President or Regulation made 
by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, all laws other than 
the late Constitution, and all Ordinances, Orders-inOouncil,
Orders other than Orders made by the President under*the late 
Constitution, such Orders made by the President under the late 
Constitution as are set out in the Schedule to this Order, Rules, 
bye-laws, Regulations, Notifications, and other legal instruments 
in force in Pakistan or in any part thereof, or having extra­
territorial validity, immediately before the Proclamation, shall 
so far as applicable and with such necessary adaptations as the 
President may see fit to make, continue in force until altered, 
repealed or amended by competent authority.
2. In this Article a law is said to be in force if it has effect
as law whether or not the law has been brought into operation.
3* No Court shall call into question any adaptation made by the 
President under clause (1).
Cornelius J. dissenting from the majority, took a different view and 
observed that the words in Art.2 of the L.C.F.O.1958, 'Pakistan shall be governed 
as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution' did not only cover 
provisions creating organs of government and defining their powers, as held by 
the majority, but also relating to the fundamental rights. The direction
was one which operated by reference to the previous instrument without giving
validity to that instrument. According to him, by the Constitution of 1956, 
the highest authority of an overriding character, governing all laws and legis­
lation in the country, had been given to the principles, which were set out and 
enumerated as Fundamental Rights in Part II thereof; no valid law could be made 
in contravention of those rights. He conceded that the said prohibition was 
permanent, the L.C.F.O.1958, gave overriding powers to the President and 
the C.M.L.A. to make Orders and Regulations contrary to anything appearing in 
the 1956 Constitution. Furthermore Art.4 of the L.C.F.O.,1958, brought into 
force all laws existing before the abrogation of the Constitution; no such law 
could be challenged on the ground of its inconsistency with the Fundamental
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Rights. But this could not annul the Fundamental Rights as such; they or any 
one of them could be abrogated only when it was so expressly provided by an 
Order or Regulation of the President or the C.M.L.A. He further observed that 
some of the Fundamental Rights, enumerated in Part II of the 1956 Constitution, 
did not derive their validity from having been formulated in words and enacted 
in that Constitution. Some of these rights are essential human rights, which 
inherently belong to every citizen of a civilized country. The cortrfry view 
would involve the danger of denial of these elementary rights, expressly assured 
by being written into the fundamental law of the country, merely because that 
writing was no longer of any force .
But it seems that Cornelius J.was not clear in his mind, in the instant
case, about the position of the fundamental rights in the new legal order; he
did not say in so many words that the fundamental rights formed part of the new
legal order. Possibly he wanted to avoid the determination of the question by
simply holding that the fundamental rights are and should be available to the
people, whether they are incorporated in the Constitution or not, because they
2
are basic human rights. This is supported by the fact that, in a later case , 
in which, being concerned about the status of the fundamental rights, he expressly 
declared that the fundamental rights formed part of the law of the land in 
the new legal order. He also avoided a declaration of the status of the 
fundamental rights by adopting another approach. He pointed out that the valid­
ity of S.11 of the F.C.R., could not be called in question under Art.*f of the 
late Constitution, on account of its inconsistency with Art*5 of the late
1. State v. Dosso, supra.
2. Mehdi Ali Khan's case infra, dissenting view of Cornelius J.
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Constitution, because Art.^ t of L.C.F.O.,1958, had given full effect, as enacted, 
to all laws existing at the time of the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956, 
insofar as the Frontier Crimes Regulation fell within the category of such laws* 
But he held that the question of validity of the impugned law on account of its 
repugnancy to the fundamental rights in question was not a question before the 
Supreme Court; it had been already decided by the High Court before the 
Proclamation and the L.C.F.O* 1956, was retrospective in application only from 
Proclamation Day, 7th October, 1956, and not from a date prior to it.
It is submitted that the question could have also been avoided by 
determining the basic and crucial question of the jurisdiction of the High Court 
in issuing the writ of habeas corpus in the instant case; a matter which belong­
ed to the special area, in which neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court 
had jurisdiction to issue the writ.
The view taken by the majority in Vosso'a case was reaffirmed in 
Province of East Pakistan v. M.Mehdi Ali Khan , in which substantially the same 
question was raised4 whether the validity of any law could be called in question, 
on account of its inconsistency with a fundamental right. It was held that, as 
the fundamental rights did not exist in the new legal order, the validity of 
any law could not be challenged on the said ground.
Cornelius J.,dissenting from the majority, reaffirmed his views 
expressed in the earlier case. He held that the rule laid down in 00360*s case 
was of a technical character. As it operated to deprive subjects of rights to 
protect their interest^ by well-recognised procedure, he conceived that to 
defeat such a rule by purely technical submissions involved no contravention of
1. P.L.D.1959, SC.387.
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law. But indeed, he observed, he had been at pains, in his examination of the 
instant case, to proceed as far as he could upon the matters of substance in 
ascertaining the true nature of the question involved. By analysing the 
circumstances in 00580*s case and those of the instant case, which were 
distinguishable^1^- therefore immune from the bar against relief by writ upheld 
in Dossajs case, he came to the conclusion that the questions were hot merely 
technical, but each had a reality of its own in relation to the intricate 
subject matter of these cases.
The subject matter was raised in Dosso's case, at a time when the 
situation created by the abrogation of the Constitution could not yet be said to 
have taken shape. Indeed, following the pronouncement of the judgement in that 
case, the momentous announcement was made that the President, who had abrogated 
the Constitution and promulgated the L.C.F.O.,1958, had himself resigned and was 
due shortly to leave the country. Now in the instant case, when the situation 
had been stabilized, it was possible to reappraise the provisions of the 
L.C.F.O.,1958, in a calmer situation. Nine months had elapsed since its 
promulgation and its application in actual practice had become a matter of 
observation. Cornelius J.,therefore, expressed his deep concern with the 
questions^ i)whether it was the intention of the L.C.F.O. to annul the fundamental 
rights; and (ii) whether the effect of Art.2(7) of the L.C.F.O., was to bring 
to an end all pending proceedings for the enforcement of the fundamental rights 
forthwith, without considering the question whether, in the changed legal 
structure, such writs were competent or otherwise.
The plain conclusion was that the fundamental rights had lost the 
binding force conferred upon them by the Constitution. No law could be called
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in question on the ground of its inconsistency with a fundamental right under 
Art.** of the 1956 Constitution. But the Fundament Rights nevertheless remained 
as provisions in the late Constitution and were enforceable to the extent assured 
by Art.2(l)of the L.C.F.O., as discussed above; the L.C.F.O. did not expressly 
put any restriction of the enjoyment of the general rights of the people, except 
that, in the case of prevntive detention, the right to personal liberty could 
not be invoked in the manner available under the late Constitution; under 
which an order of preventive detention for more than three months had to be 
referred to an advisory board. From the implication of this provision, it was 
manifested, beyond any doubt, that all rights, except the right to personal 
liberty, to the extent discussed above, were kept alive.
He further made the very realistic remark that, giving effect to 
fundamental rights could not be said to prejudice the success of the new regime; 
suspension of the constitutional guarantees frequently accompanies the promul­
gation of martial law. The 1956 Constitution, by Art.191, empowered the Presi­
dent, in a state of grave emergency, to issue a proclamation and, during the 
continuance of such proclamation,the President w$s authorised, by Art.192 of 
that Constitution, to suspend the right to move the Court for the enforcement 
of such fundamental rights as are specified in the Order and all proceedings 
pending in any Court for the enforcement of the rights so specified, remain 
suspended for the period during which the proclamation is in force. By depriv­
ing the fundamental rights of compulsive force in law,their enforcement through 
the Courts was rendered impossible, and any proceedings for that purpose, 
doomed to failure in any case under Art.192 of the 1956 Constitution. On the 
other hand, the L.C.F.O., 1958, in terms, expressly provided that notwith­
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standing the abrogation of the Constitution, but subject to any order of the 
President or the C.M.L.A., the country should be governed as nearly as may be 
in accordance with the late constitution. The provision was, in his opinion, 
of high importance as furnishing a key to understanding of the true nature of 
the Martial Law rule imposed in Pakistan on October 7j 1958, The Old Constitution 
was repudiated as to its form, but it was possible to read in the words abrogating 
the Constitution an assurance that the late Constitution's provisions, so far as 
applicable in the changed conditions, resulting irom the dissolution of the 
legislatures and the dismissal of the elected Governments, would continue to be 
applied in practice, though subject to the expressed will of the new Sovereign 
authorities. This feature gave* it is submitted, a character of novelty to the 
new regime, as a form of Martial Law Rule.
In Dosso's case, the nature of the provision 'Pakistan shall be govern­
ed. •• as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution' was considered 
only in its bearing on the question whether the Fundamental Rights had survived 
the revolution, as such rights. Upon this point the unanimity of opinion appeared 
from the four Judgements delivered; Cornelius J., dissented. According to 
Minir C.J.,the provision meant to apply to the 'structure and outline of the 
Government' Shahabuddin J., thought that the words must be taken to refer rather 
to the machinery of the Government than to legislation and the matters affecting 
the validity of the laws.' Amirudrin Ahmad J. expressed the view that the word 
'governed' relates to the structure and manner of the Government, which has been 
changed by the dissolution of the legislative bodies and dismissal of the 
ministries and the words in the Article have not the effect of reviving the 
Fundamental Rights. Rahman J. agreed with Munir C*J. According to Cornelius J., 
the provision implied that Pakistan should be governed in accordance with the
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provisions of thel956 Constitution in all practical matters except those which 
had been expressly repudiated by the Orders of the President or the Regulations 
of the C.M.L.A.; fundamental rights except the right to be referred to the 
advisory board in case of preventive detention for more than three months, 
were not annulled by the L.C.F.O. >1958, any Order of the President or the 
Regulation of the C.M.L.A.
In Mehdi Ali Khan's case the majority reaffirmed the view expressed
in Dossofs case. Cornelius J., dissenting from the majority observed that the
aforesaid words in Art.2(i) of the L.C.F.O. conveyed a clear assurance that the
new regime would govern the country according to the provisions of the late
Constitution; upon the lines to which the people were accustomed, whic£ included
2
the provisions relating to the fundamental rights. In a later case the Supreme 
Court held that the word •governed* included not only the outline or the structure 
of the Government but also all functions, legislative, executive and judicial, 
of the Government; this included the limitation on legislative power existing in 
the late Constitution. The Court was, however, reluctant to decide whether the 
Fundamental Rights existed in the new legal Order. It is submitted that the view 
that the words ’shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the late 
Constitution* included all provisions relating to the government of the country 
is correct. It can be noted that the same words were used in the Government of 
India Act,1955 and sub-section(2) of S.(8) of the Indian Independence Act, 19^ 7, 
provided that Pakistan shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with 
the provisional of the Government of India Act, 1935;,f the language of the 
provision in question seems to have been lifted from the aforesaid provision of
1. Supra.
2. Iftekharhddin v. Mohd. Sarfraz.,P.L.D.196l,SC.*585
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the Indian Independence Act»19^7* which covered all aspects of the government 
dealt with in the Government of India Act, 1935*
As regards the position of fundamental rights Cornelius J•, in his 
dissenting judgement in Mehdi Ali Khan*s case, pointed out that the question was 
one of great difficulty, susceptible of discussion in the light of legal theory 
and political philosophy at great length. The principle which seemed to him 
most apt to resolve the difficulty was that the directory provisions of the 
late Constitution,referred to in Art.2(i) of the L.C.F.O.,1958, as expressed in 
the Order, had been subsumed in Martial Law. The force which they possessed was 
not relateable any longer to their enactment in the Constitution in which they 
appeared, but existed only because of and by reason of the Martial Law and only 
to the extent that the Martial Law by expression did not recall or avoid them.
He, therefore, found a clear expression in the L.C.F.O. of the policy of allow­
ing the fundamental rights validity to the extent discussed above. According to 
him the fundamental rights existed and formed part of the law of the land in the 
new legal order, subject, of course, to the L.C.F.O. ,195>B7iand the Martial Law 
Regulations or Orders.
It is submitted that the view expressed by Cornelius J. is correct.
It is further supported by the attitude of the Superior Courts which,as early as 
in 1939j protected the rights of the people by issuing the appropriate writs.
In I960, the Supreme Court itself held that an order made by a local M.L. 
Authority was ultra vires of powers conferred on it by the M.L.Regulations and 
Orders; habeas corpus was granted. These cases will be discussed in the followini 
pages, as they indicate the attitude of the superior Courts generally with regard 
to enforcement of the fundamental rights.
455
Furthermore, the view expressed by Cornelius J*, w^ich goes beyond 
what he said in the earlier case, is correct, in as much as it maintains that 
the fundamental rights derived their force from the L.C.F.O*,1958, which did 
not expressly, annul them but clearly laid down that Pakistan should he governed, 
as nearly as may be, in accordance with the late Constitution; this expression 
meant to revive the provisions of the late Constitution with regard to the 
maintenance of the rule of law in the country, which included the basic rights 
of the people* The view is supported for the implication arising from putting 
a restriction on one of the fundamental rights and leaving the other rights 
expressly untouched; this clearly indicated that all fundamental rights, except 
the right to personal liberty in matters of preventive detention only, were to 
remain in force.
Though the view expressed by the majority in Dosso1s case and re-
1
affirmed in Mehdi Ali Khan^s case, was reasserted in Iftekharuddin1s case, it 
was nevertheless said that, if Dosso*s case required reconsideration, that 
could be done at the proper time; it was not in question in the instant case* 
Kaikaus J*, giving the judgement of the Court, however, expressed the view that 
the argument advanced by the majority in Dosso*s case, that fundamental rights 
did not exist, as the President and the C.M.L.A* were not bound by them, could 
not be supported on the ground that, because the President and the C.M.L.A. had 
the power to interfere with the fundamental rights, they had no existence. Under 
the late Constitution, the President had a power, exercisable in an emergency, 
and, of course, the Constitution itself was susceptible of amendments in all 
respects.
1. Iftekharuddin v. Mohd.Sarfraz.P.L.D.196l S.C.5S5
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It will be seen that the superior Courts soon realised the consequences, 
which were to emerge from the decision in Dosso * s case, and reaffirmed in Mehdi 
Ali Khan1s case, that they could no longer protect the rights of the people 
against the arbitrary actions of the authorities during martial law rule. There­
fore, without reversing the principle laid down in the aforesaid cases, in later 
cases they issued writs to enforce the rights of the people against the M.L. 
authorities, if it was found that the actions taken by the authorities were mala 
fide or ultra vires of powers conferred on them by M.L.Regulations or Orders or 
by the laws preserved by the L.C.F.O.,1953. They did not, however, challenge the 
M.L.Regulations or Orders, promulgated by the C.M.L.A. or authorities exercising 
powers under him; n° writ was allowed to call in question any M.L.Regulations or 
Orders, as their jurisdiction to do so was expressly and completely taken away 
by the L.C.F.O.,19^8. We will discuss in the following pages cases in which the 
Courts issued writs to enforce the fundamental rights and where they did not.
The question whether the laws, rendered invalid, on account of their 
inconsistency with the fundamental rights should be regarded void ab initio or 
void only to the extent of inconsistency, was discussed at length in Mehdi Ali 
Khan1s case. It was contended that the impugned law, which was declared void 
on account of its repugnancy to the fundamental right in question, was rendered 
void abinitio; it was not a law in force before the Proclamation, so that it 
could not be brought into force by Art.^ f of the L.C.F.O. The contention was reje­
cted. Applying the principle of eclipse, it was pointed out that such laws were 
not void ab initio, like legislation outside the competence of the enacting 
legislature; they were void only to the extent of the inconsistency, as laid down
by Art.4 of the 1956 Constitution itself. They were merely under eclipse and
1. Supra.
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unenforceable so long as the repugnancy continued. With the abrogation of the 
Constitution, as fundamental rights were no longer part of the law of the land, 
suctiinconsistency had disappeared and they were given full effect by Art.b of 
the L.C.F.O.,1958. It was further pointed out that the laws preserved by Art.k 
of the L.C.F.O. owed their authority, not to the abrogated Constitution but to 
the power which abrogated it. That authority could recognise such laws in 
force before the Proclamation as it pleased. What was recognised was the 
statute as enacted, not the statute as curtailed by the limitations in the 
Constitution •
The minority view expressed by Cornelius J. was that the impugned law
was declared void, on account of its repugnancy with the fundamental right in
question long before the Proclamation and the abrogation of the Consititution
so that it stood void at the time when the writ was sought to enforce the
fundamental right in question. Its validity or otherwise should be judged from
its position when the writ jurisdiction was invoked and not at the time when the
appeal came before the Supreme Court. The minority view, it is submitted, was
in accordance with its earlier observation that fundamental rights were still
part of the law of the land and that the fundamental rights should be enforced
2
in the form they stood when the writ petition for its enforcement was filed •
The decision in Dosso*s case laid down that, as the 1956 Constitution 
was abrogated by the Proclamation of October 7*1958, the fundamental rights 
were no longer part of the law of the land; even the Courts lost their existing 
jurisdiction and could function only to the extent and in the manner determined 
by the new legal order, the L.C.F.O., 1958, so that the Courts could only be
1. Mehdi Ali Khan's case, supra, per Mimir C.J* see also Prof.Alan Gledhill, 
Pakistan, p.109.
2. Mehdi Ali Khan's case,supra; per Cornelius J.,Ameekuddin J. with him.
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moved for a writ when a right preserved by Art.*f of the L.C.F.O. had been 
infringed. The application's and proceedings relating to a writ sought on the 
ground that a fundamental right had been contravened, should abate forthwith, 
which meant not only that the application for the writ could not be made but 
also the proceedings instituted to enforce the right must abate; this was held 
to apply to all writs which were the subject matter of appeal before the Supreme 
Court, either on certificate or by special leave.
Cornelius J., dissenting from the majority and holding that the 
fundamental rights were still part of the law of the land, expressed the view 
that, in view of the provisions of clause (*f) of Art.2 of the L.C.F.O. 1958, 
which provided that 'the Supreme Court and the High Courts shall have power to 
issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamous, prohibition, certiorari and quo 
warranto,* the Courts had power to issue the prerogative writs, if the 
fundamental rights were contravened. He further pointed out that no writ could 
be issued against the C.M.L.A. or the Dy.C.M.L.A. or any authority exercising 
powers or jurisdiction under the authority of either, as laid down by clause (5) 
of Art.2 of the L.C.F.O.
Clause (6) of Art.2 of the L.C.F.O. provided that, even where a writ 
had been sought against a civilian authority, which had been succeeded by an 
authority mentioned in Cl.(5) of Art.2 and the writ sought was provided for in 
Cl.(^ f) of Art.2; the Court, notwithstanding that no writ could be issued against 
the authority so mentioned, might send to that authority its opinion on a quest­
ion of law raised. The particular words, whose effect was to be judged, occurred 
in Cl.(7) of Art.2.; they are 'but saving those orders (as provided by Cl.(Jf) of 
Art.2) and judgements (as provided by Cl.(7) of Art.2), no writ or order for a
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writ issued or made after the Proclamation shall have effect unless it is 
provided by this Order (L.C.F.O.,195$)i1 and 'all applications and proceedings 
in respect of any writ which is not so provided for,shall abate forthwith,1
It becomes necessary to see what writs had been expressly provided
for. In Cornelius^ JJ s opinion a reasonable assumption was that the words
'unless it is expressly provided for' meant something stronger than a conclusion
based upon a mere inference. One must look diligently first for express words
and, if such were lacking, then for a provision, by which a scheme of a strong
and necessary character, directly affecting the right sought to be enforced by
*
the writ, wgs laid down. In search of such expression one need not go £ar 
afield. In Cl.(4) of Art.2 of the L.C.F.O., it was expressly stated that the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts had the power to issue prerogative writs.
It was a provision empowering the issue of writs by the Courts mentioned, and 
the kinds of the writs toAssued were clearly laid down. By the insertion of 
the prohibitive provision in Cl.(7) of Art.2, writs other than the writs 
provided for in 01.(4) of Art.2, could not be issued. But to the power given 
by Cl.(4), there were exceptions mentioned in clauses (5) and (6) of Art.2 of 
the L.C.F.O. The Courts mentioned were expressly debarred from issuing writs of 
any kind provided for by Cl.(4), against the C.M.L.A., the Dy.C.M.L.A. or $ 
persons exercising power or jurisdiction under the authority of the either. 
Specifically then, the L.C.F.O* made a prohibitive provision in respect of 
every kind of writ only against these authorities and therefore, under Cl.(7) 
of the L.C.F.O., any writs directed against such authorities should have no 
effect, In Cl.(6), there was a further provision, saving the authorities 
specified in Cl.(5)* from receiving writs, in the capacity of successors to 
those authorities, gainst whom it was competent for the Court to furnish its
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opinion on a question of law raised, notwithstanding that no writ might be 
issued against an authority so mentioned* Hence, according to him, writs, 
would lie against all authorities to enforce fundamental rights, except those 
mentioned in Clauses (5) and (6) of Art*2, and even if the Court had come to 
the consclusion, in the instant case, that the authority, against whom the writ 
was sought,was not mentioned in Cl*(6), it should have sent its opinion on the 
point of law raised; the proceedings could not be abated*
As to the expression •all applications and proceedings in respect 
of any writ which is not so provided for shall abate forthwith^* he pointed 
out that word •abate* was not applicable to the •application* and ‘proceedings* 
of the instant case, because, as is apparent from the expression, they were not 
in respect of the writ saved in Clauses (5) and (6); only those *applications* 
and ‘proceedings* for a writ were to suffer abatement, which were sought against 
the authorities mentioned in Clauses (5) and (6), and not for the writs mentioned 
in Clause (4) of Art*2 of the L.C.F.O* He also looked at the matter from another 
angle, that the instant writ petition for habeas corpus was for the enforcement 
of a right against the impugned law, which was void before the promulgation of 
the Proclamation and was decided by the High Court before the Proclamation* It 
was only the appeal from the decision of the High Court, which involved enforce­
ment of a so called abrogated fundamental right, which was before the Supreme 
Court* The ‘abatement* could, therefore, not be held to apply to those writs, 
the applications for which were decided before the Proclamation, when the rights 
were available to the citizen, and which were simply a matter of appeal before 
the Supreme Court* Lastly, in his opinion, the appeal could have been disposed 
of on the jurisdictional point, as to whether the High Court had jurisdiction
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to rule on the petition, which belonged to ’special area*, where neither the 
High Court nor the Supreme Court had any jurisdiction.
doubt
On these considerations he was unable to hold beyoncj/that the concluding 
words of Cl. (7) of the L.C.F.O. had the effect of bringing to an abrupt end the
proceedings in the petitions before the High Court commenced by the two
convicted persons in the two cases there under consideration. He did not 
therefore consider that it was open to him to reverse the judgement of the High
Court in those two cases and recall the writs issued by it, unless he was
satisfied that the view of the High Court on the point of repugnancy to Art.5 of 
the 1956Constitution, which was in question, was not tenable.
In a later case the Supreme Court re-affirmed its view about the
position of fundamental rights and the writ jurisdiction of the superior Courts
2
as expressed in Dosso’s case • But Cornelius J., expressing the minority view , 
declared that fundamental rights did exist in the new legal order and that the 
writs could be issued to enfore them, as provided by Cl.(^ f) of the L.C.F.O.,195&, 
the new Constitution. According to him, no writ could, however, be issued against 
the M.L.Authorities as prohibed by Cl.(5) of Art.2, or the authorities mentioned 
in Cl.(6), in which case the Courts could send their opinion to the authorities 
on the question of law raised in the writ petition.
It is submitted that the view of Cornelius J. is correct; it was his 
view which was later followed, not only by the High Courts but by the Supreme 
Court itself; all Judges including Mumir C.J.^, in later cases, to protect and
enforce the fundamental rights; issued prerogative writs. It was, however,
1. Prov. of E.Pakistan v. M. Hehdi Ali Khan, supra.
2. Ameeruddin J. agreeing with him.
3« See Mohd.Ayub Khoro v. Pakistan, infra.
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maintained that no writ could be issued against the M.L.Authoritiesjthis was 
prohibited by Cl.(5) of Art.2 of the L.C.F.O. Nevertheless the writs were 
issued against the authorities purporting to be exercising power under the 
Martial Law Regulations or Orders, or against the Orders of the Military Courts, 
where it was found that the order was mala fide or ultra vires of powers 
conferred on such authorities by the M.L. Regulations or Orders. The following 
cases will show where the writs were granted and where they were not.
In Aziz Din v. State the petitioner was convicted by the A$ .M. for 
violation of Cl.(^) of M.L.Order No.il.,issued by the M.L.Adminstrator, West 
Pakistan, Zone B, and the appeal to the Sessions Judge against the order was 
rejected on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the 
conviction under the M.L.Regulation or Order as laid down by the M.L.Order No.
10 made by the C.M.L.A., which by implication took away the right to appeal 
against a conviction by an ordinary Court under a M.L.Regulation or Order. It 
was contended that M.L.Order No,10 could not amend the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which was kept intact by Art.k of the L.C.F.O.,19^8* This could 
not be done by any authority other than the President. It was pointed out that 
the L.C.F.O. provided that laws continued in forced could be amended by a 
Regulation issued by the C.M.L.A. Though M.L.Order No.10 was not a Regulation 
but an Order, it did hot make any material difference, because it was issued 
by the C.M.L.A., who was competent to issue a Regulation on the point; the mere 
fact that M.L.Order No.10 was not described as a M.L.Regulation could not depriv( 
it of force it was intended to have. If the Order had been issued by the 
Authority other than the C.M.L.A. the contention would have been unassailable.
1. P.L.D.1959, Lah.336.
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The writ was refused*
In a later case the conviction of the petitioner and sentence of
imprisonment to 3 years R.l. and a fine to Rs.25»000 under M.L.Regulations No.25
and 27 by the Addl. Sessions Judge, were challenged. It was contended that
convictions by the ordinary courts in matters falling under M.L.Regulations or
Orders were not covered by the M.L.Order No.10 but they should be governed by
2
the Cr.P.C., that the law was not laid down correctly in Aziz Din v. State and
that, under S.3 of the M.L.Regulation No.6l, as reconstituted, revision or appeal
lay to the Court of Sessions in respect of sentences inflicted by the Addl.
Sessions Judge or AddlJJ.M. It was pointed out that, according to terms of the
M.L. Regulation No.6l, revision or appeal did not lie to the Sessions Judge
against the order of the Addl.D.M.jif the Order was made under the M.L.
Regulation or Order; Aziz Di^s case was decided before promulgation of the
reconstituted M.L.Regulation No.6l, and M.L.Order No.10 did not govern these
cases; it was wrongly held that appeal or revision did not lie against the
decisions of Ordinary Courts, if made under M.L.Regulations or Orders. It was
further pointed out that, if sub-sections(2) and (3) of S.3 of the .M.L.
Regulations No.6l were read together, the conclusion was that, when the competent
authority had exercised jurisdiction under sub-section (2), the jurisdiction
of the Courts was barred under sub-section (3) but, as, in the instant case, the
Sessions Judge had failed to exercise a jurisdiction which was conferred on him,
it could not be said that the provisions of sub-section (2) were a bar to the 
of
exerciser the writ jurisdiction; under Art.2(*0 of the L.C.F.O. writ jurisdiction 
had clearly been given to the Supreme Court and the High Courts; the writ was
granted._____________________________________________________________________
1. Mohd. Siddiq v. State, P.L.D.1959iLah.769.
2. Supra.
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In one case , on a petition for habeas corpus, the contentibns on 
behalf of the State were, (i) the order of the Summary Military Court could hot 
be questioned in the High Court;, this being prohibited by Art.3(iii) of the 
L.CF.O.,1938; (ii) the Zonal M.L#Administrator was competent to pass the 
impugned M.L.Order (Zonal)No.10, the alleged contravention of which led to the 
conviction of the detenu; and (iii) the officer presiding over the Summary 
Military Court, a Major in rank, was competent to pass a sentence exceeding 
3 months R.I.
As to the first contention it was pointed out that, Art.3(iii) of the 
L.C.F.O.,laid down, fNo Court or person shall call or be permitted to call in 
question any finding, judgement or order of a Special Military Court or Summary 
Military Court;* being general in terms, it was open to the High Court to pass 
an appropriate order, if it came to the conclusion that the order of the Military 
Court was without jurisdiction. If a Military Court passed on a person a 
sentence which it could not pass, or tried an offence it was not given power to 
try, the order would be without jurisdiction and would not enjoy immunity from 
the scrutiny by the High Court;;there was no ouster of jurisdiction of a High 
Court in such cases.
The reasoning of the Court seems to have been based on the well known 
principle of law that an order of the Court, which is without jurisdiction, 
cannot be treated as an order for any purpose.
But it was, undeniable that, if it could not be established that the 
order of the Summary Military Court was without jurisdiction, no Court of ordinary 
jurisdiction, including the High Court, would have jurisdiction to declare that
1. Manzoor Elahi v. State, P.L.D.1959iLah.2^3«
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order invalid, in spite of the fact that the findings of the Military Court 
were full of gross and inexplicable errors of any dimension or the sentence was 
considered to be of a severity which appeared to be uncalled for* The question 
whether the evidence before the Summary Military Court justified the conviction 
of the detenu could not be open to determination by the High Court, because a 
Summary Military Court could try all offences and persons by virtue of Cl*(a) of 
M.L.Regulation No.l-A* But whether or not the sentence passed by the Summary 
Military Court was with or without jurisdiction was a question which could be 
looked into by the High Court and, if the conviction or sentence passed by the 
Summary Military Court was beyond its power, there was nothing to prevent the 
High Court from passing an Order of release of the detenu* Whether or not 
such an order could have been passed in a particular case would depend on a 
variety of circumstances; the power to issue writs was discretionary and no 
one could claim to be entitled to it as of right.
As regards the second contention, the finding of the Court was that 
Dy.M.L.Administrator (Zonal) was competent to promulgate the impugned M.L. Order 
(Zonal) No.10. The contention that a M.L.Regulation should be distinguished from 
a M.L.Order was rejected; (ihis decision of the High Court was held to be wrong 
by the Supreme Court in a later case.) It was, however conceded that the scope
of a M.L.Order issued by any M.L.Administrator was limited to the amplification 
of a relevant M.L.Regulation. The argument that an officer, who was not 
competent to make a Regulation but only to make Order, could not issue an Order 
unless there was in existence a M.L.Regulation, which he wanted to implify by 
his order, was not accepted. It was pointed out that the question, whether or
1. Mohd. Ayyab Khoro v. Pakistan, P.L.D.1960 SC.237.«
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not M.L.(Zonal) Order No.10, issued the Dy.(Zonal) M.L. Administrator, was 
made under a relevant M.L. Regulation in existence at that time, appeared to 
be a question ofiTact and it was not an answer to the question of a jurisdiction; 
(this was also declared by the Supreme Cour^? bea wrong conclusion)^ . The Court 
further pointed out that, even if it were held that the decision of the Summary 
Military Court, constituted under the aforesaid M.L.(Zonal) Order, was a questioi 
of law and it was assumed that the decison was wrong, the jurisdiction of the 
High Court could not be attracted. It is submitted that it was contrary to the 
Court's own observation, made earlier, that a question of the jurisdiction, 
could be decided in the High Court.
The Court went on to say that, even if the C.M.L.A. had not given the 
officers authority to issue M.L.Orders, the Administrators were competent to 
make M.L’Orders, irrespective of whether or not a M.L.Regulation on the subject 
to be dealt with was in existence. The C.M.L.A. could, by making changes in 
the relevant Regulation, have validated all M.L.Orders made or acts done by the 
M.L.Administrators concerned, if the language employed in the relevant Regulatioi 
appeared to be defective or if,what powers had been conferred on them, was not 
clear. It is submitted that this was to give M.L.Administrators a power which 
the C.m .L.A. had not himself intended to confer upon them.
The answer to the third question whether the officer of the Military 
Court, being a Major in rank, was competent to pass a sentence exceeding 3 month* 
R.I., was in the affirmative. It was pointed out that M.L.Regulation No.l-A, 
made it clear that an officer below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel could pass 
a sentence of any term; the provisions of S.101 of the Pakistan Army Act,1952, 
that an officer below the rank of lieutenant-Colonel could not pass a sentence
1. Mohd. Ayyub Khoro v. Pakistan, supra.
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exceeding 3 months R.I., had been amended by the aforesaid Regulation. Therefore< 
a sentence whichexceeded3 months R.l. could not be without jurisdiction, if it 
was passed by an officer below the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The writ 
jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked against such a sentence ,
In view of the above findings, the writ of habeas corpus was not 
granted. It is submitted that the High Court was wrong in coming to the 
conclusion that the competence of a Military Court, constituted under a Zonal 
Martial Law Order,could not be challenged in the High Court. It was not correct 
to hold that the validity of a M.L.Order, promulgated by the Administrators 
exercising power under the C.M.L.A. could not be called in question by a writ 
petition, irrespective of whether such an Order was valid, or whether it was 
made under a relevant M.L.Regulation. It is obvious from the later decisions 
of the Supreme Court and the High Courts that they did have jurisdiction to 
scrutinize (i) the ’Orders* issued by the Administrators, exercising power under 
the C.M.L.A. or the Dy. C.M.L.A.; and (ii) the ’Orders' made by the Administrators 
or Military Courts in a particular case, and rule on whether they were issued
under the relevant M.L.Regulation as well as whether the authorities were
2
competent to do so •
In another case, where an application, which appeared to be a petition 
of appeals, a petition for revision,and a petition for habeas corpus euxd 
certiorari, was presented to the High Court, an objection was taken on behalf of 
the State to the jurisdiction of the High Court. The application was dismissed 
by the High Court, which held that its jurisdiction to interfere with the 
proceedings of a Special Judge, subject to confirmation by the M.L.Administrator
1. Manzoor Elahi v. State, supra.
2. See Mohd. Ayub Koro’s case, infra, and other cases discussed hereinafter.
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under M.L* (C.M.L.A.) Order No.lO, was barred by the application of Art.3 (iii) 
of the L.C.F.O.,1958* But the Supreme Court ga.ve special leave to appeal both 
from the judgement of the Special Judge and the High Court, because the case 
raised some questions of fundamental importance for consideration and decision*.
The facts of the case were that two days after the Proclamation^the 
apellant, who was the Defence Minister of Pakistan, was arrested by the police 
on a charge under the Hoarding and Blackmarket Order,1956. After investigation 
he was, on a complaint by the Government, put up for a trial by the Special 
Judge for offences under the aforesaid Order of 1956, as well as M.L.Regulation 
No.26 read with M.L.Regulation No.5 and, on being convicted only under the 
Regulations, the charge under the Order of 1956 having been separated, he was 
sentenced to 5 years R*1 and a fine of Rs.1,50,000, in default of payment of 
which he was ordered to suffer another 3 years R.l. The charge of which he was 
found guilty wqs that he purchased an unregistered car in the black market, 
paying for it out of public funds.
In the proceedings before the Supreme Court, at the outset,objection 
was taken to the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the proceedings 
and the Supreme Court was moved to dismiss the petition, being incompetent to 
hear it. The provision, on which the objection was based, was M.L. Order NoJD 
issued by the C.M.L.A. on the l8th October, 1958, which provided that 
•proceedings of cases tried under the M.L. Regulations or Orders by the criminal 
courts, after confirmation by the M.L.Administrators, will be forwarded to the 
Judge Advocate-General, General Head Quarters Rawalpindi, for final review1.
The proceedings of the instant case had been Confirmed by the M.L. Administrator
4 6 <
To appreciate the aforesaid objection, some important M.L.Regulations 
and Orders must be considered. M.L.Regulation No.l-A, which created the Special 
Military and the Summary Military Courts provided that ' Special Military Courts 
and Summary Military Courts shall have the power to try and punish any person 
for offences under the ordinary law# With regard to other Courts it stated that 
'the criminal Courts as by law established shall have power to try and punish 
any person for offences under the ordinary law and for contravention of M.L# 
Regulations and Orders#' Regulation No.Z provided that 'Notwithstanding anything 
contained in these Regulations, the criminal Courts, as by law established, shall 
continue to exercise jurisdiction over persons accused of all offences committed 
under the ordinary law and also under the Regulations.' Thus the effect of these 
two Regulations was that Martial Law Courts and ordinary criminal courts were 
invested with concurrent jurisdiction to try offences under the ordinary law, as 
well as offences under the M#L. Regulations or Orders. Nothing was said in any 
of the Regulations as to how this concurrent jurisdiction was to be regulated and 
a possible conflict avoided. Nor was anything said regarding appeals from or 
revision of the sentences awarded by the ordinary criminal courts. It was on 15th 
October, 1958, that M.L.Order No.lO, on which reliance was placed by the 
Government, was passed • This Order said nothing about appeal or revision, but 
assumed that the proceedings of criminal courts for the trial of offences under 
the M.L.Regulations and Orders would require the M.L.Administrator's confirmation 
and directed that, on such confirmation they should be forwarded to the Judge 
Advocate-General for review, the scope of the review not being defined, though the 
word 'final* was used. After so many amendments, the M.L .Regulation No.6l , as
reconstituted on 4th February,1959, provided, retrospectively from 24th December,
1. M.L.Regulation No.6l (C.M.L.A.) as originally enacted did not carry this 
provision.
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1958, that fno appeal or revision shall lie from any sentence imposed in any of 
the cases, tried and disposed of by Criminal Courts under M.L.Regulations or 
Orders before the 24 th day of December,1958, and confirmed subsequently by Zonal 
M.L.Administrators concerned*1
Even after Reg.No.6l was reconstituted there was a lacuna in it, 
because it contained no provision to deal with a case which had not been decided 
by a criminal court before December,24,1958. The instant case afforded an 
illustration of the situation, because it was pending on the 24 December,and was 
not decided by the Special Judge till the 2?th February,1959* There arise 
certain questions; whether the omission was deliberate or inadvertent? Was it 
meant that, if a case was decided by a Criminal Court not before, but after the 
24th December,1958, an appeal or revision lay; or was the intention that, after 
24th December, no criminal court, other than that of a Magistrate, even if seized 
of a case, was to function and therefore there was no necessity of making a 
provision for confirmation of its sentence? Whether, as after the said day the 
only criminal courts that could exercise jurisdiction were those of Magistrates 
and there being provision for revision of their decisions, was confirmation by 
the M»L*Administrators of the sentences passed by Magistrates necessary? It can 
be noted here that the power to confirm and the power to entertain an appeal or 
revision should not co-exist; one should exclude the other and the exclusion 
should be expressly stated. It seems clear that Regulation No.61, despite the 
various amendments, from the very inception excluded appeals but provided for 
revision, and dispensed with confirmation, where revision was provided. It is 
also clear that, where an appeal was intended to be excluded, it was explicitly 
done. Therefore, from the terms of M.L.Order (C.M.L.A.)No.lO, it could not be
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inferred that such exclusion was intended. If such exclusion had been the necess­
ary result of M.L.Order No.lO, before M.L.Regulation No.6l was enacted, the last 
amendment of that Regulation would have contained a provision that no appeal 
or revision should lie, where the sentence, passed by the Criminal Court, 
had been confirmed by the M.L.Administrator and the limiting words 'before the 
24th December,' would not have been used.
Therefore, it was pointed out, the right of appeal where it exists, 
has to be taken away expressly or by necessary intendment and a mere pCpyifrlon of 
a confirming or reviewing authority in a different jurisdiction does not have 
the effect of destroying or taking away that right, where it has accrued. Ahd 
in the instant case it was conceded by the State that the right of appeal was 
never expressly taken away.
As to the contention that the L.C.F.O* 1958, to which the reference 
was made in the earlier part of the instant case, debarred the Courts from 
calling in question the orders made by the Military Courts, the Supreme Court 
commented on the problem of protection of the rights of people against the 
arbitrary actions and ultra vires exercise of powers by the authorities, which 
purported to have acted under Martial Law Regulations and Orders. It was said 
that the instant case created the proper appportunity to examine the exact effect 
of the L.C.F.O. on the point in question. The Supreme Court seems to have 
realised, for the first time, the consequences of its decision in Dosso's case 
and appears to have been anxious to protect the rights of the people. Though 
it did not expressly say so in so many words, it considered reviewing its 
earlier decision' in Dosso*s case insofar as to the real scope of the L.C.F.O. 
and the issue of writs for protection of the rights of the people are concerned.
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In the argument put forward on behalf of the State,it was contended
that any interference by the Supreme Court or the High Courts in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction with the order made by the Dy.M.L.Administrator,
confirming the sentence passed by the Military Court, would amount to questioning
a M.L.Order, which\as prohibited by Art.3(ii) of the L.C.F.O* This argument had
1
found favour in Aziz Din v. State and the unreported case of Mian Mohd.Sajid v.
2
State , where the High Court wrongly took the view that, since Art.3(ii)
o r /
prohibited a Court from calling in question any M.L.Regulation /Order, if, in the 
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the High Court made an order inconsistent 
with the order made by the Dy.M.L.Administrator (zonal), it would come into 
conflict with the Martial Law Order itself, which conferred on the M.L. 
Administrator the power to confirm the sentence. Rejecting the contention, the 
Supreme Court held that, since the jurisdiction derived by the Courts, including 
the High Court and the Supreme Court under cl.(2) of Art.2 of the L.C.F.O. was 
subject only to an Order of the President or a Regulation or Order made by the 
C.M.L.A. and not to each and every martial law order, the appellate jurisdiction 
of the High Courts or of the Supreme Court, if it existed otherwise, continued; 
if it had not been taken aiay by any M.L.Regulation, it would continue; it would 
certainly not come into conflict with the M.L.Order itself, which conferred on 
the Administrator the power to confirm a sentence,which was in question. It was 
also pointed that the High Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion to the 
contrary. It is submitted that the reasoning of the Supreme Court is correct 
and realistic.
1. P.L.D.1959,Lah.336.
2. Criminal Eevision No.kS of 1959
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Further the distinction between the terms 'Regulation*, 'Order*, and 
•order' was clarified* For the State it was contended that the word 'Order', 
wherever it occured, in the first place , in Cl.(ii) of Art.3 of the L.C.F.O., 
meant an order made in a particular case in pursuance of a M.L.Regulation or 
Order and (ii) that, since the order of confirmation of the sentence in the 
instant case was made by the Dr.M.L.Administrator, in exercise of powers 
conferred on him by M.L.(C.M.LA.) Order No.lO, it could not be questioned by 
the Courts, as this was prohibited by Art.5 of the L.C.F.O* These contention, were 
rejected: it was pointed out that the word 'Order' with a capital 'O', v/henever 
it occured in the L.C.F.O., meant a body of rules or an order of a general 
nature such as 'conferment of judicial authority' and not an order made in a 
particular case, whereas the word 'order' with a small 'o' meant an order made 
in a particular case. In Cl.(7) of Art.2 of the L.C.F.O.,the word 'Order' occu­
red twice and word 'order' thrice.
The contention that M.L.(C.M.L.A.) Order No.lO was in law a 'Regulation1
within the meaning of Art.2(i) of the L.C.F.O., and, therefore affected the Pre-
Proclamation jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as well as the High Courts, was
also rejected. The argument in support of this contention was based on decisions
1
of the Lahore High Court, particularly Manzoor Elahi v. State • The Supreme 
Court, pointed out that the High Court was wrong in holding that there was, in 
law, no distinction between the words 'Regulation' and 'Order'. Paragraph 2 of 
the Proclamation stated that 'M.L.Regulations and Orders will be published in’ 
such manner as is conveniently possible' and 'anyperson contravening the said 
Regulations or Orders shall be liable under Martial Law to penalties stated in 
the Regulations.* It would appear from this provision that while the
1. Supra.
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"Regulations' prescribed the penalties, •Orders* merely provided the method of 
enforcing the Regulations, and in Martial Law terminology that is the correct 
distinction between the two* A Regulation lays down the principle and policy of 
the law and the penalties for its infringement; it may further lay down a broad 
outline of the procedure, jurisdictional and processual, for the enforcement of 
the law* But since the area over which Martial Law may operate may be vast and 
unmanageable by a general agency, a wide discretion is sometimes given to the 
Administrators and Sub-Administrators of Martial Law in different regions from 
time to time to issue Orders for the enforcement of the Regulations* This 
position was envisaged, in M*L.Regulations No.l, which divided the Martial Law 
area into three zones, appointed an Administrator for each zone and provided in 
Cl.fc) 'Orders* under these 'Regulations* and additional 'Regulations' herein­
after known as 'Martial Law Regulations' or 'M.L.Orders' may be issued by me or 
by an Administrator or by any other officer authorised by me* * Thus a general 
authority was given to Administrators to issue Martial Law Regulations and 
Orders. This authority was subject to the power conferred upon them by the C.M.L 
A. In this sense the main legislative authority was kept by the C.M.L.A. with 
himself while the Administrators and other officers were to exercise a kind of de­
legated legislative authority. This authority could, of course, extend to the 
making of 'Orders', determining the manner in which the principle and policy of 
a Regulation was to be carried out and prescribed penalties enforced* Of course 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator could himself issue 'Orders' but it would be : 
incorrect to suppose that such 'Orders' had the status of 'Regulations', It was 
for the C.M.L.A* himself to determine whether he would describe a rule as a 
'Regulation' or an 'Order* and it may well be that the difference between the two 
was one of form and not of authority. There can, however, be no doubt that,
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with and after the promulgation of the L.C.F.O*,1958, the distinction between 
the two became fundamental and this was recognised by Act.2 of the L.C.F.O*, 
which preserved the existing jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to any Regulatiox 
made by the C.M.L.A*, indicating quite clearly that, so far as the jurisdiction 
of the Courts to entertain and determine an appeal was concerned, it was kept 
intact and could only be taken away by a Regulation. Art*3(ii) which prohibited 
the Courts from calling in question any M.L.Regulation or Order had, therefore, 
to be read with Art.2 of the L.C.F.O. In plain language Cl.(ii) of Art.3 of the 
L.C.F.O. meant no more than that a Court could not declare a M.L.Regulation or 
Order invalid or ultra vires. But calling in question an order made under a 
M.L.Order is entirely different; it may or may not amount to questioning the 
M.L. Order itself; the former being prohibited, the latter not. For instance, 
in the instant case the order of confirmation was made by Dy.M.L.Administrator 
and it was not shown on behalf of the State that there was any provision by which 
an Administrator could delegate his responsibilities under M.L.Order No.lO to Dy. 
M.L. Administrator. Therefore, it was held that the order of confirmation, not 
being under M.L. (C.M.L.A.) Order No.lO, was not immune from Judicial scrutiny.
In the instant case, it was pointed out that the Court was not calling in 
question any M.L.Order but simply an order made by the Martial Law Authorities; 
the writ of habeas corpus was not being issued against any M.L. Authority, the 
jurisdiction in respect of which had been expressly taken away by Art.2(3) of 
the L.C.F.O; the Courts had, no doubt, jurisdiction to call in question an order 
and issue an appropriate writ against it which, though made by the M.L.Authority, 
was invalid or ultra vires of the powers conferred on it by any M.L.Regulation 
or Order; the jurisdiction was preserved by Art.2(*f) of the L.C.F.O. and was 
certainly no taken away by Art.2(3) of the L.C.F.O.
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1
There is still one point which needs discussion here. The Regulation 
which distinguished a M.L.Regulation from a M.L.Order came into force on 7th 
October,195$5 the L.C.F.O. was published on 10th October; and Martial Law 
(C.M.L.A.) Order No.lO was issued on l8th October. It was pointed out that it 
was reasonable to presume that the draftsman of the L.C.F.O.1958, was aware of 
the distinction between a Regulation and an Order and this was apparent from 
the phraseology of Articles 2 and 3 of the L.C.F.O. If, therefore, M.L.(C.M.L.A) 
Order No.lO was issued as an Order and not as a Regulation, the intention would 
presumably be that it was not to affect the jurisdiction of the Courts, which, 
though subject to any Regulation made by the C.M.L.A., was preserved by Art.2 of 
the L.C.F.O.
Another relevant question, answered by the High Court in the affirma­
tive, was whether the existence of appellate and revisional powers over the 
Criminal Courts punishing contraventions of M.L. Regulations, was incompatible 
with the powers of confirmation reserved by a M.L.Order for the Military 
Authorities. In order to find a correct answer to this question, which was to 
govern the instant case, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between 
an incorrect decision and a void decision. A judgement is incorrect if it is 
wrong in law or fact; it is void if it is pronounced by an incompetent Tribunal. 
One of the questions urged before the Court was that the Special Judge had no 
jurisdiction to try the offence under M.L. Regulations Nos.26 and 3* and that, 
therefore, his judgement in the instant case was void. This question had to be 
determined before the principal question in the instant appeal could be considere< 
The contention that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction was repelled by the 
High Court on the ground that the Court of a Special Judge, under the aforesaid
1. Martial Law (C.M.L.A.) Regulation No.l.
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Hoarding and Black'muVk^ tr Order, 1956, or under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 
1958, was a criminal Court, within the meaning of M.L.Regulations No.l-A and 
M.L.Regulation No.2; the former running as follows:
’’The Criminal Courts, as by law estblished, shall have 
power to try and punish any person for offences under 
the ordinary law and for contravention of M.L.Regulations 
or Orders.”
and the latter providing that -
’’Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations, 
the Criminal Courts, as by law established, shall continue 
to exercise jurisdiction over persons accused of all offences 
committed under the ordinary law and also under these 
Regulations.”
The argument on behalf of the State was that, if a Court could be 
described as a criminal court, then its jurisdiction to try an offence under 
any M.L.Regulation, or Order or under the ordinary law, irrespective of any 
limitations imposed on it by the ordinary law, was established by the aforesaid 
two Regulations. The reply on behalf of the appellant was that, on this constr­
uction of the M.L.Regulations, a Third Class Magistrate would be as competent 
to try an offence punishable \vith cfeath under the M.L.Regulation as a Tribunal 
set up to punish offences against the acquisition or sale of foreign exchange. 
The Councel went on to maintain that, in this sense, even the territorial 
limitations on the jurisdiction of ordinary courts would not be applicable after 
the promulgation of these two Regulations as that an ordinary Courts in East 
Pakistan would be competent to try offences under a M.L.Regulation or the 
ordinary law committed in West Pakistan.
The Court's attitude was that, instead of accepting an interpetation 
leading to the utter chaos suggested on behalf of the appalent, the Court had 
to be satisfied whether the aforesaid Regulations bore the meaning which was
claimed on behalf of the State. It was pointed out that each of these 
Regulations referred to the ordinary criminal courts 'as by law established' and 
the words within the quotation marks could only mean that, if the law imposed 
any limitation on their powers, either as regards territory or as regards 
persons or offences, such limitations must continue to exist, even after the 
promulgation of the two Regulations. This was apparent from Regulation No.2 
itself, which said that 'Criminal Courts shall continue to exercise their 
existing jurisdictions as defined by law.' Now, a Special Judge whether 
appointed under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,1958, or under the Hoarding 
and Blackmarket Order, 1956, was a Court of Special Jurisdiction, being confined
to a specified class of cases, into which the instant case did not.fall. If,
Mentioned
therefore, the Court of a Special Judge was not empowered by the provisions/ 
to try a particular offence, it would not become competent to try it, unless a 
M.L.Regulation so provided. Furthermore it was conceeded that there was no 
express provision empowering a Special Judge to take cognizance or try an offence 
under Martial Law Regulation No.26 read with M.L.Regulation No.5, but it was 
contended that, since by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Hoarding 
and Blackfrwui’Tk^ t’Order, 1956,a Special Judge was deemed to be a Court of Session, 
he was a 'criminal court' for the purposes of the two Regulations. This 
argument completely overlooked the words 'as by law established', which were 
used in both Regulations to indicate the criminal Courts that were to try 
offences under the Martial Law as well as under the ordinary law; the offence 
under the law of which the appellant had been convicted was exclusively triable 
by a Court of Session.
479
Section 29 of the Cr.P.C. provides that 'subject to other provisions 
of this Code, any offence under any other law, (That is any law other than the 
Pakistan Penal Code) shall, when any Court is mentioned in this behalf in such 
a law, be tried by such Court,' and that 'when no Court is so mentioned, it may 
be tried by the High Court or subject, as foresaid, by any Court constituted 
under this Code, by which such offence is shown in the eight column of the 
second Schedule of the Cr.P.C. to be triable.' Thus an offence under the 
Hoarding and Blackmarket Order, could, by reason of this provision, be tried 
by a Special Judge but, in the instant case, the prosecution's case throughout 
had been that an offence under M.L.Regulation No.26 was not the same offence as 
an offence under the Hoarding and Blackmarket Order, that the Regulation in its 
scope might be wider or narrower than the Hoarding and Blackmarket Order, accord­
ing to its interpretation and that the appellant was not being proceeded against 
for any offence committed under the Hoarding and Blackmarket Order and his 
prosecution was confined to an offence under M.L. Regulation No.26. If the 
Special Judge was not required to act under the Special Act which had created 
him, then, for the purposes of an offences created by Regulation No.26, he could 
only try such offences, if he came within the definition of the High Court or th< 
definition of a 'Court constituted under this Code by which such offence is 
shown in the eighth column of the second Schedule to be triable.' He was 
neither, because neither the status of a High Court or that of an ordinary 
criminal court, constituted under the Cr.P.C., was claimed for him, and none of 
the Regulations within S.29(1) of the Cr.P.C. specifically mentioned him as a 
Court competent to try an offence under the M.L.Regulation No.26. When a M.L. 
Regulation created an offence and empowered ordinary criminal courts to try it, 
the intention, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, always is
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that such offences, having become a part of the law to be administered by those 
Courts,are to be tried under the Cr.P.C. A High Court and the Court of Session 
were, therefore the only Courts competent to try an offence under M.L.Regulation 
No.26, because the offences being punishable with Ik years R.l, it came under the 
eighth column of the second Schedule to the Cr.P.C. It was, however, contended 
on behalf of the State,that, for the purposes of S.29 and Schedule eight of the 
Cr.P.C.a Special Judge was a Court of Session, because of sub-section (2) of 
Section 16 of the Hoarding and Blackmarket Order, 1956, which says 'same as 
provided in Sub-section (1), the provisions of the daid Code, except the 
provisions of S.I96-A and of Chapter 35 of the Code, shall, so far as they are 
not inconsistent with this Order, apply to all proceedings of a Special Judge, 
and for purposes of the said provisions, the Special Judge shall be deemed to 
be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury.' This sub-section does not 
have the effect of converting a Special Judge into a Court of Session for all 
the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The sub-section says no more 
than that the provisions of the Code, which 1are not inconsistent with the Order 
of 1956, shall apply to the proceedings of a Special Judge, meaning thereby that 
the only procedure to be adopted by a Special Judge shall conform with the 
procedure prescribed by the Code unless, on any matter provided by the Code, 
there was a different provision in the Order of 1956. The provision had nothing 
to do with the question of jurisdiction of a Special Judge, that having been 
defined elsewhere, and it was taken for granted that his jurisdiction to proceed 
with the case existed under the provisions of the Order of 1956, In the same 
manner, when the aforesaid sub-section says that 'for the purposes of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of
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Session trying cases without jury, ‘it simply means that for purposes of the 
procedure to be adopted by him, he should consider himself to be a Court of 
Session, not for all purposes, but only for the purpose of trying the case with­
out a jury, that is, he is a Judge of facts and law. If the contention on 
behalf of the State that the said sub-section had the effect of converting a
f
Special Judge into ‘Court of Session for all purposes is to be accepted, such 
Judge could become competent to hear appeals and revisions from the orders of 
Magistrates in the Division and exercise all other powers conferred by the Cr. 
P.C. on a Session Judge, a result which was never intended and could not be 
gathered from the words used. It would, therefore, follow that the Special 
Judge was not competent to take cognizance of or try the offence under the M.L, 
Regulation No.26 read with M.L.Regu^ation No.5* if* as alleged by the prosecut­
ion, the offence charged was distinct from an offence under the Hoards and 
Blackmarket Order, which, of course, he was competent to try. Thus the entire 
proceedings before him were held to be void and coram non*Judice*.
In view of the above discussion, the vital, question whether an appeal 
was barred by Art.3(ii) of the L.C.F.O.1958, because of the implication that 
there might be a conflict between an appellate order of the Court and an order 
of confirmation made by the Dy.M.L.Administrator, can easly be dealt with.
Kayani C.J., who wrote the judgement in the instant case in the High Court, held 
that, though the interpretation of the L.C.F.O.1958, presented from the bar was 
correct, Art.3(ii) of the same Order prohibited the High Courts from questioning 
a Martial Law Order, and if Martial Law Order No.lO was questioned, the effect 
would be that, while the Zonal M.L.Administrator might confirm a sentence passed 
by the Special Judge, the High Court might set it aside; there would be a
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conflict* The petition for the ■writ of habeas corpus was dismissed and the 
appeal was rejected by the High Court.
The Supreme Court, accepting the petition as well as the appeal, 
pointed out that, if an appeal or revision was competent, in the light of the 
above discussion, the proper order in the case was to quash the conviction and 
the sentence on the ground that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to try 
the offence* it was difficult to hold that any such order would conflict with 
the M.L. Administrator* s order confirming proceedings, because it was made with­
out jurisdiction. It was further pointed out that M.L. (C.M.L.A. )Order No.lO, 
empowered an Administrator to confirm the proceedings of cases tried under the 
M.L*Regulations and Orders by the * criminal courts’mentioned in the Regulation 
No.l-A and Regulation No. 2, both of which referred to such courts as * criminal 
courts as by law established*. If, therefore, the Special Judge could not, 
imder the law, take cognizance of and try an offence under Martial Law Regulation 
No.26 read with M.L.Regulation No.5, he could certainly not be described to be 
a 1 criminal court as established by law* for the purposes of the instant case.
The Supreme Court went on to say that if Magistrates and Courts " re not 
competent to take cognizance of offences under M.L.Regulation or Order, tried 
and convicted the accused persons, the convictions and sentences passed by them 
would be without jurisdiction. Finally, it was pointed out, in the instant case, 
if the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to try and convict the appellant of an 
offence under M.L. Regulation No.26, the proceedings before him were void ab 
initio, and he had produced nothing which could be confirmed by an Administrator 
under M.L.(c.M.L.A.) No.lO* what had to be confirmed by the Administrator was 
the proceedings in a case tried under the M.L.Regulations and Orders by a
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"criminal court as established by law.1 If this condition was not satisfied, 
if the proceedings were not those of a *criminal court established by law,' 
the order of confirmation was itself void and the High Court, by quashing the 
conviction and the sentence, would not come into conflict with an Order of 
confirmation made by the Administrator; it would certainly not come into 
conflict with the Martial Lav/ Order itself. It may be noted that it was 
accepted by the High Court itself that, if a conflict between a Martial Law 
Order and an appellate order of the Court did not arise, the jurisdiction 
of the High Court to entertain the appeal would not be affected.
The decisions of the High Court in the cases cited on behalf of the 
State were distinguishable, the appeal or revision in them being on facts. The 
Supreme Court, however, did not consider it necessary to decide the question 
whether a decision in appeal on facts, contrary to what had been Confirmed by 
the 11.L.Administrator would amount to questioning the M.L.Order No.lO, because 
that question did not arise in the case, though revision and confirmation 
did exist together, between the 24th December, 195& &nd l6th January,1959*
It was, therefore, pointed out that, unless it could be held possible for the 
M.L.Administrator, by the act of confirmation, to create an ad hoc Court ex 
post facto, contrary to the Regulations by the C.M.L.A., the confirmation 
would be void, and void added to void would be doubly void.
The Supreme Court, in conclusion, observed that, from the manner in 
which the judgement presented by the Special Judge, it was impossible for the 
confirming authority to appreciate the legal and factual aspect of the case 
or to separate the alleged Martial Law offence from the alleged pre-martial 
law blackmarket deal, for which the appellant was admittedly not tried. The 
Court whichiried the Martial Law offence in question, was not set up by any
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M.L. Administrator; nor was the case sent to that Court by the Administrator 
himself. The jurisdictional aspect of the Criminal Court , especially when it 
raised the intricate question of law, was a matter with which the was not 
suppoed to be conversant. Theref o r e ,  when he confirmed the sentence, he could 
not have been conscious of the position that what he . confirmed was something 
that did not exist in law or that he was purporting to validate what could not 
be validated. There was, however, not one word in the judgement on this vital 
point for the consideration of the confirming authority. The appeal, therefore, 
from the judgement of the Special Judge was allowed and the appellant was set
A
at liberty by issuing the writ of habeas corpus •
It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court is correct; 
the High Court was wrong in dismissing the petition in the instant case on the 
jurisdiction ground. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the instant 
case was that, under Art.3(ii) of the L.C.F.0*1958, the superior Courts were 
only prohibited from calling in question the M.L*Regulations or Orders made by 
the C.M.L.A. or Dy.C.M,L.A. or any other Administrator exercising power under 
the authority of either; it was not every order made by any M.I*.Administrator, 
which was immune from judicial scrutiny; the Courts had, no doubt, jurisdiction, 
under Art. 2(2) of the L.C.F.O.,which preserved the existing jurisdiction of the 
superior Courts to issue prerogative writs, to question any order made by the 
M.L. Authority or decision made by the Military Court in particular cases, if 
it appeared to the Court that such an Order was void, being mala fide or ultra 
vires of powers conferred on such authorities by the M.L. Regulations or Orders;
1. Mohd. Ayyub Khoro's case, supra.
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they could issue the proper order to enforce the right of the petitioner in 
question.
It is further submitted that the decision in the instant case amounted 
to reviewing its earlier judgements. The principle laid down by the Supreme 
Court in the instant case was its first step towards protection of the rights 
of the people against the arbitrary and ultra vires actions of the authorities 
exercising powers under M.L. Regulations or Orders. Whereas in the first two 
cases the Supreme Court refused to enforce the fundamental rights in question 
against the authorities purporting to have acted under the Ordinary Law, in the 
instant case it went as far as to enforce the right even against the acts of the 
authorities exercising power under the M.L.Order. The High Courts had through­
out maintained that they should enforce the fundamental rights by issuing the 
appropriate writs, wherever they found that the action by the M.L. authority or 
Military Court was mala fide or ultra vires of the powers conferred on them 
by the M.L. Regulations or Orders* The foil owing cases are the instances of this 
fact.
2
In Zahid Umar v. Ch. Secretary , it was pointed out that only those 
members of the Defence Forces,who had been authorised to do so,could issue valid 
orders under Martial Law; it was not every action of the Defence Forces which 
was immune from scrutiny by the courts of ordinary jurisdiction. It was, 
therefore, held that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ in a 
case in which an order was issued by a member of the Defence Forces, who was not
authorised to do so. was not ousted by Art.2.(4) of the L.C.F.O.
1. See Mohd.Sidd]cju£v. State, supra as well as the cases discussed in the follow­
ing pages which show that, before the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Mohd.Ayub Khorog case, the principle had been followed by the High Courts.
2. P.L.D.1959,Lah.76lj..
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Violation of the principles of natural justice was held to be a 
gound for issuing the writs. It was pointed out that an order purporting to 
hav been made under the M.L.Regulation or Order could be investigated by the 
High Court and a suitable order passed, if it violated the principles of nat­
ural justice^.
Fundamental Rights could only be taken away or altered by the
President or C.M.L.A. It was pointed out that, if the Fundamental Rights
given to the people of Pakistan were taken away by the President, there was no
principle of law, justice, equity or common sense, on which it could be held
that the rights of the people could not be altered or taken away by him. In
the instant case, in which L.C.F.O.(Amendment) Orders,1958 and 1959»altering
the conditions of service were" challenged^it was held that the Amendment
2Orders could not be challenged in the Courts , as they were promulgated by the 
C.M.L.A. .
The conditions for the ouster of the jurisdiction of the High Courts
3
were laid down by the Supreme Court • It was pointed out that if a Statute 
provides that an order made by the authority acting under it shall not be 
called in question in any court, all thiife is necessary to oust the jurisdict­
ion of the Court is that (i) the authority should have been constituted as 
required by the Statute; (ii) the person proceeded against should be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the authority; (iii) the ground on which the action 
is taken should be within the grounds stated by the statute; and (iv) the 
order made should be such as could have been made under the statute. These
conditions being satisfied, the ouster is complete, even though, in following
____________________________________________________________ /the statutory
T. Abdul Majid, P.L.D.1960,Kar.921.
2. Zafarul Asain v. Pakistan, P.L.D.1959»Lah.879; upheld by the Supreme 
Court P.L.D.1960 i960,SC.113.
3. Zafarul Alsan v. Pakistan,P.L.D.I960,S.C. 113*
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provisions, some omission or irregularity might have been committed by the 
authority* If an appellate authority is provided by the statute, the omission 
or irregularity alleged will be a matter for that authority and not for the 
High Court* It was held that the test was applicable to the orders purported 
to have been made under M.L*Regulations or Orders; if any such order did not 
fulfill the conditions laid down above, the ouster was not complete, and the 
High Court had jurisdiction to consider the writ petition and issue the approp-
-i
nate order .
In one case, where the writ jurisdiction of the High Court was said
to have been completely ousted by S. 27 of the M.L. Regulation No. 61+, it was
pointed out that the High Court was not competent to issue any writ against
the authorities, who had exercised power and jurisdiction under the authority
of the C.M.L.A., merely on the basis that the order was not based on the
principles of substantial justice. Where, a s in the instant case, the matter
in dispute fell within the jurisdiction of such authorities and the impugned
order was within the terms of the statute in question, and petitioners had
failed to make out a case that the statute had been used merely as a cloak for
mal fides on the part of the authorities, it was held that the impugned order
2
was not open to review under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court •
With effect: from 7th October,1938, when the Constitution of 1956*
including the Fundamental Rights, was abrogated, all enactments prior to October
. +
7,1958, were continued in full force, as enacted and irrespective of any conflict
1* Ibid*
2, Pahlomal Motiram v* Ch.Land*Commr.P*L.D. 1961, C^* 384*
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between their provisions and Fundamental Eights under Art*4( i) of the L.c.F.0,
A
1958, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Mehdi Ali Khan’s case. It was, 
therefore, held that the Karachi Control of Disorderly Persons Act operated , 
irrespective of its conflict with the freedom of movement and residence guarantee! 
by Art. U  of the 195& Constitution; it could not be called into question in the 
High Courts^.
The attitude of the Courts had been that they could not call into 
question any M.L.Regulation or Order being prohibited by Cl.(5) of Art.2 of the 
L.C.F.0. ,1958 5 this meant they could not declare a M.L. Regulation or Order 
invalid or ultra vires, but they could call in question any order, purporting to 
have been made under a M.L.Regulation or Order under Cl.(4) of Art.2 of the 
L.C.F. 0., unless their writ Jurisdiction had been expressly ousted by the M.L. 
Regulation or Order.
The contention that, as the authority had acted under the M.L.Order, 
the High Court could not look into the matter was rejected. It was held that 
an authority* s assertion, and even his honest belief, that what he was doing 
fell within the four comers of M.L*Regulation or Order could not deprive any 
Court of the Jurisdiction to decide the question, if it arose in a proceeding 
which the Court had Jurisdiction to hear. The argument that the High Court 
could not issue any writ, because action had been taken under a M.L.Order, 
could succeed only if the Court, came to the conclusion that the action 
intended to be taken was authorised by the M.L. Regulation or Order. If, on 
the other hand, the Court came to the conclusion that it was not so authorised,
the Court had Jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order^.______________ _ ..
1. Supra.
2. Tribunal v. Hashim, P.L.D. 1960,SC.260; The High Court’s Judgement granting 
the writ was reversed
3. Sher Mohd. v. Nasiruddin,P, L.D. I960,Lah. 583.
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In another case it was held that the decision of a Special Judge 
purporting to have acted under M.L*Regulation or Order was not j mnmpft from the 
scrutiny by the High Court. It was, however, pointed out that a police officer 
investigating the case to find out if an offence was committed, was in the 
same position as the Special Judge trying a case under the M.L.Regulation or 
Order; the police officer had to decide whether a prima facie case was 
established against the accused, the Special Judge had to give a verdict, convict 
an accused and sentence him. Both these agencies were working under the 
Regulations or Orders made by the C.M.L.A. or officers exercising powers under 
him; both were subject ot scrutiny by the Courts for acts purporting to have 
been taken under M.L.Regulations or Order , if they contravened the provisions 
laid down by the M. L. Regulation or Order under which the action was taken.
Martial Law of 1969:
The Martial Law imposed in 1969 has been discussed in Chapter IV.
It is clear from that discussion that the specified ri^its, which include the 
safeguards against arrest and detention, have been expressly abrogated. Though 
the right to personal liberty has not been annulled, it cannot be protected by 
the Courts; its enforcement cannot be invoked in view of the annulment of the 
safeguards for its protection.
As regards the writ Jurisdiction of the Courts, the position is quite 1 
clear; they can issue only unspecified writs and not against the authorities 
exercising powers under M.L. Regulations or Orders or against the decisions of 
the Military Courts. The power to issue writs against such authorities on the
1. Abdul Majid v. Pakistan, Supra; see also Mohd.Ayub Kharo v. Pakistan,supra.
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ground of mala fides or contravention of the provisions of M.L.Regulations or 
Orders has been abolished. It has been laid down both by the Proclamation of 
1969 and the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, that no writ can issue 
against any M.L.Authority or Judgement of the Military Courts, nor can any M.L. 
Regulation or Order be called in question. Doubt was,however, expressed, it is 
submitted wrongly, in Mir Hassan* s  ^ case as to whether a M.L.Regulation or 
Order can be questioned by the Courts, if it contravenes the Provisional Const­
itution Order, 1969, and whether a writ can be issued against the Authorities, 
even the C.M.L.A., if the action is not taken in accordance with law, as 
provided by Art. 2 of the 1962 Constitution, which was kept intact.
Soon after the decision in that case, on the same day, the Jurisdict:'
2
ion of the Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order,1969 , w~s issued which laid down 
that Courts have no Jurisdiction to call in question any M.L. Regulation or 
Order or to issue writs against any M.L.Authority, authorities exercising 
powers under M.L.Regulation or Order, or the Judgements of the Military Courts. 
It further says that, if any M.L.Regulation or Order requires any interpretat- 
ion, that will be done by the promulator of such M.L.Regulation or Order, and 
the Courts have no power to interpret it. It is, therefore, clear that no 
writ can be issued to enforce the fundamental rights against the actions of 
the authorities purporting to have acted under the M.L.Regulations or Orders 
or against the decision of the Military Courts.
1. Supra, the case has been discussed in the IV and IX chapter.
2. It has been discussed in the IV Chapter.
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chapter n .
C O N C L U S I O N .
There have been many revolutions in the history of mankind, some 
resulting in tyranny and intolerable suffering of qiost of the population* But
the French Revolution resulted in the fall of the monarchy, the -American
end of
Revolution and the declaration of independencein the/colonialism and the 
. 'V*Russian Revolution-'rhe overthrow of absolutism; they have all left indelible 
impressions upon the minds of political thinkers. These memories have induced 
them to seek the protection of their rights by their incorporation in a Bill 
of Rights in the Constitution. Modern Constitutions are, therefore, alert to 
guarantee the fundamental rights of the individuals.
The English people are traditionally opposed to the incorporation 
of fundamental rights in the Constitution. According to them, the incorporation 
of a Bill of Rights in a Constitution limits the scope of the rights, because 
they are limited to the guaranteed freedoms. They believe that every basic human 
liberty is a fundamental right of a citizen, except in so far as it is limited 
by an act of Parliament. As Dicey says, in other Constitutions, the fundamental 
rights flow from the Constitution, whereas, in England, the Constitution itself 
springs out of the basic rights the people. Recent events in Northern 
Ireland illustrate the traditional view of the ^ nglish people. There has been 
a pressing demand from certain people for the incorporation of fundamental rights 
in the Constitution, but the English people at large and Parliament especially 
do not seem to accept the view*
In India before independence, there had been demands for the 
incorporation of a Bill of Rights in the Government of India Act, 1935* Cn the
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recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, two rights were actually 
included in the Constitution Act of 1935• They were (i) the right to equal 
opportunity, which afforded protection against discrimination on the basis of 
race, religion or creed in relation to the public services and the providing 
of a profession; and (ii) the right to appropriate compensation for property 
acquired by the Government for public purpose by authority of law.
It was declared in the 19th Century by the Charter Act of 1833 > that
there would not be any discrimination in making appointments to the services.
Before 1833> British subjects in India were only amenable to the jurisdiction of
Justices of Peace and the Supreme Courts of Judicature, established by the
British Crown in the Towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. S.i*£ of the Charter
Act,1833) required that no law should be passed making the British subjects
capitally punishable, otherwise than by the King’s Courts. It did, by
necessary implication, authorise the British Indian Government to provide for
their t rial for non-capital offences by the ordinary tribunals of the Country,
but the provision was largely ignored. Even after the Black Act of I836, British
subjects continued to enjoy their old privileged position in this respect. In
4
I843, an Act of the Indian Legislative Council , took away the right conferred 
by the Charter Act of 1813, of removing by certiorari to the Supreme Court the 
cases of British subjects tried by the Justices of Peace in mofussil. but 
British Subjects continued to enjoy certain privileges even for minor offences; 
they could only be tried by Justice of the Peace, who were either Englishmen 
or covenanted servants of the East India Company. They also enjoyed a privilege 
in regard to serious offences for which they could be tried only in the Crown* s
1. Act IV of I843.
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Courts* Even when the High Courts were established in I865, British subjects 
continued to be under their ordinary original jurisdiction, even though residing 
outside the presidency towns . The revised Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 
continued the privileged status of the British subjects asfkr as the courts in 
the interior of the country were concerned; courts having Indian Judges could not 
try Europeans in criminal cases.
Until 1923, British subjects in India could claim trial by a juiy of 
Englishmen, while Indians had no such corresponding right. In 1884, by the 
Ilbert Act, provision was made for the trial of British European subjects by a 
mixed jury, consisting of Indians and Europeans or Americans. Englishmen were 
used to trial by jury and Indians were not; this did not, in practice, produce 
notoriously different results. But after the Constitution Act of 1919, it was 
regarded as a grievance and the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1923 so 
that, if the parties to a Criminal Case were an Indian and an Englishman, the 
accused would claim to be tried by a jury with a majority of his own people.
The European British subjects1 right to be tried by the European judges was 
entirely abrogated.
The provision of equality of opportunity in the public services in 
the Charter Act of 1833 was evaded in various ways; there was discrimination 
against Indians in recruitment to the services, until the enactment of the 
Constitution Act of 1919. The British Indian Government sought to retain the 
support of zamindars and agriculturists who?in revenue matters, secured 
favourable treatment.
1. See Chapter on Habeas Corpus.
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The rights 'which received less protection were freedom of speech, 
assembly and association* This was necessary for the security of the 
administration, the senior posts in which were usually occupied by a limited 
number of administrators from England* It was not practicable to allow the 
Indian agitator addressing a crowd with a low flash point the same licence as 
an orator at Hyde Park Corner. Most of the enactments against sedition, unlaw­
ful assembly and association have since independence been held to he reasonable 
restrictions in the interest of public order.
The development of the judiciary in British India was guided by the 
Privy Council, the ultimate court of appeal. The Privy Council laid down 
principles of constitutional law, which are still valid and did much to 
systematise Indian Law, introducing,when appropriate, legal principles developed 
in the Common Law Courts and the Court of Chancery. After independence the 
function was taken over by the Suprei® Courts in India and Pakistan.
After the partition of India into the dominions of India and Pakistan 
in 1947, Pakistan m s  governed by the Government of India Act, 1935 > with some 
amendments, till March, 1956, when the first Constitution of Pakistan came into 
force. The Government of India Act, 1935, did not, with the two exceptions 
discussed above, formally lay down any fundamental rights, but they were not 
ignored. In England, there is no formal expression of the fundamental rights 
in the Constitution, but there are conventions which give protection to the 
rights of the people; for instance, there can be no preventive detention in 
time of peace. The same convention was generdly followed in India. The writ ,
of habeas corpus, to enforce the right against unlawful arrest or detention, 
was granted by S. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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The first Constitution of Pakistan 1956, was an adaptation of the 
Government of India Act 1935, except for some significant additions and changes, 
including a Bill of Rights and Powers of the higher judiciary to enforce them, 
the fundamental rights in the 1956 Constitution seem to he an adaptation of the 
Indian Bill of Eights with slight difference in regard to the rights to personal 
liberty and equality. The 1962 Constitution of Pakistan departs from the 1956 
Constitution, not only in substance but also in form. But the fundamental 
rights in general and the provisions relating to personal liberty and the safe­
guards against unlawful detention in particular, are nothing by the reproduct­
ions of the provisions of the 1956 Constitution. There are some additions and 
alterations in the 1962 Constitution, Art.2, which lays down that no person can 
be deprived of life, liberty or property except in accordance with law, is not 
new; it was the law before 1947 and is incorporated in the Indian Constitution, 
Art. 98 of the 1962 Constitution is radically difference from Art. 170 of the 
1956 Constitution or Art. 226 of the Indian Constitution, in as much as Art.98 
does not describe the writs with their technical names. It only sets out the 
circumstances in which a Court can issue a writ and for what purposes, whereas 
in Tn^ia and in the Pakistan Constitution of 1956, the names habeas corpus, 
mandamous, prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto were specifically given.
The result is that the High Courts in Pakistan are no longer bound by any of the 
technical rules evolved in the development of these writs in England or else­
where. But it can be said that the Pakistan Constitution has succeeded in 
extricating many of the prerogative writs from some of the technicalities \diich 
still hamper their working in English law.
Unlike the American, Indian and other moder Constitutions, the 
Pakistan Constitution is silent about double jeopardy and self-incrimination.
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Being procedural safeguards, these rights sire, however, available to the accused 
persons under the ordinary procedural laws, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
and the Evidence Act, in the same manner as under the Indian and other 
constitutions# It seems that the framers of Pakistan Constitution were aware 
that, even before the commencement of the 1956 Constitution >these safeguards 
were available to aggrieved parties under the aforesaid procedural laws and they 
might have thought it superfluous, to include them in the Constitution# But a 
constitutional guarantee is the supreme protection and a constitutional safe­
guard has more binding force# Although S. 491 of the Cr.P.C. provided for habeas 
corpus, it was thought to be essential to incorporate the provisions relating to 
habeas corpus in the Constitution. It would, therefore, not be irrational or 
unreasonable to incorporate the provisions relating to double, jeopardy and self- 
incrimination in the Constitution#
The provisions in the Pakistan Constitution relating to personal liberty 
as well as the restrictions which may be put on the right in an emergency, are 
more or less in line with the provisions in the modern Constitutions# It is sub­
mitted that the ideal safeguards against the arbitrary deprivation of personal 
liberty are found in the Philipine Constitution, which lays down that the right 
of an arrested person to the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except 
in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, when the public safety requires 
it and during such period as the necessity for such suspension exists# The 
Philipine Constitution does not provide for preventive detention nor does it 
give legislature power to enact laws relating to preventive detention, like other 
modern Constitutions. It keeps alive the right to personal liberty during the 
emergency and simply suspends the remedy for the enforcement of the right during 
the relevant period only# Moreover by providing that the remedy will only be
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suspended 'when public necessity requires it' and for the period during which 
'the necessity for such suspension exists', the Philipine Constitution has 
closed the door on any possibility of abuse of 'power by arbitrary deprivation 
of personal liberty, under the plea of an emergency, beyond the period in which 
the necessity for suspension of the enforcement of the right exists.
In some modern Constitutions, where there are no such limitations as 
are provided by the Philipine Constitution, preventive detention laws are used 
more as a political weapon against the opposition by the political party in 
power than as a necessary legal measure to maintain law and order in time of 
peace* This generally happens in the democratically under-developed or develop­
ing countries^for instance, the African countries, Pakistan and India. Abuse 
of the power of preventive detention in time of peace has occurred in India and 
Pakistan. This is because the Constitutions include provisions for preventive 
detention, notwithstanding that they lay down safeguards against their abuse.
If the judiciary adopts the attitude,, irrevocably held by the Indian Supreme 
Court, that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is final, whether in 
war-time or peace, there can be no limit to the abuse of power to detain politick 
opponents. But if we accept the view expressed by the Pakistan Supreme Court 
that the detaining authority has to satisfy the court as to legality of the 
detention, it will be difficult to reconcile it with the principle of state 
necessity, if Pakistan is at war, can the executive be given extra-ordinary 
powers to detain persons suspected to be dangerous to the security of state?
Therefore, in order to avoid the abuse of power by the executive in 
time of peace as well as to provide for the states' security in time of war, 
there should be a balance between the right to personal liberty and the security
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of the State in the provisions relating to preventive detention. Either the 
Constitution should, like the Philipine Constitution, not countenance preventive 
detention and simply provide for suspension of habeas corpus during an emergency, 
or, if it permits preventive detention, it should explicitly declare that the 
satisfaction of detaining authority will be sufficient while an emergency exists, 
but that, in time of peace, the detaining authority must justify its action to 
the satisfaction of the Court.
While modern Constitutions focus attention on the incorporation of 
safeguards against encroachment upon the basic liberties of individuals, new 
factors are emerging, which limit the scope of guarantees. Since 1940, the 
economic, social and political conditions created by the World War II, appear 
to have changed the scope and nature of these liberties. The liberty of a person 
has been subjected to greater social control. Liberty in the modem state is sub­
ject to control in the general public interest. Whatever may be the ideology of 
the State, capitalist, socialist or communist, the common factor prevailing in 
them^hat the State today is no longer a tax-collecting or a police-state but a 
social welfare-state.
The prevalence of crises stifles the liberties of individuals. Wars, 
nuclear or otherwise, internal disturbances, economic upheavals, instability of 
the currency, and exchange system, prices inflation, wage inflation, public 
provision of amenities, crises in fiscal and financial policies, all create a 
situation prejudicial to the enjoyment of personal liberty . Crises are the 
anti-thesis to unrestricted liberty. They are the justification for limiting 
or extinguishing the liberties of the people. In an emergency, 'liberty' is 
the victim of the arbitrary use of power by the executive for it comes under
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-1
regulatory control by the State* Lord Hewart first drew attention to the
increasing power of the bureaucracy and the unfettered control of •liberty* dur-
2
ing an emergency* Allen was concerned a^out the war-time regulations and the
regulatory control of liberties of individuals in times of emergency* Lord
3
Summer in a case shortly after World War I commented -
"Experience in the present war must have taught us 
all that many things are done in the name of the 
Executive in such times, purporting to be for the 
common good, which Englishmen have been too 
patriotic to contest* When the precedents of this 
war come to be relied on in wars to come, it must 
never be forgotten that much was voluntarily sub­
mitted to what might have been disputed, and that 
the absence of contest and even protest is by no 
means always an admission of the right •**
The problem of maintaining personal liberty in an emergency is complex 
and there is no easy solution to it* It cannot be determined by dogmas; it can- 
not be solved by passions or prejudice • Every successive war brings an increase
ing number of restrictions on personal liberty, on account of the advanced
techniques of war and the propaganda machinery, the growing degree of 
consolidation and centralization of governmental power and the rapidly expanding 
strength of political, economic and social organisations* There can be no 
dispute that the safety of the State must prevail over individual's liberty* As 
a matter of fact, the liberty of an individual is complementary to the existence 
of the State; if the State loses its Sovereignty, the individual will automat­
ically be deprived of his liberty. Certain conclusions have already been draw.i*1
this respect in the previous chapters* Restrictions on the free enjoyment of
1. Hewart, New Despotism*
2. C.K*Allen, Law and Order*
3* A.G. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, (1920) AC* p.563*
k. see Mukherji, P.B* Civil Liberties, pp.38-55*
liberty during a crisis or emergency are, therefore, rational and in the general 
public interest*
The question, however, remains as to what degree of encroachment on the 
liberty of person in an emergency is permissible. There is difference of opinion 
on this point. According to one view, the restriction on liberty should be 
limited to the needs and durationof the emergency. Another view is that there 
should be complete suspension of the right to personal liberty during an emergency 
No hard and fast formula can be worked out in regard to the needs and duration of 
an emergency. The general rule must be that a declaration of emergency should 
be an exceptional measure, to be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances* 
Only consciousness of law and the rights of the people on the part of judiciary, 
supported by a responsible parliamentary system of government and strong public 
opinion^can solve the problem and protect the people from abuse of power by the 
executive during an emergency. ‘The safeguard of British liberty is in the good 
sense of people and in the system of representative and responsible Government 
which was evolved.'
But the situation in democratically developing or under-developed,
countries is different; the desired degree of responsibility on the part of
Government is lacking and there is no organised public opinion. The judiciary has
often to yield to the irresponsible unconstitutional actions of the unrepresent-
2
ative government . Then the judiciary, as the Supreme Court of Pakistan did, 
should assume the responsibility of protecting the liberty of a person, by laying 
down the principle of 'objective satisfaction', if in its view the emergency is
being unnecessarily prolonged and the judiciary cannot,.under the circumstances,
1. Liversidge v. Anderson, supra, see Lord Wright's observation.
2. Ghulam Jilani's case, supra.
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rule on the legality of the continuance of the emergency* The determination
of the existence of an emergency and its continuance is of.a political rather
than a judicial nature* When the unconstitutional action of abrogating the
Constitution and imposing martial law throughout Pakistan was taken by the head
of the State, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had no practical alternative to
validating the unconstitutional action and the continuance of martial laiiJ. But
it did protect the rights of the people against the illegal actions of the author-
2
ities during martial law period by granting prerogative writs • The problem has 
been discussed at length in a previous chapter*
A more serious threat to a State's security and to public safety comes 
from the internal subversive forces which are ever increasing in the present age* 
Subversion today is the work of well-organised secret associations, which design 
to capture Government and power without civil war or direct armed conflict with 
the Government. International power politics and international power-blocks with 
their military or financial aid programmes, have made it necessary to enact new 
legislation to protect national secrets, to maintain law and order and the public 
safety. The Espionage Act, the Official Secrets Act and Statutes intended to 
maintain law and order have been enacted to counter the threat. Preventive 
detention laws are, therefore, desirable to combat subversive activities in 
time of peace. It is essential that a list of the secret and subversive 
organisations should be prepared and such organisations should be banned. Member­
ship of any organisations cannot be a ground for detention of a person, unless he 
participates in subversive activities. But there is the danger of abuse of the •
provision of preventive detention laws for political ends in time of peace by the
1. See Dosso's case , supra.
2. See the cases discussed in Chapter 10 on Martial Law.
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party in power in developing or under-developed countries. Preventive detention 
is a serious inroad into the right of personal liberty "which should he guarded 
against. Preventive detention laws should, therefore, he carefully drafted and 
action taken under them should he jealously scrutinized hy the Courts.
It is contended that, while opinion should he free, action prejudicial
to the State security and public safety should he regulated, but it is difficult,
in practice, to draw a line between expressed opinion and action, because opinion
and action are closely inter-related. On this subject the American Supreme Court
has evolved the principle of * clear and present danger* that action against a
person must he justified hy the proximity and degree of danger arising out of
speech or expression. If the expression or the speech is likely to result in a
breach of peace or the subversion of law and order, proper action against the
speaker may he taken$ hut if it is not, the speaker should not he deprived of
his personal liberty. The doctrine has not been accepted to any great extent in
other countries and in America it is on its way out. titawever, the Supreme Court
of Pakistan seems to have relied on it when holding that a single speech of a
detenue which did not result in a breach of peace, was not a sufficient ground 
. 1for detaining him .
The established and continued supremacy of -the representatives of the 
people over other organs of the government is the foundation of the success of 
democracy. Successful democracy is itself a guarantee of the protection of the 
rights of people. In a democracy the subordination of armed forces to the 
civilian authority deters the military from taking over the government and power,
1. See Begum A.K.S.Kahmiris case, supra; see also A.Baqi Baluch*s case, 
P.L.D. I K'ar. £7
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so that the people are protected from arbitrary action by the military 
authorities. Even the acts of martial law authorities, done during a period 
of martial law, are subject to law and the authorities are answerable to the 
civil courts, unless they are protected by an act of indemnity passed by the 
legislature. In E&kistan this type of responsible system of government has 
been lacking from its very inception. Democracy has never been given a trial. 
Till 1956, the President(who was elected from amongst the civil servants by 
the Constituent Assembly) wielded effective power and the acts of the so-called 
representatives of the people (as there had been no free elections since the 
creation of Pakistan) were controlled by the intrigues and manoeuvres of the un­
representative heads of the State. Erom 1958 to 1962 Pakistan was governed by a 
high ranking military officer who assumed the office of head of the State , and 
ruled as an autocrat, without any semblance of representative government. The 
military authority was supported by the civil servants in the general administr­
ation of the country and ^  return the bureaucrats were given unfettered powers 
in their respective areas of administration. This arbitrary exercise of power 
undermined the rights of the people. Eventually the Pakistan high Judiciary 
thought it necessary to strike a balance between the administration of law and 
order on the one hand and the protection of the rights of people on the other.
The privilege of detaining authority to withhold facts which induced
to make detention order appears to have created difficulties in the establishment
of principle of ’objective satisfaction'in Pakistan. But any such difficulty cajg
be overcome if it is proved that the information withheld by the detaining
authority is really in the interest of State* s security.
1. See Chapter 10 on Martial Law.
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The question of parliamentary privilege,which has vexed India, has 
not arisen in Pakistan, because there has been so little parliamentary.govern- 
ment. The fundamental rights are no doubt, to some extent, subject to the 
parliamentary privileges as held in India. The question, however, remains, 
how far the rights can be encroached upon by the parliamentary privileges. To 
this end, it is submitted that, (i) the question of privilege of Parliament in 
the particular matter should be established first; (ii) it should be determined 
whether the action taken by the House is within the purview of privilege claimed; 
and (iii) if it is, the courts should disclaim jurisdiction. * In cases affecting 
parliamentary privileges the tracing of the boundary between the competence of 
the courts and the exclusive jurisdiction of either house is a difficult question 
of constitutional law, which has provided many puzzling cases, particularly from 
the 17th to the 19th centuries.* In practice, it is difficult to draw a line 
between the competence of the Courts and the extent of parlimentary privileges.
The rights of aliens with some exceptions, are reco^iised and protected
However, their status is controlled by treaties with respective foreign countries
and by special statutes like the Foreigners Act, the Immigration Act, the
Deportation Act and the Passport Acts* The conditions were different when 
2Castioni* s case was decided; at that time it was not treason to migrate to 
another country; countries did not regard each other as enemies, if they were 
not at war. But today much has changed, a state of belligerence now exists 
between countries even when there is no actual war between them. A country is 
not bound to extradite a citizen of a country with which it is at war if he has
1, May, Parliamentary Practice, 16th Ed*pp.50-51*
2. (1891) I.Q.B.349.
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taken asylum in that country. This raised questions of International law, 
which are difficult to solve by municipal law*
The criminal law of India and Pakistan, especially-the Penal Code and 
the Code of CriminalProcedure define offences and make elaborate provisions, 
for arrest, imprisonment, trial and punishment. But the list of crimes is 
steadily increasing and the penal laws are not merely confined to Penal Codes. 
Penal provisions are found in miscellaneous statutes, such as the Customs acts, 
the Income Tax Acts, the Companies Act and Labour Laws. The encroachment on the 
right to life and personal liberty increases* with the enactment of statutes 
creating new rights and duties, setting up new tribunals with new rules of 
procedure and defining new crimes. The necessity for protection against 
retroactive punishment and double jeopardy has become acute; the superior 
courts should be vigilant to prevent encroachment upon these rights.
Lav/s, inconsistent with the fundamental rights will be declared void
to the extent of the inconsistency only ; they will not be void ab initio, so
as to be struck off the statute book, like the legislation made by the
2
incompetent legislature . It is well established principle in Pakistan that, 
if any statute relating to the right to personal liberty, fails to incorporate 
the safeguards laid down by right No. 2 of the 1962 Constitution, it cannot be 
said to be inconsistent with RightNo;2 and hence void under Art. 6 of the 
Constitution; these safeguards can be read into the statute, if the statute 
does not expressly or by necessary implication intends to negative the provisions
1. See Art. 6 read with Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution.
2. M.Mehdi Ali Khan* s case, supra.
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1of Right No. 2 , but where it negatives the provisions of Right No. 2, it will be
2.
void to the extent of inconsistency; Right No. 2 cannot be read into such a 
statute. The fundamental rights as well as the jurisdiction of the High Courts 
to enforce them cannot be taken away or abridged by amendments made by sub­
ordinate legislation; the amendment will be ignored and the right will be enfor­
ced^ . Fundamental rights can, however, be curtailed or taken away by 
c onst itutional amendment s4”.
Delegated legislation has become an acute problem in the present age, 
in view of the numerous enactments relating to social control of personal lib­
erty. Delegated legislation should conform to the provisions of the delgating
5
enactment; the delegation of power should not be in excess of delegated authority
•
If the provisions of the delegating enactment are invalid, the delegated legis-
6
lation will be void . It is, therefore, submitted that it is the duty of the 
Court, in appropriate proceedings, to be satisfied that the rules and regulat­
ions made in the delegated capacity are, (i) made by the proper authority men­
tioned in the statute; and (ii) within the scope of the power delegated by the 
statute.
The principles of natural justice, in the absence of any express 
provision, substantive or procedural, incorporating them, are sometimes ignored 
in Pakistan and India. The question generally arises in the case of an authority 
exercising both administrative and judicial powers at the same time, for instance
t
Commissioners and Dy.Commissioners exercising powers under the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation. The general grievance is of bias, of denial of due justice on
1. Behram Khan v. State.,P. L.D. 1957 Kar. 709.
2. Govt, of E.Pakistan v. Rowshau, supra, Ramat Elahi* s case,supra; Farid 
Ahmad*s case, supra.
3. Begum A.K.S. Kashmiri* s case, supra.
4. Fazlul Qadir ChowdLllari v. M.A.Haque, P.L.D. 1 9 6 3 , 4&6
3. Gi^ ulam Jilani* s case, supra.
6. Humaydn Khan v. State, P.L.D. 1966,Lah.287.
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account of the performance of inconsistent functions by such authorites, 
including investigating, prosecuting, instituting the proceedings and adjudicat­
ing upon them. It is, therefore, required that the pov^ ers of such authorities 
should be clearly stated; Judicial and administrative functions should be 
expressly separated by an enactment* It can be done on the pattern of the 
American Administrative Procedure Act ,1946, ‘which lays down -
"No officer or agent engaged in performance of investigative 
or prosecuting functions for any agency in any shall, in 
that or factually related case, participate or advice in 
the decision, recommended decision or agency review 
pursuant to S. 8, except as witness or counsel in public 
proceedings.
Pair hearing is the fundamental principle of the rules of natural
Justice. There is a possibility of this basic principle being ignored or
violated by the authorities, exercising powers under enactments like the
Frontier Crimes Regulation; the trial and adjudication of guilt or innocence
of the accused by the Jirga, constituted under the P.C.R., is not subject to
any rules of procedure or evidence. There is the possibility of denial to the
accused of an opportunity of being hear^ before the Jirga rules on the question
of guilt or innocence. It is, therefore, desirable that enactments like the
F.C.R. should incorporate the provision that the accused should be notified of
the nature of the Charge against him in time to meet it, that he should have
such opportunity, after all the evidence against him is introduced and known to
him, to produce witness to refute it and that the decision should govern and be
2
based upon the evidence of hearing ,
1. See Sec. 5(c)
2. see Kapur Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1956,PunJ.p.62, per Bhadnari C.J., 
as he then was, citing an American case.
The classification of proceedings into administrative and Judicial or 
quasi-Judicial by the Judiciary in India and Pakistan and the application of the 
principles of natural Justice only to the latter class calls for attention in 
the administration of Justice. While the same authority is exercising the 
administrative and Judicial or qua si-Judicial functions simultaneously, it does 
not seem proper to hold that the rules of natural Justice should apply to 
Judicial or quasi-Judicial proceedings and not to the administrative proceeding- 
ings in the same case* Therefore, both the content and scope of natural Justice 
should be incorporated in the statutes.
The Constitutions of Pakistan have been short lived; the first 
Constitution of 1956, was abrogated in 1958 * after a short life of two years.
The Constitution of 1962 was abrogated in 1969 and martial was again imposed; it 
is still in force. There has been also a period of emergency; the emergency 
which was preclaimed in 1965 on account of the war with India, continued till th< 
proclamation of Martial Law of 1969. But the higher Judiciary was alert to 
protect the rights of the people with, of course, some exceptions. As a 
whole the right to personal liberty has been adequately protected in Pakistan.
It was during the emergency that decisions of great importance were made.
The period of emergency had been prolonged and the Judiciary was incapable of
protecting and enforcing the suspended fundamental rights. There are good
2 . *decisions like Ghulam Jilani , in which the principle of ’objective satisfaction
was laid down. But there ^1*© also "bad Judgements like Abul AlaHaududi v.,State 
Bank^, where the Court tried to strain Right No. 1 and Art.2 of the 1962
Constitution, to enforce Right No. 5, which remained suspended.
1. Ghulam Jilani* s case, supra; Abdul Baqi Baluch* s case, supra; and Begum 
A.K.S.Mashmiri*s case, supra.
2. Ibid.
3. Supra.
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It is, however, desirable that, in view of the multiplying problems
in the field of personal liberty discussed above, the provisions relating to
personal liberty in the Constitution and their interpretation by the judiciary
should confer the fullest possible degree of personal liberty on the citizens,
subject, of course, to the security and welfare of the State. This does not
mean that any impossible or extravagant provisions relating to personal liberty
or an undesirable construction of them should be permitted. The best balance
in this regard is found in the report of the South East Asia and Pacific
Conference of the International Commission Of Jurists. While laying down the
it
basic requirements of the Government under the Pule of law,/stated -
"Save during a period of public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation, no person of sound mind shall 
be deprived of his liberty, except on a charge of a 
specific criminal offence, and preventive detention 
without trial shall be contrary to the Rule of Law.r'
The system of law and justice, and the machinery to adminster it 
are valuable legacies, which the British have left behind in Indo-Pak sub­
continent. The British system of administration of justice is based on high 
traditions. The judiciary occupies a place of importance in the ^nglish 
Constitution* It ensures the citizens that the law is supreme; a Judge, 
while dispensing justice, looks only to the laws of the land and his own 
conscience. The English people slowly built up in India a judicial system, 
which imbibed some of the values of the English legal system, like the rule of 
law and independence of the judiciary , now enshrined in the judicial system 
of Pakistan.
Despite all the achievements of the present legal system in India 
and Pakistan, a few serious defects do exist. The present day system of
1. Jain,MJP., Outline of Indian Legal History, pp.387-390 (1966)
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administration of justice suffers mainly ffom two major defects; ( i) the appall­
ing arrears of work in criminal courts at all levels; a person accused of crime 
has to wait an unnecessary long time before his case is finally disposed of; 
and (ii) the combination^fexecutive and judicial functions* Another very just 
criticism of legal system is the huge cost of litigation; the poor have often 
to go without justice. It can be noted here that Abdul Baqi Baluch, who was 
detained on account of political reasons, could not secure his release for two 
years solely because of his poverty; he could not engage a competent lawyer to 
represent him, as he did not have sufficient money; a lawyer was, however, 
engaged by the Government on its own terms. The petition in the High Court was 
dismissed, largely due to the incompetence of that lawyer. It was while his 
case was pending in the Supreme Court that the detenu, from the jail, made a 
request to the members of the bar to come to his aid and procure his release 
from the prolonged unlawful detention; a competent member of the bar conducted 
the case without receiving any fee; the case was remanded on a point of law
1
to the High Court where he was released as his detention was held to be illegal .
One method of dealing with this would be to provide free or assisted
legal aid to the poor, so that they could engage competent lawyers of their
own choice. In England* the labour Government successfully introduced a
comprehensive scheme to provide legal aid and advice to persons of limited
means. Unless some measure is taken to provide legal aid and assistance to the
poor man in Pakistan or India, he is denied equality before the law. The
rendering of legal aid to the poor parties is, therefore, not a minor problem
of procedural law but a question of fundamental character. Lastly, in order to
prevent delay in the administration of justice, a considerable increase in 
Tl See Abdul Baqi Baluch1 s case,S.C.*s and Karachi H.C.'s decisions.
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Judicial personel, raising of standard for selection of Judges and good pay
scales to attract competent law graduates to the Judicial cadre, is required 
1
to be enforced • But all these measures require money* V7here is it to come 
from? The economic condition of India and Pakistan is not such as to afford 
these improvements, ^hese are the problems to be solved by the economists of 
these countries. Unless they adopt the policies of welfare state, these quest­
ions will remain unsolved.
1. See Indian Law Commission's Report, (XIV Rep.195^) pp.
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